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This study is concerned with identifying factors that are important in explaining popular support 
for genocidal violence in Rwanda. It discusses different theories to explain why genocide 
occurred in Murambi and not in Giti, two neighboring communes
1
 that were allegedly 
homogenous on cultural and socio-economic grounds. Despite the fact that “Many inhabitants 
spoke of a culture of tolerance in the commune‟s sub-region of Buganza” (Strauss 2006:86), the 
communes differ from one another in their responses to genocidal violence. Giti successfully 
resisted the genocidal violence while Murambi fell prey to large-scale violence. As a result, Giti 
proved to be a unique case in Rwanda, widely lauded for such resistance. It is a particular case 
that attracts the attention of this study, to unearth useful potentials that Giti offers for the efforts 
of peace processes in the aftermath of genocide. The study hypothesizes the middle range level 
of leadership (local leaders), and the grassroots thinking (perceptions and belief systems) about 
identity, to be important variables in explaining Giti‟s unique response to genocidal violence. 
 
The study commences by investigating the connections between popular support and genocidal 
violence, and the circumstances – of leadership and of shared perceptions and belief systems 
about identity – under which the same connections consistently operate. Popular support and 
genocidal violence are taken as key concepts around which the further discussion is organized. 
Popular support is understood as obedient behavior of ordinary people to the social power of the 
elite in hierarchical structures. Genocidal violence,
2
 as further referenced, is understood as the 
culminating phase of dichotomization – i.e., the formation of „us‟ and „them‟ – which breaks into 
                                               
1 The term „commune‟ – like „prefecture‟ – is terminology likely to arouse a lot of confusion to many of the audience of this 
dissertation today. Commune used to be a decentralized structure under the leadership of „burgomaster‟ in Rwanda. In the 
hierarchy, it was under the authority of the „prefecture,‟ which was also under the leadership of the „Prefect.‟ Upon the 2006 
administrative reform, the „commune‟ and „prefecture‟ were made bigger, given much more power, and put under the authority 
of the Mayor and Governor, respectively.  The empirical study covers the areas within the limits of the communes, structures 
under which genocidal violence took place. 
2 Most societies having been subject to the culminating phase of discrimination, that is, genocide, have not only given harm to the 
target group – it means the minority group. Rwanda is an appropriate case that documents this statement. In addition to Tutsi – 
established target group of the genocide – the political moderates of the dominant majority group were a focus of paramount 
interest (McNairn 2004:83). In this way, the first priority of the perpetrators of genocide became the elimination of the Hutu 
opposition leaders in the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, as a means of getting rid of obstacles to further violence. To illustrate, 
“„Hutu moderates‟ were slaughtered because they were perceived to be Tutsi co-conspirators.” (Zorbas 2004:31) In short, “the 
vast majority belonged to the Tutsi minority (indeed, it is almost impossible to find a Tutsi family who did not lose a member to 
the genocide), but more that 50,000 Hutus identified with opposition parties also were slaughtered.” (Waller 2007:225) By this 
is meant that genocide is about pre-established criteria of elimination. Importantly, it is also about political calculations since it 
victimizes those in the majority group who oppose deadly violence. Regarding the criteria for genocide, there is a total lack of 
concept, for instance in Rwanda, that combines both violence against Hutu moderates and genocide against Tutsi. For 
convenience and simplicity in language, Staub (1996:117) defines this phenomenon as „genocidal violence.‟ He uses this concept 
“to include both genocide…and mass killing, in which there is no intention to eliminate a whole group. Genocide and mass 
killing often have fuzzy boundaries and shared determinant”. This situation has probably served the entry point to Uvin 
(2001:75). He suggests that in the genocide “up to one million defenseless people were slaughtered during a three-month period. 
The victims were mostly Tutsi, but there were also tens of thousands of Hutu, who were either opponent of the regime or simply 
in the wrong place at the wrong time.” To refer to the report established by the commission set up by Juvenal Habyarimana to 
identify the enemy, and to advise on what had to be done to defeat it militarily, the latter include “Hutu who are dissatisfied with 
the present regime.” (Melvern 2000:61) This study is under process, while the Hutu Diaspora and a number of other non-
Rwandans argue for the concept of „double genocide.‟ The latter is serving a strong argument to implicate many of the military 
and many of the post-genocide government, on the one hand, while, for some, to deny genocide. If this study uses the concept of 
„genocidal violence,‟ the latter bears none of these complexities and political implications of genocide. Rather, it has an inclusive 
view from violence with the intention to investigate popular participation in, much as ordinary people are hypothesized to be the 
most active actors of genocide and mass murder implementation. 
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deadly violence that results in genocide – targeting the minority group – and mass killings 
against the majority group without the intention of total annihilation. 
 
As the study is particularly interested in popular support for genocidal violence, it organizes the 
discussion around three specific subject areas. First, it looks into the response to violence 
(ownership, coercion, mass effect, manipulation or persuasion). Second, it discusses the 
dynamics of relationships of different actors (the elite and non-elite) and of hierarchical 
structures (top, middle and grassroots levels of leadership) that theoretically drive the responses 
to genocidal violence. Third, it focuses on the grassroots thinking about the „other‟ (collectivistic 
values, ideology formation, shared perceptions and belief systems). Finally, it observes ways in 
which being ordinary people, who are faithful to calls of the elite, depends on psychological 
(discrepancy of gaps of frustration, crowd behavior) and structural (socioeconomic determinism) 
factors. The discussion reports on ways in which empirical materials support the above 
theoretical subject areas.  
 
The study is more a theoretical thesis than a purely testing empirical one. Using the data 
somewhat exploratively, it gives more support to the theoretical claims than the empirical. There 
are many dimensions that matter in explaining why genocide occurred in Murambi and not in 
Giti. For instance, it is not possible, with available descriptive data, to determine whether the 
local leadership matters more than the national leadership or the grassroots thinking. Some data 
give support in one direction, while other data point in other directions. The study does not 
provide a definitive conclusion about this issue – it has found that there was no single 
explanation of why genocide occurred in Murambi and not in Giti. In other words, the genocide 
(or the absence of genocide) is not mono-causal. Importantly, the various possible theories that 
could fit each have some explanatory gaps. This study addresses such gaps through a multi-
theoretical model. Consequently, it does not specifically test some crucial statements that are 
theoretically supported. 
Outline of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation comprises seven chapters, under which it reflects upon popular support for 
genocidal violence. This introductory chapter outlines the problem, and examines the theoretical 
conditions under which popular support develops, before presenting the objective and the 
research questions. The latter are followed by a discussion of the methodological approach to the 
dissertation, the methods for data collection, and analytical strategies for data analysis. The 
second, theoretical, chapter presents the inter-linkages between different parameters – i.e., the 
leadership, social power, ordinary people, popular support and grassroots thinking – involved to 
explain the problem. It describes the methodological scheme, or the pedagogical way of 
presenting the discussion. A multi-theoretical model ensues. Chapter three is a detailed 
presentation of some standpoints centered on psychological theories, resource mobilization 
theory, power balance theory, political process theory, state-building theory, escalation theory 
and the context of cruelty model for conflict. The theoretical standpoints are not presented for 
empirical testing. Rather, they serve as a strong basis to outline the amount of support in the 
empirical data for the multi-theoretical model. Hence, the empirical discussion ensues. 
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Chapter four examines the understanding of the elite by the common citizenry in local settings – 
the case studies. It also gathers information on different roles that the elite play in everyday life 
in order to tentatively establish a causal relationship between the elite and support for genocidal 
violence. The key argument is about the structure that shapes unequal social relations. By this is 
meant that the common citizenry behave in an obedient way towards the elite. Unlike chapter 
four – which is centered on the elite and different roles to ditermine the structure of relations – 
chapter five argues for the impact of grassroots thinking in the case studies. Not only does 
grassroots thinking have to be effectively present, but also, there must be a meeting point 
between the elite and grassroots thinking in order that the common citizenry are ready to support 
the elite. Given the meeting point, as a prerequisite for support, chapter six brings empirical 
answers to the reason why genocidal violence was experienced in Murambi and not in Giti, 
despite that they are allegedly homogeneous on cultural and socio-economic grounds. In a 
descriptive presentation of empirical views, chapter six highlights differences and similarities 
among these case studies. On these bases, the chapter perfoms comparisons and consequently 
draws non-definitive conclusions, in accordance with the scope of the study. 
 
Finally, chapter seven formulates the empirical conclusions and outlines new research questions 
for further studies. It bridges the gaps between the theoretical and empirical perspectives. In so 
doing, it reverts to the multi-theoretical model, and outlines the amount of support that different 
parameters – as detailed in chapter two – have „on the ground‟. The theoretical implications of 
the major findings serve as a strong basis upon which a model is designed to explain, in concrete 
terms, the polarization of responses to genocidal violence in the case studies. Hence, it provides 
an opportunity for readers to gain a clearer understanding of the support that various theoretical 
standpoints find in first-hand data. 
Problem formulation 
 
Research questions about why and how a category of people perpetrates violence against another 
have increasingly become common amongst most scholars of this problem area. For instance, 
James Waller (2002) has devoted a deal of time to investigating how ordinary people commit 
genocide and mass killing (in his book of the same title). However, few have put such questions 
in the reverse. Put another way, there are few studies, if any, which have investigated the reason 
why some people, individually or collectively, resist violence when, in certain particular 
circumstances, it becomes an accepted norm. Such cases of resistance might not have been so 
common so as to attract the attention of scholars. In rare cases, such resistance has left 
researchable questions with unsatisfactory answers. In the particular context of Rwanda, scholars 
have not yet addressed the following question: Why could genocide take place in Murambi but 
not in Giti despite that they are allegedly homogenous on cultural and socio-economic grounds? 
Waller (2002), like many other scholars, shows ordinary people as the main implementing actors 
in both Murambi and Giti, under the order of the elite. With this, popular support or, in simpler 
terms, obedient behavior, are strongly challenged. The same question can be put as follows: Why 
could ordinary people support genocide in Murambi but not in Giti despite that they are allegedly 
homogenous on cultural and socio-economic grounds? Presumably, responses to this question 
awaken new insights about the reason behind genocide in Murambi, contrary to Giti. The 
background to this problem area offers the most significant insights required to this end. 
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Background of the problem area 
 
Where does obedient behavior come from? Upbringing processes have served many societies in 
diagnosing why individuals or social categories of humans behave or interact in certain ways. 
The argument is that the same upbringing analysis may apply to this study. Centralized family 
systems, which used to exist widely throughout Rwanda, are more likely to perpetuate obedient 
behavior than „decentralized family systems‟. David Norman Smith (1998) argues that 
centralized family systems “typically value children primarily as helpers, while placing extreme 
stress on obedience toward authority.” (Waller 2002:180) Hence, such systems relate to 
authoritarian child rearing. Over time, parents traditionally took care of the children who, in turn, 
remained obedient to avoid being chased from the house in case of extreme disobedience. In this 
respect, Rwanda shared these characteristics with Germany in the past. Ervin Staub (1989) 
argued “obedience to parents, especially to the father, was the highest value in German family 
systems.” (Ibid) Equally, Thomas Blass (1993) asserts that “generations of German children 
grew up on cautionary tales whose moral was that disobedience could lead to rather drastic, 
violent consequences.” (Ibid) In this regard, obedience has remained a major cultural value that 
regulated the relations: children-parents, young-elders, and leaders-subordinates. Many more 
institutions of socialization have perpetuated family upbringing until they shaped obedient 
people in most spheres of life. As a result, centralized family systems increased the imbalance of 
power among individuals involved in those relations.  
 
In many regards, a comparison of the relations: leaders-subordinates and patriarchs-wives, and of 
daughters-sons, were made obvious.  This is true in the sense that, according to Henry Maine, 
many traditional societies were “members of a corporate family group ruled by a despotic 
father.” (Kuper 2005:3) Referring to Clapham (1985:48), leaders exercised the Weber‟s 
authority, known by the name of patrimonialism where authority was ascribed to a „father‟ – i.e., 
traditional patrimonial ruler – who exercised power over his children who, in turn, owed him 
allegiance. As a result, “those lower down the political hierarchy are not subordinates, in the 
sense of officials with defined powers and functions of their own, but rather vassals or retainers 
whose position depends on the leader to whom they owe allegiance…The system as a whole is 
held together by the oath of loyalty, or by kinship ties (often symbolic and fictious) rather than 
by a hierarchy of administrative grades and functions.” In different contexts, these relations 
influenced the governing system. The same source emphasizes that the traditional patrimonial 
rule, originally associated with feudal systems, strongly affected the rational-legal relationships 
of authority, which degenerate into neo-patrimonialism. Officials in bureaucratic organizations 
use the rational-legal authority as a means to private ends. In this context, Clapham (1985:48) 
argues, “Relationships with others likewise fall into the patrimonial pattern of vassal and lord, 
rather than the rational-legal one of subordinate and superior, and behaviour is correspondingly 
divised to display a personal status, rather than to perform an official function.” Popular support 
follows the capacities of officials to extract bribes and to appoint those who show obedient 
behavior. The patrimonial system of rule, at least in Rwanda, resulted in the “centralized and 
unconditional obedience to authority” (Prunier 1995:41) in both the monarchy and republican 
rules over the last decades.  
 
At the same time, Waller (2002:181) concludes, “Obedience to the political authority of the state 
was woven into fabric of Rwandan society.” In similar circumstances, the influential German 
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thinkers posit, “the state was not a servant of the people but an entity to which citizens owed 
unquestioning obedience.” (Ibid) As a result, the elite have devoted strong commitment towards 
ordinary people in Rwanda. Some sayings in everyday life, such as „let us strive for the social 
welfare of ordinary people!‟ have dominated over ones like „let us develop the country for the 
economic growth of Rwandans‟, or „let us make our progress‟. The complex of superiority has 
fueled the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy to the extent that the elite thought and planned on behalf of 
ordinary people. Put more simply, the elite commitment has always translated to strong 
paternalistic relations. Waller (2002:179) would talk about strong authority that created a 
situation whereby “it is less likely that individuals…oppose leaders who scapegoat, or advocate 
violence against, a particular target group.” He argues that numerous cases of genocide and mass 
killing have developed from a strong authority orientation. Existing knowledge put forward some 
explanatory arguments for this likelihood of support. 
 
The minority elite ruled the majority ordinary people, Mosca (1939) posits, because the former 
“have the ability to organize, while the masses remain unorganized. The political domination of 
an organized minority over an unorganized majority is inevitable.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:21) 
Among other reasons for which the power of minority is irresistible, according to Bottomore 
(1964a:3), “members of a ruling minority regularly have some attribute, real or apparent, which 
is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live.”. As a result, Mills 
(1956) argues for a top-down communication relation: “the communications that prevail are so 
organized that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back…the realization of 
opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such 
action…agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have 
in the formation of opinion by discussion.” (Gould and Kolb 1964:414) Therefore, Mosca (1939) 
argues that minorities govern societies because small groups are presumed to be more relevant 
for governing than an unorganized majority (Beiton et al. 2002:72). Under these capacities, some 
studies have suggested that the elite could influence the behavior of ordinary people no matter 
how deviant they are. Simon (2006:301-2) posits firstly that the elite “may order relatively 
powerless people to commit deviant acts. We observed this in the Farben case, where the cruel 
Capos were ordered to oversee the slave-labor inmates of Nazi concentration camps. 
Second…elite deviance often has a trickle-down effect, providing a standard of ethics and 
behavior by which non-elites can justify their own deviant acts. Finally, elite deviance often 
victimizes non-elites financially and in other ways.” That control of the elite over ordinary 
people has been, and is still, an explanatory factor for ordinary people‟s support of the elite.  
 
To relate Mosca (1939), “The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single 
individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority.” (Mann 
1986:7) Formal meetings purposively increase awareness and create consensus among the elite 
over given issues. The same source argues that those at the top of the hierarchy can keep the 
masses at the bottom compliant. This is made possible by the fact that they institutionalize their 
control over the masses by the means of laws and the norms that govern the society. The elite 
have the privilege to design and fit themselves into these legal instruments. Hence, the masses 
are inclined to “comply because they lack collective organization to do otherwise, because they 
are embedded within collective and distributive power organizations controlled by others. They 
are organizationally outflanked…”3 (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:23). In other words, the elite are 
                                               
3 Emphasis from source. 
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equipped with the “ability to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order 
to engage in minimally stable cooperation.” (Mann 1986:7) With this ability, for instance, any 
nationwide project may easily engage the active involvement of remote communities. The case 
of genocide in Rwanda is a definitive illustration. 
 
Theoretically, „intensive power‟ is thought to have been useful to get as many people as possible 
to subscribe to genocide. Thus, to refer to Mann (1986:7), the elite have proven “the ability to 
organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from the participants, 
whether the area and numbers covered are great or small.” Similar thinking perpetuates the 
traditional idea of the one-way pattern of the elite and ordinary people to relate to one another. 
The existing literature has mostly understood popular support for genocidal violence in Rwanda 
from this perspective. In so doing, the theoretical perspectives of this problem area have missed 
some aspects of conflict in Rwanda. The following paragraphs present some of those aspects 
likely to increase awareness of the dynamics driving popular support for genocidal violence.  
 
Mismatch of theory and practice 
 
Contrary to existing knowledge, the elite do not necessarily behave the same way vis-à-vis 
ordinary people. The case of Giti is an illustration. Under the context of strong conformity, as 
earlier documented, it is perceived as “difficult for anyone who is bonded by links of mutual 
affection and interdependence to break away and openly refuse to participate in what the group is 
doing, even if it is perpetrating extraordinary evil.” (Waller 2002:261) In Rwanda, for instance, 
some scholars have understood social conformity as a powerful tool to drive “development, but it 
can also be used to conduct a highly efficient and „decentralized‟ genocide.” (Reyntjens 
1996:245) The one-way pattern of social power is primarily made obvious. Against the variation 
of the magnitude of violence, the case of Rwanda shows the limitations of strong conformity. 
Some areas were violent, while others were less violent, regardless of the call for violence (see 
Figure 1.1). To understand this variation, there are three levels of popular support for genocidal 
violence to consider. This study seeks to take these levels as representative of behavior vis-à-vis 
national ideologies and propaganda. 
 
The first is Giti under Sebushumba Edouard – known as burgomaster. Giti is officially depicted 
as the unique area where genocide did not take place. In an interview with this burgomaster, 
Strauss (2006:85) notes that “Giti is an exception – genocide did not occur in Giti – but there is 
no appropriate reason why this was the case.” All that is known is that rescuers brought the 
power of ordinary people transforming into perpetrators to the lowest level of violence. 
Theoretically, Giti was likened to smaller and simpler or folk societies whose “ways of life must 
have produced far greater harmony and happiness for their populations” (Edgerton 1992:3), as a 
result of appropriate responses to the demands of their immediate and stable environment. Giti 
must have developed “the emotional and moral commitment, personal intimacy, social cohesion, 
and continuity over time…” (Ibid) Earlier studies might depict these as strong features by which 
Giti successfully resisted the pressure by the top-level leaders and the neighboring communes 
that fueled violence. Internal tensions were not so high in Giti, except youth who slaughtered 
cattle that belonged to Tutsi in Karenge sector.  
 
  
 
9 
As Strauss (2006:86) observed, the burgomaster did not face “a strong internal challenge to his 
authority. He…and the conseillers „spoke the same language‟ and…a rival from the rural elite 
did not make an early bid for control.” He only faced “an external attack from the neighboring 
commune of Murambi, where a former burgomaster, a national-level MRND
4
 politician named 
Jean-Baptiste Gatete, was in control. The conseiller of the attacked sector mobilized the local 
population to resist the invaders.” (Ibid) Despite that pressure, leaders successfully mobilized for 
non-violence and interfered with the genocide project. To that end, they were perceived as 
efficient. Both the President and the Vice-president of the Republic of Rwanda lauded the 
burgomaster on the occasions of their official visits on 7 March and 7 September 1996 
(Kalinganire 1997:50-1). The burgomaster was awarded a government prize for strong resistance 
against genocidal violence. 
 
The second level includes the cases in which people surrendered to the pressure for violence. 
Some leaders could be subjected to either death or summary dismissal in case of strong 
resistance. Examples widely cite the commune Muhura under Muramutsa Joachim, and the 
prefecture of Butare under Habyarimana Jean Baptiste until Colonel Gatsinzi lost control of the 
Gendarmes and the Rwandan Army Forces (FAR). To Prunier (1995:246), the security apparatus 
“were slowly drawn more and more deeply into the collective slaughter.” The prefecture of 
Gitarama under Uwizeye Fidèle is also cited along those lines. Within Gitarama, officials 
hesitated, and later resisted violence in the commune Musambira and Taba. As Strauss (2006:79) 
puts it, violence took time to start in Musambira: “closer inspection shows that while the shift to 
widespread genocidal violence took longer to materialize…the dynamics of violence were 
similar to what occurred elsewhere.” In the prefecture of Gisenyi, Kayove commune has the 
same feature. Until he resigned, Anselme Nzabonimpa was “widely credited with stopping this 
violence; he circulated throughout the commune, sent for and received gendarme reinforcements, 
and eventually arrested looters and attackers, including a communal agent.” (Strauss 2006:72) In 
sharp contrast to the commune Giti, the burgomasters were victims of the pressure for violence. 
 
The third level is representative of violent cases – Murambi commune is purposively selected as 
a crucial example. Contrary to Giti and all other cases that serve as illustration, Prunier 
(1995:246) highlights Murambi burgomaster, Jean Baptiste Gatete, as a notoriously active 
participant of the small minority of sadistic killers. This put a challenge to the culture of 
tolerance earlier known as a distinctive feature of the sub-region of Buganza. One way to look at 
this is that the burgomaster sided with the central government to carry out the genocide project 
while the burgomasters of Giti and Muhura (in the prefecture of Byumba), Musambira and Taba 
(in the prefecture of Gitarama), and Kayove (in the prefecture of Gisenyi), strove for non-
violence. 
                                               
4 MRND is a French abbreviation for Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, which was the ruling party 
until genocide took place. In English, it goes as National Revolutionary Movement for Development. 
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In many regards, this variation in levels of popular support for violence supports Stotland‟s 
(1959) cooperation-withdrawal-aggression model for response to social power. This model is 
mainly about the dynamics of responses to social power that result from the interaction between 
ordinary people and the elite. Each of its components translates the response under specific 
circumstances. The cooperation-component implies a total absence of alternative. The only 
choice is for ordinary people to comply with the will or the demands of the elite. The 
withdrawal-component suggests strong resistance by ordinary people to the demands of the elite. 
As a result of strong pressure – coercion – or of other mobilizing means – cunning and 
manipulation, among others – they end up changing their minds and withdrawing from their 
initial position. The aggression-component of the model consists of the acceptance of the risk of 
the failure in complying would involve.  
 
To summarize, “in withdrawal, the person gives up his own goals, and thus cannot be threatened. 
In aggression, the person tries to decrease the ability of the source of threat (i.e. power) to 
obstruct attainment of the goal by weakening it, asserting independence of it, or eliminating it. In 
cooperation, the person attempts to attain the goal only to the extent that the threatening person 
permits or in the form that he allows.” (Stotland 1959:54-5) This was crucial in Rwanda, given 
that when “the authorities gave the orders to kill and most of the group around you complied, 
with greater or less enthusiasm, it took a brave man indeed to abandon solidarity with the crowd 
and refuse to go along. And such a heroic position would not be without personal danger…Either 
you took part in the massacre or else you were massacred yourself” (Prunier 1995:246-7) by the 
crowd. Resistance against the will of the authority was obviously not common. Thus, the 
aggression-component was successful resistance against the will of the top-level leaders and the 
pressure by neighbours in Giti. The empirical work by Strauss (2006:205-6) concluded that 
although ordinary people “had disobeyed the authorities at some point, which seems likely, that 
so many said they had not demonstrated the importance of the perception of compliance with the 
state.” In other words, the aggression-component translates to total divorce from the top-level 
leaders‟ values. 
 
Against the case studies selected for intensive investigation, cooperation and aggression are 
components of this model that take the lead in explaining popular support for genocidal violence. 
Murambi fits the cooperation-component, while the remaining cases appear to perfectly fit the 
aggression-component of the model. In other words, they demonstrated high cooperation and 
aggression in the model by which the responses to the top-level leaders polarize in practical 
terms. According to this model, the population subscribed to the project of genocide as 
engineered by the elite without any resistance whatsoever (cooperation). As a result, full support 
was large-scale. This study assumes that Giti, and former provinces of Butare and of Gitarama 
are examples whereby resistance against the elite threat was successfully carried out, regardless 
of the levels on the ladder of success (aggression). It does not exclude the withdrawal-
component of this model from the context of Rwanda. The empirical discussion widely cites the 
leaders of communes Mbazi and Shyanda as examples of burgomasters who transformed into 
perpetrators after they had initially resisted killings. The study is only interested in both 
cooperation and aggression components to highlight that polarization. This supports the key 
question of this study interested in investigating what informs polarization in the allegedly 
homogeneous context on cultural and socio-historical grounds. 
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Context of the aggression-component 
 
The aggression-component opposed heavy pressure and tensions: the government “decided to 
exterminate one part of Rwandan population as well as all those who had not been in favor of its 
extermination policy” (Republic of Rwanda 2002:6-7) by the means of the common citizenry. As 
the literature suggests, different strategies apply for the common citizenry to engage in the elite 
endeavor. Huntington (1993:5) posits that “the governments and groups will increasingly attempt 
to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.” The 
politicization of identity is openly accepted to have applied to Rwanda in manner, which 
involved the interaction between the government and the common citizenry. Whether different 
policy areas are effective or not, it “is therefore a question of the relation between peasants and 
governments  [that matters].” (Bevan et al. 1989:1) There are different channels5 by which the 
government influences the peasants, either directly or indirectly. As it appears, these channels 
mainly find bases in wealth making in rural areas. This view probably informs people who 
connected greed for material possessions to popular support for this policy. (This is developed in 
the next section.) In different contexts, some scholars instead link ideology factors to popular 
support. Regarding Rwanda, Prunier (1995:248) posited that the common citizenry had “belief in 
a deeply-imbibed ideology which justified in advance what you were about to do, and obedience 
both to the political authority of the state and to the social authority of the group.” With this,  
shared perceptions and belief systems informed the interaction between the elite and non-elite 
until it resulted in popular support for the extermination policy.  
 
In other terms, the concerted conglomeration of power by the elite and, largely unorganized, 
passive and powerless ordinary people, would speed up the process, as the hierarchy became 
stronger (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:24). Des Forges (1995) backs the argument with the idea of 
„micromanagement‟ of genocide. She suggests that the local state representatives in the 
„micromanagement‟ of the genocide were expected to make it easy. This idea concurs with Du 
Preez (1994), according to whom, “All genocides in history have been instigated, organized, and 
legitimized by the state.” (Uvin 2001:80) The idea of micromanagement of genocide is an 
indication that, in all ages and circumstances, the middle-range of leadership plays a crucial role 
in making ordinary people carry out the will of the top leaders. In many cases, like Rwanda, such 
will has fueled violence. Some opinions relate such violent behavior to various social forces. In 
this respect, Waller (2002:269) suggests that “people tend to do evil because of where they are, 
not who they are…[and] the huge predominance of extraordinary evil committed in the world is, 
in some sense, a societal product in which a complex and sustained series of social forces 
enables ordinary people to commit such evil…In short, forces of the immediate social context, a 
context of cruelty, make active and actual the latent evil in all of us.” By this is meant that 
ordinary people become perpetrators of genocidal violence under specific situations of pressure.  
 
In different circumstances, individuals choose to associate their ethnic group with the dominant 
norms and scripts of behavior in society. This choice involves strong emotional attachment or 
                                               
5 For the vast majority of the poor in the developing countries of Kenya and Tanzania to own the government policy for poverty 
alleviation, Bevan et al. (1989) highlights four main channels of which the governments made use. One of these includes the 
effect of trade, investment, and stabilization policies on the prices paid by peasants for non-agricultural consumer goods. The 
three remaining consist of producer pricing, the availability of non-agricultural consumer goods in rural areas, and the provision 
of public services. This study does not intend to go deeper into these channels. It rather suggests that they contribute a friendly 
environment for the government to influence the peasants. 
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identification to group. In Rwanda, as elsewhere, the group is generally centered on factors such 
as race, ethnicity, tribe, kin, religion, or nationality. Under certain circumstances, these factors 
define one‟s personal identity and may even overshadow the self, Waller (2002:243) observes. 
According to Waller, “we can identify with one group, and against others, to such a degree that 
group identification comes to dominate our individual thoughts, emotion, and behaviors, often 
against the interests and welfare of other groups.” (Ibid) Group identification nourishes the social 
construction of the „other‟, forges in-group solidarity by means of which other groups are 
perceived as threats under particular conditions. Conformity to peer pressure ensues and 
individuals prefer to conform in order to be in sympathy with other people. Such behavior is 
termed „normative social influence‟ (Waller 2002).  
 
To refer to Waller (2002:259), “Conformity for normative reasons occurs in those situations 
where we do what other people are doing because we do not want be ridiculed, punished, or 
rejected by our peers. In short, the influence of our peers leads us to conform in order to be liked 
and accepted by them – especially in groups that are highly cohesive.” Against this brief 
background, collective support for violence is mostly understood as a support for the 
sustainability of the group to which one belongs. Hence, Song (2003:55) argues, “strict 
adherence to such scripts and clear observance of ethnic boundaries may provide a strong sense 
of belonging and kinship with other coethnics.” It means that individuals position themselves 
vis-à-vis the norms and scripts of society. Such a context intensifies the gap in behavior and 
predisposes people to conflict against those who do not belong to the dominant norms and scripts 
of society. Therefore, individuals are most interested in “protecting the physical well-being of 
oneself and one‟s family and preserving one‟s psychological self” (Staub 1989:4) that often 
results in the devaluation of other groups, and of scapegoating those others.  
 
To refer to Dieter Frey and Helmut Rez (2002), the devaluation of other groups serves three 
purposes. The first is a „social explanation‟: perpetrators share an interpretation of negative 
events – which may be imagined, constructed or real – in the past and hold the victims 
responsible. The second is a „social justification‟ for the discrimination or punishment against the 
victims. The third is „positive distinctiveness‟ that is the basis for the feeling of superiority of the 
in-group and, to a large degree, for a positive sense of social identity (Waller 2002:218) that 
intensifies the perception of a gap between the potential groups of victims and perpetrators. The 
greatest gap is that perceived between the in-group and out-group, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) 
indicate – the values and standards of the dominant group are less applicable to the out-group 
(Staub 1989:5). In extreme cases, genocidal violence ensues and the perpetrators ensure orders 
are obeyed in cases of reluctance.  
 
Alongside the violent aspect of humans, Staub (1989:4) recognized the existence of kindness, 
helpfulness, generosity and love, by which people risk their lives to save the victims. In this 
recognition, there is a strong emphasis on religious worldviews, which  “optimistically maintain 
that our basic predisposition is toward goodness.” (Waller 2002:137) Against religious 
worldviews, two opposite arguments are debated. It is understood that evil inclinations alternate 
with the propensity for generosity. Waller (2002:137) “predicts a natural competition between an 
intrinsic potential for good and intrinsic potential for evil.” Different social forces play a crucial 
role in determining whether the good wins over the evil or vice-versa. Bauman‟s (2002:vii) 
conclusion – according to which the “world split into mad murderers and helpless victims, with 
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many others helping the victims when they could, but unable to help most of the time” – is 
relevant to understanding the cases under investigation: Giti and Murambi.  
 
These statements are appropriate to understanding that the case of Giti interfered with the 
vertical formula by which ordinary people carry out the elite‟s demands. The discussion around 
the aggression-component is an indicator that the same formula holds in specific context. The 
cases earlier discussed under the aggression-component show that, with various levels of 
success, the local state representatives showed capacities to disrupt a nationwide project 
engineered by the national elite. This is the main lesson to take from the theorization by Stotland. 
In theoretical terms, the aggression-component of the model challenges the idea of a strong 
hierarchy, where the concerted conglomeration of power by the elite and largely unorganized, 
passive and powerless ordinary people only serves the purposes of the elite. This finds support in 
a number of reasons.  
 
For Staub (1992:164) those who challenge the rules of the game are “characterized by a positive 
evaluation of human beings and a feeling of personal responsibility for others‟ welfare” as a 
result of consistent prosocial value orientation. Put differently, they were driven by moral-value 
orientation through which they acted “according to moral rules that prescribe help for other 
people”, or simply by empathy or sympathy (Ibid). Staub recognizes illnesses such as aggression, 
violence, torture and the mistreatment of human beings as parts of human lives. This idea 
supports “the pessimistic conception of human as essentially evil, dangerous, or impulse-ridden – 
a recognition of our basic natural proclivity to turn ugly.” (Waller 2002:137) Emphasis is on the 
predisposition of humans to evil inclinations. For Thomas Hobbes, “we are basically 
unconcerned about others‟ welfare and will therefore do anything to satisfy our own interests – 
homo homini lups (man is a wolf to his fellow man)” (Waller 2002:138), no matter how harmful 
we would be to others.  
 
In Murambi, as in Giti, this study attributes the result of Waller‟s (2002) competition – between 
the intrinsic potential for good and intrinsic potential for evil – to the middle-range leaders in 
these regions. They have demonstrated the same qualities as ordinary people in different 
contexts– and in Rwanda, to a certain extent. The existing knowledge widely cites some 
Christians in Nazi-occupied Europe who endured difficulty and danger in order to save Jews and 
other persecuted people. These Christians were ordinary people, acting in natural ways. To 
Bauman (2000:7), “They were dormant heroes, often indistinguishable from those around them.” 
No matter which background one comes from, resisting evil
6
 is a common property to both the 
elite and ordinary people. Nechama Tec (1986) identifies those people as rescuers in the 
following terms: “those people who did not allow the „dirty work‟ to be perpetrated, who 
dedicated their lives to the suffering of others in the world of universal selfishness; people who, 
in short, remained moral under immoral conditions.” (Bauman 2000:5) This brief theoretical 
background helps in explaining the circumstances under which some ordinary Rwandan people 
could save some Tutsi victims. In the light of this sections, this discussion supports the 
                                               
6 Evil refers to the part of a broadly shared human cultural heritage, which is inclined to the destruction of human beings. In 
Staub‟s (1989:25) terms, it “includes not only killings but [also] the creation of conditions that materially or psychological destroy 
or diminish people‟s dignity, happiness, and capacity to fulfill basic material needs.” With him, individuals show propensity  for 
aggression, on the one hand, and for altruism on the other. Both parts of human nature tirelessly enter a strong competition, 
which results in a zero-sum outcome. Individual socialization and experience increasingly matter at certain points. 
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conclusion that the „homo oeconomicus‟ perspective is not sufficient to predict whether one 
would support violence or not. A number of moral values have a crucial role to play, as this 
section shows. At the same time, this study agrees upon the relevance of economic bases for 
popular support. In the following paragraphs, this perspective is briefly discussed. 
 
The homo oeconomicus perspective and ideological factors 
 
Although “The prospect of financial gain is seldom the primary motivation for rebellion” 
(Collier et al. 2003:4), some believe that obedient behaviors are driven in a rational way. The 
„yes-response‟ attitude by ordinary people depends on some calculations about cost-benefits. For 
instance, as Andre and Platteau (1998) argue, “those with assets faced a greater risk of being 
murdered.” (Collier et al. 2003:16) They are the same people from whom the perpetrators of 
genocide in Rwanda expected to inherit material possessions. Mobilization theorists are 
conclusive about these claims: popular support for genocidal violence would be “the result of 
rational decision processes whereby people weigh the costs and benefits of participation.” 
(Klandermans 1984:583) Once individuals perceive costs and benefits of their support, they can 
be influenced, as persuasion becomes a key element in a mobilization campaign. In such 
circumstances, the „economic man‟ approach governs the world, as rational theorists might 
argue. Khawaja (1993:49) provides a definitive illustration. To him, the response is “determined 
by careful cost-benefit calculations on the part of potential participants.” As one makes a rational 
choice, the balance between the benefit and the cost matters. Participants, according to Hall 
(1999:27), “are rational actors impelled to action by instrumental rationality and systemic 
forces.” The most eligible are hypothesized to be those who perceive having nothing to lose in 
conflict. Rather, they gain more than what they invest. This logic leads to the idea that the poor 
are more prone to violence. Overtly, this is a utilitarian view that defines the circumstances under 
which poor peasants subscribe to violence.  
 
The economic-man approach to violence should not be understood exclusively at the individual 
level. Through the expectancy-value theorists, it argues for both individual and collective 
benefits. Hence, mass participation might be understood from the expectancy-value perspective, 
much as individuals belong to collectivities. Klandermans (1984) “asserts that individuals assess 
the selective cost and benefits of participation for them as individuals, and that they also weight 
the value of collective goals against the likelihood of achieving those goals through action.” 
(Schrager 1985:858) The logic behind the expectancy-value model finds application in the case 
of Rwanda. In 1963, as well as in 1993, ordinary people joined the „self-defense‟ program as 
organized by the central authorities for individual and collective interests. Looting has served the 
individual interest, while efforts to disrupt Tutsi from returning to enslave the Hutu (Melvern 
2000:17) was, as a result of ideological factors, thought to be the collective interest involved. 
Whether or no the outcomes of actions are really so clear to ordinary people, it is a concern that 
needs further discussion. Meanwhile, it is hypothesized that mobilizations manipulated the 
perception of possible outcomes and unearthed emotions. 
 
This does not diminish the argument that in Rwanda, as much as elsewhere, human decisions are 
primarily homo oeconomicus-informed. However, the homo oeconimicus view is on its own 
insufficient to explain the case studies selected for this research project. Given the 
socioeconomic profiles of these cases (see Chapter Four), the patterns of response to genocidal 
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violence strongly support this argument. As the discussion further documents, rational and 
altruistic behavior juxtapose. For instance, Song (2003:44) holds it to be “more plausible that 
ethnic groups are motivated by both socioeconomic and political interests, as well as by non-
instrumental concerns about their representation and boundaries in relation to wider society.” 
Rwanda, among so many other cases, has increasingly served as a convincing example from 
which one could demonstrate that homo oeconomicus perspectives are just one dimension of 
popular support for violence. Scholars such as Schrager (1985:859) consider the collective yes-
response to violence to be beyond the limits of economic calculations.  
 
Referring to the expectancy-value theory, he assumes that “social and ideological factors figure 
powerfully in people‟s willingness to act.” Therefore, according to the same source, “Effort to 
model these factors should examine mobilization campaigns which generate a high level of 
commitment and which involve public actions.” (Ibid) As the case of Rwanda shows, non-
economically informed responses to violence arose from mobilization campaigns. By this is 
meant that economic calculations yield interests to specific individuals, on the one hand, while 
on the other, mobilization campaigns preach collective interests. If this was the case, there are at 
least three views to consider. One is that economic calculations by poor peasants would hardly 
lead to deadly violence on a large scale. Second, only mobilization campaigns would be 
successful, as they manipulate the perception of possible outcomes, which activates emotions. 
Third, cost-benefit calculations are complementary to mobilization campaigns to arouse popular 
interest in violence. All outcomes depend on the specific context. The empirical material 
suggests that the third option was most applicable to Rwanda. 
 
If mobilization campaigns – whether or not in joint cooperation with cost-benefit calculations – 
arouse popular support for genocide, it is an indication that the economic-man approach is not 
sufficient to explain this support. In a wider perspective, the discussion has mentioned a number 
of non-economic bases for popular support for violence. Included in this perspective is identity, 
once it is politicized. The literature widely relates bound institutions organized around ethnic 
bases by many ruling regimes. According to Mamdani (1996:24), “one finds it difficult to recall 
a single major peasant uprising…that has not [had]…ethnic…inspiration.” In such cases, 
ordinary people found it difficult to disassociate themselves from ethnic backgrounds. Many take 
policies designed during pre-genocide Rwanda, for instance, to have activated these 
backgrounds. To cite Kuper (2002:69), such policies “have the effect of collectivizing the 
members of the society into polarized section [to] increase the potentiality for genocide.” This 
obviously characterized both the elite and ordinary people as “human actors [who] make choices 
and decisions, and carry out actions which constitute, or lead to, genocide.” (Ibid) Identity 
politicization is therefore a crucial factor, in the sense that while the elite are fundamentally 
acknowledged as primarily responsible for various achievements, they are also perceived as 
representing an identity group.  
 
A two-way process of manipulation and conclusions 
 
The most important outcome of this discussion is that the elite are perceived as role models for 
their respective societies. Within similar contexts, it has seemed that it has not been 
acknowledged that ordinary people could play any active role other than order execution 
(VonDoepp andVillalón 2005:14). The democratization processes in Africa have endorsed that 
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view. As a result, they have solely understood the elite as the privileged units of analysis. The 
number of citizens who engaged in and shaped the political sphere was very small. Equally, to 
refer to the same source, the number of ordinary people that could “develop the inclinations and 
means to more effectively access and influence political officials at the level of the state” (Ibid) 
were still insignificant. With this brief background, ordinary people have remained as those 
expected to follow the elite-made trends in social norms. 
 
Classical theorists have overestimated the elite to the detriment of ordinary people. In other 
words, they have taken the way the elite relate to the common citizenry as an exclusive one-way 
process. Under various circumstances, the case of Rwanda shows the elite as driven by ordinary 
people to perpetrating genocide after they had initially shown resistance.  In line with Kimonyo 
(2000), the elite have proven to be both manipulative and manipulated (Uvin 2001:80). The 
empirical discussion pinpoints a number of cases to document this statement further (see Chapter 
Four). They serve as strong indication that the existing theoretical perspectives of the elite fail to 
explain the dynamics under which ordinary people could make the elite act in certain ways. It is 
a gap between theory and practice that needs further empirical investigation. 
 
To sum up, this discussion has presented a broader view from popular support for elite-driven 
endeavor. It has also supported the idea that the motivations for ordinary people to subscribe to 
such an endeavor relate neither to solely rational nor solely irrational incentives. Reinhard (1996) 
suggests that they go hand in hand with one other. He states: 
 
Starting from the micro-level, we have first to assume that human beings act according to their 
interest – be it by rational, pseudo-rational, or irrational choice – and that this interest has an 
elementary character and therefore needs no substantiation because it is self-explanatory. It is 
directed towards the acquisition of a large share of scarce goods. Scarce goods, however, 
should not be misinterpreted in a narrow materialistic sense. They need not consist of material 
wealth alone, but may include meaningful work – something that has become scarce in our 
society – or things like prestige or the pleasures of sex and power. Often, material wealth can 
be used as a means to achieve these additional ends. (Reinhard 1996:5) 
 
It is understood that the concept of „interest‟ is very complex. It covers both rational and 
irrational aspects. Therefore, ordinary people might be driven by basic needs satisfaction 
(rational interest), while the struggle for power (irrational interest) motivates most elite. Whether 
based on rational or irrational interest, different theoretical perspectives predict ways in which 
such interest drives obedient behavior. The social change theoretical point of view here 
highlights the social approval „paid‟ as a supporting pillar to such behavior. To social change 
theorists, one is eagerly willing to deliver so much conformity, “in exchange for so much social 
approval „paid‟. But conforming involves a certain „cost‟ in terms of self-depreciation.” (Rowan 
1976:29) Conformity requires, at least partly, strong self-denial or alienation to certain degrees. 
This is a psychological or, to put it another way, a strong irrational aspect of interest from 
conformity. The exchange theoretical point of view highlights the material incentive, that is, 
reward. Burns et al. (1982:188-9) summarize the motivations behind conformity from the 
perspective of exchange theory, as follows: 
 
 Social behavior can be explained in terms of rewards, where rewards are goods or 
services, tangible or intangible, which satisfy a person‟s needs or goals. 
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 Individuals attempt to maximize rewards and minimize losses or punishments. 
 Social interaction results from the fact that others control valuables or necessities and can 
therefore reward a person. 
 Social interaction is thus viewed as an exchange or mutually rewarding activities in 
which the receipt of a needed valuable (good or service) is contingent upon the supply of 
a favor in return (usually immediate). 
 
The following paragraphs, and further discussion later in this thesis, look at ways in which 
conformity fits these theoretical perspectives. The case of Rwanda will be the most privileged 
target. 
Popular support in practice 
 
Earlier paragraphs have discussed different contexts and demonstrated the extent to which 
ordinary people have been completely absent in the public sphere and, therefore, excluded from 
decision-making processes. As a result, existing knowledge has shown that ordinary people 
usually give full support to the ideas that the elite impose. In line with most theoretical claims, it 
is widely considered inconceivable that ordinary people could oppose the elite or, at least, 
influence elite behavior. Rwanda, in particular, finds illustration of this claim in different 
proverbs and sayings of everyday life. For instance, „Umwera uturutse ibukuru bucya wakwiriye 
hose‟ (the information from upper echelons is quickly disseminated everywhere), „Irivuze 
Umwami‟ (The word order from the King), „Umuturage ni nyamujya iyo bijya‟ (The peasant is a 
go-where-things-go person), are a few examples of many that reflect strong hierarchy in social 
and political structures.
7
 In this context, „upper echelons‟ and the „King‟ reflect the powerful and 
infallible elite over ordinary people of the monarchical era. According to Ruggiero (2006:60), 
the order of the King is not challenged. Hence, he suggests, “Acts undermining authority, be they 
peaceful or violent, become somewhat sacrilegious, being addressed against „gods‟ such as the 
majority, the will of the people, the aristocracy or talent or wealth, the divine right of kings, or 
the allegedly extraordinary endowment of the ruler himself.” De Lacger (1939), André Pagès 
(1933), Jean Jacques Maquet (1954), and many others, describe the King as “the father and the 
patriarch of his people, given to them by Imana (God). He is the providence of Rwanda, the 
Messiah and the savior. When he exercises his authority, he is impeccable, infallible. His 
decisions cannot be questioned…They still trust in him, because his judgments are always just. 
Whatever happens, he remains Nyagasani, the only Lord, superb and magnificent.” (Prunier 
1995:10). These scholars underline the supernatural aspect of power and the right to exercise 
dictatorship over ordinary people.  
 
Implications of the word order from the King 
 
As a result of a strong tradition of obedience, the King‟s decisions are not questioned. To Purnier 
(1995:245), “there had always been a strong tradition of unquestioning obedience to authority in 
the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda. This tradition was of course reinforced by both the German 
and Belgian colonial administrations. And since the independence Rwanda had lived under a 
well-organized and tightly controlled state. When the highest authorities in that state told you to 
                                               
7 Emphasis supplied. 
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do something you did it, even if it included killing.” Also, Scherrer concluded: “Obedience to the 
orders of the authorities was something that had inculcated in the population for centuries.” 
(Strauss 2006:205) This means that the orders imposed by the elite has remained important over 
time. The belief in the supernatural power – in which the power was rooted – probably played an 
important role. Alongside the supernatural power, there is a strong perception that the King, in 
exercising power, is doing the just thing (Prunier, 1995 and Hobbes, 1679). In other words, 
Kings “never rule merely by brute force; they justify their rule by political formulae (such as 
„divine right‟ or „the sovereignty of people‟), which frequently are accepted by those they rule.” 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993:21) Ordinary people just surrender to the exercise of power by the King. It 
is true that religious societies would accept elite rule on the basis of political formulae. Rwanda 
probably falls into this category, where the Catholic Church has played a major role through a 
number of missions throughout the country jointly with previous administrations.  
 
During the colonial period, for instance, “the Catholic Church worked hand-in-hand with the 
German and Belgian authorities, and after Independence there has been a remarkably high degree 
of political intertwining between the Church and the state.” (Millwood (1996:17) This went on 
from the arrival of the German and Belgian colonialists in 1899 onwards. Rwandans have 
believed in supernatural divine right and symbolic meanings of sovereignty. Until the eve of 
colonialism, Rwandans believed in Imana (God) – a supreme being they also called Nyagasani 
(the One Who Has Luck). There was also strong belief in the mediation of the spirits of dead 
heroes (like Ryangombe and Nyabingi) between Rwandans and the Imana. At the same time, 
they feared the spirits of the dead who could come back to haunt the living. When deemed 
malicious, they could pray to them, give sacrifices and could have recourse to divinations of all 
kinds. Christianity considered all these practices as pagan and Rwandans had to embrace a new 
and „civilized‟ Christian culture (Twagilimana 2007:143-4). Following specific history, 
language, culture, tradition and religion, however, Huntington (1993:3) argues, “The people of 
different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man.” The above- 
mentioned common objective elements – language, history, religion, customs and institutions – 
must have led to such a distortion. In their succession, both traditional and modern religions have 
overemphasized the belief in supernatural powers. The latter found the support of colonial and 
post-colonial regimes in the past.  
 
The fact that Rwanda is a religious community made it possible for such beliefs to endure. In the 
1991 census, “not less than 90% of the population was Christian.” (Millwood 1996:17) The 2002 
census corroborated this figure. As the census establishes, “Christian religious groups have the 
following of some 93% of the population of Rwanda”, where the Catholic faith attracts almost 
half (49.5 percent) of the resident population of the country (Republic of Rwanda 2005:39). The 
rule by political formulae – such as „divine right‟ – has perpetuated, and led to the belief system 
according to which the King played an intermediary role between the subordinates and the 
supernatural powers. With modernity, however, the idea of efficiency brought in new bases of 
popular support. Leaders represent the Hobbesian „Common Power‟ or „Commonwealth‟. 
Hobbes argues, “„what the legislator commands must be held for good, and what he forbids for 
evil‟, and that „it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil.‟” (Ruggiero 2006:23) 
Unlike many, Hobbes warns against those “„wicked sayings, that he only is a king who does 
righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things.‟”8 (Ibid) He 
                                               
8 Emphasis from source. 
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further argues that stability relates to the subordination of ordinary people to the King in the past 
(2006:49). By this is meant that the Hobbesian perspective allows no challenge whatsoever to the 
elite in leading positions. The argument is that empowerment is key in facilitating ordinary 
people in making informed decisions.  
 
Constraints to empowering popular support 
 
In this context, empowerment, according to Christian (1998), defines the “process by which 
people who are usually excluded develop knowledge, skills and the power to challenge decisions 
that affect their lives and the wider community.” (Bangwanubusa 2002:39) Rubin and Rubin 
(1986) assert that empowered ordinary people “determine the goals, act together to achieve the 
goals, directly receive benefits, and evaluate whether or not the action was worthwhile.” (Gumbi 
2001:75) Ordinary people can only stop being passive and consumers of elite propaganda and 
ideology if, to stress Bello (2003), there is a minimum condition of the “capacity to collectively 
analyze the current global context, define strategic goals and elaborate appropriate strategies and 
tactics.” (Desmarais 2008:138) The collective character of empowerment is made a fundamental 
prerequisite. Education has remained known as a widely empowering institution in learning 
skills, organizational training and access to basic services (De Beer and Swanepoel 1998:24). It 
raises awareness. The 2002 census shows the level of education remained in a rudimentary 
phase:  
 
Some 60% of the population aged 15 years and above in Rwanda can read and write a text in 
at least any one language (which was not specified). Another 4.4% can only read while 35.6% 
can neither read nor write. In the urban areas of the country the proportion of literate residents 
are higher than those in the rural areas (76.7% as against 56.6%). Men are more literate than 
women (66.5% as against 54.7%)…Overall, 31% of the resident population in Rwanda has 
never been to school, those who have attended but are now out of school constitute 45% ... As 
expected, the proportion of residents who have never been to school is higher in the rural areas 
(33%) than in the urban areas (21.1%). Furthermore, more than half (53.6%) of the urban 
residents have ever attended school as against 43.1% of rural residents. (Republic of Rwanda 
2005:46-7) 
 
This is a situation that sounded more advanced than on the eve of the genocide. If 35.6 percent of 
the population can neither read nor write, and 31 percent have never been to school, it is an 
indication that the literacy rate is extremely low. And illiteracy is disproportionately distributed 
according to gender, age and place of settlement and ethnic affiliation, on the basis of which a 
quota system applied in the past. To a certain extent, to recall Anderson (1983), there is “a causal 
relation between literacy and ethnic consciousness” (Wiegandt 1993:313) if the quota system is 
given consideration. In combination, all these elements lead to the observation that ordinary 
people quantitatively compete with the elite. This alarming disproportion was a strong criterion 
in predicting mass participation in genocide. Anderson (1983) suggests that everywhere, “as 
illiteracy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support” (Ibid) for genocidal violence. 
The youth easily fall prey to it. The major reason is that the youth defines “the population which 
has still not been able to anchor or root itself in the social hierarchy, and which still has strong 
expectations for a different and better future. Thus it is primarily among frustrated youths, 
without direct responsibility for the family‟s survival, that we find the base of recruitment for 
active participation in violence and resistance.” (Abrahamsson 2003:78) In the Hitler youth, for 
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instance, “the militia, attached to political parties, comprised the uneducated and unemployed of 
the country‟s youth, taken from the streets and from local football teams and given rudimentary 
training in the use of weapons” (Melvern 2000:44) so that they “become ground-level 
operatives.” (Waller 2002:223)  
 
To paraphrase from Paul Kagame (2002),
9
 the uneducated and unemployed youth, without 
income and with no bright future, are potential candidates for inciting and practicing violence. 
As he puts it, they resisted the ideology of extermination until they were told that they could 
appropriate the property of the victims. In clear terms, as expressed by Hopper and Pearce (1973) 
and Runciman (1966), they are “those individuals who perceive little possibility of personally 
influencing future outcomes experience greater economic insecurity and thus feel more relatively 
deprived in comparison with others who see themselves as economically secure.” (Thompson 
and Roper 1976:160) In most cases, they included delinquents and petty criminals who could 
disrupt political meetings and terrorize anyone who criticized the government. They also belong 
to social categories that are not yet rooted in the social hierarchy, despite strong expectations for 
a different and better future. Thus, Abrahamsson (2003:78) argues, “it is primarily among 
frustrated youths, without direct responsibility for the family‟s survival, that we find the base of 
recruitment for active participation in violence and resistance.” They are mostly those people 
subjected to poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and so many other illnesses. Within a framework 
of lower levels of empowerment, these illnesses predisposed ordinary people to extreme 
passivity and submission to the extent that they would be emotionally informed in a similar way 
as certain groups. This study refers to the American experience to show that passivity is a 
general trend even though it does not necessarily trigger genocide in all the contexts.  
 
Other than the power elite and members of Congress and trade union leaders (middle levels of 
power), “the masses at the bottom line are mostly passive and have little influence of their own” 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993:23) in the American society. The same source indicates: “they lose their 
will for rationally considered decision and action; they lose their sense of political belonging 
because they do not belong; they lose their political will because they see no way to realize it.” 
(Ibid) In a similar way, ordinary people are put in a weak position where nothing would happen 
without the intervention of the elite. In some societies, this passivity of disempowered groups has 
opened the ground for easy propagation of elite ideology and propaganda. In Rwanda, for 
instance, these circumstances increase the risk of the elite prompting ordinary people into 
violence.  
 
To refer to Waller (2002:12), ordinary people become “ordinary individuals, like you and me, 
who commit extraordinary evil…[which is] the deliberate harming of humans by other 
humans.”10 It means that each human being has the latent potential to become involved in deadly 
violence in certain circumstances. With Melvern (2000:17), this finds application to Rwanda. As 
she puts it, those “who died in the massacres were killed in the most atrocious and cruel 
circumstances by the local population.” Zorbas (2004:31) illustrates this point. During those 100 
days in 1994, she argues, Tutsi and moderate Hutu “were murdered mostly by their Hutu 
(peasant) neighbors and families.” As indicators show, the Rwandan proverbs and sayings 
                                               
9 The Great Lakes Conflicts: Factors, Actors, and Challenges. An Inaugural Lecture delivered by His Excellence Paul Kagame, 
President of the Republic of Rwanda at the Nigeria War College, Abuja (16 September 2002). 
10 Emphasis from source. 
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discussed above came to the fore. The theoretical claim according to which trust in the King 
depends on just judgments (Prunier, 1995 and Hobbes, 1679) appeared defunct. 
 
Ordinary people were made powerless to the extent that they obeyed the command for violence. 
Zorbas (2004:31) indicates that the Rwandan conflict is perceived as “qualitatively different not 
only in its genocidal character, but also in the overwhelming receptivity, and initiative the 
organizers of genocide found from below.” The „yes-response‟ reflected an extreme receptivity 
and the initiative among ordinary people to transform into violent perpetrators. Mukimbiri 
(2005:824) pinpoints the complicity of the larger population in violence. As with Lacomte 
(2004), discussing genocide against Jews perpetrated by Nazi Germany the idea is that the 
population has to transform into complicit actors in genocide. To Lacomte, “in order to avoid too 
great and widespread an emotional reaction, the majority of the population has to be turned into 
indifferent witnesses, accomplices, or agents of the massacres.” (Ibid) To refer to further 
discussion, similar attitudes relate to beliefs and perceptions sharing vis-à-vis the victim group 
(Waller 2002). This project hypothesizes such attitudes to be a primary condition that increases 
the probability of obedient behavior towards the elite. In other words, there is a possibility of 
increased social conformism. 
 
In the case of Rwanda, Reyntjens (1996) found „social conformism‟ and „strong state‟ as 
complementary to one another. A longitudinal view from the history of Rwanda has proved these 
variables to relate to one another over the past decades. He assumes that every Rwandan was 
„administered,‟ as a result of the state being everywhere. He argues there was a strong 
centralized structure, perceived as pyramid-like, where “orders travel fast and well from top to 
bottom.” (Reyntjens 1996:244) Behind this governing system, the areas to govern were made 
smaller with a smaller density of population. This supports the hypothesis by Aylmer (1996:59): 
the smaller the area and the less the number of people, he suggests, “then other things being 
equal the easier it would be for the central authority (ruler or rulers) to be in a direct relationship 
with all of their subjects.” This allegedly made Rwandans adopt a particular consistent attitude. 
As Reyntjens (1996:245) describes, Rwandans are people who generally show less interest in 
emerging above the grey mass: “they know that those who do emerge risk having their heads 
chopped off, physically or socially. This contributes to socially conformist behavior: many 
Rwandans tend to do what their neighbors do or what a person in authority tells them to do.” 
Regardless of who is who, he suggests, social conformity is a common phenomenon, at least to 
all those who are not in positions of authority. With the pyramid-like structure, the elite ensured 
they could carry out their will on a passive and conformist population, as a result of exercising 
social power (Weber 1978). In a different context, Reyntjens (1996) presents an illustrative case. 
Because of social conformism operating in a strong state context, many development partners 
lauded the Rwandan model of development, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s (Reyntjens 
1996:244). The argument is that the same forces that made development happen could equally be 
used to involve ordinary people in violence.  
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Concluding summary 
 
The overview of existing explanations of popular support for mass violence (see Background and 
Popular support in practice) highlights the conditions at two levels that work in a complementary 
way. Contrary to traditional knowledge, both the elite and ordinary people need to adjust for 
popular support to be a success. Along those lines, the elite are expected to carry out their will on 
ordinary people for the following reasons: 
 
 The elite have total control of most of the resource base. 
 The elite have different achievements in most sectors of life 
 In religious societies, the elite are perceivedly exercise supernatural power. 
 By the means of laws and norms (coercion), the elite efficiently regulate human behavior. 
 The elite are organized and informed bodies (they achieve updated knowledge through 
formal meetings). 
 The elite have the abilities and capacities to organize and mobilize ordinary people. 
 The elite politicize the identity to arouse popular support. 
 
As Waller (2002) discusses further, there is an appropriate mood required from ordinary people 
without which popular support is made impossible, at least on a large scale. The following are 
the conditions required from ordinary people for their cooperation: 
 
 The common citizenry needs to share beliefs and perceptions about the potential victims. 
 Receptivity is a characteristic trait of disempowered ordinary people. 
 Ordinary people tend to socially conformismist. 
 Complicity of the potential perpetrators is a fundamental prerequisite for popular 
cooperation. 
 Ordinary people identify with the norms and scripts of group identity behavior. 
 Popular cooperation is driven by the cost-benefit or economic calculations. 
 
Equally, perhaps, the cultural setting of Rwanda has shaped the elite and ordinary people to 
behave in a certain way. The proverbs and sayings presented above, among many others, 
perpetuate a stereotype of behavior, in which ordinary people are required to be obedient to the 
elite in all cases. The institutions for socialization are perceived as means to perpetuate this 
stereotype. 
 
Importantly, the review of literature is mostly interested in highlighting the bases for which the 
elite carry out their will with a minimum of resistance on the part of ordinary people. The 
literature has appeared to emphasize such a trend. In so doing, it has underestimated the 
implication of the conditions required for ordinary people to accept the will of the elite. Unlike 
many contemporary scholars, Waller (2002) suggests that the will of the elite would fade away if 
beliefs and perceptions shared among ordinary people conflict with those of the elite. He 
presents strong challenge to classical theorists who assume that ordinary people trust in – and 
obey – the elite. As the study discusses further, the major argument is that the elite command 
ordinary people and things get just done. No matter what the case is, however, it has not yet been 
clear why cases like Giti – where people have resisted perpetrating group violence – have 
occurred in Rwanda, and elsewhere.  
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Study relevance and objective 
 
Two important aspects justify the relevance of this study. First, most current literature has 
investigated the factors that contribute to violence. Little, if any, investigated the factors that 
prevent engagement in violence. To the knowledge of this study, no study has investigated why 
Sweden has not been involved in conflict for the last 200 years. Fifteen years after genocide in 
Rwanda, a number of insightful books have been made available to increase knowledge about 
why people engaged in genocidal violence. Scott Strauss (2006) is only registered to have briefly 
discussed non-violent cases in Rwanda. But it was not his central interest. This perspective of 
genocide has been ignored by academic discussion. With this study, there is a strong feeling that 
stories of what people say about non-violence in Giti commune, for instance, are not facts but 
rather indications of the truth. Second, the majority of studies available have analyzed almost 
exclusively the institutional or macro levels. To those studies, the levels of leadership are given 
primacy as playing a crucial role in obtaining the support of ordinary people for different 
ideologies, policies, programs and projects at various levels of society. They over-emphasize the 
elite to the detriment of ordinary people.  
 
Non-exhaustively, examples are Prunier (1995), Millwood (1996), Howard et al. (1996), 
Millwood and Sellström (1996), Mamdani (2001), and Melvern (2004). These authors focus 
mostly on the macro-level political, economic, and historical factors behind popular support for 
genocide and mass killing. Unlike Waller (2002), they underestimate the decisive role that the 
middle-range level of leadership plays within the interplay of different levels of leadership. 
Unlike Lederach (1997), they overlook the fact that that violent or non-violent conflict 
transformation is a bottom-up process, where “the middle level can serve to link the other two”11 
(Miall 2005:23) – the top leaders and grassroots leaders. The idea is that middle-range leaders 
have the capacity to initiate conflict transformation and have more power to do so than anybody 
else. Unlike previous studies, this is to argue that the middle-range leaders play a decisive role in 
violent or non-violent transformation under particular circumstances of grassroots thinking to 
which they appeal for popular support. 
 
In this study, the middle-range leaders fall into the Lederach (1997) categorization. First, they 
consist of people that are: 
 
…highly respected as individuals and/or occupy formal positions of leadership in 
sectors such as education, business, agriculture, or health. [Secondly, they are] the 
primary networks of groups and institutions that may exist within a setting such as those 
linking (formally or otherwise) religious groups, academic institutions, or humanitarian 
                                               
11 Lederach (1997:38) distinguishes three major categories of leadership: top-level, middle-range, and the grassroots. The top-
level leadership includes the key political and military leaders, the highest representative of the government. They are perceived as 
having the monopoly on power and influence in the hierarchy. As Lederach puts it, “power is primarily perceived in the form of a 
hierarchy in which top leaders are in a position to make decisions for, and to deliver the support of, their respective 
constituencies.” (Lederach 1997:40) The middle-range leadership is the category of people relatively independent from the authority 
of the structures of formal government and from the major opposition movements. The grassroots leadership is at the bottom of the 
pyramid and represents the base of the society. This category is about local leaders, such as “people who are involved in local 
communities, members of indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) carrying out relief projects for local populations, 
health officials, and refugee camp leaders.” (Lederach 1997:42) In the localized context of Rwanda, it is important to note the 
absence of a clear-cut distinction between the middle-range and the grassroots leaderships. 
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organizations. These networks contain individuals who lead or are prominent within a 
particular institution…who may be well recognized and respected within that network 
or geographic region. [Finally], people who are well known as belonging to a minority 
ethnic group, or who are from a particular geographic region…and enjoy the respect of 
the people of that region but are also known outside the region. (Lederach 1997:41) 
 
Instead of the over-emphasis on top leaders, this study is relevant in that it focuses on the ability 
of the middle-range leadership to mobilize ordinary people, either against or for violence. Close 
proximity and, therefore, dense interactions, are key pillars in this respect. Beyond the traditional 
one-way interaction between these actors, this study is dedicated to discussing the required 
psychological mood (i.e. extraordinary ideology formation) and social forces (i.e. the context of 
cruelty) that predispose ordinary people to violence. For Waller (2002:231), for instance, the 
context of cruelty involves “an inverted moral universe, shaped by a process of brutalization, in 
which right has become wrong; healing has become killing; and life has become death.” The 
cruelty of Hitler and the moral corruption in his ideas are widely cited as a definitive illustration. 
In connection with this, Bauman (2000:1) considers “the Holocaust as the culmination point of 
European-Christian anti-Semitism” at its most intense. Also, it relates to the “convolutions of 
German history, or in the particular moral indifference of ordinary Germans.” (Bauman 2000:xi) 
In this context, the moral indifference refers to the attitude closely related to the view of overt or 
latent anti-Semitism, to the „culmination of anti-Jewish sentiments‟, and the „eruption of the 
popular resentment against Jews‟ (Bauman 2000:33).  
 
As Goldhagen (1996) argues further, the eliminationist anti-Semitism is a central variable to 
explain contemporary horrors, mass killing and genocidal violence. The literature shows ways in 
which such an inverted moral universe goes hand-in-hand with the construction of the „other‟ 
(us-them thinking), blaming the victims,
12
 hatred ideologies, vilification, and dehumanization
13
 
                                               
12 The social psychologist Melvin Lerner (1980) is taken to be the pioneer of the concept of blaming the victims through what he 
meant by „the just-world phenomenon‟. Central to his argument is the world is just to the extent that people get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get. Socialization is taken as an explanatory process to this view much as, from early childhood, it 
teaches that good is rewarded while evil is punished (Waller 2007:217). Those informed by this belief “blame the poor and 
homeless for their own suffering” (Waller 2007:214), believe that battered spouses are responsible for their beatings, that sick 
people must have caused their illness, that accident is a result of careless driving, that rape stems from some inappropriate 
behaviors, and that theft is a result of a lack of adequate security precautions by the victims. The most theoretical implication is 
that many often see “the same pattern of blame attribution directed at victims of genocide and mass killing by both perpetrators 
and bystanders” (Waller 2007:215). It is the best way by which perpetrators contain fear against “Seeing others hurting, wanting, 
or suffering…to convince [them]selves that victims must have done something to bring it on themselves…By implicating the 
victims in their own destruction, we are protected from the painful recognition that the world is not fair or just. If victims are to 
blame for their fate, then there is no reason for the perpetrator to feel guilty. The moral foundation of much evildoing rests on 
the principle that because of their damaging behaviors, certain individuals or target groups forfeit their rights to human treatment 
and can be harmed without guilt or remorse” (Waller 2007:217-8). As a result, the victims tend to believe that they deserve 
violence. Jan Gross (2001) suggests for instance, “All this crowd of Jews on the way toward the barn outside was screaming, 
„War is because of us, war is for us‟” (Waller 2007:216). Among many others, this reference highlights the „victims‟ passivity‟ 
partly understood as the result of just-world thinking to the extent that “the victims bring their fate on themselves not by 
deserving it but by not fighting back” (Waller 2007:216). The literature includes the Armenians and the Hutu in Burundi in the 
category of those who made no resistance to the pressure by the perpetrators. Given that Tutsi in Rwanda could pay for what was 
termed „good death‟ (that is, an immediate death without being tortured), the case is also included in this category. In short, the 
just-world phenomenon is “evidenced by the fact that even victims often go to great lengths to blame themselves for their own 
victimization” (Waller 2007:217). 
13 In the same way as Lacomte (2004), Mukimbiri (2005) defines dehumanization as the third phase of the genocidal process. To 
Stanton Gregory (1996:3) it means the denial of humanity, which justifies impunity when killings occur. The victims are “clearly 
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processes. To Claudia Card (2003), the eliminationist anti-Semitism serves a transitional period 
whereby “genocide inflicts a social death which makes the victims‟ lives, and their termination,  
meaningless” (Waller 2002:197) It also prepares the victims for a mental acceptation of the 
physical termination of their lives as a decision of fate. That is probably why the victims of the 
German Holocaust could line to await their death, and why the Rwandan Tutsi could negotiate 
and pay for „good death‟, that is, death without torture. Importantly, the cooperation of the 
victims with the perpetrators has remained a crucial condition of success in genocidal violence. 
In relation to the Holocaust, Hilberg (1983) said: “A large component of the entire process 
depended on Jewish participation – the simple acts of individuals as well as organized activity in 
councils…German supervisors turned to Jewish councils for information, money, labor, or 
police, and the councils provided them with these means every day of the week.” (Bauman 
2000:23) With such cooperation, the leaders could extend the rules of bureaucratic conduct to the 
Jews so that they participated in their own destruction.  
 
Hilberg (1983) highlights that the Holocaust victims could choose their fate during the 
deportation process. On the road to the ghetto, those who “remained behind would reason that it 
was necessary to sacrifice the few in order to save the many…Those who already knew the truth 
and entertained no illusions still had a choice between a „quick and painless‟ death, and one 
preceded by extra sufferings reserved for the insubordinate.” (Bauman 2000:23) The Jewish 
„cooperation‟ in the destruction of the European Jews remained the last alternative. To illustrate, 
Isaiah Trunk says, “individual cases of disobedience remained ineffective precisely because in so 
many other cases the Nazis could count on Jewish co-operation and hence on perpetrating the 
murderous operation with the deployment of only residual force of their own.” (Bauman 
2000:118) The case of Genghis Khan is another supporting case. When the reputedly 
bloodthirsty Mongols proved to be reluctant to carry out his orders to wipe out the entire 
population of a city, he enforced ruthless methods. As Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) report, “he 
divided the estimated population of the city by the number of his troops to determine how many 
each soldier had to kill, and then ordered each soldier to cut an ear off each victim and deliver 
the ears to his superior officer for counting.” (Staub 1989:5) In this case, there was a clear 
demarcation line between the perpetrators and the victims.  
 
Conversely, there was no such clear-cut line between Jews and Nazi-Germans. Some Jews 
served as victims and, at the same time, as perpetrators. They made their annihilation – by the 
Germans – a smooth process by active participation in coordinated violent actions or by non-
resistance. As Bauman (2000:122) puts it, “the Jews were part of that social arrangement which 
was to destroy them…The Jews could therefore play into the hands of their oppressors, facilitate 
their task, bring closer their own perdition, while guided in their action by the rationally 
interpreted purpose of survival.”14 Not only did they participate through the identification of the 
victims, but they also did so through what has been earlier described as „blaming the victim‟, 
which brings with it „just-world thinking.‟ The subscription to the belief of a fair and just world 
has denoted Jews as deserving violence about which the perpetrators could not have remorse. 
                                                                                                                                                       
defined as something less than fully human” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:28) or of lesser quality. It helps perpetrators to treat 
victims as less than human. In incitement to genocide, the same source reports, “the target groups are called disgusting animal 
names – Nazi propaganda called Jews „rats‟ or „vermin‟; Rwandan Hutu hate radio referred to Tutsis as „cockroaches‟. The 
targeted group is often likened to a „disease‟, „microbes‟, „infections‟ or a „cancer‟ in the body politic.” The denial of humanity 
impacts on people‟s perceptions vis-à-vis the targeted victims. 
14 Emphasis from source. 
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The moral foundation of much evil-doing, Waller (2002:218) suggests, “rests on the principle 
that because of their damaging behaviors, certain individuals or target groups forfeit their rights 
to humane treatment and can be harmed without guilt or remorse.” There is also the role-playing 
of strong coercion.  
 
For instance, the option of non-violence was made fruitless in the German Holocaust. As a result, 
there was active participation of Jews in their own destruction. If they had a choice, Bauman 
(2000:149) suggests, “none of the Jewish councilors or policemen would board the train of self-
destruction. None would help to kill others. None would sink into the „plague-time orgy‟ style of 
corruption. But they did not have that choice. Or, rather, the range of choices had not been set by 
them.” Equally, those born from intermarriages in Rwanda, if they had a choice, would not have 
denied their mothers‟ ethnic affiliation to perpetrate genocide. If they had a choice to make, the 
victims of genocide would not have negotiated and paid for a non-torturing death. In Rwanda, 
the village of Bisesero was the top of the list of exceptional cases to the tendency of victim 
contribution to their own destruction.
15
 On one side or the other, people probably thought they 
could not be killed, as a result of their participation. However, if such participation had not 
occurred, violence would certainly have occurred on a large scale. Their collaboration to 
distinguish the good from the evil was a support for their own annihilation, in many ways. 
 
This brief background provides the discussion with information that an institutional or macro 
level of analysis could not bring up. Therefore, institutions and structures are important to 
understanding ways in which victims cooperate in their own destruction, and how ordinary 
people give support to elite endeavors. However, there are a number of dimensions of 
understanding they fail to touch on. It is suggested that investigation at the micro level provides a 
unique explanation of the potentially explosive reactions of ordinary people. In this regard, this 
study devoted particular attention to ordinary people, understood as “the rank-and-file killers, 
those soldiers, police, militia (paramilitary), and civilians at the bottom of the hierarchy who 
personally carried out the millions of executions,” (Waller 2002:16) and ways in which they 
interacted with the middle-range leaders within a specific framework of grassroots thinking. In 
other words, the study looks at the dynamics of interactions both horizontally – i.e. extraordinary 
ideology formation and the context of cruelty among ordinary people – and vertically – i.e. 
mutual influence between the middle-range leaders and ordinary people.  
Research questions 
 
In connection with the review of existing explanations of popular support for genocidal violence 
in Rwanda, this research addresses one principal question: How could genocide take place in 
Murambi but not in Giti even though they are allegedly homogeneous on cultural and socio-
economic grounds? In other words, what informs the polarization of behavior in allegedly 
culturally and socio-historically homogeneous contexts? Earlier paragraphs have discussed the 
                                               
15 There were some marked exceptions to the tendency of victim contribution to their own destruction, such as in Biserero and 
certain other regions. Bisesero defines a set of hills in Kibuye (Western Province) known for Tutsi resistance to the mobs of 
Interahamwe militia and the elements of the Rwandan Army Forces (FAR) during the 1994 genocide. Overwhelmed, they were 
hungry and tired, and fought with stones and sticks against armed persons. An estimated 30,000 Tutsi died on the hills of Bisesero 
during the fight (Twagirimana 2007:18). Various testimonies identify some more areas of resistance to the 1994 genocide. The 
most cited are Bugesera, Nyamure (in the Mayaga sub-region), Kayumba and Ntarama in the former commune of Kanzenze. 
However, Bisesero rates higher countrywide in terms of its success in resisting violence. 
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resource bases available to the elite to ensure full coverage of participation in violence. However, 
the case of Rwanda shows strong variations (see Figure 1.1) despite the elite‟s full control over 
the security machineries – the military and paramilitary organizations. This study aims to address 
some specific questions to seek empirical explanations for popular support for genocidal 
violence in Rwanda: 
 
1. What level of leadership mattered the most during the course of genocide? Under what 
circumstances did leadership matter? 
2. How did individual political networks among the middle-range leaders affect the genocide? 
3. How did formal and informal structures interact during the genocide? 
4. In what ways did mixed ethnic relations affect the genocide? 
5. What role did migration and displacement of people from the war zone have in the variations 
in the magnitude of the genocide? 
6. What role did civil society organizations play during the genocide? 
7. How did grassroots thinking help to reduce or support the genocide? 
8. Under what circumstances did vulnerability and poor living conditions contribute to genocidal 
violence? 
Scope, interest and focus 
 
This is a study concerning the phenomenon of genocide in Rwanda. With the case studies of Giti 
and Murambi, it concentrates on the pre-genocide period to learn the conditions put in place that 
are likely to explain the responses in these two areas to genocidal violence. This study also 
claims to make a modest contribution of knowledge which peace processes can make use of in 
the post-genocide era. In line with Krystof, there is “something we learn from the case that will 
give us insight and understanding about a phenomenon…and what we learn from the study of 
one of these places will increase our understanding of the concepts and provide a starting point 
for further research.” (Strauss and Cobin 2003: 285) The most important motivation of this study 
relates to the fact that many studies have predicted the recurrence of mass violence. Modernity, 
which has long been seen as a root cause of the Holocaust, is a growing phenomenon that is 
likely to activate such recurrence.  
 
Against such recurrence, Bauman (2000:2) observes modernity as follows: “above all because 
modern society has been all along, is and will remain, an organization designed to roll it back, 
and perhaps even to stamp it out altogether.” In a different context, the same applies to Rwanda. 
In the post-genocide era, the ideology of genocide
16
 was made a common talk of the day from 
2004 onwards, even though it raised controversies. If the findings of the parliamentary 
commission established to examine such ideology of genocide hold, the conclusion would be that 
endogenous factors are likely to fuel genocidal violence. For methodological convenience, this 
study limits itself to the pre-genocide period. 
 
                                               
16 A parliamentary commission was established to examine such ideology, and made the following finding: “… some of Rwandan 
people have not yet changed appropriately, they keep firmly behaving as before, are still characterized by ethnic conflicts and 
discrimination, and are led by genocide ideology which was stretched out from behind for over eighty years.” (Repubulika y‟u 
Rwanda, 2004: 4) 
  
 
29 
As discussed earlier, the study focuses on the polarization of popular support using the Stotland 
model, especially its aggression and cooperation components. Clear criteria for selection – 
discussed further – found two case studies eligible for detailed investigation. First, Murambi 
represents cases whereby people failed to resist the pressure of the manipulation process, 
regardless of whether they had no alternative (cooperation-component) or abandoned their stands 
(withdrawal-component). In this particular area, the study investigates the current Kiziguro and 
Kiramuruzi sectors, after the 2006 administrative reform. It gives attention to the Kiziguro sector 
because it is currently selected to be a pilot for a peace and community development process 
after it was associated with extreme violence (it was the site of the biggest mass grave in the 
area). It is an opportunity for the study to investigate the structure of the pre-conflict social 
fabric. Kiramuruzi neighbors Kiziguro, and was comparatively less violent. It has also been 
selected for an intensive empirical study in order to investigate what makes them different. Giti 
represents one of those areas where people strongly fought the threats of all kinds to avoid 
violence (aggression-component). It has been selected as an exceptionally unique case, which 
successfully resisted the state-led project of genocide. 
 
This study is an opportunity to investigate the means by which Giti deviated from the norms of 
the day. In other words, the focus is to explain how people in this area resisted the power of 
those in power, the top-level leadership whose intentions were to have a genocide project 
implemented, as Prunier (1995) argues. To him, the ruling elite could convey messages to the 
entire population, which would turn instrumental: 
 
A common feature of all the massacres is that they were preceded by political meetings 
during which a „sensibilization‟ process was carried out. These seemed to have been 
designed to put the local peasants „in the mood‟, to drum into them that the people they 
were soon to kill were ibyitso, i.e., actual or potential collaborators of the RPF arch-
enemy. These meetings were always presided over and attended by the local authorities 
with whom the peasants were familiar; but they also usually featured the presence of an 
„important person‟ who would come from Kigali to lend the event an aura of added 
respectability and official sanction. (Bhavnani and Backer 2000:304-5) 
 
The public knowledge available says that central government leaders took part in organizing 
political meetings in both Murambi and Giti. As a result, the middle-level leaders encouraged 
genocide in Murambi, while conversely they played a significant role in disrupting the process of 
genocide in Giti. Hence, the middle-level leaders are held responsible for the levels of success of 
fomenting genocide in a mutual contribution towards shared beliefs and perceptions vis-à-vis 
Tutsi, as Staub (1989:23) contends. To Staub, the middle-level leaders consider the cultural 
requirements when they engage in manipulation campaigns. As he put it, “Leaders also 
intentionally adjust their style and vision to the group. The idea is that environmental and 
cultural preconditions were present for one to predict that Germans would probably perpetrated 
violence against Jews without Hitler.” Thus, this study needs to investigate whether the 
intermediate level of leadership has been complementary to the process of shared beliefs and 
perceptions, to bring ordinary people to commit mass violence. 
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Methodological approach 
 
This study is predominantly a theoretical dissertation, in which empirical materials are linked to 
the theoretical discussion in an exploratory way, rather than testing theoretical claims 
qualitatively or quantitatively. Three pillars are selected to support the explanation of popular 
support for genocidal violence in the case studies. One is the level of leadership (top, middle and 
grassroots levels of leadership). Second is the extraordinary ideology formation 
(dehumanization, „us-them‟ thinking, anti-Tutsi ideology, blaming the other). Third is the 
context of cruelty (shared beliefs and perception about Tutsi, the just-world thinking, victims and 
perpetrators participation). These pillars are part of the explanation while, at the same time, each 
have some explanatory gaps. For instance, given the available data, the study cannot make a test 
and, therefore, form a clear conclusion, regarding whether the level of leadership matters more 
so than the extraordinary ideology formation or the context of cruelty. The study mainly 
references descriptive data, which variously support one or another direction. Hence, the 
explanation of popular support for genocidal violence cannot be seen solely as a mono-causal 
phenomenon. The pillars are taken together as a multi-theoretical model, or a multi-level 
analysis. In so doing, the study addresses the gaps of individual pillars and, at the same time, 
consolidates their strengths for thorough explanation. 
 
To this end, the empirical study collected information on persons‟ lives, lived experiences, 
behaviors, emotions and feelings. Qualitative approaches ensued, whereby a non-mathematical 
process of data collection was “carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and 
relationship in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme.” 
(Strauss and Cobin 1998:11) To this end, “a written list of questions and topics that need to be 
covered in a particular order” (Bernard 2000:191) was established to collect raw data, on the 
basis of which systematic comparison is made between Giti and Murambi. Against the case 
studies, the study compares a number of parameters, such as hindrances to violence, institutions 
for obedience, economic activity and income distribution, migration and land access, 
demographic profile, educational characteristics, cultural differences and similarities, elite 
relations, bottom-up relations, and relief of hardships.  
 
Given that the fieldwork was carried out 14 years after the genocidal violence, it is expected that 
this time lag may have affected the views of the informants. Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
interviewees responded entirely from their own views or rather from what they had heard from 
other people and sources. The shift to a national common civic identity – through political 
socialization – in the aftermath of the genocide might have informed some of the views and 
perceptions of the informants. Hence, different empirical claims further presented – in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six – are not understood as facts, truth or proven evidence. The interviews do not 
make conclusions. As descriptive material, they rather open the ground for further research 
projects. Throughout those chapters, the contribution of this thesis is – in terms of first-hand 
information – what local informants consider to be the factors that made people in Murambi 
engage in violence and not in Giti.  
 
The empirical material only provides supporting work, since the interviewees think and express 
how they perceive the phenomenon under study, but they cannot necessarily „prove‟ what they 
are saying. In this regard, some claims in the empirical chapters might perceivedly sound as 
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facts. The theoretical chapters look to the existing literature to find support for those claims. In 
summary, the findings further presented consist of perceptions about how people make sense of 
genocidal violence and about popular support within the framework of leadership. In other 
words, this study brings up the voices of people on the various parameters set out above. 
Therefore, no specific generalizations can be drawn from the raw data, since they are not „facts‟, 
but are rather indications. The data collection process went through three main phases: the pilot 
study, the main fieldwork, and the follow-up study. 
Administration formalities and access to the informants 
 
Running an empirical research in Rwanda has required a formal authorization issued by 
Rwandan authorities. The latter have comprised mayors who lead the districts, which include the 
research sites. With the support of the National University of Rwanda – an institution I work for 
– a formal application was addressed to the mayors and copied to the minister of local 
government. The authorities issued a recommendation letter to be presented to individual persons 
identified as „elite‟, before appointments for individual interviews were booked. Executive 
secretaries ensured the authorization was issued and, in turn, commended the cell and settlement 
levels to cooperate.  
 
The criteria for eligible informants were discussed with the cell authorities that served as contact 
persons in a research site I was not familiar with. As a result of physical contact, the research 
team established the criteria for eligibility to focus group discussions. They included, inter alia: 
(1) social majority; (2) victims of genocide; relatives of perpetrators of genocide and returnees; 
(3) balance of sex; (4) grassroots role models in various spheres of life (e.g., Gacaca Judges, 
conciliators, village shopkeepers, primary and high school teachers, medical staff, and religious); 
and (5) to belong to the cell from where the focus group takes place. In numerous cases, subjects 
may meet more than one criterion. The criteria were made numerous to control for, or at least to 
minimize, unexpected biases. Cell authorities only intervened in practical arrangements, and did 
not interfere in the process of data collection.  
 
This process made use of the sessions for participatory jurisdictions (known as Gacaca) and for 
Community Works (also known as Umuganda) to select informants for focus group discussions. 
On methodological grounds, however, there were concerns about the homogeneity of views. 
Without relevant intuition, there was a feeling that the study would leave away the views of 
those who would not attend these sessions the time informants are selected. With the benefit of 
the triangulation methods of data collection, on the one hand, and of the criteria established prior 
to the interviews themselves, on the other hand, the study ensured success in the attempts to 
overcome these concerns. The focus group interviews performed a role of major importance. 
They involved a number of informants to discuss various topics. For Neuman (2003:292), focus 
group interviews establish “secondary social interaction between two strangers with the explicit 
purpose of one person‟s obtaining specific information from the other…Information is obtained 
in a structured conversation in which the interviewer asks prearranged questions and records 
answers, and the respondent answers.” Participants in smaller and relatively homogeneous 
groups of 10 to 15 individuals were asked to reflect on different topics. At the same time, the 
interviewees could help to identify the people they considered as the most influential in their 
respective communities, who later became subjects of individual interviews.  
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The data collection progressed until adequate information was collected in order to respond to 
the research questions. For Morse (1994), “adequacy refers to the amount of data collected, 
rather than to the number of subjects as in quantitative research. Adequacy is attained when 
sufficient data has been collected that saturation occurs.” (Neuman 2003: 439) According to 
Strauss and Cobin (1998:292), saturation takes place when “no new data are being unearthed. 
Any data would only add, in a minor way, to the many variations of major patterns.” This means 
that the number of interviews and focus group discussions is not the most important factor to 
consider in a qualitative research. The size of the communities researched enabled saturation to 
be reached earlier. They are rural areas, where everyone is close to everyone else, with intense 
social interactions. After running only a small number of interviews, it was difficult to obtain 
new information. At the stage of saturation, the fieldwork had run 33 individual interviews and 
nine focus group discussions. 
 
To conclude, the fieldwork has greatly benefited from the strong cooperation of grassroots 
leaders. It ensured easy access to interviewees in areas not familiar to the researcher. The 
researcher was a university teacher from the oldest academic institution in Rwanda. The 
researcher‟s status increased the propensity for the grassroots-level interviewees to disclose 
information to someone they perceived as knowledgeable. At a national level, personal 
connections with a number of elite played an important role in access to interviewees. Making 
use of these connections facilitated the booking of appointments for interviews with people who 
would be otherwise difficult to access. Under these conditions, to refer to Neuman (2003), there 
was no need to establish the social relationship as the case was at grassroots level, where the 
researcher and interviewees were unknown to one another.  
 
Rather, conversation about private and family matters mostly served as a smooth transition or 
preamble to the scheduled interview. The more the pre-established the social relationship, the 
more that trust increased, to the benefit of an effective interviewing process. Thus, connections 
with some elites and the researcher‟s connection with a university community were the main 
factors that facilitated easy access to the national elite. Since many of them hold higher levels of 
academic qualifications and social positions, these factors encouraged them to speak freely to the 
researcher. There was less room for a complex of superiority/inferiority. At the end of the 
session, most interviewees could help to identify others they thought would relevantly contribute 
to this project, and to arrange appointments with them. With this discussion, the methodological 
rule of snowball sampling played a crucial role to identify the informants on the ground. 
The units of analysis and identification on the ground 
 
As mentioned earlier, this project is qualitative-oriented, and focuses on “people who can offer 
expert explanations and who represent the intra-cultural variations” (Bernard 2000:144) available 
in Rwanda. Since it is interested in cultural data collection it requires talking to cultural experts
17
 
who have first-hand information. Informants were taken from three main social categories. 
 
                                               
17 They are being known as informants, distinguished from respondents understood from the accounts of anthropologists and 
sociologists. In this particular study, informants refer to those chosen “because they offer insight into something that they are best 
able to talk about – their own lives” (Bernard 2000: 192) in their respective communities. 
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The first included the section of the non-elite, understood as ordinary people in different 
terminology. The first-hand information was collected to investigate ways in which the common 
citizenry accommodate social power within specific grassroots thinking. They represent the 
peasantry, living on farming or pastoral activities, on handicraft, and craftswomen and craftsmen. 
Only mature individuals – from both male and female categories – aged 25 years and above were 
selected, for one important reason. They are generally the age group of people who commit 
extraordinary evil (Waller 2002), as Melvern (2000) earlier observed in Rwanda. They were 
selected to report on the state of mind (extraordinary ideology formation), on the circumstances 
(context of cruelty) under which ordinary people engaged in/resisted violence, and on ways in 
which ordinary people interacted with the top and middle-level leaders before and during the 
mass violence in Rwanda. 
 
Secondly, the study has dealt with the elite at the local level. With the interviews at this level, the 
study gathered knowledge about the intermediation of the middle-range leaders between the 
common citizenry and the top-level leadership. In the terminology of Lederach (1997), they 
correspond with the middle-level leaders and the grassroots leaders. In a localized context, they 
were selected from settlement (Umudugudu) elected representatives, cell and sector 
representatives, District Council (Njyanama), the District Executive Council (Nyobozi), women 
and youth structures, village teachers, medical staff, village shopkeepers and farm-owners, 
opinion leaders, grassroots leaders, mediators (Abunzi), and participatory jurisdiction (Gacaca) 
judges known as Inyangamugayo. They are privileged targets because they form a concerted 
conglomeration of the local elite that ensures ordinary people fully implement the orders from 
the top-level of leadership (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, Melvern 2000). Des Forges (1995) earlier 
identified them as the local state representative in the „micromanagement‟ of genocide. The 
middle-level leaders were selected to report on how they served as intermediaries between the 
top-level leaders and ordinary people. The grassroots leaders were selected as skilled people in 
close day-to-day contact with ordinary people, to report on how they fit in the chain of mass 
mobilization. 
 
The third category is that of the national elite or the top-level leadership (Lederach 1997). This 
refers to “the very small number of people who control the key material, symbolic and political 
resources within [various institutions].” (Reis and Moore 2005:2) This category provided the 
study with data on the exercise of power to the middle-range level of leadership within strong 
hierarchical structures. The study targeted the following clusters: parliamentarians from both the 
senate and deputy chambers, ministers, political party
18
 members, public bureaucrats, and 
individuals working with the private sector federation, trade unions, mass media, educational and 
professional organizations, research associations, and religious institutions. As the list of „in-
depth interviews‟ (see Appendices) shows, many of the informants selected from this category 
had in the past moved from one cluster to another. They responded to the questionnaire from 
various backgrounds, as the clusters overlap. 
                                               
18 The national elites were selected from the political parties registered with the Ministry of Local government and working in 
accordance with the law in Rwanda. They include, inter alia: (1) the Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR-Inkotanyi); (2) the Liberal 
Party (PL); (3) the Democratic Popular Union (UDPR); (4) the Ideal Democratic Party (PDI); (5) the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD); (6) the Concord Progressive Party (PPC); (7) the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC); (8) the Rwandan Socialist Party 
(PSR); and (9) the Prosperity and Solidarity Party (PSP). 
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Sampling methods 
 
Given that this study is interested in understanding a process by which ordinary people respond 
to genocidal violence, it has an implication on the sampling methods. Hence, it has no need in 
individual-attribute data because it does not need to estimate parameters, as it is the case in 
probability sampling. In similar studies, Bernard (2000:144) suggests, “You want people who 
can offer expert explanations and who represent the intercultural variation that we find in all 
societies.” There is strong interest in cultural data that require cultural experts. Therefore, non-
probability sampling methods ensue. However, the philosophy of representativity still holds. To 
a certain extent, non-probability methods bear that element. As Bernard (2000:178) put it, “all 
samples are representative of something. The trick is to make them representative of what you 
want them to be.”19 The empirical data is representative of different views and perceptions about 
the structures and dynamics of social relations that drive popular support for genocidal violence. 
Since this study deals with persons‟ lives, lived experiences, behavior, emotions and feelings, 
purposive (or judgment) and snowball-sampling methods are the most appropriate. 
 
Judgment Sampling 
 
Judgment sampling also identifies as purposive sampling. It served two main purposes in the 
study. First, it helped to select the case studies on the basis of clear judgment. Second, it guided 
the pilot phase of this study. Bernard (2000:176) said that judgment samples “are used widely in 
pilot studies before testing a hypothesis with a representative sample.”  
 
In other words, judgment sampling served as a pre-test of the “questionnaires to make sure that 
the items are unambiguous and not too threatening” (Bernard 2000:178, 214) before the large-
scale investigation took place. The questionnaire has thus evolved until saturation or adequacy 
occurred (Morse 1994, Strauss and Cobin 1998, Neuman 2003). By this is meant that adequacy 
was a condition limiting the sample size. As an application to this study, no one should expect 
the possibility of an “over-all sampling design that tells you how many of each type of 
informants you need for a study.” (Bernard 2000:178) As the bases for judgment increasingly 
varied while on the field, the sample size was determined after saturation occurred. It means that 
the sample size depended on the degree of imagination of the bases for judgment. 
 
Snowball sampling 
 
At different levels of leadership (Lederach 1997), the elite are in a population that is difficult to 
find. To Bernard (2000:179), they are “any small population for which it is impossible to 
construct a sampling frame”; they are “people who‟d rather not be exposed.” Statistically they 
are fewer, scattered all over the country and not accessible to ordinary people. In Rwanda, the 
census held in 2002 has observed a drastic decrease in numbers of the elite, as a result of 
genocidal violence and migrations. Only 10.5% and 0.8%, respectively, had attended secondary 
schools and institutions of higher learning (Republic of Rwanda 2004:32). The same phenomena 
drastically affected the informal elite. In addition to this scarcity, they were not easily noticeable 
and about it was difficult to determine who exactly had the expert information the study was 
                                               
19 Emphasis from source. 
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looking for. Earlier discussion shows that the first informants – of both the formal and informal 
elite – to be interviewed helped to identify others who could relevantly contribute to the 
empirical study until saturation occurred. The snowball sampling method served adequately this 
purpose. 
 
Contrary to Kadushin (1968), this study did not construct a preliminary list to be shown to 
informants in order to name others. Under the inspiration of judgment sampling, informants were 
made to construct a list during the course of the interview “until the list becomes „saturated‟ – 
that is, until no new names are offered.” (Bernard 2000:179) With this sampling method, it was 
easy to identify and access people who were traditionally thought to be difficult to access for 
interview. Of course, the snowball sampling method ran the risk of having a homogeneous 
sample. To negate of this risk, the study diversified the social categories – e.g., age, geographical 
location, coverage of the sites, gender sensitivity, urbanity/rurality, well-off/worse-off, 
experience with neighboring countries, residence during genocide time, the diversity of 
backgrounds, among many other categories – from which the units of analysis were selected. In 
so doing, it followed the advice by Bernard (2000:175) “not to choose respondents who are 
pretty much like themselves; not to select only people who they would enjoy interviewing; not to 
avoid people whom they would find obnoxious or hostile; not to avoid people who are hard to 
contact (busy people who are hardly ever at home, or people who work nights and sleep days); 
and not to favor people who are eager to be interviewed.” On the basis of this snowball sampling 
method, the study interviewed 33 persons of the elite at both the local and national level after it 
found that additional data were adding in only a minor way to the many variations of major 
patterns, as Strauss and Cobin (1998) suggested. 
Techniques for data collection 
 
The study collected first-hand information (primary data) and secondary sources. Face-to-face 
contacts, findings of studies by local sociologists and anthropologists and various reports at 
district level were given most attention. The combination of unstructured interviews, semi-
structured interviews and group discussions has served the purpose of triangulation in the data 
collection process. 
 
Unstructured interviewing 
 
Unstructured interviewing consisted of standardized open-ended interviews, which allowed for 
high quality data in the social context of the elite and non-elite. Small groups of 10 to 15 
individuals were formed, and were asked to reflect on pre-designed questions, in the same way 
as Bernard (2000:191) advises: “Unstructured interviews are based on a clear plan that you keep 
constantly in mind…characterized by a minimum of control over the respondent‟s 
responses…The idea is to get people to open up and let them express themselves in their own 
terms, and at their own pace…” In this particular study, to cite Harvey L. Gochros, this technique 
is relevant in that it helped to put hands on “the respondents‟ deepest feelings and experiences 
and may well uncover emotions, attitudes, and beliefs” (Grinnell 2005: 276) about the general 
topics suggested for discussion. The same technique was also used to collect data from the 
informal elite. 
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Semi-structured interviewing 
 
This technique is designed for interviewing the elite, “people who are accustomed to efficient 
use of their time.” (Bernard 2000:191). It is useful to situations “where the time for collecting 
data from any single respondent is constrained.” (Ibid) It is recommended for various reasons. 
Firstly, the elite use time efficiently. Secondly, they can handle a certain level of abstraction and 
can summarize their views. Thirdly, as an interviewer, you can be “fully in control of what you 
want from an interview but [this method] leaves both you and your respondent to follow new 
leads.” (Bernard 2000:191) In other words, according to Harvey L. Gochros, the semi-structured 
interview gives considerable latitude “to interviewers to explore in their own way matters 
pertaining to the research question being studied.” (Grinnell 2005: 276)  
Analytic strategies for data analysis 
 
According to Lawrence Neuman (2003:440), qualitative researchers, “begin analysis early in 
research project, while they are still collecting data. The results of early data analysis guide 
subsequent data collection. Thus, analysis is less a distinct final stage of research than a 
dimension of research that stretches across all stages.” Also, Rubin and Rubin (1995:226) 
conclude that data analysis begins while the interviews are still going on: the “preliminary 
analysis tells you how to redesign your questions to focus on central themes as you continue 
interviewing. After the interviewing is complete, you begin a more detailed and fine-grained 
analysis of what your conversational partners told you. In this formal analysis, you discover 
additional themes and concepts and build toward an overall explanation.” As the data collection 
instruments continued to change until saturation occurred, this indicates that this study followed 
the above methodologies. After the data collection process, the scribing phase showed that the 
raw material tackled various aspects.  
 
Similar aspects were translated into themes
20
 under which the study sorted the raw material. In so 
doing, the study complied with Rubin and Rubin (1995:227) who recommend to “put into one 
category all the material from all your interviews that speaks to one theme or concept. Compare 
material within the categories to look for variations and nuances in meanings. The goal is to 
integrate the themes and concepts into a theory that offers an accurate, detailed, yet subtle 
interpretation of your research arena. The analysis is complete when you feel that you can share 
with others what your interpretation means for policymaking, for theory, and for understanding 
the social and political world.” This process provided an opportunity to reduce and elaborate data 
(Becker 1970, Lofland 1971, Charmaz 1983, 1995, Miles and Huberman 1994). In another 
perspective, Strauss and Cobin (1998) talk about „coding‟. They say that the data analysis phase 
“organizes the raw data into conceptual categories and creates themes or concepts, which [it] 
then uses to analyze data.” (Neuman 2003: 441) This organization broke into new conceptual 
categories,
21
 which gave new insights into the adaptation of the research question.  
                                               
20 At the scribing phase of the study, the raw information was summarized into thirteen themes: (1) Cultural interpretation of 
violence; (2) Economic activity and income distribution; (3) Migration and land access; (4) Demographic profile (5) Educational 
characteristics; (6) Socio-economic characteristics; (7) Deviating views; (8) Scale of power to influence; (9) Informal elite; (10) A 
bottom-up influence; (11) Relating the elite to colonization; (12) Supernatural-inheritance of power; (13) Structure of horizontal 
relation in practice; (14) Church-dependant power; (15) Key actors in conflict; and (16) people-centered elite interventions. 
21 The themes at scribing phase were reduced into the following conceptual categories: hindrances to violence; institutions for 
obedience; economic activity and income distribution; migration and land access; demographic profile; educational characteristics 
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The presentation of the empirical chapters follows the narrative strategy. It assembles “the data 
into a descriptive picture or account of what occurred, but as much as possible…the data [was 
left] to „speak for themselves‟.” (Neuman 2003:448-9) The narrative strategy was selected to 
provide readers with detailed knowledge, given that some may be unfamiliar to the topic, or find 
the subject matter sensitive. It is an ethical concern that Strauss and Cobin (2003:283) 
summarize as follows: “if it is anticipated that the substantive area is entirely unfamiliar to most 
readers, then it is likely that the inclusion of many quotations will enable readers to fill out the 
descriptive blanks in their heads. Also, if the final theoretical formulation is likely to be viewed 
skeptically by readers, then the researcher is likely to punch home his or her argument with many 
quotations that function essentially as convincing items (e.g., „See, this is what they say and 
think‟).” Since some aspects of genocide against Tutsi have raised disagreements between 
politicians and academics around the world, this analytical strategy is appropriate in order to 
clarify some disagreements that might arise from this discussion. 
Research ethics 
 
In the Buganza sub-region, like many of the areas of Rwanda, many people are not very familiar 
with academic-oriented interviews. The concept of „interview‟ – translated as iperereza – which 
used to involve criminal inquiry, is still understood as „police or intelligence-related 
investigations‟ to many in Rwanda. In addition to this legacy, the fieldwork was run in the 
aftermath of genocide, a time when suspicion of strangers and of the discussion of sensitive 
topics was heightened. It was also carried out not long after the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) had threatened to attack Rwanda. There was a latent panic that 
any stranger could be a spy. In this context, time was required to build trust among ordinary 
people before information could be elicited. 
 
Upon the presentation of various administrative papers, various questions were put to the 
researcher: Who are you? Where do you come from? Why did you select this research area? 
What is the purpose of the study? What do we benefit from the study? Similar questions were 
adequately addressed to meet an ethical decision to collect the empirical data the way Bernard 
(2000:201) prescribes. Once that decision is made, he posits, “you are responsible for what is 
done with that information, and you must protect people from becoming emotionally burdened 
for having talked to you.” As a result of a brief introduction (Rwandan from the Western 
Province, University lecturer, PhD student, and so on), the informants opened up to ask any 
related questions before the consent to disclose information was issued under the condition of 
confidentiality. Through this consent form, the informants consented to being recorded. For the 
sake of confidentiality, the informants were given codes in the text (i.e., Int. n° or Foc. n°, which 
respectively mean „interview‟ and „focus group‟ number), and are described by the place where 
they come from, and by the social positions they held in the past and presently (see In-depth 
interviews in the appendices).  
 
As the introduction proceeded, there was no room for identity-related questions to arise. It is 
officially unlawful, and there was no room for such details to be revealed. Any deviance would 
                                                                                                                                                       
cultural differences/similarities; social relations – elite and bottom-up relations – and relief of hardships. These variables are 
further discussed in the empirical chapters. 
  
 
38 
result in contravening the law that regulates the ideology of genocide, which is also punishable. 
At community level, at least, people tend to keep an eye on each other in matters regarding 
ethnicity. Of course, with the wounds of genocide and its consequences still fresh, some 
informants were not comfortable with ethnicity-related questions at the beginning. Over time, 
however, observation showed that it was a relief to those who dared to speak about traumatic 
experiences. One of the unexpected outcomes of the empirical research was that it became a 
form of debriefing. 
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This is a historical chapter that describes how the „us‟ and „them‟ thinking has been constructed 
in Rwanda. It mainly emphasizes the historical myth variable. In order to assess the arguments, it 
looks into five major parameters: (1) the leadership (the top, middle-range and grassroots levels 
of leadership); (2) social power (levels of social control); (3) ordinary people; (4) popular 
support or obedience; and (5) the grassroots thinking (beliefs and perception about the „other‟, 
the essentialism, social constructivism schools of identity). In the course of discussion, the 
conceptual definitions – abstractions that facilitate the comprehension – and operational 
definitions – the set of instructions on how to measure the concepts related to these parameters22 
(Bernard 2000:38) are detailed. In so doing, the study intends to establish the inter-linkages 
under which the parameters are understood not as separate pieces, but as a multi-theoretical 
model to understand the levels of support for genocidal violence in Rwanda. 
Leadership 
 
The concept of leadership is not understood from its classical perspective. Rather it is used to 
define the elite operating at the levels of leadership, as earlier discussed in relation to Lederach. 
Emphasis is here put on the formal elite and, to a certain level, on the informal elite who have 
been absent from theoretical discussions to date. The bases for identification set a clear-cut 
distinction between the elite and non-elite. Importantly, they serve as opportunities for the elite 
to carry out their will over the non-elite. It is also true that the capacities to carry out such will 
differ from one cluster of elite to another, depending on various circumstances. The concept of 
elite is discussed to investigate the capacities of the social category it stands for and the 
circumstances under which the same category carries out its will over the non-elite. 
 
In the past, the definition of the concept of „elite‟ varied from time to time. It originally 
described the “commodities of particular excellence [and] was later extended to refer to superior 
social groups” (Bottomore 1964a:1) back to the seventeenth century. During that time, according 
to the same source, these groups included the crack military units or the higher ranks of nobility. 
With time, the classical literature has identified „the elite‟ as a concept understood in binary 
opposition to „non-elites‟.23 Fundamentally, it has highlighted strong inequality of personal 
endowment in every sphere of life to distinguish the „elite‟ from the „non-elite.‟ As Bottomore 
(1964a:2) put it, this inequality translates two strata in a population such as: “(1) A lower 
stratum, the non-elite, with whose possible influence on government we are not just concerned; 
(2) a higher stratum, the elite” which comprises a governing elite and a non-governing elite. As 
the thinking goes, Pareto (1935) assumes that “people are unequal physically, as well as 
intellectually and morally. In society as a whole, and in any of its particular strata and groupings, 
some people are more gifted than others.” (Coser 1977)24 People, Etzioni-Halevy (1993:20) 
stresses, “are unequal in their personal endowments.” Similarly, George Orwell concludes, 
„some are more equal than others‟, while Ralph Miliband adds that „some are more plural than 
others‟.  
 
                                               
22 Emphasis from source. 
23 In most literature, the elites are opposed to the „masses‟.  The concept „mass‟ seems to be the terminology that fits with 
industrial societies, while it sounds pejorative in developing worlds. This study refers to that concept to mean „non-elites‟, 
„ordinary people‟, „the peasantry‟ or „commoners,‟ for convenience, in an interchangeable manner. 
24 http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Pareto/PARETOW7.HTML: visited on 6th September 2005. 
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This means that “some are more powerful or influential than others” in political processes 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993:13). For Pareto (1935), those “who are the most capable (though not 
necessarily the most honest) in any particular area of activity may be called an elite.” (Etzioni-
Halevy 1993:20) For Etzioni-Halevy, there are strong variations in personal endowments even 
among the elite themselves.  As Mills puts it, “there are obviously gradations of power and of 
opportunities to decide within modern society.” (Etzioni and Etzioni 1964:129) Therefore, the 
elite carry out their will over the non-elite in different styles. For instance, the corporate rich and 
the high warlord – in their coinciding interests –  “have benefited the most in their enhanced 
power [to the detriment of the professional politician].” (Etzioni and Etzioni 1964:128) The same 
is said of pre-genocide Rwanda. During genocide, the military and the paramilitary organizations 
are widely cited to have been the most important actors in decision-making processes. And the 
more power they had, the more the elite carried out their will on the common citizenry for 
different purposes. Regardless of the context of violence or of non-violence, this pattern holds 
true in many societies. 
 
Across most ages and in most places – to refer to Mills again – the elite have been “people 
whose positions within organizations have provided them the greatest amounts of wealth, power, 
and often prestige of any such positions in the nation.” (Simon 2006:13) In other words, the elite 
have benefited in various fields of life at the expense of the common citizenry. Clapham 
(1985:52) highlights those who acquired western education, and the social distance their social 
conditions create. As they move into well-paid modern sector jobs, the fact is “accompanied very 
often by physical distance as they move into towns where they can enjoy an appropriate life style 
and, even within the towns, enclose themselves in separate residential areas.” Theoretically, they 
reduce their capacities to carry out their will over the common citizenry as the distance widens. 
The elite are nonetheless distributed across various fields of life. According to Etzioni-Halevy 
(1993:21), they may “be a group of warriors, a group of religious functionaries, a landholding 
aristocracy, a wealth-holding or a knowledge-holding class, or some combination of these.”  
 
To build on Hussain‟s (1979:44-5) perspectives, the definition of the elite is context-specific, and 
probably refers to the most elusive concept. The elite might be in the military or come from 
political, bureaucratic, capitalist, managerial, cultural, or religious circles involved in the 
constellations of power (Dogan 2003:1). One or many of these circles selectively applied in 
identifying the elite in different periods of the past. For instance, Reinhard (1996:7) considers the 
elite as “the people who really matter in the political system, especially in the process of state 
building, and nothing more.” Referring to formal education, the concept of elite defined 
knowledgeable people in Rwanda. In the USA, the elite identified those who occupied positions 
in the “society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily 
affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women.” (Mills 1959:3) Of course, further 
discussion shows that the interaction between the elite and ordinary people is not always top-
down. 
 
Mills identifies the upper political, military, and corporate economic personnel as dominating 
institutional structures in modern society. Together, he suggests, “they form a conglomeration of 
power or a „power elite‟, which manipulates the masses into accepting its rule.” (Etzioni-Halevy 
1993:22) Also, Dogan (2003:1) highlights the conglomeration aspect of power. To him, the elite 
include a few thousand individuals who belong to the highest circles of power, while those of 
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lesser importance gravitate around them. In Pareto‟s perspective, the former might define those 
who directly or indirectly take part in the government – e.g., the governing elite – and non-
governing elite who define all others endowed with excellence in their areas of specialization 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993:20). The governing elite, according to Bottomore (1964a: 2), include 
“individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government, and a non-
governing elite, comprising the rest.”25 The definition of „governing elite‟ fits in Reis and 
Moore‟s (2005:2) view of „elite‟. To a larger extent, they mean “the people who occupy 
commanding positions within the set of institutions that are most salient to national political 
influence and policy-making within a country.” It means, to paraphrase Mann (1996:7), people 
who occupy supervisory and coordinating positions and who have an immense organizational 
superiority over other people under their responsibilities. To refer to Jacob Burckhardt (1943), 
the elite are the „great men‟ who are all that ordinary people are not. As Beiton et al. (2002.73) 
paraphrase Aron, for instance, the elite include the political class – the minority of which is 
engaged in political duties for the government – and the governing class. Since these people are 
in commanding positions of the national political institutions,
26
 the concept of elite is perceived 
as complex. 
 
In this context, the dominant elite in society are those who jointly “constitute a plurality of 
competing interest groups, a single „ruling class‟.” (Shore 2002:2) Against this „interest‟ 
definition, Reinhard (1996:6) views the elite as the “groups who, in their own interest, promoted 
the growth of state power more-or-less continuously for so many centuries, and had the means to 
do so successfully.” At least, it is theoretically supported that different actors unite to seek their 
interest. This is what the same source terms „collective egoism‟, as a distinctive feature of the 
elite. According to this view, society is composed of social groups and networks instead of basic 
units of isolated individuals. To recall Rousseau‟s perspective, Reinhard (1996) suggests that 
“the holders of power in a state did not only develop their own interest, but also a specific group-
consciousness based on interests.” (Ibid) In the context of collective egoism, there is strong 
uncertainty about whether “the interest of the power elites is also the interest of the people as a 
whole.” (Reinhard 1996:18) Group-consciousness based on interests has always made it possible 
to predict the support of the elite according to certain social categories.  
 
With the development of the „in-group‟ or clique known as Akazu27 or the “inner circle of Hutu 
nationalists” (Millwood 1996:17), Rwanda is taken as an illustration. The fact that absolute 
regimes patronize some of their citizens makes this prediction a common phenomenon. In most 
cases, group-consciousness based on interests has interfered with the „public politics‟. Not only 
does group-consciousness focus on the achievement of state goals to serve individual purposes, 
according to Clapham (1982:1-2), it also selectively applies the law when it is time to 
compensate the victims for the costs incurred by the state. Hence the „public politics‟, driven by 
group consciousness based on interests, fuel tension among people who, in turn, dichotomize 
                                               
25 Emphasis from source. 
26 The standard list of national political institutions used in this study is: “representative political institutions (legislatures, 
presidencies, cabinets, political parties); the civilian public bureaucracy; the armed forces and the police; large companies and 
business organizations; large landowners‟ interest organizations; trade unions; the mass media; prominent educational and 
professional organizations; voluntary associations; and religious institutions.” (Reis and Moore 2005:2) 
27 Akazu literary means a small house. In the political milieu, it was used as a jargon to means a small group of power people 
around President Habyarimana. It included f his wife‟s family, as well as other cronies in the administration and the army (Uvin 
2001:79-80). 
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into opposing factions. The existence of such group-consciousness is therefore an indication that 
public politics barely operates fully according to the public ideal. In any state, he purports, “there 
are sections, groups and individuals who pursue their interests independently of, or in opposition 
to, any conception of public interest, and who, most importantly, are prepared to subvert or to 
circumvent the public decision-making procedures of the state in order to do so.” In Rousseau‟s 
terms, this is an indication of the absence of the concept of „community‟ in the sense of a nation.  
 
To this background, the amount of power only matters to distinguish the elite from the non-elite. 
If powers to decide national issues, Wright Mills suggests, “were shared in an absolutely equal 
way, there would be no power elites…but only radical homogeneity. At the opposite extreme as 
well, if the power to decide issues were absolutely monopolized by one small group…there 
would simply be this small group in command, and below it, the undifferentiated, dominated 
mass.” (Etzioni and Etzioni 1964:128) The elite, the small group in command, is not 
homogeneous at all in terms of decision-making. Neither are they united. According to Etzioni 
and Etzioni (1964:131), they “are frequently in some tension; they only come together on certain 
coinciding points and only on certain occasions of crisis.” To recall Des Forges (1995), crises 
support the macro and micromanagement of genocide. Rwanda remains a definitive illustration 
of consensus for violence among individuals and structures, which formerly disagreed on many 
national issues. 
 
The bases for leadership 
 
The above discussion establishes that the concept of elite is context-specific. If the elite are said 
to manipulate ordinary people into accepting its rule, this concept can also be understood as 
socially constructed. Variations and gradations of power and of opportunities to decide and get 
full support of ordinary people vary from one context to another. Importantly, individual 
perception and judgment among ordinary people matter in deciding who to support or not. 
Particular circumstances and conditions give substance to the perception and judgment 
individuals develop vis-à-vis the elite. Hardships and grassroots thinking help understanding 
these circumstances and conditions for popular support in Rwanda. To this end, two theoretical 
debates are discussed. 
 
One is the Marxian perspective. It views the „big economic man‟ to be the most eligible elite. 
Control over material resources is the key element in conducting the analysis of classes (Etzioni-
Halevy 1993:13). This view is only valid in the context of capitalism. Against the means of 
production, Marx distinguishes at least two classes: “those who own and control them (the ruling 
class), and those who do not (the exploited class). The class that controls the means of material 
production also controls the means of mental production; thus it rules not only economically, but 
also by disseminating its ideology.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:14) This concurs with Marx and 
Engels, who associate the ruling classes with the „ruling ideas.‟ Later, Shore (2002:2) also 
subscribes, as he relates the class to dominant material and intellectual forces. To him, those who 
“for reasons of history, social status, economic position, political office or family connections, 
are the de facto power holders whose interests and normative values set the agenda and define 
the „natural order of things‟.” This means, to recall Robert L. Peterson (1963), that “class is the 
totality of people in any particular society who occupy a similar position in regard to social, 
  
 
45 
economic, and political status.” (Astiz 1969:22) In this context, the concept of „ruling class‟ is 
interchangeably used with that of „elite‟.  
 
However, Reinhard (1996:15) observes an oversimplification in such a use. He claims “earlier 
European ruling classes did not rule because they were rich, but were rich because they ruled.” In 
other words, access to power was used as a means to access wealth. Importantly, the concept of 
class extends to “human beings who have similar roles, carry out like functions, and have access 
to the same level of means [to] belong to the same social class.” (Astiz 1969:22) It is difficult to 
relate all of those who have the control over resources to power. The proponents of the Marxian 
perspective distinguish the bourgeoisie – the elite – from the proletariat – the non-elite – with 
strong polarization in less developed capitalist societies. In opposition to the non-elite, the elite 
are understood as “the owners of the means of production or at least the holders of economic 
power in a given society.” (Reinhard 1996:14)  This is in line with the theory of polarization, 
which suggests, “the polarization of society also entails a polarization in standard of living, as 
that of capitalists goes up and that of workers goes down in either absolute or relative terms.” 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1993:15)  In this context, the bourgeoisie or ruling class diametrically opposes 
the proletariat or exploited class.  
 
However, to recall Urry (1983), there is no clear demarcation between both blocks. In between, 
he identifies “the small bourgeoisie, whose members control minor means of production and are 
self-employed; the lumpenproletariat, made up of the marginal and parasitic element of society; 
the landlords; and the peasantry. But as capitalist society advances, most of the small bourgeoisie 
is absorbed into the proletariat, while a minority manages to work its way up into two mutually 
opposing camps.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:15) Advanced capitalism is said to offer opportunities 
for the new petty bourgeoisie to develop. With this development, the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat slightly overlap. Also, the new petty bourgeoisie serves as a checkpoint or a 
counterbalance between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and, as a result, lessens the repression 
of government (Bottomore 1964b:36). In advanced capitalist societies, the increase in 
differentiated professional positions and in social status drastically reduces the polarization. 
 
In summary, the Marxian perspective identified the elite primarily as those having full control 
over the material of production and, as a result, over mental or ideological resources. Hence, the 
bourgeoisie – the elite – is established to exercise power over the proletariat – understood as the 
non-elite. The idea of power has surfaced to strengthen the polarization between the resource 
holders – those who hold the reins of power and the most advantageous and economically 
rewarding positions - and the deprived (Aron 1985). On these grounds, the concept of elite 
defines “the political and economic elite in control of the state apparatus [and who] implement a 
strictly functional development policy, thus marginalizing the peasantry.” (Abrahamsson 
2003:78) Abrahamsson assumes the elite to have the power of political resistance, but also of 
subverting or manipulating many of the pioneering social actors of the society. Behind this 
power is their moral authority or economic power (Beiton et al. 2002:73). Such power might 
have been exercised over the majority of Rwandan non-elite who had long lived in abject 
poverty. Further discussion will detail cases of bribery to solicit violence. 
 
Second is the liberal perspective. The „big politician man‟ is at the very core of the liberal view 
of political elite. To Scott and Marshall (2005), the concept of elite defines “any superior or 
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privileged group, but it more properly refers to groups defined by their superior power.” This 
view supports Mosca Gaentano (1896), Pareto Vilfredo (1966) and Roberto Michels (1915), 
whose stands about the elite refer to political power or superior power. The concept of „ruling 
minority‟ is the most common concept used to define the concept of elite. The liberal perspective 
bases the definition on two dimensions of inequality. Hence, according to Etzioni-Halevy 
(1993:13), the elite are “differentiated from non-elites by the extent of their power and 
influence.” This leads elite theorists to suggest “that societies are divided into the few who hold 
power or rule, and the many who are ruled. The ruling group, or elite, effectively monopolizes 
power; it almost inevitably gets its way whenever important decisions are made.” (Etzioni-
Halevy 1993:19)  
 
The idea is that the ruling group is “a particular social stratum, relatively homogeneous and self-
perpetuating, which dominates the political process.” (VonDoepp and Villalón 2005:12) 
According to Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992), the elite are “those person who are able…to 
affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially…[,] have the ability to influence 
political life in a relatively routine manner…[, and] have the power to shape the very character of 
national political life.” (Ibid) To Wright Mills (1956), the American ruling elite is described as 
resembling that social stratum mainly motivated by a set of common interests and goals. Over 
the past, it included “the small interlocking group of corporate executives, government officials, 
and military leaders that, he argued, held effective control of major social and political decision 
making in the United States.” (Calhoun 2002)  
 
Given that the ruling group identified with wealth, power and honor, the concept of elite always 
brought with it the idea of value in most societies.  Skinner (1958) cites inter alia the well being, 
wealth, enlightenment, skill, power, respect, rectitude, affection, and religious values, which he 
terms goal events on the basis of which he classifies the elite. The learned elite, he suggests, “are 
those who possess knowledge in highest degree, the skilled elite those of highest skill and 
proficiency, the religious elite those who possess religious values in highest degree, the political 
elite those who have greatest power – and so on for elites of wealth, prestige, or any other 
important values.” (Skinner 1958:78) With this, there are many values that may define the elite. 
And the more values, the more fields of life the elite cover. Those who have the monopoly over 
values are the elite, and they politically dominate those under deprivation of the same values. 
 
Importantly, Skinner (1958:79) argues, the elite “of wealth are in positions of wealth and have 
high potential for acquiring more. Similarly the political elite consist of those in positions of 
power or with a high potential for attaining such positions.” Skinner brings in the idea of social 
reproduction of social inequality, as a basis for the definition of the concept of elite. Contrary to 
the way it is most commonly formally defined, he argues that the concept of elite applies 
depending on the context. In addition to politicians who command substantial resources, some 
African areas extend this concept to “leaders of major ethnic groups and civil society 
organizations, ranking individuals in military and government bureaucracies.” (Von Doepp and 
Villalón 2005:12) In particular, Kings, elders, and chiefs were accorded the same privilege as the 
formal elite over Rwandan history. Also, Skinner‟s definition extends to leaders in the higher 
echelons of Chinese society and their families in Bangkok, when the influence becomes highly 
generalized (Skinner 1958:77-9). Skinner reports that leaders of community or society take 
precedence over many of the active elements within the formal elite. 
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In summary, both the Marxian and liberal debates make a clear-cut distinction between the elite 
and ordinary people. Most classical theorists support strongly the idea of polarization. This has 
raised an acute problem of popular support, which, in most cases has involved physical coercion. 
Even though, according to Mary Follet (1941), those in command could intermingle with those 
who obey, the idea of physical demarcation is strongly supported. Genuine authority was the 
condition under which the gap could be made manageable (Rowan 1976:76). By genuine 
authority is meant an authority where the reconciliation of tensions between the „universalism‟ 
and „particularism‟ laid a strong foundation for the support of subordinated groups towards the 
elite. This implies Weber‟s ideal type of rational-legal authority, which has to successfully 
challenge the abuse of the traditional patrimonial rule and its neo-patrimonial background.  
 
However, to refer to Clapham (1985), the opposite holds in most third world states
28
 because of 
corruption, through which officials use public power for private purposes. There is a strong 
legacy of the patrimonial system under which the idea of corruption loses this sense. In such a 
system, “there is no embezzlement because the ruler‟s personal income is the same as the 
government revenue, no nepotism because there is no criterion for appointment to office apart 
from the ruler‟s favor. In a neo-patrimonial system, on the other hand, corruption does arise 
because the system itself is formally constructed on the principle of rational-legality. Nor is this 
just a form: corruption cannot, as it were, be abolished by declaring the state to be a patrimonial 
one after all, and thereby appropriating the revenues for one‟s own personal use.” (Clapham 
1985:50) The failure to reconcile the „universalism‟ and the „particularism‟ is an indication of the 
loose distinction between the public and private, which follows the poor rational-legality 
authority of modern states.  
 
The danger of this, primarily in third world states, is that the “public office consequently 
becomes accepted as a route to personal wealth and power…There is no doubt, however, that 
corruption is a very considerable problem almost through the third world, amounting in the 
extreme cases to a system of government for purposes of personal enrichment, which has been 
described as „kleptocracy‟ or rule by theft.” (Ibid) Clapham takes it as a characteristic feature of 
third world states with reference to the difficulty to distinguishe between one‟s private and 
official self, as a result of strong legacy of tribal societies. He argues that neo-patrimonialism 
“characterizes tribal societies in which loyalty to one‟s kin group is the primary social value, and 
plural societies like the immigrant states of the new world in which status and identity were 
determined by ethnic group affiliation or position on a caste-like social hierarchy.” (Clapham 
1985:49) Away from the patrimonial structure and, therefore, from corruption, Abner Cohen 
(1981) suggests, “an elite must convince the masses that its sectional interests represent the 
wider public or national interest; i.e., it must seek to demonstrate its „universalistic functions‟ of 
service to the public.” (Shore 2002:2)  This would prepare the ruled to accept elite rule as 
theoretically established.  
 
However, particularistic functions of the elite have mostly defeated the universalistic functions. 
To illustrate, Shore (2002:3-4) highlights that “an elite group must develop its own particularistic 
                                               
28 In the understanding of Clapham (1985:1), the “phrase „the third world‟ is generally taken, and is taken here, to include the  
Americas south of the United States; the whole of Africa; Asia apart from the Soviet Union, Chine and Japan; and the oceanic 
islands apart from Australia and New Zeland.” 
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set of interest, norms and practices to differentiate itself from the masses.” Under these 
conditions, ordinary people no longer voluntarily obey the commands of the elite. To refer to 
Mills (1959:317), manipulation remains the last choice for the elite to carry out the decisions 
they make over the non-elite. As a result, the “elite influence the opinions of the masses more 
than the masses influence the elites.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:24) That is why, according to Mills, 
democratic processes become “a symbolic exercise designed periodically to reaffirm a common 
belief in democracy and to lend the masses a feeling that they do play a role in the system.” 
(Ibid) They ritually legitimize the power of the elite and many related decisions of different 
kinds. To Mills (1959:31), the major reason for this links to the fact that “authority is openly 
identified with the ruling institutions and their agents, who may use authority explicitly and 
nakedly.” Under these conditions, the elite have always decided and the non-elite have always 
followed. Subscribing to this view, Mary Follet‟s (1941) argument that the elite intermingle with 
the non-elite is challenged. 
 
There is a strong dichotomy which applies to both the Marxian and liberal accounts. In common, 
they cover a small scope: beyond political power and economic resources – material for 
production – the concept of elite does not exist. Mann (1986:1), like many others, believed in 
four principal sources of power: “control over economic, ideological, military and political 
resources.” As a result, he has a broader view of the concept of elite. The elite is seen as bigger 
than the ruling class, the political elite, or the military elite, as separate clusters. Even if they 
were taken as a whole, the definition of the concept of elite would still have put a lot of emphasis 
on the formal elite to the detriment of the informal elite. As a result, both the Marxian and liberal 
debates have left aside the informal elite. Bernard (2000) and a small number of others in the 
current literature have included this aspect of the elite.  
 
To Bernard (2000:179), the concept of elite defines “people…whose opinions really count …[,] 
living artists whose work everyone wants to buy [or] fellow physicians whose opinions you trust 
when it comes to adopting a new drug.” To this perspective, occupied positions (Mills 1959), 
commanding positions in a set of institutions (Reis and Moore 2005), high rank and the ability of 
reward and of coercion (Rowan 1976, Mills 1956), political power (Scott and Marshall 2005, 
Mills 1956), economic power (Mills 1956, 1959), and different values (Skinner 1958), are no 
longer exclusive criteria with which to define the elite. The concept of elite accommodates both 
the formal elites and informal elite – defined from traditional and indigenous-based values. 
Consequently, this study subscribes to Bernard‟s (2000) perspective, perceived as a holistic one. 
Social power 
 
Even if earlier discussions reported a clear-cut distinction between the elite and non-elite, it does 
not meant the absence of physical contacts. Although in a disproportionate way, the elite are 
most likely actors who interact in daily life. The elite exercise their will over the non-elite by the 
means of social power. What does such power involve? Arguably, the most canonical definition 
of power found in the literature is an original formulation by Weber (1920): power defined a 
chance one has to realize his or her will no matter how resistant the other party might be. In a 
distributive way, Parsons (1960) refers to power by A over B. For each to gain power one of the 
actors must lose, implying „zero-sum‟ outcomes of social power. Against the collective aspect of 
social power, he suggests that “persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third 
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parties or over nature” in the pursuit of their goals. Further discussion cites strong support for 
this aspect.  
 
The most widely cited in Rwanda is the joint cooperation of ordinary people to involve the 
middle-range leaders in genocide after a period of resistance. With this, social power involves a 
powerful party against a weak party. This remains true for the widely supported view that the 
grater the imbalance the more the weaker party is dependent. Langner and Keltner (2008:849) 
suggest that the exercise of power produces little influence when parties do not depend on each 
other for resources. Equally, there are more typical relationships that lie between the source of 
threat and those who are subject to it, in cases where one individual has some degree of power 
over the other. High levels of dependence between actors establish the social power of mastery 
over other people (Mann 1986:6). Different definitions have emphasized this disproportion in 
power. 
 
For example, power is regarded variously as: the chance to impose personal will on others 
(Robert A. Dahl 1957); the ability to maintain control over the action, output and movement of 
other individuals or group by impeding them (Sakari Sariola 1972); the ability of one party to a 
relationship to influence the behavior of the other party (Arthur R. Cohen 1959); the authority 
that one person has to prevent another from reaching his goal (Ezra Stotland 1959); the extent to 
which the ruling minority overcomes resistance (McLean and McMillan 2003); the ability to 
change the actions of others in some intended fashion (Dahl 1957; Mowday 1978; Thibault and 
Kelley 1959); the capacity to influence, direct, or modify other‟s behavior (Kanter 1977, Kipnis 
and Schmidt 1988, Mowday 1978, Yukl and Falbe 1990); “the ability of actors to bring about or 
influence social actions and outcomes favorable to their interests within an institutionalized 
social action context” (Burns et al. 1982:41-2); “the ability to pursue and attain goals through 
mastery of one‟s environment” (Mann 1986:6); participation in the making of sanctioned 
decisions (Skinner 1958:78); and “generalized means for attaining whatever goal one wants to 
achieve” (Parsons 1968, in Mann 1986:6). The formulations vary but each of these ideas refers 
back to the canonical definition of Weber (1920).  
 
Goldmann (1977) only makes the distinction between the exercise of power and the possession 
of power.
29
 The exercise of power implies an actor to cause another to behave in a certain way. 
The possession of power is the disposition or prediction about the behavior of given actors in 
conformity to the preferences of another actor.  It translates as: “the statement „A has power over 
B‟ then implies the prediction that if A prefers B to do x, then B will actually do x. A‟s control of 
B‟s behavior is the essence of this way of defining the concept „the possession of power‟. Power 
in this sense may be seen as a quality that is distributed among the members of a social system at 
least if the distribution of power is reasonably enduring and simple we may refer to it as the 
system‟s „power structure‟.” (Goldmann 1977:2) This perspective brings in the idea of 
domination, understood as the chance to influence or command those allegedly under domination 
(Sakari Sariola 1972:58).  
 
                                               
29 As Dahl (1975) paraphrases, Weber “suggests that A has power over B to the extent that he or she overcomes the resistance of 
B if it is offered, implying that – at least some of the time – the interests of B are being sacrificed to those of A. Weber was 
certainly interested mainly in power in situations of conflicting interests.” 
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However, the nature of domination (or Herrschaft, to borrow from Weber) depends on aspects 
such as legal and physical coercion, wealth, beauty, property, physical strength, education, 
intelligence, information, imagination, and charisma. Since the bases for domination are 
unequally distributed (Pareto 1966), power is also unevenly distributed. To Astiz (1969:20), 
these bases importantly vary in weight from society to society, class to class, and time to time. 
As Burns et al. (1982:42) put it: “Access to and exercise of control over societal valuables varies 
among classes of actors (e.g. capitalists vs workers) as well as among actors of a given category 
(e.g. skilled vs unskilled workers)…In other words, distribution among societal actors of costs 
and benefits of production and exchange is unequal.” With the same logic, they also vary from 
the elite to ordinary people. 
 
When domination is perceived as legitimate, it translates to authority, as earlier understood from 
the rational-legal argument of Weber. As Clapham (1985:44) put it: “The basis of that authority 
is that individuals in public positions, possessing power over their fellow citizens, exercise that 
power in accordance with a legally defined structure directed towards a publicly acknowledged 
goal. What provides the element of „authority‟ or morally accepted or justified power, is that 
goals themselves are widely accepted, and that the structures work is a strict division between an 
individual‟s public and private roles, encapsulated in the notion of an „office‟.” In this way, an 
official is expected to exercise the powers that the office stipulates in distinction from the means 
he or she uses to achieve private ambitions and obligations. Emphasis here is on the rigid 
demarcation between the public and private compartment aspects of life. Failure to establish such 
a demarcation would result in illegitimate domination, which turns into coercion and force, or 
threat.  
 
Hume (1711:76) establishes a general pattern as follows: “Almost all of the governments, which 
exist at present‟…have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest or both, 
without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.” (Allison 2003)  
Leaders are either appointed or are elected in the political realm by their followers (Meyerson 
1987:12), who, in turn, have higher expectations of them. With these expectations, Arthur R. 
Cohen (1959) sees power as a structural concept upon which the functional arrangements of 
social systems depend. The same arrangements are of course driven by the motivations of 
individuals. As he puts it, the “exercise of power requires some acceptance by those who are part 
of the social system, and since reward and punishment are inherently involved, it has various 
repercussions upon the adjustment and reactions of everyone in the power relation.” (Cohen 
1959:35) Punishment and coercion, among other exercises of social power over the non-elite, are 
deceptive and threatening.  
 
A person under threat “feels that he has lost, is losing, or clearly may lose his ability to reach his 
goals. Power is thus threatening, since those subjected to it cannot move toward their goals.” 
(Stotaland 1959:54). Social power is therefore supported by many – Dépret and Fiske (1999), 
French and Raven (1959), Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003), Lewin (1951) – to be “the 
influence an individual exerts over his or her partner‟s outcomes through the allocation of 
resources and punishments.” (Langner and Keltner 2008:848) This means that the success in 
exercising social power is not only a result of authority. If this statement is true, it is an 
indication of the impossibility for the non-elite to voluntarily be respectful towards the elite and, 
to a certain extent, to oppose the will of the same elite. The idea of consensus is taken for granted 
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to the extent that subordinates are thought to accept the will of the leaders. This assumption is 
only valid when they exercise legitimate authority in the spirit of collective interests. To refer to 
Cohen (1959) and Follet (1941), power is seen as accepted by the ruled group, and requires no 
coercion of the ruling minority to exert control over the former. In practice, the distinction of 
legitimate from illegitimate power is only made meaningless. 
 
In summary, it is important to observe that the exercise of social power changes over time 
depending on the real cause it is serving. Equally, it is differently exercised over time. However, 
Lincoln Allison (2003) suggests that it is successfully supported – on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds – that social power alternatively takes five principal forms,30 such as force, 
persuasion, authority, coercion, and manipulation. Also, “Many theorists have argued that 
structural factors, more than personal qualities, determine individuals‟ influence.” (Anderson et 
al. 2008:702) They underestimate the contribution of personal qualities to directing or modifying 
peoples‟ behavior. It is apparent that this is why many scholars have thought that successful 
social power was dependent on legitimate authority, coercion and manipulation. This study 
agrees with this view. In addition, it subscribes to Kanter (1979), who suggests that “we have to 
look not at the person …but at the position the person occupies in the organization”31 (Anderson 
et al. 2008:702-3), to understand the dynamics behind social power. 
Hierarchical structures 
 
Strong trust in social power has led many to find explanations of different phenomena in 
institutions and structures over the last decades. In short, the elite – so far understood as the 
leaders at various levels of leadership – have been made the central actor of phenomena humans 
have experienced. Similarly, understanding the phenomenon of support for genocide in different 
societies has required grasping the nature of the elite that have been involved. Common 
knowledge has always perceived the top leaders as the most important in various endeavors. The 
following paragraphs recognize that top leaders matter. Moreover, the discussion brings strong 
recognition to the decisive role of the middle-range leaders to engage in both peaceful and 
violent processes. The argument is that, without committed intermediate levels of leadership, the 
                                               
30 Lincoln Allison (2003) describes the forms of social power as follows: (1) Force in its narrow sense implies a control of the 
body rather than the person. We may kill, bind, or render comatose without being able to get a person's actions to conform to 
our will. Only when they comply because of the threat of force can the relationship be called power and this becomes, strictly, 
coercion. (2) Persuasion, by which the slave may persuade the emperor or the professor or the prime minister. In other words 
the powerless may persuade the powerful: the offering of ideas is not control until it creates a dependency and, therefore, the 
capacity to manipulate. (3) Authority is sometimes defined as „legitimate power‟. But it can also be understood as the existence 
(in various senses) of rights to command and corresponding duties to obey. Authority is therefore separate from power, although 
it constitutes a resource for power in the same way as does money and a capacity for rational persuasion. It can exist in a pure 
form, without power, as, for instance, the authority of a priest over his flock in a secular society. (4) Coercion is perhaps the 
paradigm form of power and is said to consist of controlling people through threats, whether overt or tacit. It is, however, 
extremely difficult to distinguish a threat from other forms of relationship. Is it a threat if we say we are going to make a person 
worse off than they expected to be? Or worse off than if we were not to act? Most modern relationships, whether children's 
pocket money or promotions at work, seem to exist in a middle territory between threats and offers for which we have no 
established word in English (though Hillel Steiner suggests „throffers‟). (5) Manipulation involves control exercised without 
threats, typically using resources of information and ideas. Usually people do not realize they are being manipulated or the 
process would not work. Arguably, it is a more durable form of power: Subserviens' obedience to Superior is more securely 
founded on the belief that God wants him to obey than on the fear of being whipped. 
31  Emphasis from source. 
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initiatives by the top-levels of leadership are vain efforts. At the same time, the vertical powers – 
of both top and intermediate levels of leadership – are necessary conditions, but on their own 
remain insufficient to engage ordinary people as active partners. Grassroots thinking or, to recall 
Dicks (1950), the national character,
32
 is an undeniable prerequisite for popular support. Strong 
coherence between the intermediate level of leadership and grassroots thinking is a necessary 
and sufficient condition. This comes to challenge the traditional statu quo, according to which 
those at the lower levels of the hierarchy owe respect to those at the upper levels in the ascending 
order.  
 
Waller (2002:179) understood this phenomenon as „authority orientation‟, which translates as 
“vertical relationships with a clear delineation of spheres of power. Such a cultural model 
cultivates individuals who enjoy obeying authority and exercising power over those below them 
– individuals who prefer order and predictability.” To Gerth and Mills (1970), this behavior is a 
„moral discipline and self-denial‟, which gives the “ability to execute conscientiously the order 
of superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if 
the order seems wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant‟s remonstrances, the authority 
insists on the order.” (Bauman 2000:22) Authority orientation becomes here a starting point to 
understanding obedient behavior. In Rwanda, the literature documents this authority orientation 
with the powerful King who owned human (people) and material (the land and cattle) resources 
that he could dispose of in the way he wanted without anyone to contest his will (Melvern 
2000:7).  
 
The pre-colonial feudal kingdom, to refer to Millwood (1996:10), formed a structure “in which a 
vertical chain of command through layers of chiefs regulated the economy and the life of 
peasants through various social contracts.” Prunier (1995:12) refers to the King as the apex of a 
complex pyramid – of political, cultural and economic relationships – under whom were three 
types of chiefs: 
 
…first, the umutware w’ubutaka („chief of the landholdings‟) who took care of 
attributing land of agricultural production (and taxation); then the umutware w’ingabo 
(„chief of men‟) who ruled not the land but the bodies and, among other things, was in 
charge of recruiting fighters for the king‟s armies; and then the umutware w’inka or 
umutware w’igikingi („chief of the pastures‟) who ruled over the grazing lands. The 
three functions could be concentrated in a single person for a certain area, but in a 
difficult or rebellious area.
33
 (Ibid) 
 
In this pyramid-like structure, the Mwami is said to have ruled despotically and none could 
oppose the superiors in the hierarchy. To read this from the perspective of Clapham (1985:49), 
the delegation of power in similar patrimonial structures causes characteristic problems. He 
suggests that a superior will consider “that he has the right to intervene personally in any matter 
which comes within his jurisdiction, and will do so regardless of the chaos it may cause, before 
going on to intervene elsewhere. A subordinate who takes decisions without referring them 
                                               
32 This discussion takes the national character to refer to what Henry V. Dicks (1950) understands as “the broad, frequently 
recurring regularities of certain prominent behavior traits and motivations of a given ethnic or cultural group.” (Waller 2007:40) 
With reference to Germany he argues for a linear causal relationship between an extraordinary ideology and the national 
character, which in turn predisposes people to violence. 
33 Emphasis from source. 
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upwards may be regarded as slighting the authority of his boss – since to act independently of 
him is implicitly to challenge him.”  
 
With this, argues Clapham, the patrimonial system serves the valuable function of maintaining a 
single legitimate source of authority. Within this context, the commoners in different households 
(urugo) made arrangements to satisfy the government‟s demands under the call of chiefs at Hill 
(umusozi) level. The household was the basic unit for community organization because 
government obligations never rested on each person separately. This refers to the responsibility 
that excludes individual logic from the community endeavor (Millwood 1996). Because of 
emotional attachment to group (Waller 2002) or strong acceptance of group identification to the 
Rwandese culture, the individual “does not stand alone but is part of a family, a lineage and a 
clan, the dweller on a certain Hill.” (Prunier 1995:245) Individual characters do not judge men 
selectively.  
 
In the same way, according to Staub (1989:28), individuals “abandon themselves to the group 
and develop a commitment that enables them to sacrifice even their lives for it.” This 
background – of similarity within the in-group and of community impulses – laid strong 
foundation to social conformism on the basis of which the coercion by the leaders resulted in the 
Rwandan model for development. The funding institutions – particularly in the 1970s and 1980s 
– lauded this model for development afterwards. By this is meant that ordinary people have 
collectively responded to the leaders‟ commands over the past. Over the past, rdinary people 
made a failure of any effort that separately targeted individuals. For instance, in the nineteenth 
century they opposed the Belgians, upon the introduction of the „uburetwa‟, which was perceived 
as interfering with the traditional forms of taxation. In replacement of the institution of 
ubuhake,
34
 the uburetwa was an obligation to “each and every able-bodied person to pay…work 
on the European taxation model instead of retaining the softer form of African collective 
responsibility.” (Prunier 1995:12) The policy of indirect rule by the German and Belgian 
administrations is said to have continued, and to have strengthened the control from above 
despite resistance.  
 
That the traditional chiefs – unlike the colonial administrations – could successfully have chiefs 
enclosures maintained (kubaka inkike), the land worked (gufata igihe) and the cattle taken care 
of (ubushumba bw’inka) by ordinary people is strong indication that households identified most 
with the middle-range leaders. Unlike many studies, which have intended to understand genocide 
in Rwanda, Waller (2002) strongly supports this contention. However, many studies have missed 
this point. They assumed the instructions to ordinary people to go straight through the top, 
middle-range and grassroots levels of leadership, as would be the case in strictly controlled 
societies. Melvern (2000:8-9) viewed Rwanda as “a strictly controlled society where the central 
power monitored neighborhoods by the means of local leader who obeyed orders from above. It 
did so through the four levels (province, district, hill and neighborhood) around which the 
hierarchy was organized.” Many more studies support this argument. Rwanda was perceived as a 
                                               
34 The ubuhake or clientelism brings to unequals – in terms of the amounts of power, wealth or status – to relate under the 
pattern of superiority of one – i.e. the patron – over the other – i.e. the client. Scott has viewed clientelism as the patron-client 
relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – “defined as a special case of dyadic (two persons) ties involving a largely 
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influences and resources to 
provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.” (Clapham 1982:4) 
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“well-organized state” (Strauss 2006), an “authoritarian, repressive apparatus” (Newbury 1992), 
“totalitarian” (Melvern 2000), “a remarkably organized state, with a high degree of authoritarian 
social control from the center” (Willwood 1996:10), associated with an “intensive 
administration” appropriate to “control and mobilization” (Des Forges 1999). In relation to 
common knowledge, these characteristics symbolized the state presence everywhere. 
 
The existing literature describes  “the centralized, hierarchical, and extensive structure of 
Rwanda‟s state. Rwanda had five levels of administration before the genocide: the national 
government, the prefectures, the communes, the sectors, and the cellules. In addition, in some 
areas, there was a sub-cellule stratum called nyumbakumi, which refers to a semi-formal policy 
of having one (unpaid) official for every ten households.” (Strauss 2006:203) Strauss particularly 
highlights the decisive role that intermediate structures play in mobilization processes. What the 
display of Rwanda‟s administrative structure shows “is that the state had an extensive presence 
at the local level…Rwandans typically identify their commune, sector, and cellules of origin. 
State structures are, in other words, meaningful and resonant in Rwandan society.” (Ibid) Hence, 
the intermediate level of leadership matters the most within a community context, which 
provides soil for popular support. Many studies have underestimated the „community context‟ to 
the detriment of „leadership‟ in different hierarchies. Community context or, to put it differently, 
„grassroots thinking‟, is already highlighted as a gap for further discussion to bridge. The 
grassroots thinking is understood to be a context where language and social inequalities, among 
many things, have widened the distance between the elite and ordinary people. 
 
Language, inequalities and hierarchies 
 
Where the levels of leadership informed the thinking, authority-obedience relation in Rwanda, 
and elsewhere in Africa, is perceived as a strong legacy of „colonial manners‟. Colonial 
hierarchies have resembled more-or-less family structures, at least in Rwanda. Those in the 
upper levels of the hierarchies behaved as parents to those in the lower levels of the same 
hierarchies. For instance, General Jan disclosed to a British audience that Africa “has largely 
remained a child type, with a child psychology and outlook.” (Mamdani 1996:9) Under those 
conditions, Mamdani indicates, a child-like human that could not be a „bad human‟. To support 
the argument, he suggested that Africa was considered as faithful, an aspect that characterizes 
the efficient parent-child relationship. Hegel‟s Philosophy of History concurs with this argument. 
He identified Africa as “the land of childhood” (Mamdan 1996:9). Settlers in British colonies 
called “every African male, regardless of age, a “boy” – houseboy, shamba-boy, office-boy, ton-
boy, mine-boy – not different from their counterparts in Francophone Africa, who used the child-
familiar tu when addressing Africans of any age.” (Ibid) Conversely, Africans addressed the 
same settlers using the plural form vous, as African children do to communicate to their parents 
or to elders. This fact has probably widened the gap to the extent that child-parent relations have 
translated to obedient behavior and the exercise of power. This means that language played a 
crucial role in creating and strengthening hierarchies. 
 
In the context of strong hierarchy the imbalance of power has caused, to refer to Bogucki 
(1999:261), status, power, and wealth gradually become exclusive resources destined to only a 
few households. In addition, the imbalance increased the possibility for dependence and, in turn, 
made it easy to mobilize those who were deprived into collective action. He suggests “the 
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nascent inequalities have been perpetuated across generations to develop not just wealthy and 
powerful households but elite lineages whose head makes fundamental decisions for the larger 
society, which consists of many communities.” (Ibid) Authority and obedience become societal 
products that people inherited from one generation to another. The inner circle of power, 
identified as the „Akazu‟, has probably developed under these circumstances to heavily 
contribute to this legacy. To refer to Waller (2002:183), „social dominance hierarchy‟ found 
strong support in the same manner as colonial and postcolonial regimes‟ shared patterns. With 
this, some individuals within the society “reliably gain greater access than other individuals to 
key resources – particularly resources that contribute to survival and reproductive success.” 
Given this, hierarchical structures not only have institutionalized obedience, but they also have 
intensified inequalities levels, which in turn, serve as a strong base for obedient behavior. In 
strongly divided societies, obedience served the interests of ethnic affiliations, for instance, as 
the sense of collectivistic values increased. Different cases of genocidal violence are understood 
from this perspective. Hierarchies are also said to play a decisive role. 
 
Modern hierarchies and systematic violence 
 
To Bauman (2000:94), as paraphrasing Sarah Gordon (1984), for instance, systematic 
extermination was “carried out only by extremely powerful government, and probably could 
have succeeded only under the cover of wartime conditions. It was only the advent of Hitler and 
his radical anti-Semitic followers and their subsequent centralization of power that made the 
extermination of European Jewry possible.” Again, healthy cooperation of the sections of the 
military and bureaucracy was a necessary condition (among many others) for the Holocaust to 
take place, but was not of itself sufficient. To refer to Herbert C. Kelman (1973), strong 
hierarchies intensify a three-fold condition to explain the transformation of Germans into 
perpetrators. The conditions for mobilization into genocidal violence contribute enormously to 
the erosion of moral inhibitions, which in turn, results in violent atrocities.  
 
He equally suggests that “violence is authorized (by official orders coming from the legally 
entitled quarters), actions are routinized (by rule-governed practices and exact specification of 
roles), and the victims of the violence are dehumanized (by ideological definitions and 
indoctrinations).”35 (Bauman 2000:21) It appears that the transformation of ordinary people into 
perpetrators is an institutional process. In the structures of modern administrations, the 
hierarchical organization provides substantial explanation to genocidal violence. In other words, 
“Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of 
specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations.” (Bauman 
2000:17) Unlike pre-modern administrations, modern ones are rationally- and purpose-oriented, 
as bureaucratic practices become firmly established.  
 
The literature has identified bureaucracy not only with skills and technologies, but also with the 
scientific principles of internal management seen as primary prerequisites for genocidal violence. 
In relation to Germany, many thought that without those prerequisites the German Holocaust 
would have been impossible. It was only made possible through the bureaucratic culture of 
which the proponents tended “to view society as an object of administration, as a collection of so 
many „problems‟ to be solved, as „nature‟ to be „controlled‟, „mastered‟ and „improved‟ or 
                                               
35 Emphasis from source. 
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„remade‟, as a legitimate target for „social engineering‟, and in general a garden to be designed 
and kept in the planned shape by force…[as] the very atmosphere in which the idea of the 
Holocaust could be conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to its conclusion.” 
(Bauman 2000:18) Bauman means a society that consistently installs a new „order‟ whenever 
deemed necessary, as a result of the characteristically modern zeal for order making. The 
genocides against the European Jews, and against the Tutsi in Rwanda, were probably conceived 
under that logic, in that they were perceived as people who did not fit in the ideal society.  
 
If modernity can be understood as an independent variable to the German Holocaust, however, 
this causal relationship relates to two primary contentions. First, technological tools qualify as 
indispensable for mass murder on a large scale. It holds true as one considers the precision, 
speed, minimized ambiguity, control for contingencies, and rational calculation of costs and 
effects, among other components technology brings with it. A close link is established between 
“the advancement of modern science, modern technology and modern forms of state power” 
(Bauman 2000:62) and genocidal violence. It is emphasized that genocidal violence is 
scientifically designed and implemented for a genuinely rational concern. The German 
Holocaust, understood as the „Final Solution‟, probably falls into this category. In one way or 
another, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda follows the same logic. The second contention relates to 
the idea of scientific management – as embodied in bureaucratic organizations.  
 
It is arguable that the Holocaust would have been impossible without strong bureaucracy. 
However, massacres, pogroms, mass murders, and, to a large extent, genocides, have often taken 
place in the past without efficient bureaucracy. In accordance with Bauman (2000:17), genocides 
“have been perpetrated without modern bureaucracy, the skills and technologies it commands, 
the scientific principles of its internal management.” In most cases, they were made possible by 
the fact that the residues of pre-modern barbarity were not yet eradicated. Perpetrators were 
mobilized into an irrational outflow of such residues. If Rwanda happened to be excluded from 
the modern world, ordinary people would have responded to genocide under an emotional mood. 
This is debatable, given that Rwanda is part of the global network from which the exposure to 
bureaucratic organizations has been an obvious phenomenon. Only the level of bureaucratization 
can be subject to question and, therefore, becomes a relative reality. Whatever the level of 
bureaucratization might be, however, bureaucracy is closely associated with the division of 
labor, which, in turn, brings the distancing with it as an important implication. The idea behind 
the distancing is that the division of labor implies the hierarchy of command whereby the 
contributors to the final outcomes of collective activity create a wider distance from the top 
levels of hierarchies.  
 
The philosophy is that “most functionaries of the bureaucratic hierarchy may give commands 
without full knowledge of their effects. In many cases they would find it difficult to visualize 
those effects. Usually, they only have an abstract, detached awareness of them…It is one thing to 
give a command to load bombs on the plane, but quite different to take care of regular steel 
supply in a bomb factory.” (Bauman 2000:99-100) The same would apply if one said that it is 
one thing to command ordinary people to perpetrate violence, while it is another to have the real 
impression of bloodshed on the ground. Those who command from upper levels of the hierarchy 
are removed from the context of remorse. They might be good at commanding for violence but 
are inefficient implementers of violence. Most perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda were 
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probably ordinary people. To refer to Bauman (2000), as paraphrasing Jacques Ellul (1980), they 
had instruments that allowed them to perform a certain task, to succeed in a new operation: 
“There is no call towards a goal; there is constraint by an engine placed in the back and not 
tolerating any halt to the machine.” Bauman (2000:116) 
 
To refer to the German Holocaust, and to the genocide against Tutsi, in many ways, those with 
institutionally oriented analysis have strongly highlighted the responsibility of modernity, which, 
alone, has remained a necessary but insufficient condition for the perpetration of the violence. It 
is true that modernity “relied on the division of labor, on science, technology, scientific 
management and the power to make a rational calculation of cost and effects – all thoroughly 
unemotional stuff” (Bauman 2000:247) instead of human passions. Within the context of 
advanced technology and of strong bureaucracy, it is hypothesized that popular support for 
government officials is obvious. However, it is worth recognizing the importance of the bottom 
line of the hierarchy. To expect popular support, a strong connection needs to extend to the 
thinking of ordinary people, which might transform into violent or non-violent agents. For 
instance, the acquiescence among German – and probably Rwandan – people is made a strong 
base to which this cooperation adjusts. Gordon (1991) includes the radical anti-Semitism of the 
Nazi type, the transformation of the anti-Semitism into the practical policy of a powerful and 
centralized state. This involved the command of a huge and efficient bureaucratic apparatus, the 
context of cruelty (i.e. wartime conditions), non-interference, and passive popular support, 
among other factors (Bauman 2000). The combination of these factors is seen as intensifying the 
quick development of genocidal violence in very specific contexts. 
Ordinary people 
 
In earlier discussions, the concept of non-elite – as opposed to elite – is used as synonymous 
with „ordinary people‟ and „the common citizenry‟. The „mass‟ and „peasantry‟ are other 
terminologies that the literature uses to identify the same social category. The following 
discussion will cautiously use these terminologies since they bear a strong pejorative sense. 
Within the context of power imbalance, ordinary people were perceived as instrumental to the 
elite under specific conditions. In relation to genocidal violence, the following paragraphs 
discuss the terms, which those ordinary people who committed genocide and mass killings 
identify with. In the context of Rwanda, there are variations in meaning of the concept of 
ordinary people, depending on different points of view. 
 
One is the structure of labor force. Against this structure, ordinary people define the “rural 
masses of agrarian or pre-industrial societies” (Sharot 2001:3). To refer to a report by the World 
Bank (1997) they include those whose labor force is dedicated to agriculture (Harrison 
2004:220). When the peasant cash crops are central to the economies of the state, the state is said 
to be a „peasant state‟. Given that more than eight out of every 10 people are economically active 
and employed in the agricultural sector, Rwanda is established as a peasant society, in which 
many are not economically secure. The 2002 national census confirmed Rwanda as a 
subsistence-dominated country. “The Rwandan economy is predominantly agricultural featuring 
mainly subsistent agricultural production in small holdings using intensive artisanal 
methods…Rural population densities coupled with the tradition of sharing landed property 
among heirs has led to an excessive fragmentation of family plots to the extent that agricultural 
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production itself is producing less returns. The very low per capita income in Rwanda (US $250) 
is such that little else can be spared for investment in this sector or in the others.” (Republic of 
Rwanda 2005:51) In other words, Rwanda is a country of peasant farmers, or rather large-scale 
gardeners. If Davies (1997:xxiv) is right, subsistence lays the ground for a particular pattern of 
political action. As he puts it, “in a society in which the major preoccupation among most of its 
members is survival, the pattern of political action will be radically different from one in which 
the major preoccupation among most of its members is not survival but establishing a sense of 
group identification, of common bonds and interests.” With this, it is hypothesized that the way 
ordinary people are defined predisposes them to falling prey to manipulation, as occurred in 
Rwanda. 
 
From the Marxian point of view, the peasantry defines a social category of people of low social 
status, which depend mainly on agricultural labor for subsistence (Allison 2003) in the agrarian 
economy. The original meaning of the peasantry is tied up in feudalism during the Middle Ages 
in Europe. In this particular context, the peasantry defined a social system under which peasants 
did not own land. Land ownership was an exclusive monopoly of the nobleman. The peasants 
borrowed the land, worked it under protection, and fought for the nobleman in return (Desmarais 
2008:139). This brings with it an idea of clientelism, initially derived from the forms of social 
organization that prevailed in the Mediterranean peasant societies. It involved the patron-client 
bonds to describe ways in which peasant cultivators related to local notables or landowners. The 
essence of the relationship, Clapham (1982:2) suggests, “was that the client offered services, 
whether economic or military, to the patron, in exchange for which the patron offered some 
security or protection to the client against the uncertainties of peasant life, the whole exchange 
being encapsulated within a set of moral obligations, often symbolized, for instance, by 
godparenthood.” Beyond the economic or military deal, the patron-client relationship applied the 
principles of the neo-patrimonialism to mobilize for popular support for the patron.  
 
Political implications for the third world states 
 
In third world states, Clapham (1985:55) suggested, this security and support are expected to 
vary: “on the one hand physical or legal protection, land or a job, some kind of economic 
development assistance, even religious intercession; on the other, military service, voting, 
economic labour power, information. Very often several of these are joined together, and the 
bond strengthened by some moral sanction which obliges each side to support the other.” For 
Clapham, the patron-client relationship is common when sharp division distinguishes the 
superiors from the inferiors. Also, it fuels strong dichotomization between the elite and the non-
elite. In the feudalism of the Middle Ages, both the patron and client came together to benefit 
from what each side offers in an unequal exchange that met the essential interests of both sides. 
Equally, the same pattern is valid in the neo-patrimonial state or modern state, where Weber‟s 
rational-legal authority poorly applies. For Clapham (1985:55-6), the neo-patrimonial state 
“provides an equally fertile breeding ground for exactly the same kind of relationship…Control 
of the state carries with it the power to provide (or withhold) security, and to allocate benefits in 
the form of jobs, development projects and so forth; and where the government is under no 
compulsion to furnish these benefits according to public or universal criteria such as justice, 
efficiency and need, it may do so at its own discretion to encourage political support.” 
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The current literature supports the contention that the top-level of leadership needs the political 
support, which they can obtain in the ways presented above, or through repressive apparatus in 
extreme cases. In democratic competition, the literature suggests that political party leaders at the 
national level rely on local leaders who have strong ascendancy in their areas. As Clapham 
(1985:55) suggested, “They offer the local leader (or perhaps one of his close relatives or 
associates) a place in the party, perhaps as a candidate in his home constituency. The local leader 
gets out the vote, essentially through his own contacts and authority, and delivers it to the 
national party. The national party in turn – assuming that it wins power – delivers benefits to its 
local representative, in the form either of economic allocations from the centre to the 
constituency, such as a road or a piped water supply, or of a purely personal pay-off, or of central 
government support in local political conflicts.” Consistent with Clapham, local level politics in 
third world states has constantly adapted itself to the realities of central power so that the will of 
the central government was strongly visible among the common citizenry. Failure to adapt 
resulted in irregularities towards central government endeavors. In Rwanda, Giti, as some other 
cases earlier highlighted, theoretically falls into this category. 
 
In many ways, this theoretical discussion finds application to Rwanda. Traditional chiefs could 
own land concessions, which landless people could rent. Under the Rwabugiri administration 
(1860-1895), for instance, clientelism meant labor by landless people who, in turn, were given 
access to land and were protected while working it. Hence, the landless situation has also served 
as a basis to define the concept of ordinary people. Not only population growth at higher rates 
exacerbates this situation, but the tradition of sharing land property among relatives also plays a 
crucial role in Rwanda. An excessive fragmentation of family plots has increasingly defeated 
land concessions (Republic of Rwanda 2005:56). The current literature supports the contention 
that peasant societies were gradually incorporated into the national political systems: “peasants 
could thus be linked with the structure of the state, a linkage which was strengthened and in 
some degree legitimized through the continuation of the moral bonds and forms of behavior 
derived from the old patron-client relationship.” (Clapham 1982:3) With this, the support given 
to the small interlocking group in command was incorporated in national political systems, as 
Weber‟s rational-legal authority did not thoroughly apply in the third world states. 
 
Against this theoretical discussion, land ownership denoted power in the feudal systems. Astiz 
(1969:21) establishes that the “ownership of land has meant and still means power over those 
who work in the agricultural sector.” In the same way, the same source refers to Aspaturian 
(1963) to show that land was perceived as something convertible into power. “[It] is more 
directly connected with the means of livelihood and can be exchanged for the services of those 
who have access to other sources of power.” (Ibid) Being ordinary people, peasants, in other 
words, is viewed as humiliating. In Latin America, for instance, she reports that peasants were 
viewed as remnants of the past and, in every usage, the term „peasants‟ was pejorative. To some 
extent, this has not entirely changed in some contexts. The empirical findings by Desmarais 
(2008:140) serve as clear illustration. They establish: “Historically, we were peasants. Then, 
when the term came to mean „backward‟ we became „farmers‟…Being peasant stands for the 
kind of agriculture and rural communities „we.‟” As the „we‟ indicates, „peasant‟ is a concept 
that brings a collective description with it that applies to a specific geographical context. 
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The ‘people of land’ and community identity 
 
In connection with the labor force, the geographical location is another lens from which to view 
ordinary people. Thanks to the dominance of agriculture in Rwanda, “not less than 94.6% of the 
population lived in the countryside…Rwanda is thus a rural country, where most of the people 
live and farm on hills…which form the basis of the society.” (Millwood 1996:16). This point of 
view has always been the basis upon which city dwellers have „looked down‟ upon those in rural 
areas. The rural-urban dichotomy always invited the third point of view from which to identify 
ordinary people. Ordinary people defined those without modern civilization and academic 
qualifications. Rural people lack basic infrastructure and related facilities.  
 
The 2002 census showed that “60% of the population aged 15 years and above in Rwanda can 
read and write…Another 4.4% can only read while 35.6% can neither read nor write.” (Republic 
of Rwanda 2005:46). It also showed that in the urban areas of the country, the proportion of 
literate residents is higher than those in rural areas (76.7 percent as against 56.6 percent). 
Importantly, men are more literate than women (66.5 percent as against 54.7 percent). With this, 
the status of ordinary people is being understood as a result of lower levels of empowerment. 
Many observers also highlight poor living conditions, such as poverty, to define ordinary people. 
Between 1994 and 2006, the 2007 National Human Development Report shows that those who 
lived in poverty varied between 82.4 percent and 62.5 percent in rural areas, while the same 
varied between 27.5 percent and 22.6 percent in urban areas (United Nations Development 
Programme Rwanda 2007:7). The status of ordinary people is understood from the perspective of 
increased vulnerability. 
 
It is evident from these statistics, and many other indicators, that ordinary people tend to be a 
particular social group associated with specific living conditions. As they looked at the peasant, 
social anthropologists “tended to stress its agrarian character, household-level subsistence 
economy, and relationship to a larger state system or urban elite that dominates it politically, 
economically, and culturally.” (Calhoun 2002) Against this perspective, Edlman (2003) 
distinguishes the people of land from urban dwellers in the production system. For her, the 
concept of peasant “means „people of the land‟…We…are peasants and it‟s the land and our 
relationship to the land and food production that distinguishes us…We are not part of the 
industrial machine. We are much closely linked to the places where we grow food…The 
language around this matters. It begins to make us understand that [land identifies] „people of 
land‟…” (Desmarais 2008:139-40). Hence, the fact of being people of land gives rise to 
community identity as people become closely related to the land. Group identification and 
emotional attachment to the group grows increasingly more important than individualistic 
cultures do in city settlements. 
 
Developmental initiatives that ignored this identity failed to pull the peasants out from the land 
in most African cases. It does not matter how highly industrialized peasants would become as 
they turn into a form of quasi-business entrepreneurs. They fear being kept in separate categories 
and are nostalgic for the possibility of the loss of countryside social bonds. There is a strong 
sense of community and of communitarian ties. The community identifies with the hosting land 
and is seen as above individuals taken in isolation from one another. By this it is understood that 
the peasantry symbolizes a coherent community, with cultural habits and norms clinging to 
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traditions. Thus, to quote from Desmarais (2008:140), the peasantry constitutes “people who 
share a deep commitment to place, people deeply attached to a particular piece of land, people 
who are all part of a particular rural community, people whose mode of existence is under threat. 
This place-bound identity, it means that of „people of land‟, reflects the belief that they have the 
right to be on the land. They have the right and obligation to produce food. They have the right 
to be seen as fulfilling an important function in society at large. They have the right to live in 
viable communities and the obligation to build community.” 
 
This gives credit to the earlier contention according to which grassroots thinking is a strong base 
that needs particular attention if one wants ordinary people to respond to the elite‟s commands. 
For instance, the commitment and attachment to land constituted a background of grassroots 
thinking from which the elite enticed ordinary people to commit genocide in Rwanda. Many 
promises made to landless people that they would be granted the land of the victims aroused the 
interest of many people. In this context, the arousal of interest corroborates the historical 
perception of power over ordinary people. To Woods (2003) “power in the countryside has been 
vested with elites, usually based on the control of key resources, notably land, and enforced 
through hierarchical, paternalistic, and sometimes oppressive, systems of social stratification. 
Such structures reinforced material inequality within rural society, embedding an underclass of 
the rural power, and denied effective participation in the political process to the majority of the 
rural population.” (Guest Editorial 2008:129) This comes to strengthen the idea of obvious 
obedience supported by many classical theories. 
Obedience 
 
The points of view from which ordinary people are perceived gave an indication of ways in 
which they fall prey to the will of the elite, under certain circumstances.  In other words, 
ordinary people are still held hostage by the elite. After the detailed discussion of the 
circumstances under which popular support materializes, the following paragraphs concentrate 
on obedient behavior in Rwanda. The discussion is expected to give sufficient materials to draw 
conclusions about the predisposition of ordinary people to commit genocide. 
 
It is challenging to understand cases in which all the population – or at least the majority – is 
engaged in violence against its parts. The case of Rwanda has interested a number of studies to 
investigate this phenomenon. As did European visitors to Rwanda in the sixteenth and 
seventeenh centuries, scholarly interest has perceived Rwanda as an obedient society. Among 
many others, Henri-Phillipe Cart (1995) formulated the same conclusion following his field 
journey in Rwanda. He raised an argument “that the „unquestioning‟, „obedient‟, or „conformist‟ 
nature of the Rwandan „traditional‟ mentality made Rwandans especially inclined to follow 
orders from above, including orders to slaughter their neighbors.” (Uvin 2001:84)  Later, Uvin 
(1998) was inclined to treat obedience as very particular to Rwandan culture. He hypothesized 
that obedience was a psychological predisposition among Rwandans. He was impressed by a 
robotic obedience. It is “as if something traditional is programmed deeply into Rwandans‟ brain 
circuits, and when activated, they respond and kill their neighbors.” (Ibid) A study by Human 
Rights Watch not only corroborates this finding, but also is clear about how it operated in 
Kibirira commune, in the prefecture of Gisenyi.  
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As Des Forge put, the officials “told Hutu to kill their Tutsi neighbors to fulfill their umuganda 
[community works] obligation for the month…Just as authorities began the violence, so they 
could stop it. In Kibirira they sent two policemen who halted the killings just by blowing their 
whistles and giving the order to disperse.” (Ibid) Des Forge goes far in emphasizing the word 
order from the leaders. It predicts little probability that ordinary people resist, or, at least, remain 
indifferent to, the word order. 
 
According to the perspective of Sotland (1959), cooperation and, to a larger extent, withdrawal 
components, remain the exclusive alternatives to the word order from the leader. Provided this, 
obedience is culturally institutionalized and the religious perspective already takes over as a 
moral virtue. From the viewpoint of the Weber‟s alternative ideal type of charismatic authority, 
obedience followed an individual charisma, which refers to messianic religious leaders. 
Charisma, to refer to Clapham (1985:46), “was a form of authority inherent in an individual, who 
through his own virtue and example crystallized a new concept of authority, even though this 
would have consistent elements drawn from previous experience, and would ultimately, if 
successful, be routinized in a new institutional form.” In Christian societies, this authority 
connects to supernatural powers. As Livingstone (2006) puts it, obedience is a “moral virtue, 
which inclines people to carry out the will of their lawful superiors,” on the top of which there is 
God. In these particular societies, it has appeared that obedience to the leader was an extension 
of the obedience to God or supernatural powers from which power is biblically said to emanate. 
 
Certainly, this applies to Rwanda, a society openly accepted as Christian and where religion has 
played a decisive role in the transformation of social life. In this way, religion is regarded as part 
of culture and drives cultural models of authority orientation. Brass (1991) concluded “that 
subjects who scored high on a multidimensional measure of Christian religious orientation were 
more accepting of the commands of an authority than those who scored lower or were 
indiscriminately antireligious.” (Waller 2002:181) Hence, the system of beliefs shapes the divine 
aspect of elite authority. This contention goes back to the Middle Ages, as Reinhard (1996:1) 
established: over that time, “the authority of the ruler was sacred and received its external 
legitimacy through religion.” It is hypothesized that sacred authority begets obedient behavior. 
Equally, this assumes that the authority of leaders does not deviate from moral virtues to engage 
ordinary people in immoralities. 
 
The psychological perspective considers obedience as a normal response to the authority of the 
leader. Colman (2006) assumes Stanly Milgram (1963) to be the most experimental research 
pioneer of psychology in the US associated with this view. As he paraphrases, Milgram (1963) 
equally defines obedience as a specific behavior vis-à-vis a “form of social influence in which a 
person yields to explicit instructions or orders from an authority figure.” Milgran‟s (1963) 
central argument is that people conform to social power. This is in line with Allison (2003) who 
– through his principal forms of social power – supported the idea of conformity to the authority 
of leaders. As he posits, obedience equals the conformity of a person to the will of another 
person‟s order and instructions. This means that obedient actors surrender to the pressure of 
social power.  
 
Obedience, Allison (2003) argues, “involves a willingness to implement instructions without 
exceptions. In despotisms and absolute governments, as well as in certain religious and military 
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organizations, such obedience has been considered a virtue, but in liberal, individualist societies 
it is considered morally reprehensible and dangerous.” Some studies have established the post 
independent regimes in Rwanda to be despotic and absolute. In most cases, such regimes found 
legitimacy in military power until they transformed into democratic institutions through 
elections. The long lifespans of these regimes probably institutionalized obedience until it 
transformed into a moral virtue that most people acquired. In other words, culture has 
increasingly become inclined to integrate obedience.  If Waller (2002) asked how ordinary 
people commit genocide and mass killing, on the one hand, and Melvern (2004) referred to 
conspiracy to murder, on the other, there are strong indications that obedience is institutionalized 
in many human societies.  
 
To sum up, the experience of genocidal violence indicates that Rwanda society overall is very 
obedient. Many relate this fact to Rwandan culture and its institutions. With the latter, Rwandans 
shared explanations, images of the world, values and goals and the symbolic environment. 
According to Staub (1989:51), institutions like family, child rearing, church, school, to name a 
few, tremendously contributed to shaping an obedient personality. He argues that an 
“authoritarian child rearing teaches children to be submissive to authority, but also to raise their 
own children in an authoritarian manner.” (Ibid) With this logic, obedience was perpetuated as 
cultural heritage. Politicians made use of this cultural heritage to realize political agendas. To 
illustrate, Prunier (1995) suggests, “the decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for  
political reasons.” (Millwood 1996:16) Ordinary people have played an instrumental role. On the 
one hand, mobilization campaigns over scarce land increased extremely the levels of social 
conformity. On the other hand, the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy had widened over the past, so as to 
inspire mutual fear. The higher the levels of mutual fear, the more the idea of „preventative 
attacks‟ took hold. Equally, cycles of violence ensued. To illustrate, for instance, Stephen Smith 
(1998) held “What the Tutsi and Hutu have in common is neither language, nor country nor 
religion, but a deep-seated fear of the other – a fear which, for forty years, has served to justify 
mass killings.” (Uvin 2001:86) Whether the fear was real or perceived is not the subject matter 
of this study. If it has been the supporting base for the elite to mobilize ordinary people, it has 
involved an ideological interest of conformity. 
 
Even if rank-and-file peasants associated with conformity, Uvin (1998) thought that this is not a 
fixed property of Rwandan culture. Neither is it a psychological predisposition for Rwandans he 
argues. Rwandans have in common with other people a minimum of resistance. “[They] know 
how to resist orders from above, pretend to execute them while really opposing them, passively 
sabotage or undo obligatory programs, and the like.” (Uvin 2001:84) He observes resistance as a 
common practice under certain circumstances, such as “evading taxes, smuggling, avoiding 
mandatory meetings, escaping from community labor, engaging in petty crime, or illegally 
migrating.” (Ibid) This lends to support again to the view that the grassroots thinking is a 
critically important factor for engendering conformity. 
Grassroots thinking 
 
At least three kinds of beliefs inform the thinking about the „other‟ at the grassroots level (Waller 
2002). To refer to Staub (1989:117), this thinking consists of the “perspectives and meanings 
shared by members of a group; their views of the world and of themselves; their beliefs, values, 
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and norms of conduct; their myths and conceptions” of the world. The first belief is: „each of us 
is like no other human being‟. As this logic goes, each individual is seen as unique. Equally, 
individuals depicted as „unique‟ selectively form „unique groups‟. To quote from Waller 
(2002:199), who paraphrases the anthropologist Sumner (1906), a differentiation “arises between 
ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups. The insiders in a 
we-group are in a relation of people, order, law, government, and industry to each other.” 
(Waller 2002:199) With this each group puts itself at the centre of everything and becomes the 
reference of the outsiders in the others-groups. From a psychological point of view, the „we-
group‟ and the „others-groups‟ find meaning in the existence and definition of the „other‟ 
(Brewer and Miller 1996): “We are what we are because they are not what we are.”36 (Waller 
2002:200) This finds application to Rwanda in many ways. Upon arrival, the colonial authorities 
came out in sympathy with Tutsi, who were the nominated leaders in society for some time, until 
the colonial authorities transferred favoritism to the Hutu in 1959.  
 
The ‘we-group’ vs the ‘others-groups,’ and implications 
 
In a similar context of drastic change, each group, probably “nourishes its own pride and vanity, 
boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.” (Waller 
2002:199) In different timeframes, this ethnocentrism alternated between Hutu and Tutsi, as a 
number of studies have documented. To illustrate, scholars such as Galtung (2004:90) describe 
German colonialism and Rassenkunde (race „science‟) as “favoring the Tutsis over the Hutus and 
both over the „pygmies‟, being taller. The Belgian successors to the German colonialists after the 
First World War favored the Hutu majority, „numbers over centimeters‟, because democracy was 
„in‟.” In this context, group affiliation and the distinctiveness that intergroup comparison brought 
with it equally led to intergroup conflicts. It is arguable, to refer to Sherif (1966) and Deutsch 
(1973), that the colonial authorities “concentrated on processes of selective perception through 
forms of tunnel vision, prejudice and stereotyping, an malign perceptions of the „other‟, on 
dehumanization and the formation of enemy images, on the displacement of feelings of fear and 
hostility through suppression and projection.” (Miall 2005:45) This opened the ground for sharp 
delineations, which were later coupled with the belief in clear differences, and the various effects 
this brought with it. 
 
The belief in „we-group‟ and „others-group‟ brings with it the assumed similarity effect. It 
exaggerates the perceived similarities of the in-group members as they compare to the out-group 
members. Against the allegedly common thoughts, feelings, and behavior, the definition of what 
the in-group is “requires defining what it is not, as well” (Miall 2005:45). In 1933 Germany, for 
instance, the Nazi propaganda distinguished the „Aryans‟ from the „non-Aryans‟ to nuance the 
value of the rights of Germanhood (Bauman 2000:27). The same applies to the case of Rwanda: 
a perpetrator of genocide told certain empirical studies, “I defended the members of my [Hutu] 
tribe against the Tutsi”37 (Prunier 1995:247). This means that individuals exist for the good of 
the in-group. This belief also brings with it the out-group homogeneity effect. This effect 
exaggerates the similarities within the out-group: “we assume that out-group members are highly 
similar, or essentially interchangeable [and that] we can use our handy social group stereotype to 
quickly interpret an individual out-group member‟s behavior” (Waller 2002:174-5). The idea is 
                                               
36 Emphasis from source. 
37 Emphasis from source. 
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that we tend to extrapolate individual behavior to the entire out-group. For example, the inside 
Tutsi were being labeled Inkotanyi during the attacks in Rwanda, spearheaded by the Tutsi of the 
Diaspora. At the same time, the same belief exaggerates differences between the in-group and 
the out-group that leads to the accentuation effect.  
 
This effect “leaves us biased toward information that enhances the difference between social 
categories and less attentive to information about similarities between members of different 
social categories.” (Waller 2002:175) In the Rwandan countryside, for instance, Hutu ideologues 
ignored that: “The „small Tutsi‟ from the Hills were in no way different from their Hutu 
neighbors, except perhaps in their physical appearance.” (Prunier 1995:249) On the contrary, 
there has been an excessive overestimation of differences between Tutsi and Hutu. For instance, 
“the „different race hypothesis‟ has caused much crankish writing during the past hundred 
years.” (Prunier 1995:16-7) To refer to Elias, the ethnic “group confirmed its own identity, 
created differences in the way in which the two groups were viewed, at the same time as group 
cohesion was the power instrument that made it possible to maintain the differences.” (Olofsson 
2000:370) Various research papers, as well as political mobilizations, perpetuated these 
differences until numerous modern scholars refuted that theory and concluded that Tutsi and 
Hutu belonged to the same basic „racial stock‟. 
 
At least in Rwanda, the accentuation effect resulted in in-group patronage, which later 
transformed into social exclusion against the out-group. In-group bias ensued. According to this 
bias, we “generally like people we think are similar to us and dislike those we perceive as 
different…We evaluate in-group members more positively, credit them more for their success, 
hold them less accountable for their failures or negative actions, reward them more, expect more 
favorable treatment from them, and find them more persuasive than out-group members.” 
(Waller 2002:175) Thus, individuals tend “to attach positive value to the categories to which 
they belong and negative value to categories that do not apply to them.” (Gould 1999:359) The 
categories, to refer to Schulz (1996), “both reflect and potentially disrupt or recreate social and 
political relationships within and between groups,” (Song 2003:36) depending on the degree of 
devaluation of the out-group. As a result, “individuals and groups locate themselves in relation to 
others, understand themselves, and define their possibilities” (Ibid) within very specific social 
and political processes. For Nagel (1994), the perception of the „other‟ becomes “the result of a 
dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and process, as well as the 
individual‟s self-identification and outsiders‟ ethnic designation – i.e., what you think your 
ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is.” (Song 2003:41) Hence, identities are co-
constituted, “but…also mutually reinforcing and therefore likely to become institutionalized and 
to be reproduced.” (Hall 1999:35-6) This means that identity is about self-image and 
stigmatization, which always conflict. 
 
In other words, according to Elias, identity becomes a result of the process of evaluation and 
stigmatization, which contributes to the social reproduction of perpetrators of genocidal violence 
and mass killing. As he suggests, the civilizing process “has made us all (or most of us at least) 
dislike and shun violence. But modern civilization has also invented the means to make this 
aversion and loathing of violence irrelevant when it comes to complicity in the commitment of 
violent acts – particularly when the acts are to be committed in the name of civilized values.” 
(Bauman 2000:245) However, the process is “not an individual problem, as the category 
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„prejudice‟ might suggest, but a group problem. The ability of one group to assert the inferiority 
of another group is due to the power relations between the two groups. The fact that an 
individual in one group views a member of another group as inferior is not related to individual 
traits or qualities. Members of a stigmatized group or category are collectively viewed as 
separate from and inferior to their own group.” (Olofsson 2000:370) This has applied most in 
cases of majority-minority settings originally characterized by power imbalance. By contrast, 
Collier et al. (2003:4) posit, “societies that are highly diverse mixtures of many ethnic and 
religious groups are usually safer than more homogeneous societies.” In similar cases, ethnicity 
and religion appear much less important than people commonly believe. As the same source 
argues, “Some social, political, and economic characteristics systematically increase the 
incidence of civil war.” (Collier et al. 2003:4-5) Unlike highly diverse mixtures of identities, 
homogeneous societies develop strong beliefs in the dichotomization of identities, as a result of 
unevenly distributed power relations. 
 
The first belief, according to which „each of us is like no other human being,‟ has only attempted 
to consider the individual as unique in the limits of the in-group. By this is meant that “people 
define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an “us” versus “them” 
relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (Huntington 
1993:5). However, the criteria with which to look at people diversify beyond the in-group. A 
given group crosscuts with other out-groups originally perceived as different. This leads to the 
second belief: „each of us is like some other human beings‟. An example from Rwanda refers to 
the clans, which crosscut the boundaries of different ethnic groups. Despite that Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa are described as different from one another, the clan defines other criteria on the basis of 
which each is unique. The same applies to the formation of the „Bantu group‟, for instance. This 
means that the boundaries begin to lose meaning at a certain point. On a larger scale, this implies 
the third belief: „each of us is like all other human beings‟. With this belief, people trivialize the 
basic identities to which they originally belong in order to perceive themselves as humankind. As 
a result, people become members of „humanity‟. 
 
The thinking about the ‘other’ in practice 
 
Most divided societies have given primacy to the first belief and, as a result, have downplayed 
the latter two beliefs, from which the nature of human nature is captured. In other words, 
divisions provided soil for the formation of the „us‟ and „them‟ view of the other. In the context 
of Rwanda, for instance, people perceived „us‟ as Tutsi and „them‟ as Hutu or Twa; „us‟ as from 
North (Abakiga) and „them‟ as from South (Abanyenduga). In most cases, those who did not fit 
in „our‟ universe were perceived as evil, with no right to life under particular circumstances. This 
perception also applied to Russia and Germany: Stalin‟s and Hitler‟s victims “were killed 
because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing 
was not the work of destruction, but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better 
human world – more efficient, more moral, more beautiful – could be established.” (Bauman 
2000:92) Put another way, the universe is perceived as ideal; racially pure, such as the case of 
the German Aryans.  
 
The 1959 jaquérie or so-called peasant revolt in Rwanda aimed at the same purpose. The 
literature refers to this as “the elimination of the internal opposition and the murder of the most 
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prominent political opponents. The murders would mark the end of the role of Tutsi in public 
life.” (Melvern 2000:17) Following the invasion by the 1963 and 1990 Tutsi Diaspora, this 
argument finds support in roadblocks and „self-defense‟ groups spontaneously sent to hunt the 
(Tutsi) enemy. To refer to Bloom (1998:190), perpetrators “believed that even torture and 
murder were justified to protect their endangered people…Political, ideological and ethnical 
opposition had to be stigmatized as dangerous, irresponsible and unrealistic…” With this logic, 
the idea of grey zone between the perpetrators and victims is made impossible. Hence, “the 
dangerous myth of equality [of ethnic groups involved in tensions,]” according to the same 
source, is strongly fought. As a result, Hutu ideologues made use of this belief to entice potential 
perpetrators to violence in 1993, regardless of whether the latter believe in the myth of equality 
between Hutu and Tutsi. In this framework, this view of the „other‟ made death a recurrent 
phenomenon in the Great Lakes Region, as a result of strong divisions. In this region, Rwanda 
and Burundi particularly exemplified this phenomenon in the past. „Us‟ was perceived as the 
minority group, and „them‟ as the majority group, as an indication of lower levels of diverse 
mixtures of many ethnic groups.  
 
The minority has been understood as “a segment of a common culture and whose members are 
thought, by themselves or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of 
common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common 
origin and culture are significant ingredients.” (Song 2003:44) The majority-minority perspective 
has always served as an explanation of genocidal violence in the Great Lakes Region, 
particularly in Rwanda and Burundi. The winner takes all, and the loser is left in extreme 
deprivation. In this way, genocidal violence is assumed to closely relate to the scarcity of 
ecological resources. This suggests that violence of that kind should be less important when 
ethnic groups and resources are relatively evenly distributed. Taken from the psychological point 
of view, the majority-minority perspective established a clear-cut distinction between the „in-
group‟ and „out-group‟. The in-group may be defined as “any group to which we belong or with 
which we identify…Out-groups are any group to which we do not belong or with which we do 
not identify.” (Waller 2002:174) These groups – both minority and majority – served as „moral 
circles‟, which strengthened the „psychological construction of the other‟. In Singer‟s (1981) 
terms, this made humans in the same circles consider others worthy of a certain moral 
consideration.  
 
Pinker (2002) suggests that the moral circle is subject to the expansion “outward from the family 
and village to the clan, the tribe, the nation, the race, and most recently (as in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) to all of humanity.” (Waller 2002:201) The „us‟ and „them‟ 
dichotomy performs at both the local level – through majority and minority – and at the 
international level – through strong networks with what Waller (2002) terms the „civilized 
worlds‟, as opposed to the „uncivilized worlds‟. (In this context, the „colonial worldview‟ often 
identified with the superior civilization as opposed to „violence prone worlds‟ where people 
identify with the remnants of barbarities.) Being from a „superior civilization‟ is a basis from 
which they prove how bad it is for „uncivilized worlds‟ to be unlike the former, and how good it 
is to be safe as they are in their „civilized world‟. According to Waller, some scholars suggest 
that „civilized worlds‟ are often transformed into bystanders to conflicts because they are not 
exactly alike the parties involved, and are not affected by the conflict. The psychological impact 
of this thinking at both local and international levels, it seems, has brought those established as 
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„in-group‟ and „out-group‟ to accept their descriptions over time. In other words, to recall Bloom 
(1998), „collective consciousness‟ and „organic solidarity‟ intensively set a collective identity. 
This is not a fixed property of Rwanda, but Rwanda certainly serves as an example to support it. 
And there are other examples. 
 
The armed conflict that opposed Napoleon‟s armies in Saxony and in the rest of the German-
speaking European state resulted in strong collective identity. Hall (1999:35-6) concluded, “The 
experience of suffering at the hands of those ethnically and linguistically different from me can 
affect how I view myself as an individual, and as member of a social collectivity.” In the context 
of political violence, Ruggiero (2006:63) reports a similar result: “the reinforcement of feelings 
of unity, and conformity, among those opposing it.” The arrest of an estimated 8,000 Tutsi that 
followed the 1990 attack by the Tutsi Diaspora also raised collective consciousness in Rwanda. 
This accords with the contention by Khawaja (1993:66): “Repression can strengthen collective 
identity, the sense of belonging to a group, by operating as a symbolic reminder of a group‟s 
shared circumstance vis-à-vis authorities and their agents of control. And salient identity implies 
increased within-group solidarity [among both perpetrators and victims].” With this, repression 
plays a crucial role in bringing factional groupings within a unitary whole. White (1989) and 
Opp and Roehl (1990) support the argument as follows: “Identification with those who suffer 
from repression creates unity and is, therefore, an important factor for such regrouping and the 
eventual crystallization of collective identity.” (Khawaja 1993:66)  
 
In each of these circumstances, collective consciousness, to quote from Song (2003:41), became 
“fundamentally shaped by interactions with one‟s co-ethnics – the members of one‟s ethnic 
group.” A clear distinction is established between similarities and differences in line with the 
first belief about the other – each of us is like no other human being. The fact that one belongs to 
a given identity “gives you a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. But 
it is also about your social relationships, your complex involvements with others.” (Song 2003:1) 
According to the current literature, clientelism and neo-patrimonial regimes have only 
exaggerated these differences, mobilized into ethnic identities. In so doing, the indigenous 
parties – during the nationalist period – made use of the existing unevenness of social and 
economic change and the competition for power to intensify ethnic awareness. From a political 
viewpoint, Clapham (1985:57-8) argues, “ethnicity may be seen as a means for giving a moral 
bond or cement to a clientelist network. The party leadership is placed under an obligation to 
look after the interests of its constituent race, tribe, caste or religious group; equally to the point, 
the leadership acquires a kind of legitimacy as the authentic representative of that group, 
regardless of the enormous differences of class and wealth, and in some respects of political 
interests, between it and its followers.” Regarding Rwanda, ethnic identity remained an 
important basis for legitimacy. 
 
Essentialism and social constructivism are the lenses from which identity has been perceived. 
Particular to the Rwandan society, perceptions about identity involved strong complexity in the 
social relationships. In this context, the complexity refers to how problematic is to use „ethnic‟ or 
„class‟ identifications in line with the existing literature about identity. They are confronted with 
a „shallow identity‟ whereby migrations helped to distinguish one identity from another, more so 
than physical appearance.  This will be further discussed below. 
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The essentialist perspective 
 
Essentialism is a school of identity that informed many Western scholars in analyzing the 
complex social relationships and involvement with others in Rwanda. It alleges identity to be 
static, knowable, and given by nature, blood, or by supernatural powers like God. To Geerts 
(1963), identity is something that naturally exists, as a result of common heritage. It is basically 
an extension of blood ties (Song 2003:7) and is “inherited by blood from one‟s ancient 
ancestors.” (Varshney 2005:105) This means, to Pierre van den Berghe (1978), that ethnic 
identity is predetermined at birth (Ibid). In this context, identity has a „primordial‟ reference 
since it is understood as a biological thing, which does not change. To link this idea with Marcel 
d‟Hertefelt (1971) ethnic identities define social groups that “existed long before the colonial 
period as forming part of the identity of Rwandans.” (Reyntjens 1996:243) David Newbury 
(1979, 1980, 1988) earlier argued for this idea to show that “while the terms „Hutu‟ and „Tutsi‟ 
existed in pre-colonial times, they did not have the same significance as in the recent era, and the 
meaning of an „ethnic‟ identity, varied from place to place and over time.” (Millwood 1996:22) 
Some scholars support the idea that Hutu and Tutsi peacefully coexisted and that there remained 
lower level of tensions.
38
 Only vendettas or feuds, or noble or popular revolts were common 
events in pre-colonial Rwanda (Millwood 2001). However, the magnitude of violence in these 
events was minimal.  
 
As Prunier (1995:39) describes, “there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of systematic 
violence between Tutsi and Hutu as such. There were plenty of wars, both domestic and foreign, 
„but they either pitted the Banyarwanda as a group against foreign tribes or kingdoms; or saw 
chiefly lineages fighting each other to control some seat of power, with all the abagaragu at their 
shebuja‟s side, whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. These wars, like all wars, caused deaths…But they 
were never on the scale we have witnessed since independence and which eventually culminated 
with the 1994 horror.”39 Contrary to the 1994 genocide, the elite never connived with ordinary 
                                               
38 On a small scale, manageable conflicts occurred in the past. Conflict is held to be a phenomenon of daily human life; they “are 
very much a part of all societies” (Hachen 2001:75). Hobbes (1679) thought that human societies “cannot be organized into co-
operative „commonwealths‟ in a natural way as is the case with bees and ants because humans strive constantly for relative 
superiority over one another. To create an orderly social system among humans, it is necessary to create an artificial means of 
attaining and preserving co-operative order. This is achieved by the establishment of government”(Gordon 1991:78). It is “a 
natural and inevitable part of all human relationships” and “is necessary for growth, change and learning to occur” (Friberg 
2003:2, 8). viewed as an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change, Miall (2005:13) defines conflict as “an expression of the 
heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited 
constraints.” Simmel views conflict as a ubiquitous and regulatory phenomenon. He notes “conflict is necessary for group 
integrity, cohesiveness, and the „boundary maintenance‟ of the group.” (Williamson 1965:35) One of his findings is that “conflict 
is among the most vivid forms of human interaction […], the result of contrasting interests between the elite and the 
underprivileged” (Ruggiero 2006:4). Park and Burgess referred to Simmel as noting: “If every interaction among men is a 
sociation, conflict…must certainly be considered as sociation …Conflict is…designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way 
of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of the conflicting parties.” (Gould and Kolb 1964:123). At 
certain levels, Durkheim (1858-1917) regarded conflict as performing “a healthy function in society, as it reinforces feelings of 
unity and consensus among law-abiding people”. (Ruggiero 2006:47) Marx‟s thinking about conflict and cohesion recognizes that 
“a complex society may be characterized by constant conflict…or by consensus, but not by a combination of the two” (Merton et 
al. 1958:84). In the same way as Marx, Bonger (1969) perceived conflict as “the result of the socially unfavorable environment 
created by capitalist development…Division between those holding the means of production and those possessing only their 
labor force are singled out as the source of permanent conflict…[It is] a behavior inherent in the capitalist arrangement of 
production, society and state.” (Ruggiero 2006:86) 
39 Emphasis from source. 
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people to cause harm to one section of the population in the past: “Never before did those in 
seats of power engage in premeditated schemes to isolate and destroy a section of the Rwandan 
society. Neither had ordinary people ever engage in massive slaughter as they did in 1994, at the 
instigation and mobilization by the state machinery.”40 Rwanda has gone through disturbances 
that mainly related to the exaggerations of differences between Hutu and Tutsi. For instance, 
Maquet (1954) argues for “a consensus that all Rwandans are by birth fundamentally unequal. 
Such value consensus implied an acceptance on the part of the dominated that some (in this case 
Tutsi) are born to rule and to exploit, while others (Hutu and Twa) are born to obey and to 
serve.” (Newbury 1988:3-4) Similarly, to Berghe (1978), identity is not chosen or at least 
acquired over one‟s lifetime (Song 2003:7). Therefore, Hutu and Tutsi are accepted as radically 
different people of different race, identified with different origins and histories (Uvin 2001:76).  
Historians, anthropologists, political scientists polarized ethnic relations in the 1950s, and 
considered ethnic cleavages as unchanging „givens‟ (Newbury 1988:2). On this basis, they 
established ways in which each of Tutsi, 'Hutu and Twa are individually like no other. They 
tailored a physical typology to each of them. 
 
Rwanda has been considered to have been populated largely through migration, which has been a 
constant phenomenon over Rwanda‟s history, with numerous causes. For instance, Newbury 
(1988) focused on the Ndorwa and Gisaka immigrants from the North and East of Central 
Rwanda to Kinyaga, who were fleeing war, or domination by the central regime. Migration of 
this nature dated back to the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, under 
King Rujugira and then his son Ndabarasa, respectively. The common migrations involved, inter 
alia, “refugees from war or political disturbances, colonizers sent directly by the Rwandan court, 
refugees from famine, and immigrants seeking better land or who could not recall the reasons for 
their move.” (Newbury 1988:27) In most cases, the literature record that such immigrants 
spontaneously moved from one place to another without the prior plan of the State.  
 
Scholars observed this spontaneous aspect of migrations that ultimately brought together the 
inhabitants of Rwanda. Survival, and the conquest of better land and grazing pastures, were the 
most common reasons for the movement of different populations in the Great Lakes region, in 
general, and particularly in Rwanda. Following different sequences, the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi 
gathered in Rwanda. However, the descriptions that most historians used to refer to these „ethnic 
groups‟ obviously derided as racist in Rwanda. They require cautious use, in the modern time, as 
the ethical issues they cause bring analysts to challenge the extent to which these historians are 
reputable sources. As Melvern (2000:8) reports, the first inhabitants were the Twa as early as 
2,000 B.C.. They were hunter-gathers and were related to cave-dwelling pygmies. Prunier 
(1995:6) describes the Twa as “small, chunky, muscular, and very hairy; particularly on the 
chest. With a monkey-like flat face and a huge nose, he is quite similar to the apes whom he 
chases in the forest.” The agriculturalist Hutu followed around 1,000 A.D.. With Bantu features 
(i.e., woolly hair, broad noses, dark skin, and full lips), they migrated from the savannahs of 
present Cameroon to the Great Lakes area under Bantu expansion.  
 
Finally, Bauman (1948) and d‟Hertefelt (1962) report the emergence of Tutsi, “as larger 
pastoralist migration [occurred] southward into the Great Lakes region”, and whom settled after 
                                               
40 Beyond Absolute Terror: Post-Genocide Reconstruction in Rwanda (San Fransisco, March 7th, 2003): Speech by H.E Paul 
Kagame, President of Rwanda, at the Commonwealth Club San Francisco. 
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conquest of the then states, and the peoples in the region achieved peaceful assimilation between 
the eleventh and fifteenth centuries (Uvin 2001:76). The Tutsi identified as “very slender and 
tall, straight-nosed, and lit brown in complexion…[and who] arrived…in a migration that 
appears to have been gradual and mostly peaceful.” (Waller 2002:221) Referring to Melvern 
(2000:8), the Tutsi “originated in the Horn of Africa, migrating south, and they gradually 
achieved dominance over the other two groups.” In short, earlier studies made a generally racist 
description of identity. Importantly, they represented the Tutsi as human in a sense unlike other 
human beings. The Tutsi “of good race has nothing of the Negro, apart from his color...Gifted 
with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings, which is rare among 
primitive people. He is a natural-born leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated 
goodwill.” (Prunier 1995:6) As Magnerella (2005:806) describes, the European visitors 
“considered the above qualities to be innate, not acquired.”  
 
In addition to having a pastoralist vocation, this characterization of Tutsi as natural-born leaders 
makes many feel that “the early conception of „Hutu‟ and „Tutsi‟ conveyed class status, since 
power and prestige in Rwanda depended on possession of cattle.” (Waller 2002:221) This means 
the class of the Tutsi cattle ranchers emerged as an aristocratic elite while the Hutu farmers were 
understood as commoners. The Twa – generally potters and entertainers – were held in low 
regard by other groups. The colonial authorities geared the educational system on the belief in 
the superior intelligence of the Tutsi, “to recruit only Tutsi for posts in the administration, 
including technical departments such as agriculture, veterinary or medical services.” (Van der 
Meeren 1996:253) Also, the colonial authorities sustained the Tutsi monarch (Mwami) and the 
chiefs,
41
 who worked with him in the administration, and preferred to rule indirectly. A 
juxtaposition of powers was established, which eroded the existing institutions. The suppression 
of the tripartite system of chiefs (of land, of cattle and of army) surfaces the most in this system. 
As Van der Meeren (1996:254) describes, the colonial rule continued “an already hierarchical 
system and above all rigidified and polarized the two main categories, Tutsi and Hutu, into 
ethnic confrontation.” Lemarchang (1994) suggests this juxtaposition as the root cause of ethnic 
violence that occurred in the years 1959, 1962, 1973 and 1994. This root cause of ethnic violence 
is to “be found in the extent to which collective identities have been reactivated, mythologized 
and manipulated for political advantage.” (Van der Meeren 1996:253) In other words, the 
juxtaposition of powers had the effect of accentuating the difference between Hutu and Tutsi that 
took place on various earlier occasions.  
 
Some studies report that the polarization of ethnicity in Rwanda dates back to the nineteenth 
century. Millwood (1996:9) pinpoints Rwabugiri as having “manipulated social categories, and 
introduced an „ethnic‟ differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social position. 
Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European 
colonialism.” With the arrival of European explorers, and later the colonial and post-colonial 
regimes, strong polarization continued to increase. As Melvern (2000:8) describes, Hutu and 
Tutsi meant subject and servant, and those rich in cattle, respectively. However, she argues, “the 
                                               
41 According to Kamukama (1997) in Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, the indirect rule was made possible 
by both Germans and Belgians favoring the Tutsi over the Hutu. The most crucial evidence supporting this statement is that 
Belgian administrators replaced Hutu chiefs with Tutsi, creating a very sharp imbalance. The replacement policy, he notes, was 
so extensive that by 1959, 43 out of 45 chiefs, and 549 of 559 sub-chiefs, were Tutsi. In addition, Magnarella (2005:807) 
suggests that Tutsi held “83 percent of posts in such areas as the judiciary, agriculture and veterinary services.” 
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differences were not solely based on wealth or class; there were Hutu and Tutsi in the same 
class. Tutsi pastoralists were as poor as their Hutu neighbors.” As a result of these exaggerations, 
missionaries considered Tutsi as foreigners; descendents of Egypt.  
 
On the eve of genocide, extremist Hutu made use of this idea during the anti-Tutsi campaign. On 
this, examples widely cite the vice-president of the then ruling party –MRND – Léon Mugesera 
who addressed party militants on November 22, 1992, in the northern stronghold of Gisenyi. He 
claimed that Tutsi belonged to Ethiopia and threatened: “we are going to find them a shortcut to 
get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River. We have to act. Wipe them all out.” 
(Melvern 2000:47) In so doing, he thereby invoked violence, and the Hutu nationalist claim that 
Tutsi were foreigners in Rwanda (Strauss 2006:195). Along the same lines, Théoneste Bagosora 
suggested that Tutsi “were naturalized immigrants…[who] have never had a country of their 
own.”42 (Melvern 2000:62) Many studies have observed these exaggerations of differences 
between Hutu and Tutsi. 
43
 
 
In Grossman‟s (1995) terms, these exaggerations translate to the „distance spectrum‟. With this, 
genocide and mass killing are made difficult when the gap between the conflicting identities 
decreases. Conversely, such violence is more likely to occur when that distance increases 
(Waller 2002:196). In Germany, for instance, Jews were “marked for total destruction, and 
allotted no place in the New Order that Hitler intended to install,” (Bauman 2000:x) as a result of 
wider distance spectrum from the Aryans. The same applies to Rwanda. Had this distance not 
been increased between Hutu and Tutsi, genocidal violence could not have been contemplated. 
In both cases, „ethnocentrism‟ (Sumner 1906) and „xenophobia‟ (Tajfel and Forgas 1961) 
demonstrated that “we tend to be partial toward „us‟ and label „them‟ – those with whom „we‟ 
share the fewest genes and least culture – as enemies. We have an evolved capacity to see our 
group as superior to all others and even to be reluctant to recognize members of other groups as 
deserving of equal respect.” (Waller 2002:199) The dehumanization of „them‟ ensued and, as a 
result, the perpetrators deprived the victims of their identity and excluded them from the 
community of the human family.  
 
The logic of „ethnocentrism‟ and „xenophobia‟ constituted a necessary and sufficient condition 
to exclude Tutsi from the moral universe of obligation. For instance, it was made easy for a 
perpetrator to eliminate those identified as „Inyenzi‟ (cockroaches). It also gave perpetrators 
encouragement to commit violence when euphemistic labels for evil actions were used – i.e., 
gukora, meaning „to work‟. In this context, perpetrators don‟t blame themselves for the harm 
they commit. Instead, they blame the victims. That is likely one of the reasons why ordinary 
Germans performed executions free from coercion. As Goldhagen (1996) remarked, they “did 
not view their actions as criminal, nor did they shrink from opportunities to inflict suffering, 
humiliation, and death – openly, knowingly, and zealously – on their victims.” (Waller 2002:41) 
In other words, shared beliefs and perceptions about Jews supported violence without remorse. 
The argument is that the perpetrator “must deny the guilt within him, and he must assure himself 
that the world is not mad, that his victims are less than animals, that they are evil vermin, and 
                                               
42 Colonel BEM Théoneste Bagosora, „L‟Assassinat du Président Habyarimana ou l‟Ultime Opération du Tutsi pour sa reconquête 
du pouvoir par la force au Rwanda‟, unpublished (Impression of the author). 
43 Uvin (2001), de Lame and Newbury (1996), David and Catharine Newbury and Kimonyo (2000), and Christopher Taylor 
(1994). 
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that what his nation and his leaders have told him to do is right. He must believe that not only is 
this atrocity right, but it is proof that he is morally, socially, and culturally superior to those 
whom he has killed. It is the ultimate act of denial of their humanity. It is the ultimate act of 
affirmation of his superiority.”44 (Waller 2002:218) As a result, the “more „they‟ are to blame, 
the more the rest of „us‟ are safe, and the less we have to do to defend this safety.” (Bauman 
2000:xii) Bauman describes an extreme context of exaggerations of these differences. This had 
far-reaching implications in Rwanda. 
 
In the racist arguments of many earlier scholars, Prunier (1995:9) strongly identifies the 
development of highly value-laden stereotypes, which resulted in “inflating the Tutsi cultural ego 
inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful 
inferiority complex.” He thought hatred against all Tutsi by extremist Hutu at least partly related 
the complex of inferiority. The hatred befell even those Tutsi who were as poor as many Hutu, 
“since all Tutsi were [perceived as] members of the „superior race‟.” (Prunier 1995:39) To refer 
to Eller (1999), the image of the self and of the „other‟ continuously developed, as a result of 
conflicting identities. He agrees with Friberg (2003:16-7), that “[f]or a group conflict to emerge, 
each party has to develop a sense of identity.” The issue of identity cards in 1933 – following 
arbitrary criteria, according to Reyntjens (1985) – probably exaggerated the awareness of ethnic 
identity in Rwanda. The most important consequence of the image of the self is that it might 
make revenge more likely when one group perceives the pressure of victimhood. In other words, 
the image of the self perpetuates the self-reproduction of victimhood. This argument finds 
support in communal and sectarian enmities that have erupted into overt violence, until they have 
led to massacre or to the extermination of whole populations.  
 
Equally, daily experiences show that “murderous communal hatred has always been with us and 
will probably never go away; and that the only significance of modernity in this respect is that, 
contrary to its promise and to the widespread expectation, it did not file smooth the admittedly 
rough edges of human coexistence and thus has not put a definite end to man‟s inhumanity to 
man.” (Bauman 2000:88) No matter whether a society is modern or pre-modern,45 the 
exaggeration of differences causes a destructive image of the self, through which predictability 
of collective support for mass killing is exacerbated. 
Social constructivist perspective 
 
Contrary to essentialism, the social construction of identity alleges “ethnicity has no natural or 
objective existence as such, and [has] stressed its socially constructed, rather than primordial, 
nature.” (Song 2003:7) To Song, identity is not static and unchangeable; the boundaries of 
                                               
44 Emphasis from source. 
45 Some thinkers argue murderous communal hatred is the result of wild passions of barbarism; they tend to take it as a pre-
modern world phenomenon. However, Kren and Rappoport (1980) argue that modern societies have failed to curb human 
propensity for violence. Even if murderous communal hatred related to pre-modernity, modernity itself is still taken as relative. 
As an illustration, the Hobbesian tradition suggests that “the inhuman pre-social state has not yet been fully eradicated, all 
civilizing efforts notwithstanding…the civilizing process has succeeded in substituting artificial and flexible patterns of human 
conduct for natural drives, and hence made possible a scale of inhumanity and destruction which had remained inconceivable as 
long as natural predispositions guided human action.” (Bauman 2000:95) Even if the ideal of modernity can be attained, Bauman 
(2000) has demonstrated that, through bureaucratic organizations and scientific management, modernity perfectly relates to 
violence. 
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identity are likely to fluctuate. “[E]thnic groups can change their boundaries and criteria for 
membership,” Song suggests. The proponents of this central idea – situational theorists – hold 
that identity “can be activated in particular times and situations by material and other interests; 
that is, people can use their ethnic affiliations and ties as resources in a variety of contexts, its 
response to needs, or in terms of competition with outside groups.” (Ibid) Contrary to the 
biological understanding, in essentialism identity depends on the context; it has a „contextual‟ 
reference.  One can change identity on various grounds. This opens the possibility for one to 
accumulate identities – for example, as professor, husband, child, and politician, at the same 
time. Under the concept of kwihutura
46
 (Mbanda 1997) Rwandans could graduate from one 
identity to another. “Hutu and Tutsi were less sharply distinct, and individuals could and did 
move between the categories as their fortunes rose or fell.” (Millwood 1996:22)  
 
Importantly, this identity is a matter of how one wants to be identified and of how the 
surroundings identify her or him. Along those lines, ethnic groups were “socially and politically 
recognized and constructed by their members and by the wider [Rwandan] society.” (Song 
2003:44) Against primordial and contextual arguments, differences in identity more generally 
can be politicized for different reasons. For example, there is strong relationship between „class‟ 
and political orientation in Sweden.  
 
In Rwanda, access to education and white-collar jobs related to the ethnic group one belonged to 
under the indirect rule of colonial authorities. According to Marcel d‟Hertefelt (1971), the 
colonial authorities turned the existing identities “into „ethnic groups‟ and politically relevant 
categories as a result of the intervention by Belgian administration that streamlined, reinforced 
and exacerbated ethnic belonging.” (Reyntjens 1996:243) Later, identity determined the 
participation in national institutions in post-colonial regimes. In the case of Rwanda, identity was 
understood from the biological perspective. However, some studies argued that differences in 
identity are not inborn traits, but rather are made products. In other words, they are the product 
of history rather than of biology. To Varshney (2005:105), identity “inevitably is a product of 
time, place, and individual circumstances.” To Burgess and Murcott (2001:110) identity is being 
“no longer conditioned by an individual‟s or group‟s hierarchical place in the social structure, as 
with class. It is, instead, discursively located and continually being reconstructed and restyled.” 
This brief background applies to Rwanda in many ways. 
 
The late nineteenth century, up to the beginning of the twentieth century, was a period during 
which Rwanda hosted numerous European travelers. Contrary to the earlier discussion, these 
travelers assumed that African primitive tribes or ethnic groups and clans had ancient hatred, 
which led to endless killing among themslves. To the president Paul Kagame (2003),
47
 they also 
assumed there was an urgent need to civilize these tribes, notwithstanding that Africa had made 
major contributions to human civilization. The supporting idea “calls attention to the existence of 
traditional beliefs and practices that threaten human health and happiness more in some societies 
than in others. But it also indicates that there are some customs and social institutions in all 
                                               
46The concept of kwihutura literally means a cleansing of one‟s Hutuness. Mbanda (1997) notes, “a Hutu who gained status 
through wealth or by becoming a chief could become a Tutsi through a ritual of kwihutura…[I]f a Tutsi lost his cattle and turned 
to farming for a living and married into a Hutu family, that person could become a Hutu.” (Magneralla 2005:803) 
47 Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Rwanda: Speech by H.E Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, at the 
Baker Institute (Houston, March 6th, 2003). 
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societies that compromise human well-being or, in some instances, their survival.” (Edgerton 
1992:1-2) The myth of primitive harmony in Africa, which many anthropologists have hailed 
over the past several decades, is challenged.  
 
On the basis of harmful and controversial acts, the European travelers set a clear-cut distinction 
between primitive societies and modern worlds to justify the relevance of civilization. They 
committed to setting the rationalization of human action and organization of societies to make a 
shift from primitive to modern societies. The logic behind this shift was that “ethnic attachments 
were considered „communal‟ and were not expected to thrive in modern societies, which would 
gradually displace such putatively traditional relationships.” (Song 2003:8) To Song, as well as 
to many evolutionists, African countries were depicted as traditional societies, and backward 
pre-capitalist societies (Mamdan 1996:9). One way to put these societies „right,‟ according to 
Mamdani (1986), was for colonial authorities to racialize the existing sociopolitical distinction 
(Magnerella 2005:808). The Hamitic hypothesis ensued to support the theory of conquest of the 
inferior by superior races. 
 
Upon their successive arrivals, the kingdom of Rwanda “held a remarkable fascination for a 
succession of early travelers, missionaries, and colonial officials who came to know it.” 
(Newbury 1988:2). They found “a land of peace and bucolic harmony.” (Prunier 1995:39) Kigeli 
IV Rwabugiri had united Rwanda into one country through the conquest of smaller Hutu statelets 
(Millwood 2001). The Rwandese geographical area was a quilt of micro-units that united under 
the leadership of the King, “excluding the northern and south-western areas of the present 
Rwanda.” (Willwood 1996:10) Until the period 1910-1920, smaller states of the northern region 
near Ruhengeri remained autonomous. They united under the leadership of central Rwanda as a 
result of several military expeditions in which the German Schutztruppe played a key role in 
military campaigns against the smaller Hutu statelests (Willwood 1996:22).  
 
During the pre-colonial era, war had been a frequent activity. It was waged for “defending the 
kingdom against external enemies, extending the kingdom by conquest, and stealing cattle from 
neighboring non-Rwandese tribes.” (Prunier 1995:14) Therefore, president Paul Kagame (2005) 
stresses, pre-colonial leaders of Rwanda “sought to widen the extent of the Rwandan State and 
deepen its reach.”48 Importantly, European visitors found an administrative structure on four 
levels such as the province, the district, the hill and the neighborhood. The King remained the 
state overlay. As Melvern (2000:9) comments, the kingdom of the past Rwanda was a strict 
society whereby “the neighborhoods were generally headed by Hutu who obeyed orders from 
above, and most above this level were Tutsi; the monarchy was Tutsi and the king‟s army was 
mostly Tutsi, and Tutsi were favored for political offices.”  
 
Rwanda was the geographical centre of the world, where each of its hills fitted within the King‟s 
leadership. Europeans “were fascinated by this imperious reordering of the world according to 
preconceived cultural notions, probably because it was a process with which they were familiar 
themselves in a different form.” (Prunier 1995:19) According to president Paul Kagame (2002), 
they “found an organized state with well established institutions, such as the military, a judicial 
                                               
The Rwandan Genocide and The Failure of the International Community: Speech by His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of 
the Republic of Rwanda, Boston (April 11th, 2005). 
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system, and an elaborate administration that dated from the 15
th
 century.”49 “The administrative 
structure could link the central power to the neighborhood via the province, the district and the 
hill.” (Melvern 2000:7) This implied a highly developed state system, and clearly defined forms 
of social stratification. With this, they found indications of rationalized human action and an 
organized society, which would be the subject matter of civilizing a society that was previously 
thought of as primitive. 
 
Only a few neighboring peoples, Waller (2002:221) observes, “were as strong or stronger than 
Rwanda. It also is true that pre-colonial Rwanda was one of the most centralized and rigidly 
stratified societies in the Great Lakes region of east central Africa.” Travelling along the Nile 
River, John Hanning Speke (1863) associated successful ruling groups in several of the 
interlacustrine kingdoms with foreign origin. Driven by his logic, the extremist Hutu developed 
the conviction that “the Tutsi were a race alien, not indigenous, to Rwanda. To be a Hutu was to 
be Rwandan, a member of the nation. Conversely, to be Tutsi was to be a foreign race with no 
legitimate claims on Rwandan national identity.” (Waller 2002:178) The colonialists regarded 
successful achievements –i.e., clear administrative structures – as an authentic innovation 
beyond the sub-Saharan African imagination. On this assumption, Speke later strove to find a 
natural explanation for the success of the administrative organization. As Prunier (1995) puts it, 
Speke introduced the theory of conquest of inferior by superior races. In so doing, he also 
exaggerated the difference between Tutsi and other people in central Africa. He perceived Tutsi 
as different from the common order of natives in central Africa. This perception marked the first 
step of the „Hamitic Hypothesis‟.50 The assumption that „Nilotic‟ or „Hamitic‟ pastoralists were 
endowed with a number of qualities for which they qualified to rule guided the theory.  
 
As Sanders (1969)  describes, the success in the Great Lakes region associated with Hamites, 
because “everything of value in Africa had been introduced by the Hamites, supposedly a branch 
of the Caucasian race.” (Millwood (1996:26-7) The „Hamites‟ were perceived as born leaders 
and they had the right to a noble history, almost that of their European „cousins‟ (Linden 1977). 
Tutsi were considered as „Hamites‟: “they resemble the negro only in the color of the skin” 
(Jamoulle 1927); “before becoming black these were tanned” (de Lacger 1961). Perceived as 
such, Tutsi resembled the European more so than the Negro. A number of studies described how 
Tutsi were perceived in this historical context. As Gahama (1983) describes, for instance, “it 
would not be an exaggeration to state that he is a European who happens to have a black skin.” 
To Prunier (1997), the Europeans were impressed with the ruling Tutsi when they arrived in the 
Central Africa: 
 
                                               
49 The Great Lakes Conflicts: Factors, Actors, and Challenges. An Inaugural Lecture delivered by His Excellency Paul Kagame, 
President of the Republic of Rwanda at the Nigeria War College, Abuja (16 September 2002). 
50 Sanders (1969) in „The Hamitic Hypothesis: its Origin and Function in Time Perspective‟ considers the Hamitic Hypothesis to 
assume that 'Nilotic' or 'Hamitic' pastoralists possessed a number of qualities which made them fit to rule. The current literature 
finds this to be a social construction emphasized by the Belgian administration, which the Catholic Church supported. An 
observation made is that both bodies contributed to setting a „Tutsification‟ policy in the late 1920s. Reyntjens (1996:243-4) 
traces the discontent of Hutu that later culminated in collective violence from this policy. As he puts it, “This policy undoubtedly 
created the feeling that Tutsi were rulers and Hutu were subjects, a situation which was to prove untenable in the mid-1950s 
when democratization appeared on the agenda, and the Hutu realized that, although being a demographic majority, they were 
totally excluded from power.” 
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The Europeans who arrived in Central Africa were generally impressed with the ruling 
Tutsi…many Europeans believed that Tutsi political and economic success evinced their 
superior fitness in the struggle for survival. Since the Tutsi ruled over the Hutu and Twa, 
Europeans concluded that they were, indeed, like the colonialists themselves – a people superior 
to common Africans. European commentators concluded the Tutsi were not really sub-Saharan 
Africans at all, but rather a Hamitic people, probably descendants of the ancient Egyptians. 
Hence, the colonialists developed the „Hamitic myth‟, which held that the Tutsi and everything 
humanly superior in Central Africa came from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia. (Magnerella 
2005:805-6) 
 
As the theory goes, Speke linked “the monarchic institutions he had found in the area with the 
arrival of a „conquering superior race‟, carrier of a „superior civilization‟” (Prunier 1995:9) to the  
political and economic success. He arbitrarily identified Tutsi as the „carriers of superior 
civilization‟ who he related to the Galla (presently Omoro) of southern Ethiopia. With massive 
assumption, different studies assigned Tutsi to many places of origin. These included, inter alia, 
Egypt (Father Pagès 1933), Melanesia or Asia Minor (De Lacger 1939), Southwest Asian 
Caucasus and Greece (Father van den Burgt 1977), India (various anthropologists), Garden of 
Eden (Jean-Pierre Chrétien 1977), and the continent of Atlantis (Paul del Perugia 1970).  
 
With particular emphasis, the theory described Tutsi as aliens on the basis of having achieved 
successful institutions. Linked to this was a strong belief that a superior culture in central Africa 
necessarily originated from elsewhere. As Melvern (2000:8) also describes, “it was impossible 
that „savage negroes‟ could have attained such high levels of political and religious 
sophistication. The Tutsi ruling classes were thought to have come from further north, perhaps 
Ethiopia, and were more closely related to the „noble Europeans‟.” In his presentation Paul 
Kagame (2003) critically interprets that everything good in Africa is generally expected to 
originate from outside. Therefore, he notes, “the Batutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, who 
constituted the ruling group, must have come from…outside the Great Lakes region. They were 
said to have invaded and ruled over the Bahutu and Batwa. The former are said to have arrived in 
Rwanda from the Central and West African plateaux, while the latter are said to be the original 
inhabitants. This rendered the Batutsi aliens and illegitimate citizens.”51 Given this source, the 
Hamitic theory was built upon debatable bases – successful institutions brought by Tutsi, with 
civilization, during the monarchy era.  
 
Controversially, De Lacger (1959) substantiated the belief “that the monarchic institution in 
Rwanda was locally-grown from among the Hutu population.” (Prunier 1995:17) With strong 
research facts, he consistently argued that monarchic institutions were original inventions of the 
Hutu population. He suggested that numerous Hutu micro-monarchies had even survived the 
conquest by the central state (Prunier 1995:17) until the German Shutztruppe brought military 
assistance. This argument gives indications to undermine the Hamitic theory according to wich 
the success of local institutions was a Hamitic innovation. 
 
Whether the Hamitic theory is correct or false, it succeeded in driving thinking about the „other‟ 
among the Rwandan population. Earlier studies have documented the patronage of Tutsi by the 
colonial authorities over Hutu for years. This might have contributed prejudicial fabrications 
                                               
51 Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Rwanda . Speech by H.E. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, at the 
Baker Institute (Houton, 6th March 2003). 
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that, in turn, generated the Tutsi cultural ego. On the other hand, it might have generated the 
crushing Hutu feelings, which later transformed into an aggressively resentful inferiority 
complex (Magneralla 2005:805-6). Following the point of view of civilizing process, the 
difference in moral status (the self-image and the feeling of stigmatization) has probably 
developed as well. Elias and Scotson (1994) suggest “powerful groups look upon themselves as 
the better people, as endowed with a kind of group charisma, with a specific virtue shared by all 
its members and lacked by others. What is more, in all these cases the „superior‟ people may 
make the less powerful people themselves feel that they lack virtue – that they are inferior in 
human terms.” (Olofsson 2000:369) This background brings the discussion back to the earlier 
argument by Khawaja (1993), according to which collective identity found strengths and 
factional groupings set into a unitary whole for „us‟ to perceive „them‟ in a particular way and, 
therefore, interact accordingly.  
 
This argument is assumed to be true, since the colonial and post-colonial regimes, and the 
monarchy, to a certain extent, were informed by the schools of identity – essentialism and social 
constructivism – which mainly exaggerated the difference between Hutu and Tutsi. In  Ridley‟s 
(1996) terms, these regimes might have intensified the „xenophobic group loyalty‟, understood 
as social instincts, which  “promote ethnocentric conflict by providing a critical building block 
for in-group alliance and out-group hostility.” (Waller 2002:200) The idea is that those shifts 
have involved the evolution of sociability, altruism, and cooperation, which brought with them 
the evolution of animosity towards outsiders over time. Should this be the case, „xenophobic 
group loyalty‟ has served a strong potential for collective support for genocidal violence in cases 
where catalysts were put in place. 
National Common Civic Identity 
 
On the basis of oral traditions and myths, it is suggested that the view of the „other‟ involves 
diversity – each of us is like no other human being – and meeting points – each of us is like some 
other human beings; each of us is like all other human beings – between ethnic groups, tribes, 
social categories and clans. These terminologies do not matter. However, previous discussions 
show that the myth about differences has dominated thinking about the other. In other terms, 
most regimes politicized identity over the past.  
 
As a result, ethnic groups “had been defined, re-defined, as groups opposed to each other.” 
(Mukimbiri 2005:826) The other version of the same traditions and myths reports that Gatwa, 
Gahutu and Gatutsi were sons to the very first King, and they defined social hierarchies. To 
Middleton (1997) the King “entrusted to each a churn of milk. Gatwa quenched his thirst, 
Gahutu split the milk but Gatutsi kept his intact and so he was entrusted to command the other.” 
(Melvern 2000:7) In so doing, the King established hierarchies within households on the basis of 
levels of trust. Hierarchies are taken as normal to set order in the family. The proponents of this 
perspective viewed group affiliation as an opportunity where attitudes change, mutual 
understanding, trust and common or „superordinate goals‟ develop, with a strong focus “on the 
general identification of conditions which promote positive intergroup contact” (Miall 2005:45). 
In short, traditions and myths strongly supported the idea of common ancestry to Rwandans.  
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From this perspective, Prunier (1995), Mukimbiri (2005) and many others agreed that Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa share an eponymous forefather identified as Kanyarwanda. To learn from Eller 
(1999), Rwandans had “chosen a history and a common ancestry and created myths about 
differences [and similarities] that were not really there from the start.” (Friberg 2003:16-7) As 
the thinking went, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa defined “social groups within the same culture [with] no 
separate dwelling pattern” (Prunier 1995:249). They shared the same features within a common 
geographical location. d‟Hertefelt (1971), Prunier (1995) and Reyntjens (1996) accord to 
conclude that they lived side-by-side on the hillsides with each other all over the country– with 
no separate „Hutuland‟ or „Tutsiland‟ – and often intermarried. They spoke the same Bantu 
language and respected the same traditions, under the supreme leadership of the King (Waller 
2002:221). To sum up, they “had the same founding myth, the same traditional religion, the same 
social and political organization, the same language and the same agro-pastoral vocation with the 
prevalence herding for the Tutsi and agriculture for the Hutu.” (Mukimbiri 2005:825-6) To refer 
to Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), the identity of Banyarwanda created internal solidarity 
between different identities. In sum, it means that the demarcation line was loosely constructed.  
 
To Millwood (1996:22), “people identified themselves according to clan rather than to ethnic 
affiliation, and the description of so-called ethnic groups was laid down by…[European] 
travelers.” Such travelers found Rwanda a society divided into clan units, where descent from a 
putative common ancestor only determined the membership. As Newbury (1980:1) puts it, “each 
of these clans contained members of different ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa – groups 
which were also (theoretically) mutually exclusive and determined predominantly by descent.” 
Within this context, Rwandans were, as d‟Hertefelt (1971) puts it, “scattered over 18 Rwandan 
multi-ethnic clans,
52
 a sign of considerable mobility in the pre-colonial era. By this is meant that 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are social groups that refute the anthropological sense they were charged 
with.” (Ryntjens 1996:243) This means that the terminology of Hutu and Tutsi of the pre-
colonial times continually changed relevance from time to time. To David Newbury (1979, 1980 
and 1988) “they did not have the same significance as in the recent era, and the meaning of an 
„ethnic‟ identity, varied from place to place and over time.” (Millwood 1996:22) To recall Hall 
(1994:34), identity has been “subject to change by force and events that are both endogenous and 
exogenous to domestic society.” The contextual argument of identity found strong application in 
pre-colonial Rwanda. The population was linguistically and culturally homogeneous; it was 
inappropriate to identify identity as the tribe or ethnic group. 
 
This argument strongly challenges Maquet (1954), who established identity as caste. He assumed 
that the separation between the ethnic groups was rigid and the hierarchical character of relations 
between them was unchanging. Thus, he classifies “Rwanda as a caste system on the basis of 
four overlapping criteria: the presence of different groups characterized by endogamy; hereditary 
membership in these groups; hereditary occupational specialization within the groups; and 
arrangement of the groups in a hierarchical social structure.” (Newbury 1988:243) He stresses 
the rigid and „closed‟ character of the strata. As Melvern (2000:8) observed, some have even lost 
position on whether identity in Rwanda stands for a class or a caste. It is true that the ownership 
                                               
52 d‟Hertefelt (1971) in Les clans du Rwanda ancient. Elément d‟ethnosociologie et d‟ethnohistoire, has established until 1960 
the following clans: Abasinga, Abasindi, Abazigaba, Abagesera, Abanyiginya, Abega, Ababanda, Abacyaba, Abungura, 
Abashambo, Abatsobe, Abakono, Abaha, Abashingo, Abanyakarama, Abasita, Abongera, and Abenengwe. Abakone, Abaha, 
Abashingo, Abanyakarama, Abasita, Abongera, and Abenengwe are the only clans that did not include the Twa group. 
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of cattle was “a sign of wealth, power and good breeding, it was not only an „economic‟ gift but 
also a form of upward social mobility.” (Prunier 1995:14) If Tutsi necessarily relates to cattle 
ownership, there is fluctuation of content.  
 
It is widely supported that via the Ubuhake, as an institution, and by means of bravery in the 
battlefield, cattle ownership was extended to non-Tutsi. The theoretical discussion has failed to 
establish identities of ethnic groups in Rwanda. Controversial arguments were raised in this 
discussion. In line with the pre-1950s European rural areas, it true that social groupings 
identified with the “modes of production, settlement patterns (village or scattered farms), 
householder organization (nuclear or complex families), landlord-tenant relations, inheritance 
patterns, and other elements of the „rural setting‟ [gave] a particular content to people‟s 
perception of their position in society.” (Howell et al. 1993:2) The order in which different social 
categories inhabited Rwanda and their productive activities correspond with this identification – 
according to Howell – in many ways. This identification is a necessary condition, but is still 
insufficient to denote an ethnic group, a caste or any other related terminology.  
 
After people “came to group themselves in different ways, often with a newly articulated 
consciousness of a common cultural heritage and similar set of beliefs and practices: they 
became ethnic groups.” (Wiegandt 1993:306) Internally grown consciousness of sameness – on 
various grounds – is a key element to define an ethnic group. Far from growing from within, the 
consciousness of ethnicity is supported to have been a result of identity politicization. That is 
where the middle-range leadership was understood as a crucial factor in this process. 
 
Against this background, to draw from Wiegandt (1993:305), non-violent cases “initially 
transcended potentially divisive differences…Ethnicity was not an important factor in defining 
people‟s sense of self or determining their group membership…but emerged with the changes 
associated with…political consolidation.” Kinship, intermarriages, the clan and many other 
factors are hypothesized to be of primary interest in the determination of identity reference.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has discussed different parameters and highlighted the interactions they involve. It 
identified greed as a strong factor in genocidal violence. In so doing, it opened the gate to the 
economic explanation of conflict (Collier et al. 2003) when one ethnic group is dominating. In 
the case of Rwanda, this translated to the binary opposition of majority-minority ethnic groups. 
This case was suggested to be at high risk of genocidal violence in the context of limited 
ecological resources. As further chapters demonstrate, scarce resources have laid strong ground 
for ideological factors on the basis of which it was made easy to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi in 
Rwanda. Chapter four finds that it is initially difficult to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi when the 
ideological factors play a neutral role. Bauman (2000) expressed the same argument. In 
Germany, he emphasized, one could not differentiate Jews from Germans physically from each 
other. Hence, the Nazis identified a need to find criteria to differentiate. A social construct of 
„us‟ and „them‟ resulted. 
 
As far as Rwanda is concerned, the distinguishing tool began with immigration. This chapter 
strongly highlighted that the inhabitants‟ profiles are an outcome of immigration over the last 
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century. With Huntington (1993), this chapter could demonstrate ways in which the arrival of 
immigrants fueled the „clash of civilizations of cultures.‟ Following this clash, the subjective 
self-identification of people took precedence over the common objective elements – i.e., 
language, history, religion, customs and institutions. He hypotesized the same clash to be the 
fundamental source of conflict or the battle lines of the future, although the details of the chapter 
show that it is also a social construct. The content of „clash‟ is increasingly expanded, given the 
common objective elements alongside the side-by-side style of cohabitation.  
 
Whether or not the clash is a social construct, interactions between peoples of different 
civilizations are increasing, and perform an integrative role. As Huntington (1993:3) argues, they 
“intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and 
commonalities within civilization…The interactions among peoples of different civilizations 
enhance the civilization – consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and 
animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.” The application of theories 
around „the clash of civilizations‟ to Hutu and Tutsi might have laid the ground for different 
beliefs earlier detailed, on the basis of which the dichotomization of identity into „us‟ and „them‟ 
successfully developed. 
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Chapter two built up a multi-theoretical model of which the parameters are linked to each other 
for comprehensive explanation. This chapter discusses the theoretical assumptions, with no 
intention to reassess theories and adjust the problem under study, as Newbury (1988:6) did after 
increased acquaintance and familiarity with pre-colonial Rwanda. Against the functionalist 
model – under which identity was unchanging „givens‟ – she “seemed less compelling, less 
satisfactory; ultimately they were at variance with the empirical record, and this prompted…to 
reassess the conceptual bases and explanatory framework of the prevailing paradigm through 
which Rwandan social phenomenon have been perceived.” This study does not follow this 
approach, because of its exploratory method. It does not aim to test theories. Rather, this chapter 
relates the parameters of the model to different theories that are accepted to give insightful 
explanation of popular support for the middle-range leadership. Attention is paid to 
psychological theories – relative deprivation theory and crowd psychologies theory – resource 
mobilization theory (structural factors), power balance theory (psychological and structural 
factors), political process theory, state-building theory, conflict escalation theory (bottom-up and 
top-down processes, the Galtungian ABC-theory), and the context of cruelty model. 
Approach to relative deprivation 
 
With this approach, this study needs to investigate ways in which not only scarce resources and 
inequalities, but also comparisons, triggered the support for violence. With attention to 
comparisons, the study intends to be in line with Burton (1990), whose analysis of conflict is 
“rooted in the denial of ontological human needs” (Miall 2005:39), by which frustration grows. 
Against the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Berkowitz (1989) reports, “individuals are 
confronted with frustration if they are prevented from achieving an anticipated satisfaction” 
(Haller 1999:53). With this hypothesis, Gurr (1968b:277) established a direct link between 
frustration and aggression. “The frustration-aggression mechanism…is the source of most men‟s 
disposition to illicit collective violence.” By this is meant that the conditions for violence to 
explode were all met. In life, there are many examples to illustrate this cause-effect relationship. 
 
Given the width of the existing gap, some deduced “that had the RPF not invaded, there might 
have been a different civil war, north against south.” (Melvern 2000:43) Equally, Williamson 
(1965:36) relates revolutionary conflict to unacceptable status quo in favor of the majority the 
majority. To Nkemdirim (1977:76), such conflict pervasively erupts in many parts of Africa and 
probably elsewhere in the world. One way for conflict to escalate is that specific social groups or 
classes “make demands on the regime for the relief of their hardships; but if there are no 
effective routine procedures for making claims on the operation of the government they will tend 
to lash out violently.” (Ibid) A number of African countries – such as Zimbabwe, Algeria, 
Mozambique, Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands and Angola – serve as tangible illustrations of 
where disadvantaged groups threatened their respective governments for change. Under the 
domination of the colonial authorities – British, French and Portuguese – extreme hardships 
ensued as injustice increased.  
 
However, there was no violence in these cases until new empowering organizations awakened 
the peasants. As Nkemdirim (1977:84) puts it, they only engaged in guerrilla warfare when they 
perceived injustice and organized to become active on the political scene. The same applies to 
most African countries, until liberation movements and the move to democracy prompted the 
5
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winds of change in politics. Efforts to engage in these initiatives always followed the denial by 
the dictatorship of “the ability of the disadvantaged to stand up for their rights and struggle for 
justice and thus for change. This is precisely the right that despotic regimes, in which elite 
autonomy is lacking, have denied.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:6) In a similar context, the “pressure 
of power sharing and democratization emerged both from within and from the international 
community, threatening the privileges of the Akazu” (Ewald et al. 2004:108) in Rwanda. It was a 
signal for the peasants to divorce themselves from the dictatorial government formerly taken as 
legitimate. 
 
Against this brief background, it is understood that the concept of poverty extends to relative 
deprivation.
53
 Hence, greed is a factor that is emphasized as significantly explaining violence. 
Studies commissioned by the World Bank were conclusive as follows: “civil war is now an 
important issue for development. War retards development, but conversely, development retards 
war…Where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, 
making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at high risk of 
becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of 
further war.” (Collier et al. 2003:1) The levels of satisfaction of needs are taken as a benchmark 
by which one decides to engage in violence: “The important observation is that these needs will 
be pursued by all means available. In ontological terms the individual is conditioned by biology, 
or by a primordial influence, to pursue them. It follows that unless satisfied within the norms of 
society, they will lead to behavior that is outside the legal norms of the society.” (Burton 
1990:36-7) Burton‟s point happened in most contexts of lower levels of socioeconomic 
development, where there was a strong disparity between social wants and social satisfactions. 
Traditional societies were most singled out to be relatively unsatisfied “because they have been 
awakened to a desire for new life” (Kirkham 2002:142) as they get exposure to modernity.  
 
The causative relationship between development and civil war has given rise to the argument 
that: “The risk of civil war is much higher in low-income countries than in middle-income 
countries. Civil war thus reflects not just a problem for development, but a failure of 
development.” (Collier et al. 2003:ix) Against Maslow‟s ladder of needs satisfaction, most 
traditional societies are low-income countries and are still on the bottom line of needs 
satisfaction. They barely satisfy biological needs of food and shelter; growth and development 
that should relatively meet these needs are still lagging behind (Burton 1990:36). In societies 
where ecological resources highly compete with population growth, needs satisfaction is put at 
risk (Davies 1997). As a result, the possibility for violence is largely mollified. This mostly 
                                               
53 Some well-informed illustrations have strongly documented the relationship between the concepts of poverty and conflict. 
First, the economic base, within the core of Marx‟s historical materialism, remains a leading explanatory component in major 
social changes such as class struggle (Chalmers 1999:131). Second, studies commissioned by the World Bank hold that conflicts 
“in Africa and most of the developing world are fuelled by greed rather than grievance” (Draman 2003:9). Third, Galtung 
(1977), quoted by Hettne (1990:13), ventures the suggestion that a popular conception of the distinctive feature of relationship 
between peace and development be captured by the slogan „Peace is Development and Development is Peace.‟ The same is true 
for instability and underdevelopment, or simply poverty. Similarly, fourthly, Hettne (2002:53) perceives this relationship in 
terms similar to Galtung‟s as follows: “The fact that a generalized connection between reducing poverty and enhancing security 
can be taken for granted – simply because of common sense reasons – does not tell us very much about what particular patterns 
of poverty would lead to particular varieties of social violence, and what specific development activities would have a positive 
role to play in conflict reduction.” Finally, the Rwandan President is consistent with the above underpinnings when he declares, 
“Another problem that we should bring to the attention of Rwandan people is „poverty.‟ Defeating poverty remains yet another 
way of strengthening unity and do away with conflicts” (Republic of Rwanda 2002:7). 
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represents modern societies, identified with mass production and, therefore, higher levels of 
needs satisfaction. As a result, they fit in different higher levels of Maslow ladder (self-esteem of 
dignity needs, self-actualization needs, and basic instrumental needs – i.e., security, knowledge 
and power needs) (Davies 1997:xviii-xxv). With this logic, modern societies are hypothesized to 
be less prone to violence. Against Bauman‟s (2000) arguments on the cause-effect relationship 
between modernity and genocide, the validity of this statement is debatable. Conversely, 
violence often amounts to the maximum levels in traditional societies where the population 
growth has dominated over ecological resources. As one of the most highly populated countries 
in Africa, Rwanda falls into this category. Many arguments find the explanation of genocide in 
the scarcity of ecological resources. The Malthusian perspective of population growth ensues.  
 
Against „hard‟ Malthusian, it is held that “overpopulation and land scarcity unavoidably lead to 
social conflict and communal violence. When countries have exceeded their „capacity,‟ there is 
no other outcome possible than famine and/or conflict, allowing nature to restore ecological 
equilibrium.” (Uvin 2001:82) As the same thinking goes, the 1994 genocide was seen as “the 
unavoidable outcome of overpopulation and environmental limitations.” (Ibid) The perpetrators 
thought that genocide could set an ecological equilibrium after population growth containment 
failed to bring solutions. However, overpopulation and environmental limitations are not alone 
likely to instigate social conflict and communal violence. The „softer‟ Malthusian position 
additionally argues for specific conditions: “other variables, such as the nature of the state, the 
existence of conflict-resolution mechanism, and broader economic and social dynamics, 
determine final outcomes.” (Uvin 2001:83) These Malthusian arguments are not exclusive of 
each other – as far as Rwanda is concerned. The „hard‟ Malthusian position might have 
intensified the above conditions until they broke into deadly violence. In both traditional and 
modern societies, the levels of propensity for deadly violence closely relate to the concept of 
frustration. 
 
The International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP)
54
 established that “military dictatorship 
frustrated the ambitions of many within the Rwandan elite” (IPEP 2000:31), until the conflict 
exploded. Frustration arose only when people compared themselves to others. Comparison is the 
fundamental essence of this theoretical model. The model is “based on the insight that people 
compare themselves to specific peer groups, not to the world at large.” (Bernard 2000:56) As an 
example, Bernard alleges that professors of sociology are likely to complain if their fellow 
psychologists or anthropologists in the same university earn significantly higher salaries than 
they do. This would not be the case if engineering professors earned more money. Right 
entitlement to peer groups remains a key element to this theoretical model. The wider the gap is, 
the more deprivation is felt. Thus, deprivation becomes “generally conceived of as one type of 
anger roughly synonymous with a feeling of resentment or dissatisfaction or with a sense of 
grievance.” (Crosby 1979:104) People feel deprived from, among many areas, economic, 
political, and educational grounds. At the same time, the effects can vary from one person to 
another, since it is mainly about perception. Marital status, educational background, religion and 
ethnic affiliations, geographical region, and socioeconomic status, among many others, are 
variables that cause the perception of deprivation to vary. What is relative deprivation? At what 
                                               
54 International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000). Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Online: 
http://www.visiontv.ca/RememberRwanda/Report.pdf: visited on October 10th, 2005. 
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point of time do peer groups enter the conflict and, therefore, violence? These are legitimate 
questions the following paragraphs address. 
Definitional considerations 
 
To begin with, deprivation is closely related to perception. It is therefore a „relative‟ concept. 
That is why this study deals with deprivation as compounded by relativity. With this concept, the 
idea is that it goes beyond emotional deprivation. It defines the perception of disproportion of 
right entitlements between peer groups.
55
 The right socially entitled is the core of this concept to 
predict the propensity for people to engage in violence. The relative aspect of it would consist of 
the extent to which peer groups perceived the gap as fair. Those under deprivation must perceive 
the gap as disproportional. With this, Abrahamsson (2003:73) defines relative deprivation as the 
disproportion that creates the „gap of frustration‟. Those under deprivation perceive getting less 
than what they should be socially entitled to, as a right. Whether or not the perception is real or 
constructed, it remains the driving force of the value judgment they make. Thus, relative 
deprivation takes the meaning of gap of frustration, which creates the conditions of anger or 
distrust. It is, to recall Gurr (1997), the disproportion between the „should‟ and ‟is.‟ Crosby 
(1979:107) mathematically presents this central proposition as: 
 
RD = (Ve-Vc)/Ve 
 
In this mathematical presentation, RD stands for „relative deprivation; Ve stands for „value 
expectations;‟ and Vc for „value capabilities.‟ It means that the “amount of felt deprivation is 
theoretically equal to the sum obtained by subtracting Vc from Ve and dividing the difference by 
Ve.” (Ibid) The less is the sum (RD), the less the felt discrepancy becomes. The larger is the 
sum, the more the social categories it represents are better off and highly valued than the worst-
off categories (Gurr 1968b:253). This causal relationship also varies, as value systems differ 
from society to society. Hence, the behavior they cause would equally differ from society to 
society. Many variables account to make a judgment on the perception of the reasonableness of 
the gap. That is, relative deprivation bears strong perceptual aspects. Gurr (1997:294) thought it 
to be the “actor‟s perception of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and 
conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value 
capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and 
keep).” Hence, engaging in conflict and violence follows the judgment one makes about this sum 
under specific conditions. Galtung (1962) posits: “The external conditions leading to 
aggression…probably have to pass through the minds of men and precipitate as perceptions with 
a high emotive content before they are acted out as aggression.” (Gurr 1968b:251) As far as 
comparison is concerned, it is important to prove that the increase in the position of one group 
influences the decrease in the position of the other.  
 
In other words, there must be enough evidence to support relative deprivation as a zero-sum 
outcome. Rawls‟ (1971) argument goes in this direction. As Midlarsky (1988:492) paraphrases, 
                                               
55In the context of this study, peer groups represent the ethnic groups on the eve of genocide. With this logic, the aim is to 
investigate the possibility of the gap between Hutu and Tutsi over the past, to instigate genocidal violence. The extent to which it 
was perceived as either fair or unfair is expected to throw insights into the response to genocidal violence by the cases under 
intensive study. 
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Rawls reports, “Each gain to the most advantaged in society is accompanied by a gain to the 
least advantaged,” in the society he investigated. In case one already well-off societal sector 
increases (or at least stabilizes) its wealth while another originally poorer sector is declining, 
conflict has most escalated. In this context, economic decline and uneven distribution of income 
links to devastating consequences, such as disputes and different forms of state incapacitation. 
As Collier et al. (2003:4) establish, this is likely to “create a pool of impoverished and 
disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by „entrepreneurs of violence.‟ In such 
conditions the state is also likely to be weak, nondemocratic, and incompetent, offering little 
impedement to the escalation of rebel violence, and maybe even inadvertently provoking it.” 
Unless the situation is put right, the findings of the UNDP report
56
 are a clear indication that 
Rwanda is likely to follow the above-described pattern in the longterm. One of the findings 
states: 
 
Rwanda‟s recent growth has largely bypassed the rural poor, leading to a concentration of 
wealth at the top of the income distribution, and increase in the country‟s Gini coefficient from 
0.47 to 0.51 from 2001 to 2006…The average income of the top 20% of the population has 
almost doubled since 1996, while the income of the bottom 20% has remained stagnant in the 
past 10 years…Inequality in Rwanda is not only rising, it is changing nature: it is becoming 
increasingly rural and increasingly detrimental to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in 
society. Since then, two new features of Rwandan income distribution have emerged very 
strongly. First, the top income quintile has distanced itself very sharply from the rest of the 
population, with incomes taking off as the rest of the population have seen only modest rise 
income. Secondly, we observe that the bottom quintile seems to be falling behind the rest of 
the population: the poorest of the poor are becoming poorer in relative and sometimes even in 
absolute terms. (UNDP 2007: 5, 17-18) 
 
The report documents large and growing inequalities between social categories and geographical 
areas. However, it does not establish the clear link between the increase of wealth, on the one 
hand, and stagnation, on the other. Also, there are fewer facts available to generalize this pattern 
in the pre-genocide period. Even if facts were available, it would be difficult to link the 
discrepancy to the support for genocide, since the inequalities do not implicate identities. They 
only provide an indication of a non-egalitarian society. The current literature strongly 
emphasizes large-scale political violence to relate closely to ethnic dichotomization. At the same 
time, other contexts openly link political violence when deep inequalities drastically drive 
socioeconomic change. For instance, Kirkham (2002:124) hypothesized “that a high rate of 
socioeconomic change would entail a high level of political violence. Conversely, less rapid 
change will mean a more stable society.” To result in large-scale political violence, the direction 
of change should probably be negative so as to constitute a strong threat to people‟s futures. In 
similar circumstances, the threat is politicized and turns into an ideological factor for violence. 
Very few relative deprivation theorists have deepened this aspect. 
 
                                               
56 The Government of Rwanda expressed strong disagreement with parts of the (or entire) findings of this report. According to 
the „Addendum – Corrigendum,‟ the government raised some methodological issues before it suggested some amendments. It 
suggested that the estimates are based on the comparison of a number of different data sets, which use different methodologies 
and are therefore not directly comparable. Equally, the data of the immediate post-genocide period were particularly considered 
as unreliable. Forllowing this argument, the government posited, it did not make sense to use the same data as baseline without 
adequate qualification of the results. Equally, it has apparently accepted the increases in inequality registered in rural areas. At the 
same time, it brought the attention of the authors to the fact that inequality levels remained higher in urban areas. 
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Davies (1974) highlights the concept of „uncertainty‟ to describe such possibilities. This denotes 
„perceived vulnerability.‟ To put it another way, it defines the failure to predict the future and, as 
a result, increases worries about expectations. It is contended that as environmental conditions 
are increasingly perceived as a strong threat to the future, the level of expectations 
correspondingly decreases. In these circumstances, the probability of people engaging in conflict 
increases. The study on the Pullman Strike of 1894 in Chicago by Davies (1974) is a strong 
illustration. After analyzing the strike of workers in the 1890‟s he postulated: 
 
People who have (like academicians in the mid-1960‟s) come to expect yearly salary increases 
are frustrated when these increases diminish or stop. If after such a period of rising 
expectations, academicians were to lose their jobs, the deprivation would be greater and the 
probability of their becoming rebellious would increase. People whose physical and social 
environment has improved are frustrated when they fear these advances may be lost…People 
who have come to expect career opportunity to improve and then see it threatened by military 
service are indeed frustrated – as the student uprisings in American universities in the 1960‟s 
have adequately demonstrated. (Davies 1974:609) 
 
Similarly, people who have expected the right to schooling, employment, property ownership, 
and other basic rights, and then see these denied according to the identity to which they belong, 
might feel their expectations of the future are diminished. The same applies to an abrupt 
interruption of improved socioeconomic conditions towards poor living conditions. As Hoffer 
(1951) illustrates, discontent is likely to be highest when conditions deteriorate, causing misery, 
following conditions that have previously improved (Gurr 1968b: 258). The threat to people‟s 
future grows increasingly higher under similar circumstances. To refer to Davies‟ (1969) „J-
Curve‟ hypothesis, abrupt change of improved conditions is likely to yield social discontent in a 
chronological sequence. With this hypothesis, Davies considers revolutions to be the result of a 
prolonged improvement, which suddenly suffers from interruption: “Expectations represent 
extrapolation from earlier experience; when past successes have promotedly elevated 
expectations but ‟actual need satisfaction‟ drops, the gap between them may become intolerable 
and result in revolutionary activity.” (Taylor 1982:24)  
 
This leads to the conclusion that relative deprivation is history-driven. The experience of 
Rwanda can be paralleled to this theoretical perspective in various ways. In a zero-sum effect, 
Hutu replaced Tutsi as a result of the 1959 violence. The 1975 Coup d‟état later brought the 
region with it to narrow down the beneficiaries between Hutu when, in demand for available 
resources was outstripping supply. Further, discrimination based on ethnicity and region 
introduced exclusion, marginalization and inequalities, with similar effect. In many cases, these 
strategies led to latent and overt conflicts in varying proportions and regularities. Viewed from 
the history-driven perspective, the magnitude of violence is dependent on the recurrence of 
deadly violence in the past. The magnitude of the 1994 violence has followed a similar historical 
context in the cases selected for intensive investigation. 
 
In short, uncertainty is identified as a relevant condition for insurgent and rebellion movements 
against governments to develop. Should these movements grow stronger and threaten the 
government, vulnerability also increases until mechanisms to retain power are firmly enforced. 
The development of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), on the one hand, and mobilization for 
genocide, on the other, are indications that this aspect of relative deprivation was a real 
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phenomenon in Rwanda. To illustrate, uncertainty “generated in many Hutu a passionate, 
ideological commitment that their lives were menaced from inside and outside Rwanda by Tutsi 
infiltrators (as well as Hutu supporters of democracy). Such an ideological commitment became 
the match that started the fire of burning hate that would eventually consume Rwanda.” (Waller 
2002:187) The failure of power sharing, and the ethnic hatred that followed, are understood from 
this perspective. As a result of the Arusha Peace Accords, incumbents thought that they would 
lose their political positions and related benefits if they were implemented. Conditions conducive 
to genocidal violence were established.  
 
To refer to the „hard‟ Malthusian argument, the existing environmental opportunities did not 
accommodate the pressure of population growth. On this point, a close link is established 
between genocidal violence and the environmental limitations. For instance, “low productivity in 
agriculture; poverty; exclusion – marginalization; inequality; and landlessness” (Ewald et al. 
2004:130) drastically threatened the future of many. As a result of the context of frustration, 
many in northern Rwanda felt vulnerable after they had received particular attention from the 
central government. The width of the gap between the north and the south led some to speculate, 
“that had the RPF not invaded, there might have been a different civil war, north against south.” 
(Melvern 2000:43) This brief discussion clearly shows that the „relative‟ aspect of deprivation 
has various dimensions. It either denotes the discrepancy between the „should‟ and „is‟, in terms 
of rights socially entitled, or it denotes the vulnerability and uncertainty that arise as expectations 
about the future deteriorate. Of course, the magnitude of the disproportion and vulnerability is 
differently felt and spread over several levels. This is arguably why the propensity for violence is 
unevenly distributed among people of the same level of deprivation. The case of Giti under study 
should be a tangible illustration if it shares cultural and socio-economic grounds withMurambi.  
 
If it is true that this discrepancy is an independent variable in measuring propensity for violence, 
it is also true that violence starts from a specific point. Earlier cases showed that disadvantaged 
groups – identified as peasants – tend to lash out violently at the government when hardship 
levels are high. This implies conflict developing from below. In some cases, peasants could 
initiate – or be awakened for – the demand for equality. In one or another case, the literature 
argues that the presence of the middle-range level of the elite arouses peasants to mobilize. 
Specifically, Nilsson (1999:216) argued that those who “have been distanced from the possibility 
of political and economic affirmation, and who deduce that they have no chance of competing 
with the consolidated power elites since the system‟s basic rules are insufficiently congruent 
with the socio-economic and cultural reality.” They simply awaken the peasants to bring support 
and justification to the fight against the government elite. The cases under study – Giti and 
Murambi – show the middle-range leaders (mayors) also have that capacity to drag ordinary 
people into a collective initiative. 
 
Most studies – for example Panning (1983), Nagel (1974) – suggest that relative deprivation 
unavoidably leads to violence at a certain point, when the difference in wealth is moderate, rather 
than for small or large differences. The universal standard of measurements is an element of 
particular conjecture. However, there is still a lack of a clear benchmark to measure how large, 
moderate or small relative deprivation must be, to predict the concomitant consequences. As an 
indication, Gurr (1968b:260) hypothesized that the “strength of anger tends to vary inversely 
with the extent to which deprivation is held to be legitimate.” At the same time, he suggests that 
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“the greater is regime legitimacy at a given level of deprivation, the less the magnitude of 
consequent strife.” (Gurr 1968a: 1106) 
 
Hence, the variations also corroborate the relative aspect of the concept of deprivation, originally 
understood as fluctuating from one context to another. Alongside the concern of measurement, 
some studies – for example Davis (1964, 1966), Empey (1956), Rostow (1960), Smithies (1961), 
Kunkel (1965), Rogers (1969), and Rodrik (1999), North et al. (2000) – suggest the possibility of 
a degree of relative deprivation to be “essential to stimulate academic and economic achievement 
orientations and promote economic growth.” (Thompson and Roper 1976:156) This means that 
human beings give priority to empowering strategies (e.g. programs, policies, new systems and 
schemes) to fit new contexts of life, at a certain level of relative deprivation. To deal with certain 
levels of deprivation, Mouton (2001) suggests, classical theories – such as Saint-Simon and 
August Comte – have placed the improvement of the human conditions at the core of social 
sciences: 
  
Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer believed that the social world is plagued by all 
kinds of social ills such as crime, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and injustice. In order to 
address these social illnesses, human beings continually devise different interventions – 
economic and social policies of upliftment, employment schemes, literacy programmes, 
poverty relief efforts, and so on. In fact, one could argue that most of what human beings do in 
the social world through their interventions is aimed at improving the human condition. 
(Mouton 2001:336) 
 
As the same thinking goes, Giti dealt non-violently with poor living conditions, discrimination, 
and lower levels of job opportunities and schooling. If relative deprivation can, at certain levels, 
yield alternatively, non-violent approaches and violence, it identifies as a two-sided concept. The 
level at which either violence or empowerment ensures is left to individual contexts, since 
relative deprivation lacks universal standards of measurement. At this level of discussion, the 
study finds it necessary to consider the classical theorists of relative deprivation, and investigate 
the extent to which it yields either violence or non-violence at specific levels. Four leading 
classical theorists describe the circumstances in which relative deprivation drives particular 
behavior. 
The reference person or group 
 
Against relative deprivation, Gurr (1968b) established that people are qualitatively and 
quantitatively unequal, given that some are highly endowed (better-off categories), while others 
are extremely deprived (worse-off categories). With this view, he joins or subscribes to the 
theorizations that earlier established a strong dichotomy between the elite and ordinary people. 
Davis (1959) identifies the elite as the reference person or the reference group. It means those 
valued and always taken as the model that all would want to follow and become.  
 
There is a value system, to recall Davis (1959:283-4), by which „in-group‟ and „out-group‟ are 
clearly established to translate differences. At the same time, a „social distance‟ brings with it the 
feeling of „relative superiority,‟ on the one hand, and of „relative subordination,‟ on the other. In 
this context, the belief about the „other‟ yields the polarization of relations, with the possibility of 
overt conflicts. This holds particularly in most divided societies. The definition of the „superior 
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race‟ by Speke is the creation of „relative superiority‟ in Rwanda. There is no „relative 
superiority‟ without a corresponding „relative subordination,‟ or relative inferiority, to oppose. 
Hutu ideologues exaggerated the feeling of „relative inferiority‟ following their perception – or 
manipulation – vis-à-vis Tutsi. Their argument is that the Tutsi „masters‟ exploited the poor and 
downtrodden Hutu in the past (Prunier 1995). It was understood that Tutsi enjoyed relative 
superiority while Hutu endured relative subordination. 
 
If this is the case, the approach of „reference person/group‟ to relative deprivation suffers from 
the out-group homogeneity effect; it exaggerates similarity in the out-group. Without exception, 
it would identify all Tutsi as „haves‟ against the Hutu „have-nots.‟ It follows that the model of 
relative deprivation is “a curvilinear function of the proportion of „haves‟ and „have-nots‟ with 
the likelihood of felt deprivation being greatest when the in-group is evenly split between 
„haves‟ and „have-nots‟.” (Crosby 1979:105) Since within-group comparisons can still show who 
is better off than another, this is a bias in the model. The bias makes the model difficult to 
perfectly apply to Rwanda, given that group homogeneity applied to neither Tutsi nor Hutu. It is 
true that having cattle was “a sign of wealth, power and good breeding, it was…also a form of 
upward social mobility.” (Prunier 1995:14) Also a large number oflandholders could obtain 
enormous wealth from farming activities.  
 
In addition to land, Hutu have generally acquired cattle under various circumstances. History 
cites the ubuhake or the patronage clientship – a contract between the patron and the vassal – 
farming products exchanged against the cattle and bravery in the battlefield resulted in cow-
giving to non-Tutsi. The cattle were given to Hutu “as a reward for bravery in battle and they 
remained as purely private property, without any social obligations linked to their ownership.” 
(Prunier 1995:14) Unlike the case of patronage clientship, they did not have any obligation to 
share future calves with others. Cattle ownership “could be the beginning of an upward social 
climb where, once endowed with cattle, the Hutu lineage would become icyihuture, de-Hutuise, 
i.e. Tutsified.” (Prunier 1995:14) If the possession of cattle is a primary condition to define a 
reference group, the generalizing view of Tutsi as reference group holds poorly. That is, Tutsi 
were probably the majority in the reference group. It is true that the reference group contained 
members of both Hutu and Tutsi affiliation groups. The bias of generalization has arguably been 
brought about through the underestimation of the fact that Hutu who owned cattle acquired the 
status of Tutsi through the ritual of kwihutura. 
 
Against this discussion, living conditions did not necessarily depend on identity affiliation. To 
illustrate, earlier discussions showed that the perpetrators of genocide could kill victims because 
of their living conditions. In terms of discrepancy in socioeconomic conditions, the relative 
deprivation has weak argumentation to support some research specialists of Rwanda who have 
regarded social distance as the key motivation in many cases of violence that exploded over the 
past decades against Tutsi. In other words, social distance alone does not explain the support for 
genocide against Tutsi. It is true that various institutions – i.e., ubuhake and uburetwa – 
intensified social distance in many ways. Resources were unevenly distributed. Without being 
politicized, however, many accord to the view that it would not have resulted in genocidal 
violence. As history shows, the instigators of violence, from the 1959 violence onwards, were 
not necessarily the most deprived. Most of the perpetrators were employed in colonial and 
religious institutions. Rather, ideological factors may have played a decisive role in awakening 
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the propensity for violence in ordinary people. However, there is little said in the literature about 
Giti, which Strauss (2007) identified as non-violent over the last decades. 
The ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ construction 
 
In the same way as the construction of „relative superiority‟ and „relative subordination,‟ „in-
group‟ and „out-group‟ build on the belief of unique groups, which are unlike others. Both 
groups also share the belief in out-group homogeneity, out-group accentuation, and in-group 
bias. In practical terms, these beliefs involve sharp delineations based on egoistical, fraternal, 
and double deprivation, as Runciman (1966) theorizes.  
 
Egoistical deprivation occurs, Crosby (1979:105) asserts, “when individuals feel personally 
deprived relative to others in their comparison group. Fraternal deprivation occurs when 
individuals feel that their own group is deprived relative to another group, although they are 
personally gratified. Double deprivation occurs when individuals feel both egoistically and 
fraternally deprived.” Egoistical deprivation undoubtedly applied to Rwanda, since both Hutu 
and Tutsi contained better-off and worse-off categories, unlike the contentions based on „relative 
superiority‟ and „relative subordination.‟ Referring to social distance, relative subordination 
merely emphasized fraternal deprivation to exaggerate the polarization between both identities. 
Previous arguments found that this is an oversimplification.  
 
Runciman‟s (1966) model of egoistical, fraternal and double deprivation is largely based on 
perceived „value‟ – meaning a desired object or opportunity – in specific fields of life. Unlike 
earlier references, relative deprivation is not merely about comparison; it is part of a process set 
in this definition of deprivation. Runciman takes it as a situation “when individuals who lack 
some desired object or opportunity (which we shall call X): (1) want X; (2) compare themselves 
with better off others (including themselves in the past); (3) feel that they deserve X; and (4) 
think it feasible to attain X.” (Crosby 1979:105)  In this context, power, wealth, social prestige 
and intellectual property, are examples of values that disadvantaged groups contest for. 
 
With the (2)-component of Runciamn‟s model, above, the model has the merit of bringing up the 
chronological or historical context of relative deprivation. „How steady has the discrepancy been 
in the past?‟ is a question to be given attention before it is understood as deprivation. The idea is 
that discrepancy would yield variation in levels of violence, depending upon whether it has been 
either steady over time or abrupt. The measurement of relative deprivation not only considers 
individual feelings and perceptions about the comparisons, but it also must be able to establish a 
strong correlation between the present and the past. With this component, this theoretical 
perspective makes a significant difference. A longitudinal view of the discrepancy is highly 
recommended. There is a strong assumption that “present actions are to a large degree affected 
by the outcomes of actions experienced in the past, either directly or vicariously.” (Pitcher et al. 
1978:23) This corroborates the idea that relative deprivation is a history-driven concept. 
 
While the (2)-component of Runciman‟s (1966) model looked into the sequence of events in the 
past, the (4)-component of the model is strictly concerned with individual capacities to attain the 
missing value. Consistent with Crosby (1979:108), “one cannot feel deprived about the failure to 
possess X unless one perceives that it will be possible to attain X.” Through this component, the 
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model bears an intrinsic determination of individuals to attain prior established goals. Whether 
the goals lead to either violent or non-violent behavior depends on various factors. To relate to 
earlier discussion, the factors could include the amount of threat to people‟s futures 
(vulnerability), the rate of felt discrepancy – as large, moderate or small – and the extent to 
which one feels s/he deserves X. But also, the behavior depends on the levels of people‟s 
commitment. Gurr (1968:257-8) hypothesizes “that the more intensely people are motivated 
toward a goal, or committed to an attained level of values, the more sharply is interference 
resented and the greater is the consequent instigation to aggression.” Aggression is assumed to 
be the last alternative for goal and value attainment when non-violence fails to bring about 
change. Such aggression has historically ensued in the context where identity has been the issue 
in dispute, as appears to apply to Rwanda. The struggle for identity made it a concern of life or 
death, as it increased the possibility for violence. 
 
The theorizing by Runciman (1966), unlike some theorists, shows that relative deprivation yields 
the possibility of two opposite outcomes: violence and non-violence. However, the violent side 
of the model applies poorly to Rwanda, since those who possessed the Runciman‟s X-values 
were divided – in disproportional representations perhaps – between both Hutu and Tutsi 
identities. In the chronological sequence, violence has always missed the real target in Rwanda, 
as a result of the belief in the out-group similarity. Wealth looting and taking power from Tutsi 
did not follow this theoretical perspective. The theory would have applied if the disadvantaged 
Buganza sub-region – traditionally associated with Tutsi affiliation – had challenged and 
threatened the government through rebellion movements. But that has not occurred. On the non-
violent side, Runciman „s model (1966) concurs with the work of a number of relative 
deprivation scholars who earlier demonstrated the possibility for certain levels of relative 
deprivation, which yield empowering outcomes – i.e., academic and economic achievements and 
economic growth. Many cases with empowering outcomes of relative deprivation widely cite the 
consciousness of responsibility as a driving force. 
The consciousness of responsibility 
 
Theorizing around the consciousness of responsibility (Crosby 1976) is complementary to the 
delineations that Runciman (1966) outlines above. Crosby considers these delineations as 
necessary conditions, sufficient for relative deprivation under one condition: the victims of 
relative deprivation should not have contributed to their lacking conditions.  
 
This requires fair self-examinations for the definition of relative deprivation to hold. To Crosby 
(1979:106) it should be relative deprivation “when and only when the four preconditions 
specified by Runciman are joined by a fifth: lack of personal responsibility for current failure to 
possess X. When one blames oneself for failure to possess X, one does not experience 
deprivation.” Unnecessary conflicts involve violence because humans generally evaluate the we-
group more positively, and hold themselves less accountable for any failure. Unfair self-
examinations ensue. Whenever one looks for the possibility of being part of the problem, violent 
behavior was likely to be controlled. That human beings are inherently endowed with creative 
interventions curbs the possibility for crises to flourish. In contrary cases, human beings prefer to 
fight back, with the possibility of a win-lose outcome.  
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Following this logic, individuals, communities and societies react differently in conflict-prone 
contexts. For instance, many in Rwanda, and particularly in Giti, have understood that, in 
different ways, they were part of the social context that fueled the 1994 genocide. If the 
democratic system applied prior to the genocide, each and every person contributed to institute 
and support government institutions by means of elections. If this holds, each and every person 
equally shares in the discriminatory policies later designed by the then government on behalf of 
the electorate. Thus, fair self-examination is a way in which individuals and communities 
resisted violence and, therefore, their own institutions. The levels of failure in self-examinations 
have led to strong variations in the magnitude of violence. 
The magnitude of strife 
 
Strife is another variable that deserves important attention in the relative deprivation debate. 
Gurr (1968, 1970) has remained the pioneering figure in this debate. His prominent contention is 
that frustration sequentially leads to an instinctual, acquired, or innate response. As a result, 
human aggression is a strong factor in collective behavior (1968b:247-9). Against this 
background, relative deprivation is “the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and…the 
more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the 
magnitude of strife in one or another form.” (Gurr 1968a:1104)  Thus, recidivist violence could 
be taken as being a result of steady deprivation. The gap between individuals‟ expectations and 
achievement on some value is definitively “posited as the primary force moving individuals to 
radical political orientations and activating participation in protest activities” (Isaac et al. 
1980:193). However, a number of theorists argue that the causal relationship is not always 
positive. Nagel (1974) predicts the possibility of variation in discontent as one compares 
different individuals.  
 
Paraphrasing him, Panning (1983:324) concludes, “The expected discontent of the poorer will be 
greatest when their difference in wealth is moderate, rather than large or small. If their difference 
in wealth is small, comparison is highly probable, but the resulting discontent will be small. If, 
on the other hand, their difference in wealth is great, then comparison produces high discontent 
but is unlikely to occur.” The imbalance57 of power between the better-off and worst-off 
categories arguably establishes the differences as given and unchanging. This is true in the sense 
that actual possibilities for achieving the desired change depend on various factors, which 
include the differences in power resources between the parties involved in the comparison 
process. In many situations, Korpi (1974:1569) suggests, “where the desire for change in a 
collectivity increases with increasing relative deprivation or hardship, the actual possibilities for 
alleviating the situation may at the same time be decreasing as a result of the changing balance of 
                                               
57 Wiberg (1981:116) considers the fundamental idea of balance of power to consist of dissuading “attack by making it credible 
that one has enough capability to make it fail, or at least to make so much resistance that the goals of the potential attack cannot 
justify it.” By this is meant that only the balance of power (independent variable) is a regulatory force by which collective violence 
surrenders to sustainable peace, seen as synonymous with development in Brandt‟s (1985:7) terms. Conversely, Maurset (1964) 
assumes balance of power plays an exclusively destabilizing role, leading rather to non-peace in the negative sense. Wiberg 
(1981: 116) also sees balance of power “…as a legitimization for irrational wars, falsely assuming comparability between different 
capabilities, discouraging peaceful progress, spurring expensive arms races, falsely assuming common system interests, having no 
foundation in historical evidence, and serving as a pretext rather than a true reason for war.” It is therefore meant that the 
performance of the methods of maintaining peace has its own limitations. 
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power among the parties.” By this is understood that the increase in power and power resources 
determines the achievement of desired change.  
 
To Galtung (1962), relative deprivation is taken to be a key psychological variable, whereby 
violence translates anger, which in turn materializes into aggression. The basic idea in Gurr‟s 
(1970) theoretical perspective is that “variation in relative deprivation strongly affects the 
potential for collective violence and thereby also the potential and magnitude of political 
violence. Increases in relative deprivation will thus…be associated with increase in conflict.” 
(Korpi 1974:1576) However, strong facts are needed to support how the same levels of 
deprivation lead to comparable magnitudes of political violence. Equally, empirical observations 
need to support the outcomes of the relative deprivation debate, about which theoretical 
perspectives are in strong disagreement.  
 
While some argue for academic achievement orientations, economic growth and generally non-
violence, Gurr (1968, 1970) only views relative deprivation as destructive, as it leads to political 
violence. His model involves aspirational, decremental, and progressive deprivation. 
Paraphrasing Gurr (1970), Taylor (1982:24) concludes that these typologies instigate conflict in 
relatively the same proportions. Aspirational deprivation, Crosby (1979:107) suggests, “occurs 
when value capabilities remain constant over time while value expectations increase. 
Decremental deprivation occurs when value capabilities decrease over time while value 
expectations remain constant. In progressive deprivation, value capabilities decrease while 
expectation increases.” In a historical context, the variation of value capabilities and value 
expectations in opposite directions makes sense of deprivation. 
 
In application of this model to Rwanda, this discussion refers back to the „hard‟ Malthusian 
argument. This argument documented the erosion of ecological resources over time, which 
strongly surrendered to expectations of higher rates of population growth. It described a situation 
of progressive deprivation. To illustrate, De Herdt and Ndayambaje (1994) have “pointed to the 
steady deterioration of the economic situation and the growing inequalities from the mid-eighties 
onwards.” (Reyntjens 1996:1) Equally, the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) 
documented an economic crisis during the 1980s, as follows: 
 
The fall of the coffee and tea prices in the early eighties triggered the economic crises. Aid 
dependency and budget deficits increased. Harsh „shock therapy‟ structural programmes 
increased unemployment, inflation and reduced social service and real wages. A policy that in 
combination with increasing land shortage hit hard at the majority of the population. 
Inequality increased. Rural land was accumulated by a few at the expense of the many. In 
1990, one quarter of the rural population was landless…In particular, the young men‟s 
situation became worse. Without land they could neither marry nor earn an income, and had 
little hop for the future. (Ewald et al. 2004:108) 
 
Of course, the „hard‟ Malthusian argument aligns to ideological factors, as earlier documented. 
There is no consensus yet established on the magnitude of violence likely to result in the three-
fold deprivation. Unlike Gurr (1970) and his supporters, the magnitude is unevenly distributed 
according to the „hard‟ Malthusian argument. Aspirational deprivation, Korpi (1974:1576) 
suggests, “will only add a little to the probability of conflict, while increasing decremental 
deprivation tends to be associated with a decreasing probability of conflict.” There is a tendency 
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to take this argument for granted. As a result, conflict did not necessarily explode or, at least, be 
extremely violent due to steady decremental deprivation. The probability of significant conflict 
would only hold if the three-fold deprivation applied as a whole.  
 
Against revolution, for instance, Davis (1959) understood progressive deprivation as “associated 
with a high probability of conflict, [and it therefore becomes] the decisive factor behind the 
outbreak of revolutions.” (Korpi 1974:1576) As Korpi puts it, progressive deprivation translates 
wider social gaps that yield conflicts (i.e., revolution and collective violence). He considers 
conflicts as “primarily responses to an intolerable gap between normative expectations and 
actual achievements created by cumulated experience of hardship in a collectivity, i.e., as a result 
of an increase in relative deprivation.” (Korpi 1974:1569) Of course, this perspective is very 
generalizing. With progressive deprivation, it seems that conflict is perpetrated from below. 
Hence, it underestimates state-mandated conflicts.  
 
The above discussion aimed to use the four classical theorists to understand the polarization of 
responses to violence, as registered in the case studies under investigation. The review starkly 
highlighted the causal relationship between relative deprivation and collective violent behavior. 
Also, vulnerability, or uncertainty, was identified as another aspect of relative deprivation, which 
reflected the threat to people‟s futures. With this aspect, the discussion singled out the 
ideological factors for conflict, as those under uncertainty strive to lessen the fears this entails. 
On the development side, the same review has established that relative deprivation could 
stimulate academic and economic achievement orientations and promote economic growth. Only 
the Runciman (1966) and Crosy (1979) models thought along those lines. This meant that as 
deprivation yields violence at a certain point in time, the models apply to understand non-
violence in Giti. 
 
McPhail (1971) thought that extant research must address a number of methodological 
distortions (Isaac et al. 1980:194). The measurement of the concept of relative deprivation is 
given primary attention. Not only does the existing knowledge fail to give universal standards of 
large, moderate and small deprivation, but also, many studies – such as Crawford and Naditch 
(1970), Muller (1972), Grofman and Muller (1973) – assert that indicators for relative 
deprivation “typically do not assess anything beyond a perceptual difference in standing on some 
dimensions of well-being (e.g., occupation, income, housing, etc) thought to be important” 
(Ibid). The basic idea is that the analysts of the emotion of deprivation underestimate the causal 
factors. Criticism mainly challenges Gurr‟s measurement tools. He suggested six measures to 
investigate the actors‟ perception of discrepancy: economic discrimination (exclusion of some 
group from economic arena), political discrimination (exclusion of groups), potential separatism 
(size of separatist regions or groups), dependence on private foreign capital, religion cleavages, 
and the lack of educational opportunity.  
 
A number of sources have identified the risk of these measurements failing to portray the 
respondents‟ feelings of resentment or grievance (Crosby 1979:107). To Geschwender and 
Geschwender (1973), these measurements limit themselves solely to the value and comparison 
standard. In so doing, they miss what Morrison (1973) terms “the respondent‟s feeling-state 
toward the differential.” (Isaac et al. 1980:194) Hence, psychological factors have controlled for 
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structural factors from which anger or discontent is said to develop. Many more studies 
overemphasize the irrational aspect of conflict. 
The crowd psychologies 
 
The crowd psychologies theorize another step of popular support for collective action. The 
concept clarification of „obedience‟ could support statements such as the following: “80 to 90 
percent of the men followed orders to kill Jews, though almost all of them – at least initially – 
were horrified and disgusted by what they were doing. To adopt overtly nonconformist behavior 
– to refuse to kill – was simply beyond most of the men.” (Waller 2002:259) Many of the 
perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda followed this behavior. In this, there is consciousness of 
what is being done under strong coercion. Some individual cases show the same level of 
conformity out of consciousness. Individuals could perpetrate violence under the cover of the 
crowd. Under those particular circumstances, the crowd psychologies ensue.  
 
Le Bon (1913) and Sorokin (1925) are widely known as key pioneers of the crowd psychologies. 
They have “emphasized the same „unconscious‟ nature of crowd behavior and its „de-
individuating‟ effects” as the privileged factors, meant to offer adequate explanation of popular 
support for violence. (Ibid) In this way, Le Bon (1895) admits the collective to be an 
unreasoning, primitive, fickle, dictatorial, intolerant and stupid aggregate, as follows: “Whoever 
be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their 
preoccupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed 
into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, 
and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, 
and act were he in a state of isolation.” (Waller 2002:34)  
 
This finds application in contexts where Sigmund Freud (1921) considers that individuals lose 
personal opinions and intellectual faculties until they fail to control their feelings and instincts, 
while in the crowd. In this perspective, he highlights the individual regression by which the 
group becomes dominated by the unconscious. Importantly, he stresses what he terms the 
„superego,‟ by which he translates the individual‟s conscience and values. He posits, “Each 
member of the group identifies with the group leader to such an extent that the group begins to 
share a common superego. Violence in the group becomes possible, therefore, because the 
individual is no longer checked by his or her own superego but follows the conscience of the 
leader.” (Waller 2002:35) 
 
Along these lines, Gurr (1968b:272-3) suggests a number of models
58
 for which individuals are 
predisposed to violence. He suggests normative support, for instance: the more cohesive the 
community is the more popular support ensues. The level of mobilization of the non-elite into 
that support is established to depend on “issues of the nature of ethnic identity and solidarity and 
the characteristics of the national government having sovereignty over given ethnic groups.” 
(Howell et al. 1993:3) Also, close ties of the local leaders to the non-elite matter. There is a 
                                               
58 Normative support: There is good experimental evidence that individuals alone or in poorly cohesive groups are less likely to 
express hostility than those in highly cohesive groups. Protection from retribution: In an experimental study by Meier (1941) and 
others, two-thirds of subjects who were prepared to join a lynching mob said, inter alia, that they would do so because in the 
crowd they could not be punished (Gurr 1968b:272-3). 
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strong tendency for the crowd base on identity and social ties to develop in most divided 
societies. They serve as situations “in which normal, civilized, rational patterns of human 
interaction have been broken; [in] a crowd, brought together by hatred or panic…shouts of panic 
replace command and stampeed instead of authority decides the direction.” (Bauman 2000:154) 
A chaotic situation gives the floor to passions to lead human behavior. To quote from Rule 
(1988), “crowd behavior flows out of emotional influence from fellow human beings. Social 
control fades away in the physical proximity of the crowd…Thus, crowd reactions are seen as 
highly irrational, and…have nothing to do with the real interests or needs of the participants. 
However, in terms of social differentiation, those most vulnerable to influence by a crowd 
mentality are the marginalized segment of society.” (Nilsson 1999:149) That crowd behavior 
does not target material interest is a relevant definition of the irrational aspect. With crowd 
behavior, participants find interest in group solidarity. 
 
In this context, many ordinary people joined the violence to be supportive to their ethnic 
affiliation. Equally, those born from intermarriages – when the father was Hutu – joined to 
obtain the credibility of perpetrators during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Was it about violent 
emotion? The existent knowledge teaches that emotion can only apply to short-term violence. 
Given the length of time genocide took in Rwanda, the emotion is increasingly becoming weak 
factor for valid explanation. Within a period of three months, for instance, approximately 11,000 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu died per day; an estimated one million Rwandans were killed. If the 
same rate applied during the Holocaust, the Nazis would have killed at least 100 Jews per day 
over a period of 200 years, to amount to the six million Jews who are estimated to have been 
killed (Bauman 2000).  
 
These examples show that violence in Rwanda took place within relatively long chronological 
limits. It is theoretically supported that the longer the period of violence, the more that emotions 
fade. Sabini and Silver (1980) assert that, “People can be manipulated in fury, but fury cannot be 
maintained for 200 years. Emotions, and their biological basis, have a natural time course; lust, 
even blood lust, is eventually sated. Further, emotions are notoriously fickle, can be turned.” 
(Bauman 2000:90) The idea is that steady violence over such time-frames depends on a grand 
design, not on fury or emotions that fade away. It is rather a grand design of strong bureaucracy 
that organizes routine, instead of arousing perpetrators‟ passions. Violence needs to be socially 
engineered in a way that establishes social order in a perfect manner. Against this background, 
crowd behavior is likely to last longer under a rational and carefully calculated design, which is 
strong bureaucracy. 
 
Protection from retribution is another pillar that Gurr (1968b) establishes for crowd 
psychologies, which concerns accountability. The idea is that participation in crowd behavior 
does not involve punishment because of the large numbers of participants. Even if collective 
punishment applies, it is not confined to individual participants. Unlike individual repression, 
collective punishment does not alter the cost of participation. To refer to Khawaja (1993:52), 
individualized repression is the most effective as compared to “collective punishment in 
decreasing collective action, other things being equal.” Like „normative support,‟ „protection 
from retribution‟ greatly informed popular support for genocidal violence in the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994.  
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To illustrate, the implementation of genocide, the Institute of Research and Dialogye for Peace 
(2006) describes, “put humanity in a deadlock where everybody is guilty, which amounts to 
impunity and to lack of accountability.” (Republic of Rwanda 2006:155) This could work when 
the bureaucratic organizations, which organize the routine, also promised that no one would be 
held accountable for crowd violence. Also, it could work under the authority of informal 
structures long based on extended families. As a result of community cohesion, solidarity within 
specific social units, and experience sharing, the elders could exercise authority over the whole 
community and make things happen, including crowd behavior. In history, the same could apply 
if sorcerers and thieves were found guilty of a wrong. TheThe authorities could legitimate 
violence, which involved the crowd. 
 
Looking for application of „the crowd psychologies‟ to Rwanda, the explanation of popular 
support for genocidal violence does not omit explanation through the rational bases of conflict. 
Put another way, both rational and irrational bases of conflict are not exclusive, but are rather 
complementary to each other. Against the theory of scarce ecological resources, rational bases of 
conflict explain mass engagement in collective violence as follows: 
 
The dependent position of the peasant and the conservatism of the poorer strata who had 
little means to change their existence could also serve to support alliances with an elite 
interested in preserving its position in a changing political world…In early all these 
instances, movements were led by elites or wealthier members of the non-dominant ethnic 
groups, for they were the ones who had the resources necessary for mobilization. Within 
these elites there often emerged charismatic figures whose forceful personalities played an 
important role in pushing movements to defining themselves in ethnic terms. (Wiegandt 
1993:310-13) 
 
However, “an individual will not necessarily join a collective action even if its end is beneficial 
to him…collective action does not always occurs among the most seriously disadvantaged ethnic 
groups. The strength of ethnically-based organizations is held to be an especially powerful 
determinant of the likelihood of ethnic collective action.” (Hechter et al. 1982:412) In the 
specific case of Rwanda, the presence of the elite has mostly channeled the same behavior. 
Identity politicization has played a crucial role in this sense. The elite – then perceived as 
reference groups – have manipulated identity as a sensitive concern to ordinary people in order 
to garner their full support. And the more the elite emerge as reference groups, Lloyd (1966:52-
3) assumes, “the more non-elites may take the values of the group as a model for their own 
behavior without necessarily aiming at membership or identification.” This is not only valid to 
the formal elite, but also to the informal elite.  
Structural factors  
 
The relative deprivation model – also termed the traditional collective behavior approach to 
conflict – is grounded in the concept of deprivation and/or stress. It limits the explanation of 
collective violence exclusively to the psychological orientation of actors, their mental perception 
of reality and violent emotions – the crowd psychologies.  
 
Nonetheless, they have some limitations. It remains uncertain whether deprivation or stress 
offers adequate explanations to contemporary conflicts. Equally, there is uncertainty about 
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“whether collective action increases as [a] function of increased hardship or improved political 
opportunities and/or economic resources for mobilization.” (Khawaja 1994:191) Clapham 
(1985:1) globally found that people seek security, wealth and power in entering politics. In so 
doing, people “have particular interests and ambitions which they try to achieve, and which in 
some ways conflict, [and] in other [ways] coincide with the interests and ambitions of others.” In 
the process of pursuing these interests, Clapham argues, they regard other people with 
indifference, suspicion and, in the extreme, downright hostility, which manifests either in “the 
imposition of physical force, or indirectly through the organization of their surroundings in ways 
which reduce, and perhaps almost entirely remove, their capacity for individual choice” (Ibid). 
Different cases in which conflicts arose out of relative deprivation and stress laid oppropriate 
ground for criticism. As a result, the North American sociologists shifted from the traditional 
collective behavior approaches to resource mobilization models of conflict.  
 
To refer to Charles Tilly (1978), the shift is made “from a primary concern with anger and 
psychological strain to the relative power and resource capacity of both the state and its 
challengers. This shift is informed by the presupposition that social movements are rational 
responses to injustice and conflict interests.” (Khawaja 1993:48-9) This logic gives primary 
importance to resource mobilization in the explanations of collective action, over the deprivation 
account. The basic idea behind this paradigm change is that the conception of collective protest 
is no longer viewed as an abnormal phenomenon, whereby outbursts are conceived as rational, 
calculated reactions to injustice and conflicting interests. The current literature circumscribes the 
decolonization movements of many third world states in this category. After independence, for 
instance, the third world state had “to maintain itself by extracting resources from the domestic 
economy, and especially from the trade generated by the economy‟s incorporation into a global 
structure of exchange…Along with the state come the people who…already enjoy the greatest 
social status, wealth and power. The state becomes in their hands not only a source of benefits in 
itself, but also a means to defend themselves against domestic discontent, and in some measures 
also against external penetration.” (Clapham 1985:40) Control over the state had become a prize 
for which many fought.  
 
Clapham further emphasizes the means for repression that the small interlocking group in 
command puts in place, as “determination to cling on is likely to be strengthened by a growing 
dependence on the comforts of office, and the fear of retaliation should their opponents get in” 
(Clapham 1985:41). On a large scale, to follow Rawls (1971), this augured for disproportionate 
growth among well-off and worse-off groups, which, in the long-term, perpetuates a circle of 
violence (Midlarsky 1988:493). This is beyond simple irrationality. The same paradigm change 
leads to the conclusion that inner circle of power creation, and the strategies to contain the 
possibility of political challengers, is a rational choice made by many in African leadership. 
Given that rational bases have driven the support for the elite, this logic applies to ordinary 
people in one way or another. The case of genocide in Rwanda is an illustration detailed earlier. 
 
Korpi (1974:1569) identifies Snyder and Tilly (1972), Tilly (1973) and Oberschall (1973), as the 
pioneering figures of the resource mobilization model. The entry point for this shift is the claim 
that deprivation explanations overestimate frustration of the supporting base. However, Khawaja 
(1994:193) describes that “the ultimate source of discontent and frustration is attributed to large-
scale socioeconomic changes.” For instance, Snyder (1978:502) argues for both Marxian and 
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economists‟ rational choice arguments to identify the importance (and problematic nature) of the 
organization of discontent. The idea is that the social environment remains the base for structural 
factors from which psychological factors of violent behavior develop. If this is the case, resource 
mobilization theory offers another perspective of explanation of responses to violence. Given 
that psychological factors emerge from that social environment, the “motivational factors are 
generally accorded a central place in theories of mobilization.” (Korpi 1974:1570) This means 
that structural factors are complementary to the psychological factors. 
 
The resource mobilization theorists argue for “power resources, the mobilization of power 
resources, and the struggle for power as the central features in an alternative approach to conflict 
theory and in explanations of conflicts like revolutions and collective violence.” (Korpi 
1974:1569) They highlight that the primacy of the concept „power‟ is at the very core of the 
escalation of conflicts. While ecological resources – as the „hard‟ Malthusian argument 
documented – have decreased in most African countries over the past decades, many people 
increasingly relate power to wealth. With this, the search for power has denoted, in many cases, 
the search for wealth. As a result of (real or perceived) hardships, many cases of conflict have 
developed in the past. As this logic goes, the resource mobilization model of conflict advocates 
socioeconomic determinism.  
 
The latter is widely used to understand the processes of political struggles in individual cases 
from the African continent. Some leaders could distort the Bible
59
 –as the former president of 
Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, did in the 1950s – to justify political struggles. As Nkrumah said, 
“Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things else shall be added unto you.” (Reyntjens 
1996:242) According to some scholars, the founding president of Ghana had in mind that 
political independence was an independent variable to political development, as conflict would 
be reduced and prosperity increased. The failure he registered is not the focus of this study 
(Mazrui 1995:20). Rather, it signifies that many have appropriated his focus to underline strong 
socioeconomic determinism as a hidden agenda of power possession. Much as the African state 
is “the largest employer in the country…the most important gate to privileges of all kinds…the 
most effective distributor of wealth and the most efficient avenue of class formulation” (Ibid), 
there is a socioeconomic determinism in the explanation of tensions that endlessly oppose the 
ruling class to challengers. In short, political positions offer – to African leaders mostly with a 
peasant background – the advantages that drive a circle of contemporary African conflicts.  
 
Once in power, African rulers control critical resources over which they establish strong 
clientelist relationships, given that “lack of access to them substantially increases the 
vulnerability of other sections of the society, or reduces their chances of achieving their goals.” 
(Clapham 1982:7) With Rawls (1971), and Midlarsky (1988), among others, it has been detailed 
that large-scale political violence is likely to develop when one already well-off societal sector 
increases (or at least stabilizes) its wealth, while another originally poorer sector is concurrently 
declining. Also, Kirkham (2002:124) hypothesizes that “a high rate of socioeconomic change 
would entail a high level of political violence” when access to the resources controlled by the 
inner circle of power – or patron – group through cooperation is made impossible.  
 
                                               
59… strive first for the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all the things will be given to you as well (Mt 6, 33). 
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In most cases, the confrontation yields fewer results: “It may turn on a failure by client groups to 
recognize their common interests and organize themselves to achieve them: the „false 
consciousness‟ and absence of party organization habitually used by Marxists to explain the 
absence of class action among clearly exploited peasantries.” (Clapham 1982:8) No matter how 
this applied to Rwanda, patronage is openly accepted to have served as a supporting pillar to the 
philosophy of the inner circle of power. The Akazu is strongly supported as informed by the 
competition over scarce ecological resources, which were later politicized to become 
instrumental in the eruption of genocidal violence. That is why the inner circle of power used 
wealth as a bait to acquire popular support.  
 
Of course, the socioeconomic view from the case of Rwanda served as a strong background of 
exacerbating factors that led to the eruption of the conflict. The literature review by Reyntjens 
(1996:240-1) demonstrates a number of these exacerbating factors. Against the „hard‟ 
Malthusian argument, it pinpoints the untenable demographic pressure and the scarcity of land as 
supported (Vis, Goyens and Brasseur 1994, Bonneux 1994, and Willame 1995). Willame (1995) 
relates frustrations inherent in socially culturally oppressive rural environments. The African 
Rights (1994, 1995) and Braeckman (1994) found the inherent genocidal potential of the 
ideology as an important factor after the 1959 Rwandan revolution. Meanwhile, the steady 
deterioration in the economic situation, and the growing inequalities, from the mid-1980s, has 
found consideration in many more studies (Bézy 1990, Maton 1994, Marysee, De Herdt and 
Ndayambaje 1994). To understand the phenomenon of popular support requires a multi-level 
analysis at both psychological and structural levels.  
Political process model 
 
The discussion of the resource mobilization model has overemphasized structural factors. Hence, 
it takes the expectation achievement approach to conflict as insufficient. At the same time, it 
recognizes the contribution of the same approach to understanding the dynamics of conflict 
despite of the limitations it brings with it.  
 
However, Kerbo (1982) depicts the resource mobilization model as failing to offer adequate 
explanation likely to apply to varied settings of collective violence that develop from varied 
socioeconomic conditions. Against the variety of socioeconomic conditions, he associates 
different types of movements with varied patterns of collective action. There is a kind of area of 
conflict in which each model specializes. As the thinking goes, both approaches are 
complementary, not only in understanding the levels of support for genocidal violence in 
Rwanda, but also in understanding a variety of social movements. Therefore, Kerbo suggests that 
only a joint action of both deprivation and resource mobilization can offer adequate explanation 
for the „movements of crisis‟ and „movement of affluence.‟60 Without the psychological 
explanation, he suggests, resource mobilization theories can only explain the movement of 
affluence and not that of crisis (Khawaja 1994:192). The combination of psychological and 
                                               
Kerbo (1982) considers that the more socioeconomic conditions vary, the greater the number of different types of movement, 
incentives for participation, and patterns of collective action. He identifies the „movements of crisis‟ and the „movement of 
affluence‟ as the major type. The movement of crisis defines the “collective action brought about by life-disrupting situations”. At 
the same time, he refers to the movement of affluence to identify the “collective action in which the major participants are not 
motivated by immediate life-threatening situations of political or economic crisis” (Khawaja 1994:192).  
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structural explanation is only taken to be a comprehensive model of conflict. A combination of 
these diametrically opposed approaches involves the political process model of conflict. It 
bridges those gaps as it brings with it the political variables. 
 
These variables, according to Tilly (1978), include, inter alia, “the effect of repression and power 
concentration opportunities for action, and the role of institutional disruption in shrinking state‟s 
resources and capacity for control.” (Khawaja 1994:195) McAdam (1982) ideally shows that the 
political process model of conflict is bigger and more inclusive than the resource mobilization 
and relative deprivation models. It accommodates both motivational and structural approaches to 
conflict. As he warns, “neglecting the role of consciousness and…granting the elite absolute 
control of power, classical theory (which he terms the elite model) provides a pessimistic view of 
change, making the development of insurgency and resistance impossible.” (Khawaja 1994:195-
6) On the contrary, he adds, social movements might arise and seek changes in the larger 
sociopolitical environment. Nilsson (1999) understood the latter as a strong base from which 
intrastate conflicts emerge.  
 
With this belief, he came to address two major problems. First, he argues, “it removes the 
„primordiality‟ of the quest for political power as the driving force behind intrastate conflicts, as 
it introduces unsatisfied needs as an important component in conflict analysis. Second, in 
recognizing the possibility of elite relative deprivation and frustration, it permits a legitimization 
of elite needs, giving them a legitimate role in conflict resolution processes.” (Nilsson 1999:226) 
With this approach, he straddles both resource mobilization and relative deprivation models. The 
same applies to Korpi (1974) who incorporates “the central concepts from both the expectation 
achievement approach and the political process approach” in the chain of causal relationships 
between variables to explain conflicts like collective violence and revolutions (Korpi 
1974:1570). The expectation achievement approach interposes between power resources, 
mobilization resources and collective violence or revolutions.  
 
To sum up, the political process model, like the psychological and structural models, still does 
not provide enough explanation for cases of genocidal violence where perpetrators and victims 
had lived side by side and were formerly bound by unifying factors in the community. To refer 
to Colletta and Cullen (2000), in Collier‟s et al. (2003) paraphrase, genocidal violence can only 
be regarded as an outcome of the relationship between violent conflict and the transformation of 
social capital. As a result of this style of cohabitation life, “social capital atrophied as the 
country, communities, and families fell prey to hatred and violence. Yet integrative forms of 
social capital increased within families fighting for survival; among individuals attempting to 
save or rescue Tutsi…Strong, exclusionary social capital also emerged within Hutu extremism, 
with extremely negative ramifications for those excluded, showing that violence can coexist 
with, or be a result of, strong bonding social capital among its perpetrators.” (Collier et al. 
2003:16)  
 
Unless the transformation of social capital is given consideration, the explanation of genocidal 
violence is not yet satisfactory in a country like Rwanda that “existed as a Nation with all 
unifying factors that make up a sovereign nation state. Rwandan society existed in harmony. 
Rwandans whether Hutu, Tutsi or Twa shared the same culture, religion, language, 
intermarriages and lived side by side on the hillsides.” (Umar and Surya 2003:28) This translates 
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the „common objective elements‟ – such as language, history, religion, customs and institution – 
which, together with „the subjective self-identification of people,‟ defines a civilization 
(Huntington 1993:2). At a certain level, as earlier detailed, there are opportunities for non-
violence grounded in the past ways of life. The models discussed in the preceeding paragraphs 
only give indications of ways in which kingdoms and regions became relationally and culturally 
distant, and thus violence-prone, as a result of identity politicization (de la Roch 1996:109-110).  
A brief discussion of the background of Rwanda is likely to enlighten the various arguments 
made above. 
Strong statebuilding 
 
The phenomenon of non-governmental organizations has been mushrooming, all over the world, 
for some decades. Some are committed to promoting human rights, and democratic values – such 
as equality, justice, and transparency. However, inequality and oligarchy remain present in many 
areas of the world. In such areas, democracy does not work well. Where it does, it produces “a 
relatively content population that, on…average and over time, gets much of its wishes satisfied, 
within the limits of the feasible.” (Galtung 1996:4) Conversely, to recall Pareto (2003), the elite, 
which seeks power, assumes the leadership of all the oppressed. It “declares that it will pursue 
not its own good but the good of the many; and it goes to battle, not for the rights of a restricted 
class but for the rights of almost the entire citizenry. Of course, once victory is won, it subjugates 
the erstwhile allies, or at best offers them some formal concessions.” (Pareto 2003:36) This 
prepares favorable ground for corrupt bureaucracies to develop, and bureaucratic machinery to 
advance the interests of those in leadership positions and, therefore, to divert from the 
organizational goals.  
 
This presupposes a specific power distribution style within the organization. Michels (1962) 
argues, an organization “ultimately tends toward an organizational structure in which a great deal 
of power becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few high-ranking persons.” (Karp 
et al. 1991:157) Michels identifies this situation as the „iron of oligarchy‟ to denote the strong 
controversy between democratic values and the concentration of power in the hands of few high-
ranking persons. His investigation into political parties led him to the conclusion that “„who says 
organization says oligarchy‟…and the more developed the organization, the stronger the 
oligarchy. Such oligarchy is undemocratic also because, once in office, the leaders develop their 
own interests and no longer is to promote the socialist aims of the organization, but rather to 
maintain the organization on which their elite positions depend.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:22) The 
oligarchy stands for the interests of those few high-ranking persons in power.  
 
Within the organization, a demarcation line is established between the minority leaders and a 
majority of those who are led. The minority leaders, the executive organs, eventually “come to 
exert almost unlimited power over the rank and file. The external forms of democracy are 
preserved, but underneath them oligarchy becomes more and more pronounced.” (Etzioni-
Halevy 1993:21) To Gouldner (1954), the rules within bureaucracies become unfair as they treat 
people of same organization differently (Hachen 2001:38). Despotic regimes ensue and the 
strategies for government survival become the major preoccupation, which opens the ground for 
violence to serve the same purpose. As a result, ordinary people are kept submissive and made 
ready for anything those in power command. It does at least seem tenable, Waller (2002:179) 
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draws, “to accept that there are cultural variations in models of authority orientation that are 
relevant to understanding how ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing.” Many accord 
that the propensity for violence varies from one model to another.  
 
As Kirkhan (2002:146) illustrates “coercive systems (totalitarian states) are able to deter 
assassins and expressions of political violence. Permissiveness appears to be associated with the 
lowest amount of violence; moderate coerciveness of political regimes appears to be associated 
with the highest amount of violence.” Again, the measurement of coerciveness is a 
methodological concern, which makes it hard to find an indication of when the government as an 
institution deters insurgency or perpetrates violence on parts of the population. To relate Hettne 
(1990:8), governments are great powers that can exercise hegemonic power over whomever fall 
under their responsibilities. Driven by private benefits, they make use of terror to preserve peace 
or instigate the growth of political violence. To refer to Mazrui (1995), this depends much on 
whether the regime enjoys „much government‟ – one-party systems – or „too little government‟ – 
multi-party systems. Whether the government is too little or too much, he purports, “Too much 
government is the high road to tyranny; too little government leads to anarchy.” (Mazrui 
1995:23) 
 
In the Rwandan context, it can be seen that the government generally ensured that the “state is 
present everywhere and every Rwandan is „administered‟.” (Reyntjens 1996:244) This denoted a 
strong state, under which the oligarchy – known as the Akazu – ruling Rwanda and made sure 
each and everybody was precisely administered. The Akazu was most concerned with power 
sustainability. It is literally understood as „little house,‟ which translates as the „inner circle of 
power.‟ It is loosely used in the present day to mean the few high-ranking persons in the hands of 
which power is increasingly concentrated. Many seem to have been familiar with the concept of 
Akazu during the Habyarimana regime under which genocide was perpatrated. In a loose way, 
many talk about the Akazu under Kayibanda, the first president of republic of Rwanda. This 
rotation could be held responsible for the recurrence of intrastate wars.  
 
Thus, the concentration of political and economic power alternated firstly between Hutu and 
Tutsi and, secondly, between Hutu of the south and the north over the past. However, this 
concentration of power dates back to the pre-colonial era. It defined “the circle of courtiers 
around a king, [which] held the reins of power in shadow of the throne.” (Melvern 2000:40-1) 
To illustrate, Kanjogera, the former King Musinga‟s mother, is thought to have held that kind of 
power in a network with her two brothers – Kabare and Ruhinankiko. She “played a vital role as 
manager of the royal household, and was the focal point of all court intrigue.” (Ibid) From 
colonial times, different regimes in their succession juxtaposed with the power of the Akazu, 
which mostly developed along ethnic lines and, loosely, along regional bases. In a pervasive 
way, this invisible power yielded fruits in the post-colonial era. The oligarchies that emerged 
immediately after independence, to refer to Paul Kagame (2002)
61
 “were usually from the same 
ethnic groups, clans, and in some cases, from the same families.  
 
They monopolized power and the assets of the young states and, in so doing, encouraged the 
development of corruption, hegemony and exclusion of certain members of their society. 
                                               
61 The Great Lakes Conflicts: Factors, Actors, and Challenges. An Inaugural Lecture delivered by His Excellency Paul Kagame, 
President of the Republic of Rwanda at the Nigeria War College, Abuja (16 September 2002). 
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Population in the end respected individuals in power, rather than the law.” (Kagame 2002) This 
view is supported theoretically. The learning-theory rationale for legitimacy of Merelman (1966) 
shows that “people comply with directives of the regime in order to gain both the symbolic 
rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government first associated 
itself.” (Gurr 1968a:1106) In many cases, the inner circle of power played a decisive role. It 
could influence and recommend people they come out in sympathy with to the appointing 
authority. 
 
The most recent Akazu, under former president Habyarimana, according to Melvern (2000), 
defined his wife‟s personal network. It included her three notorious brothers, and was associated 
with a death-squad recruited from the Presidential Guard. It had strong contacts “in local 
councils and prefectures; it had representatives in all of Rwanda‟s embassies; and its richer 
members kept bank accounts abroad.” (Melvern 2000:42) No matter how remote the village, the 
central elite monitored ordinary people by means of the established hierarchical structures. To 
this end, the Akazu increasingly grew bigger into what Mfizi (1992) understood as the “Network 
Zero.”62 It included “a group of people who had successfully infiltrated all areas of Rwandan 
society: politics, the army, finance, agriculture, science and religion. These people treated the 
country like a private company from which a maximum profit could be squeezed. The president 
and the leaders of the MRND were enmeshed by this group and unable to escape. In order to 
retain power, the group was encouraging racism and regional division,” (Melvern 2000:42-3) to 
resist democracy that was the fashion of the 1980s.  
 
By this is meant that the inner circle of power was always coupled with patronage or clientelism, 
as in many systems of government. Especially those of non-industrial societies, Clapham 
(1982:5) argues, “it is openly recognized and accepted that rewards will be distributed according 
to the subject‟s loyalty to his leader.” Equally, to Clapham, the White House staffs of American 
presidents are allocated posts on the grounds of personal patronage. The relationship between the 
subject and the leader is based on individual or private morality, which always interferes with the 
“public morality based on the goals which an organization is intended to achieve or the internal 
virtues which it is intended to exhibit.” (Ibid) Understood from this perspective, the „Network 
Zero‟ was important for the government‟s survival. McNairn (2004:83) pinpoints the “mix of 
dispossession and division which left the majority of Rwandans powerless to participate in 
decision making, living in abject poverty, and manipulated by powerful elites” as a strong 
implication which remained silent until the introduction of the multiparty system. 
 
The inner circle of power has critically weakened the governing systems. The theoretical 
paradigm of the circulation of elite argues for the new elite, which seeks to supersede the old one 
on the basis of superior qualities. Against this paradigm, the ruling classes demonstrated the 
capacities to impose their political formulae, as a result of strong authority orientation, to 
manage society and render a service to it. However, they failed to open up, “to the more talented 
and ambitious people among the ruled, [in which case] gradual change and progress in society 
will take place.” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:21) On the contrary, they became closed to talented 
outsiders. In so doing, they increased the possibility of violent upheavals. In this case, the 
paradigm advises, these failures “frequently result in the total replacement of the ruling classes” 
                                               
62 Chritophe Mfizi, „Le Réseau Zéro‟, Lettre Ouverte à Monsieur le Président du Mouvement Républicain National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développement (MRNDD), Editions Uruhimbi, BP 1067, Kigali, Rwanda, 1992. 
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(Ibid). The military victory of the Rwanda Patriotic Front in Rwanda is arguably seen as a result  
of the failure of the Akazu to open up to those talented and ambitious elites. To recall Weber, 
such upheaval is made possible “when the legitimacy of an old historical structure is exhausted, 
a charismatic leader emerges outside the structure…The leader and his followers take over and 
build a new structure.” (Etzioni and Etzioni 1964:5)  
 
This denotes the outgoing regimes driven by corrupt and incompetent oligarchies to be 
continuously replaced by new ones as soon as the higher strata of society turn into the monopoly 
of decadent elements. It is a continuous process in which slowing-down in social uplift breaks 
into revolution when those in government are perceived as “no longer possessing the residues 
suitable for keeping them in power and shrinking from the use of force; while meantime in the 
lower strata of society elements of superior quality are coming to the fore, possessing residues 
suitable for exercising the function of government and willing enough to use force.” (Zetterberg 
2003:10) Among other factors, the reluctance to make the right decisions at the right time is an 
indication of slowing-down in social uplift that the literature has most cited. When it occurs, 
Clapham (1985:49) suggests, “the entire system sinks into a torpor from which it may only be 
rescued by is overthrow and replacement by a new boss who rapidly gets things under way.” The 
pre-genocide government demonstrated drastic erosion of such capacities to make decisions and 
to open up to the new talented elite and of suitable residues for keeping their hold on power.  
 
The 1980s declaration by the central committee of the then ruling party is one of the principal 
indications of such erosion. After the 1959 Rwandan refugees showed an interest in repatriating 
from their host countries, the declaration read as follows: “Rwanda would not allow the return of 
large numbers of refugees, since the country‟s economy was incapable of sustaining such an 
influx.” (Ofcansky 2001:914) This sounded a denial of citizenship, which increasingly opened 
the ground for a context of cruelty. The social atmosphere of that time was seen by many as a 
strong opportunity for this context to break down the relative stability. For instance, the “military 
dictatorship controlled by a small clique of Hutus from the northwest, increasingly frustrated the 
Hutu elite‟s from other regions…The marginalized elites outside the narrow insider group grew 
increasingly anxious.” (Ewald et al. 2004:108) At a certain point of time, the frustration gap 
attained the highest level, both for the inside and outside elite, for conflict to explode. In a power 
realist perspective, to refer to Gould and Kolb (1964:84), the “lion-like strength of conviction 
and the willingness to use force are necessary conditions for the seizure of power, although there 
must be some of the fox-like qualities of intellect and cunning in order to develop the strategy 
and tactics of seizing power.” The fox-like qualities made it possible for ordinary people to join 
the elite‟s endeavors. 
 
Both selfishness and greed for power are the supporting pillars to the oligarchy. In line with the 
theoretical paradigm of elite circulation, “oppositions and rivalries, in terms of political power 
and social and economic privilege, have polarized and have been interpreted in the context of 
ethnicity. Social relationships have been portrayed and manipulated by interested parties to serve 
their own goals of securing wealth, power and resources.” (Van der Meeren 1996:252-3) Scarce 
resources remain supported as one of the most eligible issues on which the philosophy of a 
strong state builds. The elite‟s manipulation for violence effectively and successfully develops, 
Martinussen (1997:327) advises, “in relation to people who themselves experience competition 
and conflict with other people belonging to different ethnic categories.” Rwanda in the 1980s is 
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arguably a convincing illustration; competition over scarce resources is depicted by many to be 
the motivation factor for inner circle of power to be strategically established.  
 
As an illustration, “the central government was employing 7,000 people and the local 
governments 43,000. By law, only 9 percent of these employees could be Tutsi. Eliminating the 
Tutsi would open up 4,500 more government jobs for Hutu.” (Magneralla 2005:818-19) Thus, 
the quota system and violence become here strong strategies to own the maximum amount of 
assets. And the scarcer the resources, the smaller the inner circle of power becomes to satisfy 
individual interests. To borrow from Hall (1999:26), those in the inner circle of power strove to 
be “primarily and causally motivated by an instrumental rationality.” With this, the study agrees 
with Martinussen (1997:325-7), that the same competition over scarce resource makes 
manipulation by the elite an easy process, and “more effective and successful in relation to 
people who themselves experience competition and conflict with other people belonging to 
different ethnic categories.” That is, where politicization of poverty has been an important factor 
for support for violence. This remains true since “competing material interests or behaviors are 
said to have an „instrumental‟ view of the sources of conflict.” (Miall 2005:10) Therefore, wealth 
accumulation was used as a strong weapon for the recruitment of those having poor living 
conditions – mainly peasants – to join genocidal violence. This background has identified cruelty 
as a recurrent phenomenon over the past. 
 
To conclude, the authority of informal structures is held to be influential, as the above discussion 
has shown. With the informal authority of kinship institutions, it has shown powers on the 
African continent on the basis of which the local leadership was traditionally defined. In sub-
Saharan Africa, for instance, Mamdani (1996) and Mbembe (2001) argue that the colonial forms 
of indirect rule made use of the local chiefs, whom they incorporated as an extension of colonial 
regimes. With the independent era, most governments limited the power of the chieftaincy 
structures to cultural and spiritual activities, by which the population owed them much respect – 
more probably than they had under the colonial authorities. This deviated the predictions – to 
refer to modernization theorists – according to which the decolonization process would result in 
the erosion of chieftaincy power as post-colonial African states became independent. For 
instance, Levy (1966) suggested, “indigenous structures and practices would rapidly wither 
away” (Vaughan 2000:3) with the advance of modernization. Equally, Fallers (1956, 1964) 
concluded “that the incompatible values of modernization and traditionalism would marginalize 
chiefly power in African states.” (Ibid) 
 
Despite the attempts by the modern governments to ban kinship-based institutions, the latter 
have largely survived. Referring to the Yoruba people in Nigeria, “indigenous structures have 
become part and parcel of contemporary stratification and politics, they have had equivocal 
consequences for the legitimation of the Nigerian state.” (Vaughan 2000:1) In sub-Saharan 
Africa, Ekeh (1975) and Sklar (1999) observed a „mixed polity‟ or a dualism of structures of 
power. The latter reflected “the prevalence of „two publics‟ competing for the allegiance of 
citizens within nationalized territories that the states involved have seldom been able to control 
fully.” (Kyed and Buur 2006:1) At the same time, Skalnik (2004) argues, the “chieftaincies or 
kinship-based forms of governance have never ceased to be important, despite various attempts 
by states to do away with them.” (Ibid) This shows ways in which the leadership grounded in 
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indigenous bases was powerful to influence people‟s opinions. The same is said of the inner 
circle of power, which exercised power in shadow of past regimes in Rwanda. 
The context of cruelty 
 
The situationist perspective widely trusts the forces of the immediate social context as strong 
enough to make active and actual what is latent in the nature of humankind. Earlier, they were 
said to have the power to immerse people in institutional environments, which transform them to 
behave differently. As an illustration, ordinary people who had not killed before perpetrated 
genocide in Rwanda. The following paragraphs discuss the immediate social context – the 
context of cruelty – that involved these people in such a drastic transformation. 
 
Until the RPF launched war in 1990, insurgencies had been a common phenomenon over the 
past in Rwanda. Insurgent organizations often transformed latent conflict into manifest conflict, 
to challenge “social structures which were harmful because they were highly inequitable” (Miall 
2005:39), but, unlike the Gandhian model of conflict, they set a spiral of violence with a strong 
determination of settling issues in dispute, as repressive structures underestimated the priority of 
addressing structural violence (issues of social justice). To recall Herman Schmin (1968), the 
absence of war over the post-independent period (negative peace) overshadowed deep injustices, 
which not only made a mockery of peace but also contained the seeds of the next violence 
conflict. In other words, to refer to Galtungian philosophy and methodologies of 
„TRANSCEND‟ (Galtung and Jacobsen 2000, Galtung 2004), the insurgencies of the past were a 
result of a total absence of a new “forum to address underlying structures and culture of violence, 
and the need for new language, dialogue and perspectives such as might offer more creative and 
viable alternatives for the twenty first century.” (Miall 2005:43) As a result of this lack, violence 
repeatedly occurred in the past, and people were brought up that way “to see killing as legitimate 
under some conditions. That brings us to culture, that great legitimizer of violence, but also of 
peace.” (Gultung 1996:6) Importantly, insurgent organizations had cost many human lives.  
 
History highlights the 1962 insurgency, which brought the Hutu to power to establish 
Republican rule. Melvern (2000:16) observes the radial dictatorship of one party being replaced 
by that of another, with a popularly elected assembly. The composition of the ruling group “was 
drastically altered, as Hutu leaders, members of the majority (but formerly subordinate) group, 
replaced the earlier Tutsi rulers.” (Newbury 1988:1) The 1963 insurgency, pioneered by a group 
of monarchists, is also known by the lasting damage it inflicted on the military power base of 
Gako. Many describe the monarchists as extremists, nostalgic for power, who were “seeking to 
regain power in Rwanda by any means, including taking up arms.” (Melvern 2000:62) Security 
measures were set up by which many inside Tutsi lost their lives. Similar losses were common in 
1972, as a result of sporadic attacks against Tutsi in different milieux. The mobilization of 
ethnicity, existential fears and violence, are direct implications of different insurgent 
organizations. Similarly, the RPF was “seen as a mortal threat, which it was not hard to present 
as an attempt to restore the pre-revolutionary „feudo-monarchical‟ order. The war provided a 
pretext for manipulation, violence, destabilization and political stalemate.” (Reyntjens 1996:246) 
This means that the propensity for violence was set to be a normal reaction – in the sense that it 
had created recidivist habits – to insurgent organizations. 
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In 1990, an estimated military force of 10,000 that represented the exiled, Tutsi-dominated, FPR 
– known as Inkotanyi – “crossed the border from Uganda into north-eastern Rwanda, where they 
swiftly occupied several towns” (Ofcansky 2001:915) within this background. Subsequently, an 
estimated 8,000 Tutsi were arrested and jailed for complicity, until almost all were released in 
April 1991. In November of the same year, those convicted were released under amnesty, only to 
be subjected to genocide later on. As a result, to refer to Elias, each ethnic “group confirmed its 
own identity, created differences in the way in which the two groups were viewed, at the same 
time as group cohesion was the power instrument that made it possible to maintain the 
differences.” (Olofsson 2000:370) In other words, the arrests re-activated the differences that 
earlier insurgencies had put in place. The dominant group developed strong cohesion to contend 
with whoever identified with RPF.  
 
At the same time, the minority group perceived the regime as corrupt and incompetent. This 
means that ethnicity had become the central variable on the basis of which perceptions were 
formulated towards each other. Against this social environment, social crises provided the 
ground for massacres and death squads to become a common phenomenon to ordinary people, as 
the war was going on. To refer to Staub (1989:183) such crises served as a strong basis to 
mobilize local communities into the „ideology of antagonism‟ or the „ideology of hate,‟ which 
theoretically takes three components. The first is the negation of intimacy. It “involves the 
seeking of distance from a target individual…The second component, passion, expresses itself 
motivationally as intense anger of fear in response to a threat. The final component, 
decision/commitment, is characterized by cognitions of devaluation and diminution toward the 
target group.” (Waller 2002:187) This background made it possible that people would subscribe 
to violence once it exploded. 
 
On the eve of the genocide, as during the course of genocide, this background made it easier for 
the conflict to recruit sympathizers among the uncommitted sections of the population. 
Theoretically, those sections included ethnic, religious, economic or other types of group, whose 
(real or perceived) grievances were being disregarded by the government. In the specific case of 
Rwanda, disadvantaged ethnic, economic and political groups have been the most attractive 
targets of recruitments. This remains true since “violence may attract some subgroups whose 
distinctive needs are left unsatisfied, and who find delegation of their needs to others 
unsatisfactory.” (Ruggiero 2006:63) From these specific target groups, the insurgency was 
“faced with the task of recruiting cadres and sympathizers. It is the sympathizers that provide the 
cover and protection from governmental authorities that is essential to the growth of a 
movement. A government is faced with a similar task of mobilizing the uncommitted and 
particularly the target population of an insurgency.” (Gude 1997:261) The recruitment process 
went on in a one-way direction. The marginalized elites outside the inner circle of power were 
the privileged target of the RPF, which then had proved to be militarily powerful enough to bring 
about change in structures. The RPF had the privilege to recruit the political opposition, which 
was fed up with the existing inner circle of power abuses. Very few, if any, Tutsi elite joined the 
side of the then government. Instead, many intermarriage families broke down, as tensions 
increasingly grew higher. Given this development, the top-down process competed with the 
bottom-up process of conflict theoretically meant to meet at a certain point in order for conflict 
to explode. 
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The recurrence of the context of cruelty has mobilized for violence along ethnic lines. There has 
been illusion, to refer to Rapoport (1967), to translate increased losses for the other side as a 
„win‟. As a result, conflict was prolonged and conflicting parties ended up playing the game of 
„lose-lose‟ (Miall 2005:44). Each conflict registered the loss of human lives and of material 
property, coupled with migration that could go beyond the boundaries of Rwanda. Importantly, 
these episodic conflicts have sequentially applied episodic conflict resolution strategies that 
overlooked the seeds of future violent conflict. There has been a failure to move beyond episodic 
conflict resolution to Burton‟s new political philosophy marked by „provention.‟ Beyond the 
episodic conflict resolution, he suggests conflict provention – which “means deducing from an 
adequate explanation of the phenomenon of conflict, including its human dimensions, not merely 
the conditions that create an environment of conflict, and the structural changes required to 
remove it, but more importantly the promotion of conditions that create cooperative 
relationships.” (Burton 1990:3) With this philosophy, Rwanda could have acquired proactive 
capabilities to predict and avoid destructive conflict, as a result of making use of this problem-
solving method. Failure to incorporate this philosophy in the conflict resolution mechanisms in 
the present days suggests latent potential for more violent conflicts in the future. 
Bottom-up and top-down processes of conflict 
 
Most of the intrastate conflicts that Africa has experienced justified their causes in ordinary 
people‟s political demands. To recall Pareto (2003), they assumed the leadership of all the 
oppressed and the good for many. Regardless of the possibility of greed for power and 
selfishness – as a hidden agenda – causes formulated towards these perspectives have served 
many – civil society and the international community – as a strong basis to perceive such 
conflicts as legitimate. There are many examples of this kind. The 1959 „Rwandan revolution‟ 
aimed to liberate the popular masses – which were understood along ethnic lines – against abuse 
by the aristocratic elite. The 1963 and 1990 invasions of Rwanda, from Burundi and Uganda, 
respectively, by the Rwandan Tutsi Diaspora, aimed to repatriate all refugees back to Rwanda. In 
many cases, these have been „noble‟ causes that found national and international support, 
although they inspired existential fears about security threats. 
 
Uncertainty, scarce resources and sustaining power greatly exacerbated an atmosphere of fear 
about the „other‟ – the ethnic group. Mobilized into strong dichotomy, the ethnic groups 
demonstrated to be “not simply the passive recipients of imposed identities; rather, they can 
actively respond to negative and unwanted images and identities in various ways.” (Song 
2003:41) Under this determination the context of cruelty became increasingly inevitable. 
Theoretically, this required joint actions of both oppressed ordinary people and the marginalized 
elite against the oppressor. To illustrate, a group of monarchists was successful in recruiting men 
from refugee camps in Uganda under a secret organization. In 1963, the group invaded Rwanda 
via Burundi to unsuccessfully attack the military camp at Gako (Melvern 2000:16-7). Also, the 
elite were at the front-line at the inception of the RPF, which began as the Rwandese Aliance for 
National Unity (RANU). Equally, the marginalized elite outside the inner circle of power – 
known as the Akazu – internally took the lead to mobilize ordinary people with the advent of the 
multiparty system. 
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Given this background, the politicization of group interest identity remained weak to involve “a 
bottom-up process, in which large segments of a population increasingly interpret the causes of 
their sufferings, and formulate their political demands, in name of an identity which corresponds 
to those sufferings.” (Nilsson 1999:213) In other words, given that ordinary people live “in 
precarious conditions, or feel their long-term survival threatened” (Abrahamsson 2003:73), they 
haven‟t formulated political demands to the government, then perceived as going bankrupt. This 
supposes popular political protest “made against existing patronage networks that exclude large 
numbers among whom resentment results in combining together to confront the regime, often 
with outbreaks of violence” (Furley 1995:5). Alone, the politicization of group interest identity 
would hardly fuel overt conflict, if the process did not involve the marginalized counter-elite. 
The marginalized counter-elite who had “less room for affirmation in terms of economic, 
political, social or cultural needs and to improve their capacity for competition against other 
elites” (Abrahmsson 2003:73) are definitely catalysts for the process of conflict.  
 
A move to social change arises “in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individual or 
groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures” 
(Miall 2005:22-39), established to be responsible for the prevailing situation. Under these 
circumstances, it has required strong top-down processes whereby the counter-elite might “resort 
to actions that are not in conformity with the modern westernized mode of political and 
economic management” (Nilsson 1999:216). In Gurr‟s (1968b:250) terms, this means “a 
calculated strategy of dispassionate elite aspirants…[with the] expectations of gains to be 
achieved through violence.”  Ordinary people joined to reinforce the social base – or the 
constituency – of the elite and to support the cause the elite designed to justify the conflict. As 
the politicization of group interest identity (the bottom-up process) was lacking in this process, 
the elite dragged ordinary people into conflict not “to formulate political claims in terms 
coinciding with the claims of a group identity which is being, or already is, politicized” 
(Abrahamsson 2003:73) but to support the elite‟s project of social change. 
 
This background serves as a clear manifestation of a lack of capacity for ordinary people to tailor 
their political claims. It is an issue of lack of empowerment, as earlier described. Nilsson 
(1999:222) suggests, “It is not yet common for population groups in the rural areas to manifest 
interpretations of the inadequate satisfaction of basic needs in broad politicized identity terms.” 
They always act under the hidden hand of the elite, who take the opportunity to think for them. 
There are indications that this applies to Rwanda, which is estimated to be a rural population, in 
the ratio of 80.1 percent (Republic of Rwanda 2005:7). The conceptual clarification of 
„obedience‟ has established a positive link between rural areas and lower levels of 
empowerment. With these lower levels of empowerment, the rules of conflict escalation – as 
theories prescribe – are destroyed. As a result, they interfered with the bottom-up and top-down 
processes of conflict in ways that Abrahamsson (2003:73) suggests: “When the process of 
politicization of identity from below meets and interacts with the process of instrumentalisation 
of politics from above, that the situation will be explosive and prone to violent conflict.” This 
can only happen if ordinary people are empowered enough to “make demands to change their 
economic, political or social status, then these groups have reached a stage of ethnic 
mobilization.” (Wiegandt 1993:308) Since this condition was not satisfied in Rwanda, the 
bottom-up process was destroyed, arguably because of the aggravated nature of the conflict itself 
– genocide. 
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The conflict that opposed the government of Rwanda to the RPF was mainly elite-driven. The 
non-elite were brought on board at the implementation phase of the project. On both sides, the 
elite organized the conflict and reached “down to a variety of social groups, involving regional 
and ethnic inequalities, where mobilization in the conflict may be based on appeals to ethnicity.” 
(Furley 19959:5) Therefore, it is difficult to apply the theorizing of bottom-up and top-down 
processes of conflict to Rwanda. 
The ABC-theory of conflict 
 
If the bottom-up and top-down processes of conflict fail to apply to Rwanda, the issue in dispute 
deserves particular attention. Many root causes of genocide – grievances, land, power struggle 
and identity – were earlier discussed in order to understand the contradictions (the C-component 
of the theory) – or issues, incompatibility of goals, or Mitchell‟s (1981) „mis-match between 
social values and social structure‟ (Miall 2005:9). Both the „hard‟ and „soft‟ Malthusian 
perspectives, the beliefs about the „other‟ – through the essentialism and social constructivism 
schools of identity – have helped to understand the development of contradictions that drove 
towards genocidal violence.  
 
To refer to Burton‟s (1990) typology, these contradictions comprise the „interests‟, as 
distinguished from the „needs‟: “Interests, being primarily about material „goods‟, can be traded, 
bargained over and negotiated. Needs, being non-material, [and] cannot be traded or satisfied by 
power bargaining. However, crucially, non-material human needs are not scarce resources (like 
territory or oil or minerals might be) and are not necessarily in short supply.” (Miall 2005:44-5) 
Depending on whether or not Burton‟s „problem-solving‟ approach to conflict applies – “to 
achieve mutually acceptable and self-sustaining outcomes” (Miall 2005:39) – the contradictions 
based on interests are increasingly rendered trivial and less conflict-prone. Particularly, interest-
based contradictions remained an issue of concern in Rwanda over the past, but rarely led to 
violence on a large scale. The conflict structure lacked conflictual attitudes or behavior, which 
made it latent. 
 
Need-based contradictions were enough to generate destructive attitudes (the A-component of 
the ABC-theory) – i.e. “parties‟ perceptions and misperception of each other and of themselves 
…demeaning stereotypes of the other…influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness 
and hatred.” (Miall 2005:10) It was discussed above that many Hutu referred to Tutsi as 
„cockroaches‟ or „snakes‟, until ultimately dichotomization escalated to violent behavior – 
genocide. Under these circumstances, violent behavior (the B-component of the ABC-theory) – 
i.e. cooperation and coercion to violence, hostility, threats and destructive attacks (Ibid) – 
ensued. The conflict structure, which originally remained latent “becomes a manifest conflict 
formation as parties‟ interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict 
parties then organize around this structure, to pursue their interests.” (Miall 2005:10)  
 
It was earlier stressed that interest-based contradictions are likely to be resolved through means 
of a problem-solving technique. Parties involved in conflict can negotiate mutually acceptable 
and self-sustaining outcomes, given that means to satisfy interests are always in relatively short 
supply. More importantly, they involve similar parties – i.e., symmetric conflicts. Being related 
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to ecological resource shortages, the interest-based contradictions were less conflict-prone. 
Instead of a particular issue, the root cause of hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior between 
the parties lies “in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may 
be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict.” (Miall 
2005:21)  
 
In this context, the study refers to an asymmetric conflict, which involves dissimilar parties with 
power imbalance. It is a situation that opens no ground for „win-win‟ outcomes, given that the 
structure has to change to make the asymmetrical relation more balanced. Conflicts of this nature 
“impose costs on both parties…There are costs for the top dogs in sustaining themselves in 
power and keeping the underdogs down. In severe asymmetric conflicts the cost of the 
relationship becomes unbearable for both sides. This then opens the possibility for conflict 
resolution through a shift from the existing structure of relationships to another.” (Miall 2005:21) 
At a given point in time, the conflict in Rwanda turned into an asymmetric conflict, as the 
structure of the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi became the real issue in dispute. The 
conflict took the pattern of the government against a group of rebels, which degenerated into the 
majority against the minority. When mediation and other forms of third-party intervention 
proved to be ineffective conflict escalated to large-scale violence. How does the Galtungian 
model help to understand popular support for genocidal violence in Rwanda? 
 
It is true that local leadership sometimes has the capacity to stick to the issue (the C-component 
of the ABC-theory) rather than changing the attitude (A-component of the ABC-theory). As a 
result, they end up creating a violent atmosphere (B-component of the ABC-theory). In this case, 
recalling Galtung, all the three components are present together in the life circle of conflict 
(Miall 2005:10). As per earlier discussions, this applies to the case of Murambi. Equally, the 
local leadership has the capacity to stick to attitude change (A-component of the ABC-theory) as 
it has appeared in the case of Giti. As earlier mentioned, the conflict structure remained without 
conflictual attitudes or violent behaviors. It remained a latent conflict structure.  
 
As Figure 7.1 (see Chapter seven) indicates, the same capacity of the local leadership met the 
support of ordinary people in the direction of local shared beliefs and perceptions about the 
„other‟ and „ourselves‟ (humanization/dehumanization, us-them dichotomy/inclusive thinking, 
anti-Tutsi ideology/unifying ideology, and the just-world thinking), the political network 
(highly/less influential), the hierarchy (strong bureaucratic pressure/strong pressure by traditional 
elders), and of the propensity for violence (anti/pro-violence). This leads to the idea that the local 
leadership and ordinary people play different roles in the conflict escalation process. That the 
local leadership clears the path for the subordinates in violent or non-violent behavior is an 
important observation. As it helps to understand what attitude the local leadership stuck to, the 
Galtungian model of conflict is strong basis to theoretically corroborate – with Lederach (1997) 
and Waller (2002) – the decisive role the local leadership play in the interplay between different 
levels of leadership. 
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This chapter aims to familiarize its audience with the context of the case studies selected for this 
investigation. In a descriptive manner, it presents different claims from the raw material to lay 
the possibility to draw conclusions in a non-definite way. In so doing, it provides an idea about 
how the elite is understood in local settings, and about the different roles they play, on the basis 
of which genocide may or may not be predictable. It also discusses different: (1) structural 
factors – i.e., economic activities and income distribution; (2) historical processes – i.e., 
migration and land access, demographic profile; (3) the context of cruelty – i.e., war 
displacement of people; (4) social inequalities – i.e., access to education and distribution of skills 
and knowledge; and (5) the socio-cultural bases. The argument is that the claims that the chapter 
presents help to understand the context under which genocide and the absence of genocide 
occurred, in Murambi and Giti, respectively. 
An overview of the elite 
 
In the local context of this study, the concept of elite was associated with the power to make 
social changes happen. Even in cases of social change where the common citizenry is on the 
frontline, the interviewees argued that the hidden hand of the elite had significant influence. A 
researcher reported that the elite guide the population in different initiatives: “productive and 
commercial associations are developing all over the country. Even if this initiative comes from 
the mass, the design belongs to the elite. They organize and structure these associations. They 
conceive and are near the population to know all what is needed for the population to overcome 
poverty. Even though all economic activities are meant to be population-centered, it is the elites 
who conceive them and guide that population in its activities.” (Int.29) The interviewees linked 
the intervention of the elite to a certain amount of power, unevenly distributed.  
 
In the broader context of Rwanda, the interviewees reported power differences among the elite 
across different time periods. It was argued that the elite of the kingdom era slightly differed 
from the elite of both the colonial and of the post-colonial periods. A similar difference was 
pointed out between pre- and post-genocide Rwanda. The capacity of elites over different time 
periods, and across regions and districts, to bring about change or to maintain the statu quo 
varied. A former leader of Giti said: “All our elites do not influence in the same way. There is a 
kind of variation, which is a very necessary thing. One is mistaken when they say that opinion 
leaders in our villages are the same. Some of them are more trusted than others; but once again 
those variations are necessary.” (Int.32) The interviewees agreed unanimously about variations 
in influence, but disagreed about which of the elite had the most power.  
 
Distribution of power to influence 
 
Some interviewees ranked the religious elite first in a descending order. For instance, an elder in 
Giti said, “religious people are very educated and the political elite go to church as well. In these 
categories, it means that the religious rank first and they have a very large number of people 
going to them. People at all levels go to church. Religious men are very strong then.” (Int.3) The 
interviewees established that the Church was competing with the local government elite 
following the consequences of genocide.  
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A church leader in Gakoni cell said, “the Church is increasingly becoming the privileged 
institution to rely upon. The local government elite are really no longer the most powerful 
because of genocide where the same elite have played a major role …Because of that experience, 
people do no longer expect the elite to take them to better agendas.” (Int.8) Despite the erosion 
of trust in the local government elite, many more interviewees argued for the primacy of the 
political and well-educated elite, in various formulations. They reported the public 
administration leaders as the most powerful elite. For instance, a village leader in Karenge cell 
“ranked first the elite involved in public administration” (Int.6), while a village leader in 
Kigabiro cell reported that “the power to influence lies in the hands of local government 
leaders.” (Int.14) However, they did not underestimate the presence of other powers, with which 
the administrative elite are in healthy cooperation. They emphasized the importance of the 
religious elite whose power did not rely upon coercion. 
 
At the same time, it was strongly agreed that universities and higher leaning institutions are seed-
beds of the government elite. A researcher and university lecturer said: “a politician is then a 
person having power and has much more influence on the population than rich people. 
Illustratively, Nyirangarama
63
 is a man who does many things for the population of his region. 
However, he does not have any influence to the population as the mayor of Rurindo District.” 
(Int.29) To substantiate the point, this interviewee referred to the political elite as carriers and 
holders of physical and legal instruments of coercion. With the same instruments, for instance, 
the interviewees said that leaders made it an obligation to participate in genocide. A church 
leader in Gakoni put it as follows: “It was a must! Whoever disobeyed faced physical coercion. It 
means that only those in power were considered as the elite who were respected. And people 
could struggle for power since they thought they could benefit from it in many ways.” (Int.8) 
Throughout the above claims, the interviewees registered the importance of the religious elite 
and the political elite in the dynamics of social change. In contrast to polarization, some 
interviewees said that the political elite are on equal footing with the religious elite. 
 
For instance, a former minister said that Rwanda had two visible categories of elites: the 
religious and political elite. Against the political elite, he reported: “The political elite aren‟t they 
very strong today? They certainly exercise power in Rwanda. I mean an effective influence 
driven by the committed elite. I do not overlook the fact that the head of state is military as well. 
When I talk about the military elite, I do not exclude him from the military body seen as 
enormously influencing the Rwandans. With its discipline and communication skills, I am 
convinced the military body does. The fact that the military is based in people‟s location is an 
innovation.” (Int.1) The interviewees realized that the military is associated, more-or-less, with 
the political elite. At the same time, they established the role that the military particularly play to 
attract the sympathy of the common citizenry.  
 
                                               
63 Nyirangarama is a beautiful hillside area located in Rurindo District, in the Northern Province. On the main road Kigali-
Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, it is approximately 42km from Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. It hosts an agro-industry known as 
Urwibutso, owned by Mr Sina Gérard. In people‟s common use, Nyirangarama identifies with Mr Gérard. In this quotation, 
Nyirangarama refers to Mr Gérard. 
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A former prefect of Kigali drew from a survey-based investigation ordered by the Rwandan 
Senate to report as follows: “80 percent of the key informants identified the army to be the factor 
for reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide…As a matter of fact the army militarily stopped 
genocide and succeeded in managing the after-genocide situation. Also, the army has reconciled 
people through the integration of the Rwanda Army Forces (FAR) into the Rwanda Defense 
Forces (RDF). Those factors did not compare to any thing else.” (Int.5) At the same time, the 
interviewees unearthed the rate of attendance at church as a strong factor in the importance of the 
Church. When you observe weekends, a former minister reported, “those who attend church 
services are, sincerely speaking, many in Rwanda. Churches are running a lot of high schools. As 
government, you have to collaborate with them for you to be successful.” (Int.1) The 
interviewees had higher levels of trust in the Church to the extent that the latter would arguably 
have thwarted genocidal violence, if it had committed itself to that goal. 
 
This is the way a former leader of Murambi referred to this: “With an estimate of more than 90 
percent of believers, the Bishop could have prevented violence from happening simply by telling 
them that deadly violence were sinful. Since the Archbishop was politically active and 
manipulated, violence turned to be not considered as crime to some believers also manipulated 
by then. Mass participation was therefore a result of joint exercise of powers distributed to 
individual elites unevenly.” (Int.33) According to a community mediator at Gakoni cell, violence 
was made possible by preparatory meetings – at various levels of leadership – that raised 
awareness of the target group and of the motivations to engage in violence. “Participants to the 
meetings spread the message in relays to attain all the ordinary people. In other words, if for 
example the upper echelons convened a meeting, there were always people subordinate to them 
who could be summoned in meetings for them to spread the message. Influential people attended 
those meetings as well to be mobilized for a joint action.” (Int.12) Upon strong collaboration 
with the local government elite, the interviewee holds, churches are institutions that served as a 
channel to disseminate the resolutions of those meetings.  
 
Unlike elsewhere, village leaders in Karenge and Kigabiro cells in Giti reported, “the religious 
elite committed themselves to popular education and mass mobilization for the betterment of the 
population.” (Int.6). The same claims applied to Kigabiro cell, in the former Karagari sector. 
This is the way a village leader put it: “the cooperation between the religious and the local 
government leaders was healthy. We enjoyed community harmony, as a result.” (Int.14) In short, 
the interviewees established that the amount of power required to exercise ascendancy over the 
common citizenry depended much on the position held in the social hierarchy. As an illustration, 
it was said that the President of the Republic did not compare with ministers or bishops in that 
matter.  
 
In addition, the interviewees concluded that the capacities to influence were unevenly 
distributed, and that the degree of influence varied according to specific contexts and 
circumstances. In line with these claims, an official in the office of the Ombudsman concludes: 
“The political elite [are] more influential than the other groups of elite because [they] set up rules 
and regulations and [are] able to generate crises….Political elite can directly influence a given 
crisis or stop it. To provide a person with a long-term life guiding principle is a duty of another 
important types of elites. It means teachers and religious men. The political elite use the military 
power to cause and stop conflicts and prohibit people from committing crimes. But this does not 
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change an individual on [a] long-term basis. It‟s the other elite…teachers and religious people 
that do [that].” (Int.26)  
 
In reconciliation processes, for instance, the interviewees found the religious elite as of 
paramount importance, because they reach the innermost side of the individual through their 
preaching. Many concluded similarly with a native of Murambi, now based in Giti: “The 
religious elite have more people than others. A pastor can have more influence than an ordinary 
leader. Churchgoers accept what he tells them. The example is when leaders tell people to go for 
community work; only a few go there. But when the religious elite call on them for a service, 
people go in strength. That is why the religious elite are more powerful than ordinary leaders.” 
(Int.16) This interviewee suggested the fact that the religious elite are physically and socially 
close to their people to be an explanatory factor for this difference. The interviewee reported that 
many leaders use dictatorship, to the extent that people are led by orders.  
 
A Rwandan researcher affiliated with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) 
concurred with this interviewee. He explained the circumstances under which the political and 
religious elite succeed or fail to exercise ascendancy over the common citizenry. “In the police 
and army, orders are executed and not discussed. There is no influence but there is the capacity 
to persuade by force. This is done through coercive power rather than conviction. The religious 
elite use the power of the doctrine, which is supernatural power. If you are subordinate on earth, 
you will be elevated in Heaven. They urge upon believers to prefer what is eternal rather than 
what is temporary. The power of this elite on the population comes from their preaching about 
sanctions by the invisible being [God] rather than from the preaching about eternal welfare.” 
(Int.29) Hence, the interviewees emphasized the specific contexts and circumstances that are 
relevant benchmarks from which to decide ranking of the elite in terms of their respective power 
to influence. 
 
Typologies and bases of the elite 
 
In his typology, a former minister distinguished the modern from the traditional elite of the past. 
As he put it, “the traditional elite included the King, different chiefs and their deputies. They 
exercised power alongside the guardians of esoteric codes – known by the name of Abiru – 
through oral-based wisdom. Also, the former were responsible for the ritualism in the royal 
court. The performance in different positions constituted the base for power over the common 
citizenry. The power of the King was essentially hereditary, and respect followed his success in 
governance. In modern time, the elite defined the knowledge holders who also varied with the 
level of their qualifications.” (Int.1) In other words, the concept of elite corresponded with 
Western culture, in that the colonial authorities inculcated students by means of formal 
education. The Western perspective had a strong emphasis on gradations. As a researcher traced 
back common perceptions, the common citizenry understood an elite to denote “someone who 
studied at university or higher learning institution or technical institute and did something special 
that uneducated Rwandans [were] not able to. The elite are not only those who studied much, 
they are also those able to exploit their intellectual potentials.” (Int.29) As a result, the same 
interviewee reported, they are a base from which ideology and policy designers are recruited.  
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An official at the Ombudsman‟s Office distinguished the elite from the common citizenry based 
on the distinction that the elite “create an ideology because they are equipped with instruments of 
analysis” (Int.26) Hence, possession or lack of the instruments of analysis was seen as a line of 
demarcation between the elite and the common citizenry. From this perspective, the interviewees 
strongly reported that knowledge was the most effective factor to bring about social change. 
Also, the dichotomization of rural and urban areas helped to understand the concept of elite. 
According to the interviewees, this seemed to correspond with urbanity, while rural areas were 
viewed – in block – as non-elite. In other terms, the interviewees associated these areas with 
literacy and illiteracy, respectively. The elite, an official at the Commission of Unity and 
Reconciliation reported, “think that they should not stay in rural areas together with non-elite. 
Instead, they think that they should be city dwellers and do white collar jobs.” (Int.18) In 
connection with this dichotomy, the interviewees pointed out the difference in manner and 
behavior between the elite and the common citizenry in villages. 
 
The same informant reported as follows: “As you study up to university, the higher you go, the 
more the society fears…Moreover, you change the way you talk to them, tell them you no longer 
speak the mother tongue – Kinyarwanda – whereas you grew up there and they themselves 
realize that you are different from them. Consequently, when you go to your native village, they 
take you as a visitor. They greet you very humbly and do you honor. It creates in you something 
that makes you think you are different; [you have a] superiority complex.” (Int.18) It is not just 
the fact of being a member of the elite that makes the common citizenry come to respect 
someone. Also, the interviewees reported that it creates a feeling of detachment. One studies and 
looses interest in going back to the village to live with those who did not study. The interviewees 
realized that selfishness begins to gain ground, while non-interest-related values fade away. The 
same interviewee took it as the reason why certain elite were involved in plans to perpetrate 
violence against their own people or group. On this basis, she reported, “it is easy to kill people 
in order to easily achieve one‟s own interests. Genocide was mainly caused by hatred and elite‟s 
interests.” (Int.18) The idea that the elite were involved in plans to perpetrate violence has 
brought the interviewees to take the concept of leadership as synonymous with that of elite.  
 
In this context, the concept of elite corresponded with those in power. According to the 
interviewees, perpetual conflicts continually developed around the leadership that aimed to 
topple those in power. As a politician reported, “the counter-elite are the spare elite who replace 
the ruling minority by the means of political competition. Within this competition, the minority 
strives to sustain itself in power while the counter-elite do the same to take possession of it. This 
is seen to be the daily relationship between the ruling party and opposition parties. With this, the 
elite refer to persons who exercise influence.” (Int.31) Under these circumstances, „the elite‟ was 
used as synonymous with „the leader‟, in a vernacular context. However, whether the position of 
„elite‟ was based on knowledge ownership (formal education), the performance in the 
administrative positions (chiefs in kingdom systems), magical and religious power (guardians of 
the esoteric codes and in-charge of the royal court ritualism), heredity (the King), or on 
leadership, the interviewees reported a number of limitations in the scope of „elite‟. 
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Limitations in definition 
 
The interviewees considered that the concept of elite goes beyond educated people, political 
leaders, bureaucrats, and opinion larders who can influence lower people‟s opinions. If the 
concept were narrower, it would imply only the formal elite. From an ideological point of view, 
for instance, the interviewees equated the concept of elite with formal education. According to a 
former prefect of rural Kigali: “I stick to the idea that the elite conceives…I include the 
academics among the conceiving elite; they influence through ideas and teaching.” (Int.5) In 
many ways, the bases for which elite exercised influence over the common citizenry were 
knowledge or expertise in different fields of specialization. With this, the interviewees 
established that the concept of elite corresponded with a bigger base. As a former university 
lecturer put it, the elite is defined as the “opinion leaders in terms of politics, religion, ideology, 
and economy; people who have influence on others” (Int.9) As the interviewees established, 
formal education remained the most successful key, which opened success in these areas. As a 
result, the common citizenry owed respect to the potential candidates to that success, on whom 
they might depend upon the completion of their studies.  
 
A former parliamentarian from Murambi, in line with his youth experience, said: “you were 
considered by the villagers as a junior king. People in the entire village respected you! The 
whole village was eager to receive you as the most promising child…That is how the social 
ladder was built up. Whoever was highly educated was understandably the most important in 
society. In fact, an educated person could interact with the white people in French, [which] 
automatically placed the same person in a position to influence people. That person could for 
instance influence people‟s understanding of some issues by coming and telling them, „stop it‟.” 
(Int.4) The interviewees made it clear that this view from the concept of elite was narrow. The 
elite include the traditional chiefs, and the magical and religious power in this concept, without 
having formal education. To an official at the office of the Ombudsman, “those who have a 
definitional problem are the ones who think the elite to be someone civilized with the Western 
school education. We have not yet understood that someone who grew up in our tradition can be 
the „elite‟ without any formal education.” (Int.26) There are a lot of considerations beyond 
knowledge, the interviewees established, such as the fundamental values of each society. As an 
illustration, a professor and researcher reported: “elite is a person embodying those values and 
puts them in practice. I consider as elite the person practicing fundamental values of the society.” 
(Int.29) The interviewees identified „integrity‟ as one of the main fundamental values of 
Rwandan society. 
 
A former village leader in Giti, with family ties in Murambi, reported a member of the elite to 
be: “a person of integrity. It means someone who cannot be corrupt, who cannot commit 
iniquity, who does not lie, who is fair. That is the real elite. When the elite is with ordinary 
people, they can accept his advice. When they think you are corrupt, they have no trust in you.” 
(Int.16) Without integrity, to this interviewee, the corrupt elite can be made to do anything. As 
an example, she assumed that such an elite could plot against someone by mobilizing potential 
accomplices around a drink in a cabaret. Alongside integrity, the interviewees defined a member 
of the elite as a „problem solving-oriented person‟. For instance, a focus group discussion held at 
Agakomeye cell defined the concept of elite to denote a person in the community where “no 
problem could be solved in his or her absence” (Foc.1) Participants in this discussion said that 
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the opinion of the persons perceived to be the elite always matter before any innovation can be 
introduced in the community.  
 
In very tangible terms, the group discussion named individuals who, because of holding 
influential opinions, found their lives in danger when they resisted violence. So many genocide 
perpetrators suppressed the humanity within themselves because they could be at risk if they 
displayed open disagreement with violence. The participants identified this as a context in which 
such people lost their lives. They said: “I can give you the example of a man by the name of 
Munana. Munana was killed together with another man named Kiromba because they were 
respected in this community. Munana died because he was an elite. Many people said he died for 
nothing; they say that he caused his own death by contesting violence. They said he should have 
done [i.e., acceptation of violence] as others have but he accepted to die just as Jesus. He was the 
first person to be killed at Kiziguro. People tried in vain to corrupt him. There used to be elites 
like him but at a certain time people got scared. Instead of keeping their character, because life is 
precious, their being elite died away. Good elites were outnumbered. Those who refused to take 
the possessions were hushed or else killed.” (Foc.1) With theses claims, the interviewees 
understood the perspective of a member of the elite who is also a member of the common 
citizenry. 
 
The interviewees identified people of similar character as Munana, Kiromba and others, as the 
advising elders. They also indicated that each extended family had access to such people who 
could intervene to settle disputes, in addition to many other responsibilities related to family 
representation. An elder who also serves as advising elder of his extended family in Giti 
highlighted a personal experience: “There is no single family without an advising elder. To take 
my own case, I am the one who advises the family daughters in law, and all our descendants. It 
means that I am responsible for settling different conflicts from various areas, if any. In the 
process of conflict settling, elders are the very first concerned level before formal institutions can 
intervene.” (Int.23) In this vein, the interviewees used the concept of elite as synonymous with 
„family chief‟, who is selected on the basis of fundamental values. The criteria for selection have 
nothing to do with knowledge and other bases for defining the formal elite. Even if knowledge, 
among other factors, was a definitive criterion to define the elite, the interviewees identified it as 
but one of the definitional dimension. To deserve respect, the interviewees suggested that 
knowledgeable people were required to show a high level of fundamental values, as earlier 
mentioned. Also, a former deputy chief during the kingdom era said: “To qualify as an elite, not 
only one has to be relatively well-off, but he also has to prove to serve as role model to many in 
his area. The elite are those who share their experiences with others who seek information to 
design their style of life and, as a result, become successful in life.” (Int.7) With this, the 
interviewee referred to the elite as „the pioneer of innovations‟ in the community who is willing 
to share his „know-how‟ with the community. People of this category were depicted as 
exercising strong social ascendancy over people who surround him and depend upon his work. 
 
A former prefet of rural Kigali described it thus: “In the Northern Kigali, we have someone – 
known by the name of Sina and sometimes identified with Nyirangarama – who employs and 
monthly pays 800 non-elite of his community. You cannot include him in the category of the 
conceiving elite. He is only interested in his business and food processing. But he has strong 
ascendancy over those he employs and monthly pays which might extremely exceed that of the 
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conceiving elite. He might even influence the agricultural decision-making policy.” (Int.5) The 
interviewee suggested that people of this category are trustworthy and, therefore, qualify as 
elites. He depicted the latter as charismatic persons, whose ideas are accepted because they have 
wealth by which they can cater for the common citizenry. In the chain of causal factors, the 
interviewees identified wealth as a strong base for exercising strong ascendancy over the 
common citizenry. They reported that the opinion of village shopkeepers matters most in the 
community.  
 
Also, they found ordinary people put too much reliance on such people, as they also do in 
relation to their own children who succeed in life. A businessman with family ties in Murambi 
summarized it as follows: “When parents pay school fees to their children who later on become 
successful in life, the parents entirely depend on and become faithful to them. Children take care 
of their parents who hardly can refuse to implement what they tell them to do because of trust 
and strong reliance. The elite belongs to the common citizenry. It does not form a distinct class. 
For instance, when the monarchy was abolished, the independence was driven by younger 
generations, which came from the people. They were given respect because of their education 
and wealth. As a result, they exercised tremendous influence on ordinary people.” (Int.1) The 
interviewees suggested that, as a result of a communitarian spirit, the elite who carry out 
rewarding jobs share their monthly paid salaries with their families. The interviewees found that 
the same feeling of reliance and faithful behavior applied to the informal elite in the community. 
 
The interviewees argued that because the elite took care of their parents and relatives, this kept 
the dependent relatives in a weak position, to the extent that they hardly resisted whatever their 
elite relatives required them to do. A former governor in the Eastern Rwanda expressed it thus: 
“They could be kept imprisoned by those elites who could coin and organize ideologies for 
violence, all conditions being satisfactory. This is true because they are more enlightened people 
who have the leadership of the society. With their potentials, they are seen as people who are 
capable to be anticipatory to look beyond the wall and say, there is a danger coming and set up 
the required measures.” (Int.17) This attitude has led the interviewees to conclude that strong 
family ties between the elite and the common citizenry was a strong factor in accounting for 
violence or the absence of violence in the case studies. In summary, the interviewees showed that 
the concept of elite in Rwanda goes beyond the scope of the formal elite. In line with tangible 
evidence, they found that formal education is not a unique criterion in defining the concept of 
elite. They indicated, rather, that „elite‟ is a „context-specific‟ concept, which finds real meaning 
only within a context. They also indicated the formal elite – people educated in the Western 
school system and culture – always took precedence over the informal elite. The latter used not 
to be visible in the spheres of decision-making. Consequently, there has been little knowledge 
about what the informal elite can contribute to the process of social change. 
The informal elite 
 
The above has dealt with the definitional aspects of the formal elite. However, the interviewees 
found the questions like „Who qualifies as elite?‟ and „Who most influences the common 
citizenry in Rwanda?‟ were left without satisfactory answers. The interviewees suggested that 
the difficulty in finding answers was consequent upon the limitations of the definitional 
understanding of the formal elite. To begin with, „elite‟ was seen as an elusive concept. Instead 
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of the formal elite having an influential monopoly on the ground, the interviewees rather showed 
that both the formal and informal elite coexist and overlap in their influence.  
 
In the particular context of this study, the interviewees argued that the informal elite were most 
influential. In contrast with the way they described the formal elite, the interviewees referred to 
the informal elite as people in whom the population has trust, and who live in the same area as 
the population. In the specific context of Rwanda, a former prefect in rural Kigali referred to 
those who most likely qualified when electing people of integrity. The informal elite are “the 
people originally embedded in the cultural setting of the community and who have strong 
ascendancy over the common citizenry.” (Int.5) With reference to the case of Giti, the 
interviewees showed that the informal elite played a key role in resisting violence. Also, they 
established that the informal elite range from the opinion leaders (wise men and women – or 
mediators known by the name of abunzi – who settle community disputes), judges in the 
participatory jurisdictions (Gacaca – known by the name of Inyangamugayo), to grassroots 
leaders in local government.  
 
A village leader at Gakoni cell said that the concept of the informal elite includes “the religious 
leaders, village shopkeepers, farm owners, primary school teachers, nursing staff, veterinarians 
and agronomists, and other people who succeeded in life and whose experience enlightened their 
neighbors.” (Int.10) The interviewees revealed that many of the informal elite overlap the youth 
and women structures based in rural areas. At a certain level of the community, they revealed the 
formal and informal structures were inextricably intertwined as they were in the past. Previously, 
a historian reported, leaders descended into the grassroots structures, in families, and created 
close proximity so that the formal structures merged with the informal structures. “Leadership 
hierarchy was descending and reaching the activity levels (chiefs in charge of animal breeding, 
chiefs in charge of land) and families. After reaching the families, it was a mixture of 
powers…there were the king, the high ranking chiefs, the chief of military staff, other chiefs in 
charge of land and animal breeding, heads of clans and heads of families. Heads of clans and 
families did not have a political influence but they had a brotherly influence. This was 
influencing the politics to enter the social and horizontal structure.” (Int.26) For this interviewee, 
the network of family relations made it possible for one to exercise sound power. In addition, he 
emphasized that the leaders who were in close contact with the informal structures where they 
came from might have made use of the network of family relation to have their exercise of power 
accepted. 
 
In very specific circumstances, the interviewees reported that the informal networks could even 
compete with the formal structures in terms of popular support. To illustrate, an elder in 
Murambi said: “You see that the religious elite have a bigger audience than others. For example, 
on this hill, the leader can call up people to a meeting and there just come only one-third of the 
inhabitants. But, when there is someone to come to a given church and Christians are asked to be 
present, only three percent of the Christians may be absent with apology…Thus, people are 
willing to go to churches more than they are when it comes to going to the leaders.” (Int.12) 
Most of the interviewees reported that if religious people should want something done, citizens 
would do it quicker compared to what leaders would tell them to do. They linked this to the 
recent role the political elite played in genocide. 
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A former leader of Giti claimed that the amount of trust that people placed in the political elite 
has been on the wane since the genocide: “When a politician holds a conversation with lower 
citizens, they hardly resist saying that all the politicians are the same…In their understanding, 
they think that politicians are people who muddle up citizens and cause problems.” (Int.32) The 
informal elite may be taking over from the leaders, but interviewees established that they had 
been weak over the last several years in the pre-genocide Murambi. Unlike in Murambi, the 
informal elite showed strength in Giti during the genocide. The participants in the focus group 
discussion held in Karagari confirmed that the absence of genocide in Giti was a result of the fact 
that “those who wanted genocide to occur did not have the support of the elders [for] their plan.” 
(Foc.4) The interviewees said that the elders exercised power in shadow, which backed up or 
guided the burgomaster on ways in which to behave during the course of the genocide. 
 
In the same focus group discussion, a participant described that the burgomaster “could come 
back to his parents and none of them could instill …[divisive ideas] into him. It means that his 
unifying ideas held the top position and elders…back him up on [a] regular basis.” (Foc.4) As 
the interviewees suggested, the burgomaster appeared on the scene to implement ideas agreed 
upon with community elders who remained trustful advisors. Contrary to the responses in Giti, 
the interviewees reported that the elders in Murambi were made weak and that they did not have 
a say at all. A native of Murambi reported: “The youth could beat the elders. Authorities could 
encourage young people to beat their parents whenever the latter went out to have a drink with 
their friends Tutsi. They were promised that the accusations would not be taken into 
consideration…They accepted because the people in authority positions told them. Despite the 
fact that the elders were being beaten, elders did not accept to get divided along ethnic lines.” 
(Int.16) The participants in the focus group discussion held in Karagari said that the elders in 
Murambi went through circumstances under which they lost the moral authority over the youth. 
As a result, they were denied a say on what the elite did, contrary to Giti (Foc.4). A local force to 
counterbalance the formal elite went missing, the interviewees suggested. 
 
In summary, the interviewees revealed the elite to be a factor of paramount importance in 
explaining why genocide occurs in one place and not in another. However, they also supported 
that the elite was not a mono-causal explanatory factor. Further, the income-related aspects of 
genocide attracted the attention of the interviewees. Unlike Murambi, for instance, the 
participants in the focus group in Karagari cell affirmed, “there were no rich people either to 
offer material support to genocide in Giti. The nature of Giti is set in a way that people were 
homogeneously poor.” (Foc.4) The interviewees supported the possibility of a causal 
relationship, at least partly, between income and violence. 
Economic activity and income distribution 
 
The case studies under intensive investigation are parts of the sub-region of Buganza. Formerly, 
the latter comprised six chiefdoms during the kingdom era. Over time, the sub-region was 
increasingly reduced to the former communes of Giti and Rutare in the Northern Province, and 
to the communes of Muhura and Murambi of the Eastern Province. The interviewees supported 
that the Buganza sub-region was an appropriate region for cattle breeding.  
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A researcher said: “Murambi was a large area, which made it favorable to cattle breeding.” 
(Int.29) As a result, cattle breeding drove the economy, together with small-scale agriculture. A 
former village leader based in Giti disclosed: “Hutu and Tutsi were not used to farming activities 
until [the 1960‟s]. They rather liked keeping cows and simple farming.” (Int.16) At around the 
same time, the interviewees suggested, immigrants flowed into Murambi, before cattle breeding 
juxtaposed with agriculture on a large scale. A participant in a focus group discussion held in 
Karenge cell observed: “Murambi was inundated by immigrants who came to seek…land in the 
1960s. Upon arrival, they bought plots from the native residents and settled. Soon after, the 
following years characterized a succession of good harvests.” (Foc.5) The interviewees 
confirmed this claim in the neighboring cell known by the name of Karagari. In a focus group 
discussion, a peasant claimed to have “observed a lot of immigrants who could own larger 
spaces for farming activities from which they became very prosperous, if compared to the 
natives” (Foc.4) The same peasant observed that, the immigrants rented other people‟s lands, 
extensively cultivated and attained a far better economic situation than ever before. Particularly, 
they specialized in banana planting which increased income for many of the immigrants. 
 
A former village leader in Giti, and native to Murambi, reported: “The immigrants had much 
beer because they could grow sorghum and banana. They got rich. Other Hutu and Tutsi would 
go drinking beer over there, working for them and so on. They became more powerful and they 
started doing business. The native ordinary people started serving the immigrants who started 
ruling over them.” (Int.16) The same interviewee reported this situation to have prevailed, until 
there were indications that it could degenerate into the 1994 genocide. Another native to 
Murambi, married in Giti, reported during a focus group discussion held in Karenge cell: “[As 
the region increasingly grew wealthier,] the elite in Murambi increasingly entered political 
parties. The same political parties later on served a favorable ground for leaders to mobilize the 
immigrants into genocide.” (Foc.5) The interviewees established that the immigrants were most 
active in the multiparty system, upon the arrival of the democratization era of 1980s Rwanda. At 
the same time, they reported strong indifference to Giti politics. 
 
A former village leader at Nyagahinga cell reported: “The Mayor could welcome all political 
parties including the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) under which 
he led our commune. He gave opportunity to the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), the 
Liberal Party (PL) and to the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) to speak and he 
made sure the security was granted during [all] the political meeting sessions. No one could be 
tortured because of his political beliefs. We could come and listen to speakers but they failed to 
attract fans.” (Int.23) The interviewees established that the common citizenry followed the 
political choice of the local elite. This is the way people put it during a focus group discussion 
held in Tanda cell: “Our area did not get involved in political parties. We simply could look at 
very few individuals who adhered to political parties but we did not follow them. We all 
belonged to the same party (MRND) as our burgomaster.” (Foc.9) While the burgomaster has 
served as the role model in the strong community bonding of Giti communities, the interviewees 
highlighted an intermediary role played between richer people and the burgomaster to arouse the 
interest of the common citizenry in political parties in Murambi. The interviewees stressed that 
the improved economic situation made the mobilization into politics an easy process. 
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According to a focus group discussion held in Karagari cell: “In Murambi, genocide was driven 
by richer people from the very outset of the process. Against the ecological resources available, 
Murambi tremendously competed Giti.
64
 As a result, the former had many richer people to own 
and speed up the process of genocide than Giti did.” (Foc.4) In other words, the interviewees 
established the rich people of different communities as relevant figures carrying out this process. 
During a focus group discussion held in Agakomeye cell, an elder man claimed to have followed 
the developments since the arrival of the immigrants. On that basis, he established them as the 
real catalysts of the process of genocide in Murambi. 
 
The immigrants – that is, the then richer people at the community – remarkably contributed 
when the political parties started. They cooperated with people from other areas but they were 
not the ones to plan for the happenings. It is the people who were in high institutions who 
planned for all that. They sensitized all the people who were in Murambi and everything 
changed…Maybe when the political parties started, they got support from those hailing from the 
northern part of the country and elsewhere. Then, when the divisions broke, maybe, they were 
pushed by the fact that Tutsi were taken as Inkotanyi‟s accomplices. It means that, from 1973, 
the supporters of the regime came down to the grassroots level and they could see Gishoma, for 
instance. If he accepted their policies, they would ask him to involve me and other people. That 
is how the ideology spread but there was no sign of anything that could be seen before. (Foc.1) 
 
With the above claims, the interviewees established that immigration played a large role in 
genocidal violence in Murambi. Migrants thereby served as relevant intermediary actors between 
the middle-range leaders and the common citizenry who came to depend economically on the 
nouveaux riche of their communities. The interviewees linked the immigration to land access. 
Migration and land access 
 
A causal link was established between land shortages and immigration in the sub-region of 
Buganza. In this causal chain, immigration was linked to the erosion of the sense of community, 
which later on degenerated into the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomization. The following paragraphs 
present different claims to bring empirical support to this causal relationship. They also relate 
violence or the absence of violence to that chain of relationship. 
Background of immigration 
 
The interviewees supported that, until the 1960s, the sub-region of Buganza only accommodated 
its natives. Particular circumstances made it possible that immigrants accessed and settled in this 
sub-region. A researcher said: “there has been a problem of land in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye 
and Gikongoro prefectures. The administration obliged a part of the population to be transferred 
to Buganza but also to Bugesera, Gihunya – i.e., the present Rukumberi – and to Rukaryi which 
is presently Bicumbi.” (Int.29) The same interviewee indicated that land shortages pushed people 
to this region over time until immigrants became the majority. The interviewee claimed that 
immigration to Umutara – to which Murambi belongs - was made easy since it comprised free 
                                               
64 During his empirical work, Strauss (2007:86) also found Giti poorer. Socio-economically, he notes, “the commune had normal 
levels of education and population growth rates…The economy was peasant-based, without factories or any large-scale 
commercial centers. If anything, the commune was marginally poorer than most and entirely rural.”  
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and fertile land. Against this background, the interviewees claimed that immigrants became the 
predominant group inhabiting Murambi.  
 
A village leader in Cyeru cell observed: “Unlike Murambi, families in Giti easily trace back 
more than seven ancestors. Nowadays, someone tells you, for instance, my family has been 
living in this place for the last three centuries. That cannot be the case with a family that settled 
after it migrated from Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Gikongoro and so on, to conquer land in Murambi.” 
(Int.25) The interviewees unanimously held that Giti did not have many inhabitants coming from 
other places. It kept its own people. A former village leader in Murehe cell reported as follows: 
“We did not have many people coming from elsewhere. Only natives stayed in Giti. They 
married among themselves, they were friends, and they shared everything and gave cows to each 
other. No one came from Ruhengeri or anywhere else. Giti remained Giti. Instead, some people 
would leave for Murambi or Rukara. That is why we had no troubles. That is why we won. We 
kept our culture.” (Int.16) As the interviewees argue, the fact that many shared the ancestral 
home in Giti was a difference compared to Murambi. The fact that marriages were organized 
among themselves, the interviewees claimed it possible that power could descend, and families 
could retain power, and actively involve their representatives in power. With this, leadership in 
Giti overlapped the system of leadership in the monarchy era. As the interviewees emphasized, 
family relations turned into a key element to leadership legitimacy, as they served an 
instrumental role in building strong trust between the burgomaster and the common citizenry. 
 
Unlike in Giti, an official at the Ombudsman‟s office found the vertical structure of leadership in 
Murambi failed to build political legitimacy on the grassroots thinking embedded in the deep 
structure of the family. He argued that in the decentralized system, “the structure…[builds 
political legitimacy on the grassroots thinking], but it only reaches the level of „umudugudu‟ 
(settlement); it does not reach the family. The shortcoming with [the decentralized system] is that 
a leader who has been appointed to a post because of a given interest and not because of family 
relation that you have in common, whenever that interest is no longer there, your relation is not 
there either. For instance you would try to forgive and correct a relative trapped in a case of 
embezzlement. You only share a given interest with someone who was democratically elected. 
When that interest is gone your relation is also gone.” (Int.26) The same interviewee supported 
that tolerance and legitimacy were likely to flourish when leaders succeed in incorporating the 
family component into the vertical structure of leadership. The interviewee said that this was 
made possible given the degree of homogeneity among the population. He affirmed that the 
success in incorporating the family component into the vertical structure of leadership in Giti 
was a strong preventative factor against internally perpetrated violence. 
 
As they argued, the same applied to Murambi until the 1960s, the time associated with the arrival 
of the immigrants. A community mediator in Murambi said: “There used to be people from 
Buganza and those people were all considered as Tutsi. They said no Hutu hailed from Buganza. 
Then, bit-by-bit, people came from different regions and they brought their families until they 
outnumbered those who were born here. When you analyze you see that those who moved and 
came here since 1960 were more numerous than those who were born here in Buganza.” (Int.12) 
The interviewees reported that fertile lands attracted many immigrants who could make 
conquest.  
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According to a former mayor of Murambi, “Bugesera residents, for example, moved to Murambi 
when they were under the pressure of famines. They did not go back when they found there was 
no problem. Instead, they invited their fellows. That is why you find a lot of immigrants in 
Murambi.” (Int.33) In line with this interview, a priest at Kiziguro Parish said that immigrants 
came from many areas of Rwanda and are scattered in each corner of the sub-region of Buganza. 
He said: “If you went to Matunguru…you would find out that it is a place inhabited by people 
who moved from Musasa, Ruri, Nyabikenke, and so on. They came during the periods of years 
1982-1985. This case applies not only to Matunguru but also to parts of Rugarama and 
Rwimbogo. You could realize that there are still immigrants until [the present time].” (Int.27) 
The interviewees accorded to the fact that the immigrants settled and brought as many relatives 
as possible to the newly settled land. 
 
A retired pastor and immigrant to Murambi backed up these claims with his own example: 
“Immigrants who came to seek…land settled and never went back. Even myself came 
from…Nyanza and when I found it good, I went back to bring my cattle and settled for 
good…Immigrants from Ruhengeri settled in the place called Bidudu while those from 
Cyangugu were in Ntete. And they still are there.” (Int.28) Among others, a focus group 
discussion held in Agakomeye cell widely cited the arrival of Kanyarengwe – a former high-
ranking military officer native of Ruhengeri deployed in Umutara at that time – who also 
“brought all his family at Kiramuruzi after he had established a grain mill.” (Foc1) At the same 
time, they also cited a peasant immigrant who came from Gikongoro to seek work.  
 
As the participants to the focus group discussion put it, “He liked the area then he brought all his 
family. He used to live at Kiramuruzi and his father at Rugarama. Others immigrants were at 
Matunguru and elsewhere in Murambi…They came here and they just liked the area.” (Foc.1) 
The interviewees continued to indicate various areas from which the immigrants came. As per 
the focus group discussion held in Murehe cell, a resident said that immigrants also came from 
Muhazi lakeside areas and rural Kigali. “The primary mission for those immigrants was to seek 
land from free forest areas, which were immensely available. As a result, the amount of 
immigrants extremely competed with the natives of Murambi in numbers. (Foc.6) 
Controversially, the interviewees related the large-scale violence in Murambi to intense 
immigration. They brought up a number of arguments to justify ways in which immigration 
might be the root cause of violence. This is the way a former village leader in Nyagahinga cell 
summarized it: 
 
The immigrants failed to build brotherhood-based relationships together with the hosting local 
residents…When they arrived in Murambi, the burgomaster was not wise enough to advise 
them on valuable social ties. One could realize that various meetings he was convening were 
divisive. In so doing, he missed the role a leader was expected to play. A leader is just like a 
parent. He does not patronize some of his subordinates and just underestimate some others. 
Conversely, the immigrants have connived with the burgomaster to mistreat the local residents 
to the extent that they later on killed them like unknown aliens. (Int.23)  
 
This explains why many succumbed to violence in Murambi, as violent behavior was a precursor 
to the forthcoming killings, the same interviewee argued. Among many examples, the same 
village leader affirmed to have attended Kiramuruzi market and witnessed verbal haranguing of 
natives of Murambi by the Bakiga.  Also, he said that conflicts related to economic activities 
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involved strong competition. “The Bakiga could want to cultivate most [of] the land, including 
the grazing pastures. Also, it could very often happen that the cattle stray[ed] into [another] 
farmer‟s garden. Under these circumstances conflicts develop a leopard-like staring [or 
contentious] relationship. Cattle keepers could want to have large grazing pastures while farmers 
also wanted relatively the same amount for farming activities. This created a feeling which 
interfered with their relationships until deadly violence developed.” (Int.23)  
 
The interviewees indicated that the competition degenerated into ethnic conflicts, which were 
later politicized to serve as a strong basis for manipulation. The interviewees suggested that, had 
the competition not degenerated into ethnic conflict, “it was apparently difficult for the Buganza 
people themselves to kill their fellows. The killer, in fact, would find the first person to kill is his 
cousin; another person to kill is his nephew or niece, things like that. Buganza people were really 
overpowered.” (Int.4) Emphasizing these claims, the interviewees supported the argument 
according to which the depth of violence that occurred in Murambi largely depended on the 
internal migrations, given that they dichotomized the inhabitants into the „we‟-„them‟ 
background. 
 
The interviewee accepted that immigration in Murambi brought strong cultural diversity to the 
area. However, some interviewees did not find immigration as a source of major cultural 
incompatibilities. They reported no harmful disagreements. During a focus group discussion held 
in Agakomey cell, a participant substantiated these claims: “I cannot depart from immigration 
and say that the genocide took place because those people had come to live here from Ruhengeri. 
They came here and the relations were good between them and other people. Thus, I cannot say 
they are the ones who caused all that to happen.” (Foc.1) To the participants, community social 
ties did not suffer because the immigrants had come.  
 
By this was clearly said that the immigrants did not behave the same way in Murambi. To 
illustrate, they highlighted the cultural practice of cow giving that applied in many cases. 
Referring to a veterinarian known by the name of Emmanuel, a participant in the same focus 
group disclosed that his uncle had gifted him a cow at Bishenyi. From a broader perspective, he 
emphasized, “the immigrants looked at the way people lived at Murambi and they could not find 
a way through. We all looked like brothers. You could not separate people who were like 
brothers. I cannot say those who moved to this area caused all that.” (Foc.1) The interviewees 
maintained that immigration could lead to violence in combination with other variables. 
War-displaced people 
 
Among other variables that fueled violence in Murambi, a former lawmaker pinpointed „people 
displacement‟ in the war zone: “There is also a key role that the displaced people from as far as 
former commune Kiyombe have played to make the situation catastrophic in Murambi.” (Int.4) 
Interviewees with a retired pastor in Gkoni cell strongly suggested that those who migrated from 
the war zone were extremely violent. He reported that displaced people could walk around from 
Kiziguro where they had established their refugee camp, and could come to the pastor‟s house to 
work for food.  
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At the same time, he reported, “They could ask us whether we had any idea about the war. When 
we said no, they told us that they would own our properties when it was our time to flee our 
place. They could talk to each other in their Rukiga-dialect language. Exactly, when the war 
began, they are said to have killed many people in Kiziguro…They might have killed even in 
Gakoni after we had fled, I didn‟t know.” (Int.28) The interviewees reported the hand of the 
leadership in violence. As a former lawmaker reported in Murambi: “Destructive mobilization by 
the then burgomaster became the catalyst for the displaced to engage in killings. Within this area 
of Buganza there were evil people who used to come and influence people.” (Int.4) To a large 
extent, the interviewees held people displacement, as a result of war, as responsible for deadly 
violence in Murambi commune. 
 
A priest at Kiziguro Parish made it clear in the following terms: “It is true that Murambi had its 
own Interahamwe militia. But the rate of participation by the displaced people in the killings 
here in the [Kiziguro] Church and in most sectors could be estimated at 85 percent.” (Int.27) The 
interviewee indicated that, in many regards, destructive mobilization by the local leadership 
inflamed ethnic and discriminatory feelings among the displaced from Kiyombe and Muvumba 
then based in Ndatemwa. As in Murambi, there was a clear-cut distinction between Giti residents 
and displaced people who came from Mukarange and Kiyombe in 1993 to settle in the center of 
Bijunde, in Giti. There was a total cultural gap, the interviewees maintained.  
 
A former burgomaster reported: “Whenever there is temporary immigration, people mix their 
culture, and this sometimes causes a problem. For example, we had displaced people because of 
war in 1993. We received our fellow citizens from the northern communes, which had been 
affected by the war since 1990. They came here and settled in camps but they were so virulent 
that they influenced some of our people. When cultures are different cohabitation becomes 
somehow difficult. When those people with different cultures live together for a long time some 
cultures affect others little by little so that with time some people change and some cultures may 
disappear.” (Int.32) As the interviewees disclosed, Giti was more fortunate because those 
displaced people stayed on their land for one year before they moved away. They left before 
their culture drastically affected Giti residents.  
 
A village leader at Cyeru cell reported that if the displaced people had stayed longer they would 
have affected Giti residents. He considered immigration as a phenomenon, which always brought 
with it destruction, in many places in the past: “While on our land, displaced people could 
interfere with the existing leading structures. In vain, they strove to engage Bijunde residents 
into discriminatory practices. Fortunately, there were no displaced people left before deadly 
violence exploded. They had scattered all over [the communes of] Muhura and Kinyami. That is 
one of the key factors for which there was no violence in this area [of Giti]. If they happened to 
be here around that time, ordinary people could have trapped into hatred because of 
mobilization.” (Int.25) A former deputy governor expressed similar concern. He suggested that 
many people who were displaced from the commune of Mukarange to Giti would have 
exterminated many residents if they had still been there when the killings started. He refers to the 
junior seminary school of Rwesero to support the point. “The situation was tense because of 
teachers and priests from elsewhere lived at Rwesero seminary school. That fact of not having 
people influencing the population of Giti kept the identity of our commune unchanged. Rather, 
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the ethnic identity was less conflict prone.” (Int.3) Thus, displacement has been a strong factor in 
explaining the levels of violence in both Murambi and Giti.  
 
The major reason for which displaced people perpetrated violence, according to a former mayor 
of Murambi, “[was] that they fled the war in their home areas and were sensible of the danger of 
war so that they fell prey to destructive mobilization by the local government leaders in 
Murambi.” (Int.33) The interviewees reported that they had experienced cases of violence and 
death left in their memories on their way to Murambi. In short, they ended up treating violence 
and death as trivial, as a result of being in close proximity to the „battlefield‟. The interviewees 
singled this out as the background that accelerated the process of violence, given other 
conditions that were compatible with violence. In addition to proximity to the battlefield, a 
Rwandan senator referred to violence as a result of human factors, which could serve as 
catalysts: 
 
In case there is one or …a few extremists, because of taking the RPF, Tutsi and MDR, and 
because of feeling an imminent danger, they had a feeling of hearing gunshots: people at 
Murambi hearing gunshots from Mutara! When the 1990 war broke, they felt it was [right] 
next to them. This was another factor. Moreover, there were refugee camps at Kiziguro. They 
would tell them: you see what the Inkotanyi have done and yet you live together with them. It 
is possible for the situation to…turn out to be bad for the targeted people because people 
might say „don‟t you see what is going on?‟ (Int.9) 
 
In line with these claims, the interviewees argued that genocide or the absence of genocide, were 
connected, at certain levels at least, to the existence or absence of human factors to sensitize the 
common citizenry into violence. 
Circumstantial confusion 
 
The process of understanding the relatively non-violent Giti has unearthed many factors that are 
of themselves insufficient when taken in isolation from many others. The interviewees depicted 
confusion as one of those factors. To begin with, the interviewees reported that the beginning of 
sequences of violence in Rwanda have always involved situations where the communication 
about what was going to happen next had often not been clear to all, in the same manner. 
Referring to the violence of 1959 and 1960, a politician said that both the elite and the common 
citizenry failed to decode the language, which used euphemistic labeling. As a result, he claims 
that there were variations in obedient behavior. Some of the military could want to negotiate 
with the RPF, he reported, “and „pacify‟ in the right sense of it. In parallel, Bagosora65 could 
send out the same call to „pacify‟, which denoted to „exterminate‟. It was the same as the 
euphemistic labeling „to work‟, which deviated from the original meaning to signify „to 
exterminate‟. Some leaders, such as burgomasters, had resisted violence. The central government 
could require them to „pacify‟ the areas under their control and they understood it right way.” 
(Int.20) This interviewee brought up the formulation of the justification of non-violence in Giti, 
looking at two aspects.  
 
                                               
65 Bagosora is widely considered the mastermind of the April-July genocide against the Tutsi and the slaughter of Hutu opposed to 
the genocide, particularly the Hutu leaders of opposition parties (Twagilimana 2007:9). 
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Firstly, it reported, there had not been enough time for the residents to be indoctrinated with 
hatred in order to show resistance. Second, much confusion reigned in relation to what was going 
to happen after the then president was shot dead. Since violence did not immediately follow the 
death of the president on the night of 6
th
 April 1994, other than in the capital city, the interviewee 
reported the violence to be the result of the fact that the burgomasters and the common citizenry 
were in total confusion. The interviewee argued that burgomasters had resisted violence 
everywhere until they were told what to do in clear terms. Referring to the particular case of Giti, 
a former deputy governor reported: “Leaders did not give a go-ahead. It is as if they were 
wondering if what they were about to do would be right or wrong; if there would be no 
consequences. They were not attracted by the extremists‟ propaganda.” (Int.3) The same 
interviewee depicted the former burgomaster of the neighboring Rutare commune as having 
made an uninformed decision, which resulted in his ultimate jailing for perpetrating violence. 
 
Alongside this confusion, „difficult access‟ to Giti was highlighted by many interviewees as 
having been an obstacle to the indoctrination of the residents with hatred. There was a total 
absence of communication infrastructure. Therefore, Giti was a land-locked area, difficult to 
access for mobilization campaigns. There was only one road in poor condition that linked Rutare 
commune to the highway to the capital city. As a result, the interviewees established that 
meetings with the central government leaders were held at Rutare. The latter could expect the 
representatives of Giti to disseminate the resolutions of the meetings among their subordinates. 
An elder in Giti reported: 
 
Some people told us that Bagosora had been at Rutare one week before the genocide started. 
He attended a meeting of sector counselors together with soldiers, which was not clear. One or 
two Tutsi counselors were kept out then. No one knows what was on the agenda. We think 
that he gave them something like a signal. Maybe he told them to start as soon as the president 
dies. They did not come here, maybe because it was difficult. The way from Kigali to Rutare 
was not the same as the one from Kigali to Bukure. Moreover, because our commune was 
locked between other communes, they thought things would just get done automatically. 
(Int.3). 
 
In addition to the difficulties in decoding the euphemistic labeling, and the poor communication 
infrastructure, the interviewees also touched on the proximity of the RPF troops,
66
 as a reason for 
non-violence in Giti. A politician said that the amount of time it took for the Inkotanyi to 
conquer Giti was too little to allow anyone to perpetrate genocide. The local residents had no 
time to oppose violence. This was different from the case of Butare prefecture under 
Habyarimana Jean Baptiste and of Gtiratama prefecture under Fidele Uwizeye in southern 
Rwanda. He said: “It is being said that some residents of Giti committed violence in the 
neighboring communes.” (Int.20) He reported, like many other interviewees, that the Inkotanyi, 
                                               
66 The current literature has given a lot of credit to the proximity of the RPF troops to explain why there was no genocide in Giti. 
It has seemed that their presence in the neighboring communes exercised strong pressure on the Rwandan Army Forces (FAR). 
The idea is that the RPF troops would intervene in case any violence occurred. Strauss (2006:87) put it: “The critical change that 
stopped the violence from taking hold was the arrival of RPF rebel troops. Although the troops did not set foot in the communal 
administrative headquarters for another week, they arrived in neighboring Rurate Commune the night of April 9, and knowledge 
of their presence was widespread in Giti on April 10. Just knowing the RPF troops had arrived and had stopped the violence in 
Rutare was enough to calm the situation and block a dynamic of violence from taking hold in Giti…The critical difference that 
stopped a genocidal dynamic from taking hold in Giti was the arrival of the RPF, which calmed the situation.” 
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who could monitor Giti from the nearby communes, did not delay becoming involved to fail the 
possibility of genocide.  
 
Some interviewees corroborated these claims, indicating that the fact that the Inkotanyi did not 
delay was a relief to the then burgomaster who was increasingly exhausted. The interviewees 
said that the fact of being exhausted would benefit whoever wanted to perpetrate violence. 
During a focus group discussion held in Karagari cell, a woman claimed to have seen the 
burgomaster coming across the Kabuga commercial center, and she asked him: “„Are you still 
driving a car?‟…It is not easy anymore, I told him. The soldier son of Gafaranga is fully armed 
and has just been looking for you. He immediately abandoned the car and went into hiding. And 
Inkotanyi arrived the following day. As time went on, he was increasingly becoming powerless.” 
(Foc.4) With this statement, the interviewee reported a joint action of the Inkotanyi and the 
middle- range level of leadership to thwart any attempt by the military to perpetrate genocide 
after losing the battlefield. In this effort, some interviewees tended to over-emphasize the hand 
importance of leadership. 
 
A businessman and former minister said: “Leadership is an explanatory variable of why across 
the country Giti has remained like an Island in the ocean of violence…I am not aware of the 
relation between the Inkotanyi and Giti. That there have been external influences, 
communication with the Inkotanyi, I ignore. However, I strongly believe that if the burgomaster 
was inclined to evildoing, violence would have surely taken place.” (Int.1) Many interviewees 
also indicated that the leadership – from cell coordinators up to the top level of the commune 
management –played a key role in their opposition to genocide. To substantiate this argument, 
the interviewees traced back to the nationwide demonstrations that took place in 1993 to resist 
the power sharing deal that was concluded with the Arusha Peace Accord. As a result of 
leadership, Giti made an exception by opposing these demonstrations. The then burgomaster 
reported: “I did not organize them. I told my people that whoever wanted to demonstrate would 
go to Kigali where they could be seen by high authorities. I told them to work hard for their 
livelihood instead of demonstrating.” (Int.32) Along the same line, a former staff member of Giti 
commune, now retired, said that genocide could have taken place if the leadership had failed to 
prevent it. He said that people in Giti were given weapons in the framework of self-defense 
against the Inkotanyi, whose nationwide mission later changed to genocide: 
 
It happened that we had a good and powerful leader. I sometime[s] say that he acted on behalf 
of God. He was Hutu as many others but he never wanted people divided. Except very few 
who wanted genocide to happen, all the population was solidly behind his unifying message. 
He could even resort to coercion when it was deemed necessary. He could say for example, 
whoever performs violence will definitely be held responsible. Even those who had [an] 
interest in violence could give up. As a result, they could perform violence in neighboring 
communes like Gikomero and elsewhere. That is why you see Gacaca running here. (Int.24) 
 
The burgomaster himself – a parliamentarian at the time of interview – accepted that it was 
possible that violence could have taken place. Primarily, he had in mind invaders who could 
come from neighboring Murambi to perpetrate genocide, in particular, from the former Kigabiro 
and Gasange sectors, which bordered with Murambi. He thought the residents could imitate what 
was happening in Murambi. He described the situation and the strict measures he put in place: 
“They started by looking for ways to get hold of Tutsi cows, and afterwards massacres could 
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take place. Nevertheless, these people did not succeed in their plot on their neighbors‟ lives for 
we immediately imprisoned them. This frightened other people who could attempt to do so. 
Since Gasange was not far from the commune office, and the prison was in its compound, we 
took those people with malicious intent, made them go around the compound as a way to show 
other citizens that whoever could attempt to commit such a bad crime would get trouble.” 
(Int.32) 
 
The interviewees identified a number of strategies put in place to discourage violence in Giti. A 
retired commune servant corroborated the above claims of the burgomaster. He said that the 
burgomaster made use of the security officers then appointed at Giti commune to take the people 
with malicious intent of Gasange sector to Kigaga center, where he beat them to dissuade them 
from committing violence. As he says, the strategies also extended “to the invaders who came 
from any neighboring communes – that is, Gikomero and Gikoro – across Muhazi Lake. The 
burgomaster urged the population to throw stones at them before they reached our land. And we 
successfully [achieved that].” (Int.24) With such claims, the interviewees suggested that the 
leadership adequately dealt with violence. At the same time, they argued for the important role 
played by external factors. 
 
To some other interviewees, if the Inkotanyi had not been present, genocide would have been 
inevitable. Such interviewees said that the absence of the Inkotanyi would have led the 
burgomaster to fail, when he ultimately became exhausted in his own resistance. A focus group 
held at Karenge cell made it clear that the middle-range leaders worked in a symbiotic 
partnership with the presence of the Inkotanyi. A participant reported: “Sebushumba [, the then 
burgomaster,] played a key role for genocide not to take place in Giti. But, at a certain time, it 
worked because the close proximity of the military elements of Rwanda Patriotic Army – i.e., 
Inkotanyi. Those who could have perpetrated violence feared the possibility of intervention of 
that military.” (Foc.5) To most interviewees, the active role that the leadership played was 
indicative of the personality traits – of non-violence – of leaders who had reigned over Giti over 
the years. They also highlighted the cultural, environmental, political and historical contexts that 
made Giti a unique case in Rwanda. 
Demographic profile 
 
As related in the above paragraphs, the interviewees reported that the population in the Buganza 
sub-region comprised immigrant Hutu and the Buganza residents, then perceived as mainly 
Tutsi. To begin with, the immigrants had full consciousness of their Hutu identity. A group 
discussion held in Karagari cell reported as follows: “When one follows up on the internal 
migrations in this area of Buganza, it is found that most immigrants belonged to the ethnic group 
of Hutu. Tutsi have also migrated but they are not many as…compare[d] [with] Hutu.” (Foc.4) 
The interviewees said that the immigrants were the ones who brought the idea of Hutu and Tutsi 
identity to the attention of many of the residents of Murambi.  
 
Upon arrival, the immigrants, according to an informed-elder in Murambi, “called themselves 
Hutu and they called some people here Hutu as well whereas they call the majority of the people 
they had joined here Tutsi. They could even qualify some people as Hutu for example in the 
leadership and they could just accept them as Hutu…you can see that some people from Buganza 
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participated in the killings, killing other people who were born here: those they had just pointed 
their fingers at as Tutsi. Those people could be killed without anyone coming to their help.” 
(Int.12) As this interviewee argued, the immigrants brought Hutu identity to the fore, which had 
increasingly had loose meaning as intermarriages intensified. The interviewee said that the 
immigrants were able to recruit converts – to their ideas of ethnic differentiation –from the 
residents of Murambi. In so doing, they deepened the gap between the „us‟ and „them‟ 
dichotomy. As a focus group discussion held in Gakoni cell unanimously supported, the 
recruitment of converts followed rising deep feelings of distrust of people of central Rwanda – 
known as Nduga – and the sub-region of Buganza, by those of northern Rwanda – known as 
Rukiga. 
 
The interviewees explained that this distinction aimed to regard inhabitants of these regions as 
Tutsi.
67
 In the sub-region of Buganza particularly, the entry point for those perceptions was the 
cattle breeding regarded as the main economic activity of Tutsi since the monarchy era. The 
interviewees established the identity crisis in this sub-region. A church leader disclosed: “Even 
Hutu could not be trusted as such since everyone was thought to be Tutsi in the region. As a 
result, leaders who originated from the sub-region of Buganza were not many. In the past, ethnic 
discrimination rated higher to the extent that it was always said that there was no single Hutu in 
Buganza.” (Int.8) As a result of extensive intermarriages, the interviewees said that it was made 
difficult to associate a person with a particular identity on the basis of physical appearance. In 
racial terms, the „pure Hutu‟ identity did not exist to the Buganza region, the interviewees 
established. 
 
An elder in Giti reported: “Some people would say they were „pure Hutu‟ just because mixed 
ethnic relations did not exist at all. It did not apply to Nduga and Buganza where many people 
from both ethnic groups would marry one another. The intermarriages did not give birth to „pure 
Hutu‟, even if the husband in the couple belonged to Hutu ethnic background. Given the above, 
the „pure Hutu‟ were Bakiga.” (Int.3) The interviewees said that the rule of patriarchal system 
formerly help to attribute to children the identity of the father if the husband in the couple 
belonged to an ethnic group. Contrary to this system, the racial „pure Hutu‟ considered children 
born from intermarriages, as Tutsi regardless of whom of the couple was Hutu or Tutsi. In short, 
the identity had become an elusive notion because of strong mixed ethnic relations. A native of 
Murambi who married in Giti reported: “You could not tell Hutu from Tutsi at Murambi. Tutsi 
and Hutu would get married to one another. Then children were alike. You could not know who 
Tutsi or Hutu was. You could not tell Hutu from Tutsi based on cows. Their children used to be 
friends. Nothing went wrong here in Murambi.” (Int.16) To the interviewees, social conditions 
mattered the most to distinguish one from another. 
 
For instance, a researcher reported, “the son of a military general visits the family of generals 
and ministers. When he wants to marry, he looks for a partner in those families. In the past, 
                                               
67 The fact that the inhabitants of these regions were regarded as Tutsi can probably be linked to the history of immigration. 
Peaceful coexistence is said to have developed between Hutu and Tutsi when they gathered on Rwandan soil, according to 
essentialist writers. By this is meant that Hutu and Tutsi were perceived as „given‟ groups. With this, ethnic identity was 
understood from the contextual reference. However, Millwood (1996:22) posits that the coexistence “was usually followed by 
Tutsi conquests…One, often repeated, assertion is that about 20 generations ago, one Tutsi clan, the Nyiginya, achieved political 
dominance in eastern Rwanda. Over several centuries, they came to form the core of a state that expanded westwards to cover 
most of the modern-day territory”, Newbury (1987) suggests. The Buganza region is part of this territory. 
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families of the same level of economic status did intermarriages as well. A rich businessman 
Hutu could not necessarily marry a Hutu girl who is not of his social category. He rather lived 
with the farmers‟ chiefs because they belonged to the same levels.” (Int.29) The interviewees 
established that the physical appearance of people did not help to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi. 
They found that intermarriages had distorted the characteristics from which people used to assign 
people to different ethnic identities. 
 
A retired lawmaker in Murambi claimed that intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi was a 
solution to identity-based problems. Thus, he found it misleading to pretend to know a local 
Tutsi person by judging from the shape of the nose, for example. He emphasized that 
intermarriages had been organized to such an extent that it could have been difficult to know 
whom to kill during genocide in the sub-region of Buganza, since people looked more-or-less the 
same way. As a result of the lack of distinguishing physical traits to differentiate Hutu from Tutsi 
in Murambi, he reported: “A militiaman could be actively involved in the killings of people from 
Murambi here, while his younger or elder brother could be killed in Kigali. These are many such 
cases that occurred. There were neither Hutu nor Tutsi in Buganza; the problem had already been 
solved. But anyone who was lucky to be recognized as a Hutu did terrible things. But he could 
do those terrible things while his relative living in another region of the country was undergoing 
the same.” (Int.4) 
 
The interviewees established that the fusion in identity in this region would have made it difficult 
to mobilize people according to the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy. To refer to a native woman of 
Murambi, “Leaders could not easily find a way to sow hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. They 
would wonder how to separate someone from his in-laws. They had same grandchildren; their 
children were friends, they all kept cows together. They failed to separate them.” (Int.16) As 
with people from Murambi, the same interviewee reiterated, Giti people had also surpassed being 
Hutu or Tutsi because of intermarriages. This enabled them to resist violence together. The 
interviewee reported that by God‟s blessing, a local leader was selected from them and happened 
to be moderate. 
 
Efficient leadership  
 
The interviewees revealed the level of leadership efficiency was an important element in 
understanding why genocide occurred in Murambi and not in Giti. As a result of being moderate 
and not inclined to violence, leadership in Giti was efficient according to the interviewees. 
Rather, they reported that inefficiencies characterized the leadership in Murambi.  
 
A retired lawmaker in Murambi referred to these inefficiencies through a Rwandan proverb: 
“akamasa kazaca inka kazivukamo” – literally; „an exterminating ox is born from the cattle it is 
part of‟. He meant that the burgomaster exterminated the people he was born from. As the 
interviewees reported, violence was perceived to be the result of the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy 
that followed the arrival of the northern immigrants then known as the Bakiga. He concluded: 
“Had…the Bakiga people not identified Gatete as a savage person and had they not turned him 
into the way they wanted him to be, I am telling you, they wouldn‟t have ruled over the Buganza 
region. But the man shook up the region to such an extent that a form of radicalism between 
Hutu and Tutsi was created and firmly established. It is not easy to explain.” (Int.4) Most of the 
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interviewees said that becoming radicalized in this way made the burgomaster a popular figure, 
not only among the Bakiga, but also among the central government network.  
 
A former burgomaster in Giti said that his counterpart in Murambi was solidly behind central 
authorities, and was ultimately entrusted with very important matters. He reported: “They 
trapped him into preventing the Inkotanyi from invading the country. He considered them as 
wicked people. He successfully indoctrinated ordinary people with such a feeling, as they trusted 
him because he was educated and knowledgeable. At the same time, he began training the 
Interahamwe militia men which increasingly diluted the quality of social relations which earlier 
existed.” (Int.30) The interviewees reported that the burgomaster failed to unite the population 
and to preserve the community harmony that prevailed for a long in the past. On the contrary, 
they argued, people developed intense hatred against each other. To the interviewees, this 
interfered with common practices, such as blood sharing by the means of which intermarriages 
flourished in the past to support community harmony. 
 
Instead, the interviewees established that conflict has continuously brought Hutu and Tutsi into 
confrontation. To stress the dominance of Tutsi in the sub-region of Buganza, they reported that 
people perceived Buganza as „another‟ area with „other‟ people. A focus group discussion held 
in Gakoni reported: “People heading to the region of Buganza could say that „we are going to 
„iwabo w’abantu n’ibintu’68 – which literally [translates] as an exclusive fief comprising 
„humans‟ and „property.‟ We realize that such an expression bears „Hutu‟ and „Tutsi‟ dichotomy 
and corroborates the same stereotype, according to which the Buganza is tutsified.” (Foc.3) To 
the same focus group discussion, „abantu‟ and „ibintu‟ are terms, which respectively translate as: 
„Tutsi‟ and „cattle‟. The participants meant that this sub-region was associated with Tutsi and 
cattle. With governments basing their legitimacy on the ethnic identity, this perception strongly 
impacted on various fields of life, including education. 
Educational characteristics 
 
This study has empirically established that the post-colonial Rwandan governments have been 
fundamentally Hutu-dominated. As a result, „ethnicity‟ and „region‟ were the supporting pillars 
of power legitimacy, on the on hand, and also served as strong criteria for discrimination, on the 
other. Internally, the interviewees reported, ethnicity and region served the purpose of solidarity 
and of uniting people. For instance, a politician reported that those from former Cyangugu 
prefecture – commonly known by the name of „Abashi‟ – were widely said to be in strong 
solidarity relationship with one another. He disclosed: “People say that solidarity is specific to 
those from Gitarama. We are in [stronger] solidarity relations with the descendents of the 
                                               
68 This expression was openly used in the aftermath of genocide to recall the pejorative perspective it bore in the past. According 
to the focus group discussion, it meant the former province of Umutara, which covered many parts of Buganza. It was reported 
to be the main gate through which the Tutsi Diaspora entered the country, thirty years after many settled in Uganda. It seems 
that the term „abantu‟, whose English is originally „people‟, meant the newly repatriated Tutsi Diaspora. Some had managed to 
repatriate the cattle, which symbolized „wealth.‟ The term „ibintu‟ meant this „wealth‟. In a block, the focus group discussion 
concluded that the expression „iwabo w’abantu n’ibintu‟ defined „the home of newly repatriated Rwandans and wealth‟. It 
concluded that the parity in it consisted of the fact that the sub-region identified with the newly repatriated Rwandans, also 
identified as Tutsi. The danger was two-fold. One is the denial of the sense of humanhood to non-Umutara residents, which 
would open the ground for conflicts to develop. Second is the coincidence that the Umutara included the Buganza region 
historically perceived to beTutsi land. 
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proponents of Kayibanda‟s Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (Parmehutu) than we are vis-
à-vis those from Buganza or those who come from Kigali.” (Int.20) 
 
He argued that the region was the most important criterion to distinguish people from others, 
more so than ethnic affiliations. “Tutsi people had fled to Nyamata in the past. One minister 
went to this place to recruit some of his former classmates for job. Interestingly, he selected 
those of same region as himself regardless whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. If so, the region 
translated an inclusive inner group whose values took precedence over ethnic identifications.” 
(Int.20) For this interviewee, access to job opportunities and schooling, to name just two issues, 
were driven by where one came from. Within that framework, however, the interviewees 
supported that there were many ethnic victims. The „perceived‟ Tutsi land – that is, the sub-
region of Buganza – was strongly highlighted by the interviewees to be a case of illustration vis-
à-vis the education sector. Through a smaller sample of statements, the interviewees illustrated 
this case in many ways. For example, they argued that access to high school has followed a 
pattern, which is specific to the sub-region of Buganza. 
 
As a retired pastor lamented in Murambi, “Only those from Rukiga (the northern part of 
Rwanda) had higher rates of access to education, but never those from Nduga (central Rwanda) 
and Buganza.” (Int.28) The interviewees reported that this situation was mainly linked to the 
stereotype, according to which these regions were largely identified with Tutsi. A church leader 
of a different congregation in Murambi made a comparable statement: “Children could not easily 
access high schools and the university even if they were smarter because their identification 
papers contained their ethnic details. It could not work, unless one found someone…in the 
Ministry of Education to intervene. Failure to find that person could result in not being selected, 
no matter whether you got the pass-mark. With this, those who could access education in Giti 
have had to go through similar tricks. As a result, one could be selected without necessarily 
being intelligent enough.” (Int.8) 
 
The same church leader pinpointed a scenario by which he illustrated his statements: “There is 
time in the past I went in Muhura. A…girl had an uncle who told me the following a story: when 
the results came in of those who sat for the national exam, she was the best over the former 
Byumba prefecture. Later on, people said the girl had just been roaming from one school to 
another and she had repeatedly failed. The secret is that he had given the child details to 
someone in the Ministry of Education who intervened in her favor.” (Int.8) As a way to access 
education, the interviewees said that many in Giti identified as Tutsi benefited from the 
cooperation of the burgomaster to be given an identity card with Hutu ethnic group. 
 
As a result of good relations between people, a public servant on retirement reported, “A Tutsi 
could be advised to have their identity cards changed for him or her to get schools for the 
children or to get laissez-passers.” (Int.3) The interviewees also pointed out the lack of school 
infrastructure in the sub-region of Buganza. As a result, the very few who managed to be 
selected were studying far away from their region and the risk of dropping out increased. A 
retired pastor in Murambi enthusiastically lauded the fundraising initiatives by which schools are 
now being built. As a result, he said, “those who qualify might not be sent to schools far away 
from home. We have contributed money and construction works are progressing well. No child 
will go to school at Cyangugu or Ruhengeri anymore…We have been totally deprived over the 
2
  
 
142 
past. Those from here who were not given the opportunity to study went for private scholarship 
to Zaïre – now Democratic Republic of Congo.” (Int.28) The interviewees depicted the scarcity 
of educated and knowledgeable people as very strong. Some people could still ask themselves 
whether they had existed in the past. The interviewees assumed that questions – on whether they 
had –were an indication of lower levels of school enrolments in the sub-region of Buganza. With 
regard to Giti, the interviewees showed ways in which the very few elites deserted their 
respective communities. 
 
As a result of good relations between people, a public servant on retirement reported, “A Tutsi 
could be advised to have their identity cards changed for him or her to get schools for the 
children or to get laissez-passers.” (Int.3) The interviewees also pointed out the lack of school 
infrastructure in the sub-region of Buganza. As a result, the very few who managed to be 
selected were studying far away from their region and the risk of dropping out increased. A 
retired pastor in Murambi enthusiastically lauded the fundraising initiatives by which schools are 
now being built. As a result, he said, “those who qualify might not be sent to schools far away 
from home. We have contributed money and construction works are progressing well. No child 
will go to school at Cyangugu or Ruhengeri anymore…We have been totally deprived over the 
past. Those from here who were not given the opportunity to study went for private scholarship 
to Zaïre – now Democratic Republic of Congo.” (Int.28) The interviewees depicted the scarcity 
of educated and knowledgeable people as very strong. Some people could still ask themselves 
whether they had existed in the past. The interviewees assumed that questions – on whether they 
had –were an indication of lower levels of school enrolments in the sub-region of Buganza. With 
regard to Giti, the interviewees showed ways in which the very few elites deserted their 
respective communities. 
 
Referring to her in-laws, a former village leader made some clarifications. “The elite, native[s] of 
Giti, lived in Kigali where they worked. They came here just passing. Moreover, they were 
mixtures of Tutsi and Hutu. They didn‟t care about the discriminatory ideology. They would not 
care about who lives here who lives there.” (Int.16) She cited specific individuals, like the 
former minister Rucogoza who was killed during the genocide. She recognized that he used to 
visit many families and in so doing, he would not say this is Hutu that one is Tutsi. She also cites 
her brothers in law. The latter were important persons who worked in Russia, and one was an 
advisor in the Rwandan Embassy in Uganda. As she observed, they bought and shared beer with 
everyone whenever they came for holidays. No one sensitized people with those discriminatory 
ideas in Giti, she emphasized. 
 
In addition, a village leader in Cyeru cell also cited the late journalist Rubwiriza Tharcisse who 
also lived in Kigali before he was killed. He was inclusive when he said, “All of those we mean 
by „elite‟ could come and tell the local leaders and ordinary people to not follow destructive 
messages which were being delivered in the neighboring areas. With their solidarity to locals, 
they helped a lot.” (Int.25) Among the interviewees, there is a consensus that the elite were 
solidly behind the then burgomaster. This meant that mobilization, no matter how little it was, 
instilled non-violence into the community. The interviewees suggested that Giti had particular 
socio-cultural assets that provided a solid base for such a commitment. 
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Socio-cultural characteristics 
 
Traditionally, the interviewees reported, the sub-region of Buganza had developed a strong 
cultural base for which people became united and formed a community. Some of the aspects of 
this base, according to a former burgomaster, consisted of the fact that “inhabitants have lived 
side by side in harmony…They devoted little attention to ethnic-related issues. People could feel 
that they were brothers. For long ago, they intermarried, and shared everything as experience of 
life. Had it not been for the interference of migration, it would not be easy to mobilize the 
population into hatred.” (Int.30) As the interviewees earlier highlighted, the sense of community, 
extensive intermarriages, and the exchange of cows and brides, cemented brotherhood and 
friendships in many cases. A former village leader, now retired, observed ways in which they 
yielded appropriate fruits. During the 1994 war and genocide, he reported, “People could even 
flee to the same place together and support one another. Females and children could stay aside 
while males patrolled along the camp.” (Inte.23) He took it as a cultural heritage and lauded the 
effort of the leadership to assure full protection over the past, until genocide exploded.  In this 
context, the interviewees emphasized that people resisted violence, much as they had arrived at 
the level where ethnic identity almost indicated the position one took in the scale of wealth.  
 
They took an example from Murambi, where labels like Hutu, Tutsi and Twa translated as jargon 
people used to estimate the amount of cattle one owned. The interviewees referred to a person 
known by the name of Karegeya to show the extent to which these labels fluctuated in the past. 
A primary teacher in Murambi said: “Even though he came from the Hutu ethnic background, 
his children were always registered as Tutsi because he had a lot of cows. There was an 
understanding that rich people identified as Tutsi and poor as Hutu. Here in Buganza for 
example, that identification of Hutu and Tutsi was ambiguous and therefore not easy to 
understand out of this context.” (Int.11) In line with comparable claims, ethnic identity was 
given very loose consideration, which mixed up what the stereotypes behind Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa would mean.  
 
For instance, a researcher of dialogue for peace made the following clarification: “From the 
reign…of King Cyirima Rujugira (1720), Tutsi defined whoever had material possessions and 
lived in that high class. A Tutsi was determined by the position or class held in a society rather 
than blood. Seminarians and gradients from schools such as Group Scolaire Officiel de Butare 
became automatically Tutsi when they married Tutsi ladies.” (Int.29) The interviewees made this 
clear to be the context under which the common citizenry successfully resisted violence 
communally in Giti. They also found another aspect, which led to the success. It was supported 
that the locals in Gti are very much cautious and reserved. The interviewees established that 
attitude to constitute a stereotype, which was entirely extrapolated to the sub-region of Buganza.  
 
A former village leader who moved from Murambi to marry in Giti reported: “Normally, people 
from Giti are obedient. But, they do not go brutally. They do not jump at whatever one may tell 
them. No! They first analyze what you tell them, they find out why you say so and what the 
consequences might be. All I know, which took me a long time to find out after I got married in 
Giti, people can easily be [hypocritical]. They can show you they love when they don‟t. That is 
why people from Buganza are said to be not straightforward. They keep secrets. They avoid 
being the cause of anything. Someone can even witness something wrong and refuse to say it just 
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[so as] not to be the cause of something else.” (Int.16) To the interviewees, the cautious attitude 
and the fact of being reserved has affected the grassroots thinking in many incidents that could 
have required the locals to behave in a violent manner. 
 
Referring to the abolition of the monarchy system, a former burgomaster in Giti, to illustrate, 
reported that the residents vainly resisted its collapse given that they perceived having no 
problem with it. As the interviewees underlined, a reserved and cautious attitude shaped a pattern 
of social relations, which affected politics at local government level in the past. For instance, the 
same burgomaster argued, “ethnicity did not have any control over the local leaders as they have 
been taking over one from another. Sebushumba who took over from me did not become 
involved in hatred even though he is Hutu. Thus, he did not exercise his influence in a 
destructive way. This kind of discriminatory behavior originated from the Bakiga people with 
whom earlier social relations eroded in many areas of the sub-region of Buganza” (Int.30) At 
their arrival, he noted, “Hutu always tended to think that Tutsi is someone else, and vice versa. 
He or she seemed not to belong to their inner group.” (Int.30) This interviewee said that 
Murambi was most affected.  
 
As a retired burgomaster, he circumscribed the leadership of Giti in a broader historical context: 
“Even those who preceded us in both the pre- and post-colonial eras did not want their 
subordinate divided. You could find that the leaders of the commune have been unifying actors. 
As a result, opposing ordinary people along ethnic lines was really difficult. Even I did not get 
involved in conflicts where you distinguish Twa from Hutu or Tutsi. I could identify them as 
brothers. I personally identified as Hutu but when I married I went for a Tutsi girl. I never 
thought about it. It was like I could marry anyone else.” (Int.30) These claims, among many 
others, suggested the interviewees considered the cultural base in the sub-region of Buganza as 
strong– as comprising life side by side, in harmony, intermarriages and cow exchange, reserved 
and cautious attitudes. At the same time, they established a causal link between the same base 
and the perception of identity and the non-straightforward attitude, vis-à-vis the external factors 
that informed politics at local government level. 
Summary  
 
This chapter has gone through a number of parameters to understand why genocidal violence 
takes place in one area and not another. It was highlighted that the elite have the hand in all the 
initiatives that every level of the society implements. They were understood to be the „catalyst‟ 
for change in society, which yield different outcomes depending on whether they intervene 
during crises. Also, the elite were seen as capable of changing the inner side of individuals. 
Against this context, the chapter highlighted that the political elite – using legal instruments and 
physical coercion – interchanged with the religious officers and teachers at all levels of the 
society. At this level of understanding, the elite were only taken from the formal aspect. Not only 
was there emphasis on the formal aspect of the elite, the chapter also pointed out the scarcity and 
unequal distribution of the elite. Scarcity and unequal distribution was discussed to be the result 
of a strong dichotomy between the ethnic group identities in the sub-region of Buganza. 
 
The chapter also highlighted that the informal elite juxtapose with the formal elite. Under various 
circumstances, as the case of Giti showed, it was supported that the informal elite exercise power 
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not only shadowing the formal elite, but also exercised power over the common citizenry – a 
group to which they belong. In this context, they served as checkpoints in various ways. 
Contrary to Giti, the chapter pointed out that the informal elite were weak in Murambi. As a 
result, they failed to influence the elite and the youth who socially incapacitated them. It was 
discussed that the social incapacitation of the informal elite relates to the demographic profile in 
the sub-region of Buganza. The juxtaposition of the immigrants and the natives, who perceived 
themselves from ethnic lenses before conflict intensified, was highlighted. 
 
Also, the chapter looked into some variables by which genocidal violence is understood in the 
case studies. With strong emphasis, the competition between farming and cattle breeding has 
shown ways in which Hutu and Tutsi entered into conflict in Murambi. At the same time, it 
demonstrated how income distribution has equipped some with material means by which they 
provided others with livelihoods before they mobilized them into violence. Migration, as a result 
of land shortages, as well as the context of cruelty that led to large numbers of war-displaced 
people, was taken to be an argument to justify the intensification of violence. 
 
Finally, the chapter brought up a controversial discussion on the possible explanation of non-
violence in Giti. On the extreme sides, leadership and the proximity of the troops of the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front were supported as key variables to explain Giti as a unique case in Rwanda. The 
chapter argues for a joint action of both the leadership and the proximity of those troops. When 
the pressure of the Interahamwe militia increased, the leadership was said to become 
increasingly weaker. Had not strong pressure by those troops been exercised, the chapter argued 
that genocidal violence would have been inevitable since there was a strong intent by the militia 
Interahamwe in the neighboring communes to invade Giti and perpetrate violence. 
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5. The structure of social relations 
 
7
  
 
147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
  
 
148 
 
In Rwanda, at least, it is openly recognized and accepted that culture regulated violence in the 
past. It prevented, but also legitimated, violence. To begin with, this chapter assumes that solid 
grassroots thinking determined the structure of social relations that, in turn, determined violence 
or its absence. Social taboos, social pacts, the institutions for obedience and collective social 
units, are variables that this chapter presents to draw the reasons why there was support for 
genocide in Murambi but not in Giti. 
Cultural barriers to violence 
 
The structure of social relations has led many to hypothesize about the existence of barriers to 
violence. The interviewees revealed that a warm welcome is a strong basis to predict non-
violence. A former parliamentarian in Murambi found it difficult to explain how forefathers used 
to walk throughout the country, and could spend the night in any family, and was taken care of 
free of charge in the past. Above all, Rwandans felt that a guest highly deserved respect and care. 
In their time, none of the forefathers cared about the identity group of the person coming to seek 
hospitality. There was no violence on a large scale among Rwandans (Int.4). 
 
A retired elder in Giti supported this idea, highlighting that Rwanda has repeatedly gone through 
conflicts over the last decades. Rwandan culture,
69
 he suggests, is, above all, based on good 
relations, even if it did not totally control for violence at a certain point of time (Int.3).  An 
officer in the Office of the Ombudsman said: “The existence of violence in the past should not 
have been the reason of committing genocide! Such atrocities that occurred during genocide 
reflect the violence that has been kept among people for a long time and which was once 
triggered and burst.” (Int.26) Despite the small scale of violence in the past, many strongly hold 
that „social taboos‟, „blood brotherhood‟, originally known as „kunywana‟,70 „social pacts‟ also 
known as „igihango‟, and „collective social units‟, prevented violence from takig place on a large 
scale.  
Social taboos 
 
Until the formal legal system was established, social taboos served as social regulations or norms 
by which people could prescribe and preserve accepted behavior. Even on the battlefield, an 
officer at the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission said, “Nobody could kill a child or 
a woman. They could only take them hostages. But killing a child or a woman would be a 
                                               
69 In the context of this study, the concept of culture is understood from various perspectives, as many scholars discuss in Gould 
and Kolb (1964:165-6). According to Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C. (1952), it defines the “patterns, explicit and implicit, of 
and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artifact.” From this perspective, social values are identified as the essential core of culture. Taylor‟s view, as 
echoed in F. Boas (1930), also helps the study to define culture as “all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the 
reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and products of human activities as determined 
by these habits.” In summary, culture defined the “whole „way of life‟ which is determined by the social environment,” in order 
to determine the way people behave in particular circumstances, in turn. 
70Kunywana means “to drink each other‟s blood.” To be blood brothers, two people would have incisions made on their 
stomachs, and then each would taste the blood of the other. The blood brothers, called, abanywanyi (meaning „those who have 
drunk each other‟s blood‟) had strong mutual obligations. As the practice disappeared in modern Rwanda, the term simply means 
„very close friends‟ (Twagirimana 2007:106-7). 
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sacrilege.” (Int.18) Given that social taboos were binding, genocide is an extreme violence that 
could not be easily explained in culture. After he closely observed the fluctuation of the same 
taboos during the last days leading to genocide in Murambi, a former minister found it unfair to 
Rwandan ancestors “if we related the 1994 tragedy with the Rwandan culture. The history of 
Rwanda was not characterized by violence…Killing was a taboo to the extent that you could find 
out social norms in our society.” (Int.1) This claim found the support of an elder in Giti. To him, 
culture was fundamentally regarded as the regulatory element of human behavior in ancient 
times. There had been sufficient social norms, which prescribed what to do and not to do. There 
was no conventional law as is the case in the present day. Only culture was entrusted with the 
authority to lead people (Int.7). He was, rather, convinced that genocide is a result of crisis in the 
system of social values and of socially accepted taboos. Some people observe the deviation from 
socially accepted taboos in different uncommon behavior that attracted the attention of many. 
 
A retired public servant reported one of the most scandalous scenes he had ever seen. In Giti, he 
regrets, “people invaded the school over there and tore schoolbooks that pupils used. They even 
invaded the church and threw away the Eucharist all over the village or ate them in public places. 
What a pity [, he exclaimed angrily]. There was no taboo any more. It is also documented that a 
woman was shot dead while she was dressed in a cassock that priests wear when preaching. So 
as priests were not around, the woman got it from the place it was kept with others and put it on 
up to toe, you see. That was something unusual.” (Int.3) Referring to comparable cases, a senator 
and former prefect of rural Kigali argued that social values were deteriorating, which led many 
to support genocide. “The values that most regulated harmony had deeply depreciated. As a 
result, many gave full attention to anti-values during the crisis time. Values were suppressed to 
the advantage of the anti-values. The latter have always affected daily life practices to the extent 
that at a given moment, the leading elites misled those there were formerly responsible for 
leading.” (Int.5) First, the blame is put on the Church, with which the deterioration of social 
values is associated. Particularly, the interviewees argued that there was a strong mismatch 
between Western and Rwandan culture. As an example, the interviewees regarded Christianity as 
an interfering factor to the traditional religion and legitimate norms. An official at the 
Commission for Unity and Reconciliation said that the traditional religion, around which social 
taboos and uniting values were built, was seen as backward
71
: 
 
Christian religions came and neutralized our social taboos. Because of social taboos, no one 
could kill his or her own children; there could be no orphans and street children roaming 
around. Since religions have changed a lot of things in our culture, it happened that people 
killed children and we experienced orphans and street children in the neighborhood. Children 
could no longer obey their elders and good social relationships were somehow limited by 
those religions, which killed the accepted social taboos…I think that the most prominent 
problem that we had is that colonialism and religions brought us cultures from abroad. 
Therefore, we were considered backward and we lost our values. (Int.18) 
 
                                               
71Local scholars have linked the crisis of social values to colonization and Christianity. They “imposed new values which gradually 
shook the Rwandan traditional values. The imported…values, weakened the structures of the society, its institutions and belief 
system. Instruments and symbols of social cohesion, friendship and solidarity, particularly the kubandwa and guterekera cult as 
well as the kunywana practice, collective responsibility, were all swept away [as a result of the Western civilization and 
Christianity].” (Republic of Rwanda 2006:160). 
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The fact that the Christian religion speedily spread over Rwanda made it easy to drastically 
change the values setting and the belief system. And the presence of the Church everywhere led 
many to perceive Rwanda as a religious community. An official at the Commission of Unity and 
Reconciliation Office put it as follows: “In the morning, churches like St Michel and others are 
always overloaded. Last time, people told us that there were about 800 churches in Kibuye alone. 
So Rwanda is a religious community.” (Int.15) Even though the Church and the Christian 
religion were perceived as responsible for the deterioration of the system of social taboos, it was 
made clear that they also came with taboos and norms, which condemned violence, rape and any 
other kind of harm against humanity.  
 
Religion in social life 
 
The interviewees unanimously attested that Christianity played a key role in social life 
transformation. As an institution, religion regulates the behavior of believers. It prescribes what 
is appropriate to do and not to do. As strong taboo, for instance, it was a strict prohibition to 
perform violence not only in the church, but also in its surroundings. Should a fugitive from 
violence enter the church, those who were running after him or her were unconditionally 
required to desist. A political party official referred to history: “In 1963, people could flee to the 
church, the priest, no matter whether he is white or black, Tutsi or Hutu, without any weapon 
whatsoever, and could say, „I do not want anyone to abuse God‟s people in the monastery‟. The 
perpetrators could fear to be cursed with wrong things, and they could go back without 
performing any harm whatsoever. No one could abuse a person who succeeded to seek 
protection in the Church because God wanted it to be that way. Since it was not the case during 
genocide time, it could mean that God wanted Tutsi to be killed.” (Int.20) Believers showed 
scrupulous respect to that prohibition for years in the past. 
 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has led to the total collapse of this prohibition. As the 
interviewees observed, the sacred places were demystified and the related taboos were 
challenged. As a result, perpetrators could perpetrate violence in churches. Against this collapse 
and demystification, the same interviewee reported: “Those who sought for God‟s protection in 
church were handed over to killers. Massacres in the church were brought to the attention of the 
general public on purpose. This fact meant that even the powerful God, Jesus, from whom they 
came to seek…protection had abandoned them. They could think that massacres were accepted 
by the Heavenly powers that have handed Tutsi over to death. The time the first person faced 
death in the church it became an eloquent fact to substantiate this argument. Since it was the case 
during genocide time, it could mean that God wanted Tutsi to be killed.” (Int.20) Under these 
circumstances, the interviewees argue, the Christian values formerly viewed as binding were 
destroyed. As a result, the supernatural powers that priests and parents, to a certain extent, 
exercised were challenged. This breakdown of Christian values was regarded as a clear path to 
violence, where the majority of the perpetrators were Christian believers. 
 
Otherwise, a strong belief among many interviewees was that Christianity as a religious doctrine 
preached not doing bad deeds to others, and importantly the interviewees argued of a total 
opposition of abuse in its values. Instead, they repeatedly pointed out its role in the destruction of 
the basis of the existing traditions and practices, which disconnected modernity from the 
traditional way of life. The interviewees showed that they yielded poor outcomes as a result of 
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neutralizing the institutions that the society accepted to be the channels for socialization 
processes to the system of social taboos. An elder in Murambi lamented: “There came the 
religious elite telling us that the Church had removed the taboos. Then, we forgot about our 
cultural, dos and don‟ts, and we followed what they told us. When we ignored our cultural, dos 
and don‟ts, we forgot that in our culture it was a taboo to do something bad to anyone. It was a 
taboo to abuse anyone. Taboos were our cultural secrets and we respected them. But, they came 
and weakened that by saying the Church had removed the taboos. Then, we ignored the taboos 
on which our culture was built. The taboos were our culture.” (Int.12) The advent of Christianity 
has brought an important implication to the attention of many interviewees. As a result of the 
removal of social taboos, the Church took away the authority of parents over their children and 
weakened the role of the family in socialization processes.  
 
Interference of the Church with politics and depreciation of parental authority 
 
The arrival of the European missionaries found that obedient behavior had long existed. Most 
people generally believed in supernatural powers. The interviewees established that they 
believed in God, whom they claimed made everything that existed. On the arrival of the 
missionaries, the interviewees reported, they exploited that base of religious belief. In so doing, 
they told Rwandans that the God they respected and believed in was not the true God. While 
tracing back events of his childhood, a politician reported: “The missionaries claimed that there 
was a powerful God which could even impose sanctions in case one was mistaken. And the one 
who represented him is the missionary who also proved to be powerful, could beat you and take 
land from you, and make you divorce from your wife. If this representative is powerful, God 
himself was certainly thought to be the most powerful.” (Int.20) With the arrival of the 
missionaries, there has been a shift in role models, from the parents to the representatives of the 
newly introduced supernatural powers. This led to a marked shift in the local administration, 
which found support in the existing obedience. 
 
Upon direct observation during the colonial era, a public servant, now retired, reported the 
recruitment of the Rwandan elite by the Roman Catholic Church. Many people were baptized, he 
disclosed, “because the king had been baptized first. Because the king had accepted, the chiefs 
had to do so in order to show they were behind him and for the king to do favors to them. 
Baptism was so quick…Christians just went behind the king.” (Int.3) The choice of the King 
became the national choice. As a politician established, “Rwandans thought the subscription to 
the King‟s choice would be meaningful since they had considered him as the most powerful 
human of the country…The modern religion was given full support because the local elite had 
surrendered to missionaries who turned to be the most powerful.” (Int.20) He suggests that these 
circumstances caused ordinary people to have no choice left other than surrendering to the new 
role model. At the same time, there were other important incentives. As he put it, some could be 
awarded medals and so many advantages. They could also be given jobs while others could be 
promised heaven after life.  
 
To the same interviewee, the adherence of ordinary people to modern religion meant a social 
promotion to ordinary people. “The element of power was a driving force of rapid popular 
adhesion to Christianity. It was obvious since the missionaries represented the administration 
that they had taken over from the monarchy.” (Int.20) Given this shift in role models, coupled 
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with the removal of the traditional religion – long seen as the carrier of social taboos – an elder 
in Murambi lamented the loss of parental authority over children: “A parent would call a child 
and say: „my child, it is not done to do this or that‟, and the child kept it in mind that it was not 
done, that doing it would be disobeying, that one might be punished, that God could punish 
anyone who does something that is a taboo. Then, when we lost the culture, we adopted other 
cultures, we forgot about our taboos. People turned out to see that it was nothing to beat and 
wound someone. People started abusing others and they felt it was like clearing their throats. 
They never took it as a taboo any longer. The loss of culture caused all the evils and led to the 
genocide happenings.” (Int.12) 
 
An official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation suggested that weak authority over 
children was seen as exonerating parents from some requirements, such as the street children 
phenomenon, deadly violence, and disobedience. She said that in the long run individualistic 
values took over from the communitarian and kinship society. “Your love towards people gets 
less [,]…to the extent to be selfish. Look at our plans, you will have to pay school fees but when 
relatives come to you and ask you for their children‟s fees, you take it as if they were interfering 
in your programs. Even though it is good on one hand, it is a kind of culture that detaches you 
from society. When you are detached from the society, you do not care about its members‟ 
problems and they do not take you as theirs [,] since you do not have love for them. You only 
consider your interests before anything else.” (Int.18) She linked the street children phenomenon 
and disobedience to weakness of parental authority and the family as an institution. 
 
On a higher level, the blame for the deterioration in values and belief systems is put on 
colonialism. The formal education served as strong channels by which the local elite acquired the 
culture of the colonial authorities – i.e. colonizers and missionaries. As the interviewees showed, 
the former served as role models of the local elite, meant to fit into the pre-set order that divided 
the population into antagonistic social categories. This is the way a former parliamentarian in 
Murambi spoke: “The first mission of the colonizer was to divide people. This was even the 
motto of the Belgian colonizers: divide and rule. This means that it was absolutely a must to 
divide people. If you wanted to divide Rwandans you would start from those who attend your 
class. This is something you can read from history. When the colonizers arrived, they claimed 
that Tutsi did not have any possible similarity with other Africans. They held that Tutsi are close 
to the Europeans, clever and born to rule. Thus, the colonizers came saying that a Tutsi is a 
clever person, he is the only person able to rule, he was born for nothing else other than ruling. 
The Tutsi came to a point where he developed this feeling, the superiority complex.” (Int.4) The 
interviewees emphasized strong patronage, and linked this situation to the construction of ethnic 
groups in Rwanda. 
 
The Tutsi aristocracy – under the nationalist political party, the Rwandese National Union 
(UNAR) – was made a strong pillar to support the colonial power. As per claims for immediate 
independence, this party was overthrown to the benefit of the Hutu elite – under the Democratic 
Republic Movement, MDR-Parmehutu – who perpetuated discriminatory practices, as a result of 
a failure to build the political ideology upon the problems that people themselves had.  The 
interviewees considered that the same discriminatory practices left a strong legacy behind that 
affected many of the next generations. A senator and former journalist referred to the statements 
of the late Catholic Church Bishop, Nikiwigize Phocas, to an international journalist: “Tutsi are 
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fundamentally not bad people by birth, but by nature.” (Int.15) The same interviewee claimed 
that this is the same bishop who told the national radio, “Even God did no longer want them 
anymore”. 
 
The interviewees perceived similar statements as an official call made to many believers, so that 
they would understand violence as legitimate. To support this claim, a senator and former 
minister concluded: “The process of violence speeds up when Church officials like the 
Archbishop Vincent Nsengiyumva
72
 straddles the Church and politics. As a result of closely 
working with the then government, he successfully exercised influence on both religious and 
political grounds.” (Int.22) In close connection with this observation, the interviewees claimed 
the Church to have interfered with politics. The interviewees asserted that the interference of the 
Church with the State dates back to the arrival of the missionaries. A historian reported as 
follows: “The Church‟s interference of the Church with the State derives from the White 
Father‟s philosophy from Lavigerie who used to urge his priests to go and collaborate with the 
governments they were joining.” (Int.26) A former deputy governor in Giti found the 
interference of the Archbishop Vincent Nsengiyumva within that framework. 
 
As he reported, the Archbishop used to attend different political meetings under the pretext that 
the former president had attended the seminary school. “People at all levels go to church. 
Religious men are very strong then. I think that even all along our history, if the government had 
not cooperated with religions, however strong the leader might be, it would not have lasted long. 
Thus, religious men are very strong in that almost all of us have churches to which we belong.” 
(Int.3) This context brought the interviewees to regard Rwanda as a religious community, 
whereby politics and religion were mixed up at a certain time in history. An official at the 
Commission for Unity and Reconciliation said: “Churches closely collaborate with the 
government so that it cannot be easy to cut a line between politicians and religious leaders. So, 
churches replaced culture and made us lose values. When [King] Rudahigwa was baptized, 
Christianity was spread all over the country. However, it caused many problems.” (Int.18) 
Within this context, the interviewees established the clergy as bystanders, on the one hand, and 
active in violence, on the other.  
 
A former mayor in Murambi put it as follows: “Rwanda has not been a country where, in line 
with Zimbabwe, a bishop could realize that the country is collapsing and publicly condemn the 
political officials responsible for the collapse. It was not common where a bishop condemned 
violence. They kept quiet because they collaborated with the government. It would have been a 
contradiction if they did. And priests could not take the first step to condemn violence before 
their superiors in the hierarchy did.” (Int.33) The interviewees established a historical pattern of 
collaboration between the government – i.e. the vertical structure of power – and civil society 
organizations – i.e. horizontal structures of power. This was underlined as having made Rwanda 
a different society as compared to many others.  
                                               
72 Many support the contention that the Catholic Church had a major influence in the pre-colonial history of Rwanda. On their 
arrival, in 1899, the French Catholic „White Fathers‟ set up a number of missions across the country within a few years. During 
the colonial period, many document that “the Catholic Church worked hand-in-hand with the German and Belgian authorities, 
and after Independence there has been remarkably high degree of political intertwining between the Church and the state” 
(Millwood 1996:17). The recruitment of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church in Kigali to politics is understood from 
this background. In the mid-1970s, he “became a member of the Central Committee of the ruling MRND party, official confessor 
to President Habyarimana‟s wife and close to the akazu inner circle of Hutu nationalists.” (Millwood 1996:17). 
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This is the way an officer to the Ombudsman‟s Office illustrated the point: “Both structures have 
always been working hand in hand so that any decision from the vertical structure was 
immediately implemented by the horizontal structure. This had entered the…mentality of 
Rwandans. Contrary to Zambia, for instance, the vertical structures could want to implement 
some initiatives but the horizontal structures could successfully resist inefficiencies. Whenever 
leaders wanted to influence the people negatively, teachers and Church leaders resisted and 
neutralized its counterpart.” (Int.26) The failure in Rwanda was connected to its history of 
colonization. 
 
Many of the interviewees considered that the commitment to violence had something to do with 
the patronage by the colonial authorities, which alternated between the Tutsi aristocracy and the 
Hutu elite. Some interviewees went further, to isolate violence from the pre-colonial era. A 
political official and former minister put it thus: “Violence was an importation of colonials. 
Abusing, beating and wounding someone to death were out of the Rwandan culture. Colonialism 
and religion have drastically led to the crisis of cultural values. During genocide time, Rwandans 
happened to take violence as the normal
73
 thing to do, as a result. Otherwise, violence is 
demonstrated to be something not embedded in the Rwandan culture. During the Kingdom era, 
property could be taken from you if only you have extremely been wrong. But being subjected to 
violence because of who you are, it was very unusual and completely forbidden.” (Int.20) The 
same source suggested that the normal aspect of violence made it demystified, as a result of the 
normless situation
74
 that the breakdown of socially accepted taboos brought with them. 
 
The absence of social regulations 
 
Many of the interviewees supported that genocide led to large-scale violence, as a result of the 
absence of norms. If one should go to street children and tell them to go plundering someone‟s 
house, a senator and former minister assumed that they would not think intelligently. To have 
them doing what you require to do, he argued, you “only need to remove moral barriers or 
prohibitions. In other words, you would need to make sure the police do not intervene and then 
they would do whatever they please [without remorse].” (Int.9) In the case of Rwanda, this is the 
way he reported evolving events: “The authority showed that there was nothing morally, 
physically or psychologically forbidden. For example, in the military, officers turned out to be 
led, beaten and disobeyed by their subordinates so that people thought there was no hierarchy.
75
 
At the same time, people could dismiss their burgomasters and re-appoint the former ones even 
though they could have been dismissed appropriately in the past. All over the country, they could 
                                               
73 The respondent is not trying to value violence. He refers to the fact that violence had become common. Therefore, he is not 
judging whether violence is either abnormal or a case of malfunction or of social deviation. The normality of violence resides in 
being a general trend in time and geographical space. 
74 The normless situation defines an anomic situation understood from the Durkheimian perspective as a situation that is free from 
social regulations. In other words, it is a situation whereby both the social taboos and the conventional laws are blind to violent 
behavior. 
75 As an illustration, Shalom Ntahobari became a „big man‟ as the slaughter began in Butare: “He swaggered around town with 
grenades hanging from his belt, often armed with a gun which he once aimed in insolent jest at a local burgomaster. One witness 
asserted that even military officers saluted Shalom[, a notorious Interahamwe militia in Butare town]. He controlled his own 
barrier in front of the family house near the university campus where he bullied his militia subordinates as well as passersby.” 
(Waller 2002:255). The lack of social regulations destroyed the institutions to the benefit of perpetrators of genocidal violence.  
5
  
 
155 
bring ex-leaders back to power. That was a way of upsetting the stability of…power, for people 
to see that nothing was morally forbidden anymore, that they would do as they pleased.” (Int.9) 
This was understood as an important role that the leadership played to pave the way for large-
scale violence. 
 
A local government leader in Giti emphasized: “The elite blind eye laid a strong foundation to an 
ungoverned situation. When it became the case, popular support developed in favor of the abuse 
whatsoever. It means violence. Of course, popular support performs differently when 
dictatorship applies. Not only ordinary people, but also most of the counter-elite were subjected 
to the dictatorship. The context of political crisis made it an easy process during the 1994 
Rwandan conflict. As a result, the counter-elite also subscribed to violence.” (Int.2) In short, the 
interviewees identified the crisis in social regulations, in social taboos and traditional values as 
being related to colonialism and religion and to be closely linked with the explosion genocidal 
violence in 1994 Rwanda.  
Social pact 
 
The interviewees highlighted the social pact as an important variable on the basis of which one 
could predict behavior in given ways. It defined as a contract freely engaging two individuals at 
a certain level of friendship, with effect on their respective families. They could taste the blood 
of each other to express the feeling of blood sharing and, therefore, the commitment to be 
faithful to one another.   
 
A Murambi businessman put it thus: “Betrayal was not common in the past. Instead we had 
heroes. People could commit themselves to integrity and could be proud of having been useful to 
one another. People could come to the level of friendship where they taste each other‟s blood.” 
(Int.1) Those under the terms of contract – termed „abanywanyi  – defined best friends, while 
their families – termed „imiryango minywanyi‟ – defined the best friend families from which at 
least two individuals entered the contract. The parties engaged and involved – the family 
members – in the contract committed between themselves: to strengthen friendship, to not cause 
harm to each other, to assist each other in case of danger, to exchange gifts (cows, land and 
brides). A myriad of social taboos were constructed around the social pact to keep consistent the 
commitments. During a focus group discussion held at Agakomeye cell, participants explained 
ways in which this kind of social contract served as a strong obstacle to the course of genocide. 
 
They concluded: “It was like when they had a traditional culture based on blood-confirmed 
promise of friendships. Anyone who would go against the promise would bear the consequences. 
I think they did not succeed in their plans a hundred per cent because there was that cultural 
friendship that dates back to our ancestors‟ time.” (Foc.1) An official at the Commission for 
Unity and Reconciliation referred to the social pact as an aspect of culture with which “it was not 
done to harm to a blood-bother or his children before some values eroded” (Int.15) Despite the 
erosion of such values, the interviewees strongly supported that such social pacts created and 
strengthened social ties in some cells, not only at the individual level, but also at the extended 
family level. The Karagari cell in Giti surfaced the most in supporting this viewpoint. In a focus 
group discussion, it was established that the “culture prohibited the abuses of any kind against 
human beings or material property of those we have been in social pact with” (Foc.4) It was 
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supported that the blood-confirmed promise to assist and to be faithful to one another – as the 
social contract prescribes – applied to preserve a non-violence environment over the last 
decades.  
 
Referring to Giti, the interviewees found non-violence was common over the history of violence 
in Rwanda. A village leader reported: “It dates back to many generations. As you might know, 
the 1994 genocide was a continuation of the sequences of violence of 1959, 1963, and 1973. But 
frankly speaking, Giti was not involved in any of those sequences. Whenever I asked the root 
cause of that difference, the parents have told us the leadership was efficient.” (Int.25) The same 
interviewee said that in the past, deputy chiefs of the monarchy era also successfully prevented 
wars extending to Giti. Only a few houses were set on fire in 1959. Those whose houses were set 
on fire could be given accommodation by their neighbors. In only a few days, the neighbors 
would rebuild their houses. 
 
As a result, the interviewee concluded, not many Giti residents fled Rwanda in 1959. The 
information available on the difference in Giti was found as a result of oral transmission. The 
interviewees found that information mainly describing not only different scenes of violence in 
the neighboring areas, but they also described different strategies by which Giti protected those 
that violence would target the most. Most interviewees accorded to the core idea, as summarized 
by a former leader of Giti: 
 
People who witnessed the 1959 events tell us that there were no massacres in Giti even 
though Tutsi fled from their places. The 1959 massacres started from Gikomero, came 
across Muhazi Lake and reached Giti. Hutu were telling Tutsi to flee from their places 
since the situation was getting worse and worse. People also told us that Hutu could even 
accompany Tutsi up to the borders and stay with their cows. It is then understandable 
that, in that time, people did not massively participate in the massacres. Maybe a few 
number of people died, I am not sure, but the rate of participation in massacres was at a 
low level. People were somehow confused and could not know the origin of that 
malicious idea. This pushed Hutu to tell Tutsi that it was advisable for them to flee to 
other countries. That cultural aspect was present in Giti and was from time to time 
increasing. Moreover, it is not surprising that Hutu of Giti could go to Uganda and visit 
Tutsi in their refugee camps or elsewhere they were living. This relationship…[between 
inside-Giti residents and refugees to Uganda remained visible]. (Int.32) 
 
The interviewees already found an explanation for this difference in the social taboos 
which most helped to build the blood brotherhood. However, they found that the blood 
brotherhood was not a mono-causal explanation. They also identified the impact of the 
social pact. In other words, they considered the clientele relationship between two unequal 
parties – the patron and the vassal – as a social pact.  The interviewees most cited the 
„ubuhake‟76 as the most widely known clientele system. Even if the system involved two 
                                               
Over the pre-colonial era, the ubuhake was a clientele system that involved two persons. One was in the position of power and 
wealth – the shebuja (patron) – and usually was a Tutsi. Another was in the position of client – the garagu or umugaragu (vassal), 
and was usually a Hutu. The shebuja offered protection and the promise of a cow to the garagu after an undetermined period of  
service. Both parties entered the contract „freely‟, and on this basis, the ubuhake differed from slavery. However, it kept the 
garagu inferior with very little opportunities for class mobility. Instead, the ubuhake involved considerable exploitation of the 
garagu by the shebuja until the Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa abolished it in 1954 (Twagirimana 2007:162). In short, it was “a 
form of unequal clientship contract entered into by two men, the shebuja (patron) and the mugaragu (client),” (Prunier 1995:14) 
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unequal parties, the interviewees showed that it yielded different results. In some areas, the 
interviewees reported that the inequality between parties involved was given trivial 
importance.  
 
For instance, a former secretary in the colonial administration from Giti said, “The patron 
and client behaved as brothers. The Tutsi were not so much disdainful of Hutu. There were 
inequalities but the gap was not so big. That was an opportunity.” (Int.3) With this, the 
clientele system was perceived as a factor for community cohesion. For instance, a focus 
group discussion in Tanda cell established: “People enjoyed the clientele system since their 
masters appreciated them. The clientele system was like an educational institution from 
which people learnt to be non-violent towards their masters.” (Foc.9) This was an 
argument that deviated from what people commonly support, as the interviewees 
considered the case of Murambi, blood-confirmed promise poorly applied, as a result of 
immigration. 
 
Conversely, the interviewees in Giti substantiated ways in which the ubuhake turned into an 
opportunity for a peaceful environment, while it was a divisive factor elsewhere. A former leader 
of Giti summarized it as follows: 
 
Tutsi had cows and could give some to Hutu. Some Hutu had good Tutsi masters up to 
the 1954…[redistribution of cattle and land, as ordered by the King]. A Hutu could then 
say: „This Tutsi has been a good master of mine‟, and felt he was grateful to him. Even 
though some Tutsi houses were destroyed in 1959, a Hutu could be faithful to his master 
as if they had made a pact. He could then say to his master: „You have never been unkind 
to me.‟ Furthermore, Tutsi respected Hutu during subjection works77…I have a feeling 
that the clientele system has yielded positive outcomes, which are satisfactory to both 
Hutu and Tutsi. The subjection works for a cow did not aim to enslave Hutu. Tutsi 
respected the so-called subjected Hutu during subjection works. This fact also helped a 
lot…If we look into the clientele system in the past Rwanda, we notice that a cow was 
somehow the cause of them to be in a close relationship. A vassal who was given a cow 
should not show any sign of ungratefulness towards his master. (Int.32) 
 
The interviewees observed extensive intermarriages strongly explanained non-violence in Giti. 
There was a time, people said, when it was not easy to find a Tutsi without biological ties of the 
Hutu, and vice versa. A researcher said that there could be neither „pure Hutu‟ nor „pure Tutsi‟, 
such as in Rukiga, where the „pure Hutu‟ was the „Umukiga,‟ given that there were not 
                                                                                                                                                       
which resulted in cow giving. Of course much depended on the shebuja because “some were real Scrooges and the poor 
mugaragu, who in the meantime had many social and economic obligations towards his patron, would never get anywhere at all 
with his deal.” (Ibid) Hence, the ubuhake, or cattle clientship, was seen as the central traditional practice that tied Hutu and Tutsi 
into solid relations of deep exploitation and inequality (Uvin 2001:77). Importantly, Willwood (1996:23) argues, “One person 
could be a client as well as a patron. Even Tutsi patrons of Hutu could be clients of yet another Tutsi. Theoretically, the only 
person ultimately not a client of this system was the Mwami himself.” 
77 This claim shows that the Ubuhake, as an institution, has played a key role in predicting non-violence in Giti. Unlike this 
particular area, the clientele system intensified hostilities as hardship grew. As a result, political mobilizations to topple Tutsi 
were always predictable. Sharp disagreements in ideologies on the eve of genocidal violence in 1959 onwards were a tangible 
demonstration of this predictability. Prunier (1995:14) summarized it as follows: “For the Tutsi ideologues it was a mild practice 
amicably linking different lineages into a kind of friendly mutual help contract. For the Hutu ideologues it was an ironclad form 
of quasi-slavery enabling the Tutsi masters to exploit the poor downtrodden Hutu. Of course the reality was somewhat 
complicated.” 
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previously mixed ethnic relations (Int.29). A focus group discussion held in Karagari cell 
understood intermarriage as a basic social pact by which violent behavior was made difficult to 
take place. An elder in this group put it as follows: “Intermarriages have translated a social pact 
you could not afford to break down…It was a very strong and binding contract. The clientele 
system, the intermarriage and cow-giving practices have built strong ties among people.” (Foc.4) 
The social ties among people were supported to have developed not only from the clientele 
relationships but also from the traditional religion. 
 
Emphasized here is specifically the religious ritual known as kubandwa.
78
 The interviewees said 
that by virtue of the oaths taken the moment the initiates performed a religious ceremony, they 
were considered as brothers and sisters in their traditional religion. Those who were converted to 
that religion could not harm each other. A former parliamentarian in Murambi spoke as follows: 
“In terms of religion, the traditional religion with Ryangombe inculcated the Rwanda values. 
People were unimaginably trustful. First of all, you entered a social pact with those to whom you 
have been godfather in the traditional religions: he or she was converted to your blood children. 
Equally, you turned into a blood brother or sister to his or her family members. You could never 
fail to be faithful to those you entered with in such a social pact. They could never fail to rescue 
you from danger.” (Int.4) As this interviewee argued, the same feeling between the godparents 
and the initiates extended to the initiates among themselves. The initiates of the same cohort 
perceived each other in the same way as if they were biological brothers. It was supported that 
the values inherited from this religious ritual bore fruits until the missionaries toppled the 
traditional religion. With the different empirical claims, it was supported that the understanding 
of social pact took different patterns in different sequences of time. At the same time, it variously 
served different purposes. 
 
A focus group discussion held in Murehe cell spoke about the „uburetwa‟79 that was engineered 
by the Belgian administration – supported by the monarchy administration – to impose official 
taxes on Hutu. As they put it, “The contract which formerly served the purpose of establishing 
social ties turned into an administrative requirement.” (Foc.6) Until the eve of genocidal 
violence, the social pact still engaged the same nature of parties – ordinary people and the 
incumbents. A minister described it thus: “It is a contract between me and you that you will lead 
me and I follow. It means that you give me trust to lead you in a very efficient way. That is the 
most important thing. For me to agree your leadership, it is under the condition of efficiency. 
When you poorly lead me, then you have a bigger share to blame…[An] enlightened questioning 
of society needs to perform constantly, as feedback. It means to be able to say, „you person 
who‟s leading us, are we on the right track?‟ Then you come back and convince me.” (Int.17) 
                                               
78 Kubandwa was an initiation ritual that aimed to bring young adults under the spiritual protection of Ryangombe, the chief of 
imandwa, spirits of dead heroes. Previous graduates of the initiation, referred to as cult fathers or mothers, taught the new 
initiates about the secret language and songs honoring Ryangombe and the other imandwa. The initiates were painted with white 
clay and acted wildly. Calling each other Ryangombe, taking a beating, and swearing obscenities against their mothers, were signs 
that they had grown up. The initiates were also forced to drink a sour, red potion, which was symbolic of blood; this meant that 
the initiates had drunk of the same blood and had become adults. At the end of the ceremony, the initiates lay beside their cult 
parents for a moment to take on the heroic qualities of imandwa and to begin a new life as adults (Twagirimana 2007:106). 
79 Uburetwa was a form of forced labor in return for access to land. It was imposed upon the Hutu peasant farmers by 
Rwabugiri‟s administration (1860-1895) (Millwood 1996:9) through Tutsi chiefs. Under the Belgian colonial administration 
(1916-1962), uburetwa became part of the tax regime imposed on Hutu male adults and justified as a contribution to national 
development (Twagirimana 2007:162). 
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This interviewee lamented the poor “decentralization of powers through participation, through 
encouraging people to voice their concerns to question, consciously empower them…With this, 
we need a bigger base of elitists, the middle class to be able to stream [an informed] obedience.” 
(Int.17) The same interviewee said this base was still in its embryonic phase when genocidal 
violence started. 
 
As it appeared, this typology of social pact required empowered contracting parties, otherwise 
the intermediation of civil society organizations – such as the media – would serve an interlink if 
they are active. Given that, according to a former prefect of rural Kigali, “Rwandans have 
already a remarkable amount of obedience vis-à-vis whoever they consider to be elder.” (Int.5) 
This interrelationship was of extreme need. Because of lower levels of empowerment, the same 
prefect said, “the common citizenry had very rudimentary capacities to make choices. This fact 
has served an opportunity for the elite to make them take part in violence sheeply, simply 
because the leader has invited them to do so.” (Int.5) The interviewees identified this as a strong 
obstacle for the common citizenry to resist the inefficiencies of the elite. But also, the 
interviewees showed a strong absence of a clear-cut distinction between the hierarchy – that is, 
the vertical structure of power – and civil society organizations – meaning the horizontal 
structures of power. Under these circumstances, it was understood that the common citizenry 
were repeatedly the victims of the inefficiencies of leaders. Given the above, the interpersonal 
contracts between the common citizenry and the incumbents were fundamentally led by trust 
based on normative claims. A former leader of Giti said: 
 
Leaders should lead their people to the right way. They should not mislead them. That 
word „leader‟ becomes therefore self-explanatory. People know that their leaders are wise 
and intelligent and that they should organize their leadership to make it more profitable for 
their people. Furthermore, the common citizenry knows that a leader fails to respond to 
their needs not because he or she is unable to do so but because of his/her will. Every 
citizen can wish that the mayor of a district comes and shows them how to farm since he/ 
she has a car and other means. Why doesn‟t he/she come to show them how to plot a road? 
How does he/she fail to manage his/her people? Citizens who can follow leaders in 
wrongdoing can also follow them in doing good things. (Int.32) 
 
Given different characteristics of the common citizenry, many considered that the leaders are the 
engines of the society. The extent to which they are efficient determines the amount of violence 
to expect in their behavior. Also, different typologies of social pact – i.e., the clientele system, 
intermarriages, the traditional religious ritual (kubandwa), forced labor (uburetwa) and the 
political mandate – were understood as variables which contributed to the grassroots thinking in 
particular contexts. Under specific cultural, environmental, political and historical contexts and 
the personality traits of the leadership, these variables, however, yielded different outcomes in 
Giti and Murambi. The interviewees established the non-violence in Giti as historic. On the other 
hand, they tended to support that violence was also historic in Murambi. A native of Murambi 
who married in Giti reported: 
 
I remember about the ex-leader of the commune of Murambi, Gashugi, and the ex-leader of 
the commune of Gakenke, Kagubari. We were in Gakenke and others were in Murambi. Hutu 
in Gakenke discriminated against Tutsi in Murambi. And Hutu in Murambi discriminated 
against Tutsi in Gakenke together with moderate Hutu. Kagubari‟s mother was Tutsi and so 
was his wife. Then, people said: „what brings us against that hybrid? He will only have our 
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people killed!‟ People like Sebazungu started going against him until he was removed from 
power. Then, Gakenke fused with Murambi, which continued to be under the leadership of 
Gashugi after the fusion. Gashugi could say: „I have exterminated most Tutsi in Murambi‟. 
There remained those who meant nothing, who could not stop them from doing whatever they 
pleased. There was a marsh called Nyamarebe between Kawangire and Gakenke. They started 
singling out men and boys and they went to kill them in the marsh at night. I saw many of 
those killings. They killed many people. It was back in the times of parties such as UNAR and 
so many others. The MRND had not come yet…I tell you they killed many Tutsi! Gashugi and 
policemen took Tutsi away and they never came back. They started going to take Tutsi 
schoolboys from schools for them to exterminate the ethnic group. (Int.16) 
 
The interviewees said the violence increased, as the leadership changed from one another. During 
a focus group discussion held in Karenge cell, a native of Murambi who also married in Giti, 
reported as follows: “When Alexis Rwagashayija took over from [Gashugi, former bourgomaster 
of Murambi] he was worse until Gatete came in to lay the ground for genocide.” (Foc.5) The then 
vice-governor said that the coming to office of Gatete was a bad fate for Murambi. It turned into 
an opportunity for this vice-governor to learn about the rivalries that used to characterize Murambi 
during elections. He reported thus: “It was said that Gatete had gone mad because some people 
were opposed to him as he was rivaling with Munyakayanza who was a member of parliament 
then. I was told to go and see but I found that he was sane. You understand how much people had 
differences between themselves.” (Int.3) On the basis of these claims, among many others, the 
interviewees established that violence was rooted in the past of Murambi. 
Institutions for obedience 
 
Consistent with earlier paragraphs, the family, in its extended sense, education, the 
administration – under the monarchy and the colonial authorities – and the religion – i.e., 
traditional and modern – have been the institutions which were most involved in the process of 
socialization. Against the extended family, for instance, the interviewees said that the 
socialization of children was not limited to the nuclear family. It also involved the relatives of 
the parents and neighbors. Equally, socialization processes expected adults to make sure younger 
children conformed to the accepted values and norms in the society. A primary teacher in 
Murambi reported: “Previously in Rwanda, relatives and neighbors used to help parents to 
educate their children. In an informal way, they inculcated the basic manners that were socially 
accepted. He or she could be taught what is required to be done and not done so that they showed 
respect in the way they spoke to others. In the long run, this informal socialization has brought 
Rwandans to trust the leaders‟ opinions.” (Int.11) The research showed that families, schools and 
churches have most contributed in perpetuating such obedient behaviors.  
 
Also, the research highlighted the importance of theItorero,
80
 formerly understood as an 
institution through which the youth made a smooth transition from childhood to adult life. A 
former deputy chief in the kingdom era reported: “It provided the opportunity to introduce 
younger people to the adult way of life. The latter could build brotherhood by sharing the same 
room, learn dancing, sports of all kind, good manners, some aspects of the Rwandan culture, 
                                               
80 In the present day, the Itorero has become a Rwandan initiative, a legitimate channel for informal education from which the 
participants harmonize knowledge on very specific issues. To date, it has served as a forum for various social groups to discuss 
national unity, reconciliation and development issues, among other things. 
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such as mutual respect, the folklore, self-defense and military techniques. The Itorero is meant to 
be an institution through which adults inculcated the accepted values. It also prepared the youth 
for war, which aimed to protect the sovereignty of Rwanda and to conquer the neighboring 
kingdoms.” (Int.7) The elite, earlier understood as the engine of social change in the society, 
were reported as being the pure products of the combination of these processes. Thereby, the 
elite required the common citizenry to actively participate in this process. 
 
The interviewees identified different methods – i.e., physical and legal coercion, bribery 
initiatives, cunning and persuasion, among others – that the elite used in order to garner popular 
support. With these methods, a village leader at Akabuga cell observed as follows: 
“…everything goes smoothly when you look at ordinary people. They are satisfied with little 
things. When an ordinary person has security…they do whatever the leader wants them to do.” 
(Int.19) This brought the interviewees to establish that the local government elite were equipped 
with power over ordinary people to make things happen. A village leader at Gakoni cell in 
Murambi suggested as follows: “Whatever that government would want them to do, they could 
do it. The leadership does things the way it wants, especially now that we have good times. 
Then, there are different means for the leadership to pass their good policies for people to be 
united again… It is through the leaders in general, the administration, and the authorities.” 
(Int.19) The local government elite were successful, not necessarily because of coercion. Rather, 
by living side by side with the common citizenry, this interviewee found that the ordinary people 
developed trust in the elite. The interviewees selected some factors to explain the obedient 
behavior that followed the interaction between the elite and the common citizenry. 
 
The implications of cultural prescriptions 
 
The socialization processes were identified at the top of the list. The interviewees found that 
Rwandans inculcate a strict cultural upbringing that extends from childhood over the entire 
lifespan. The most obvious outcome of this has been obedient people. An official at the 
Commission for Unity and Reconciliation illustrated as follows: “I am sure that in the Rwandan 
culture there were negative values that caused genocide. There are a number of facts on this. 
There is a proverb – …„umwera uturutse i bukuru bucya wakwiriye hose‟ – that says that 
information from upper echelons is quickly disseminated everywhere. Such proverbs mean that 
we have to implement what the leaders from upper echelons say.” (Int. 18)  To relate obedient 
behavior to strong hierarchies, a former parliamentarian referred to many other proverbs such as 
„irivuze umwami‟ – the word order from the King. The interviewees understood this as „no one 
could overturn the King‟s order‟. 
 
This meant that the administration in the hierarchy expects everybody, without exception, to 
obey orders from the upper echelons. The interviewee summarized: “No one else can dare come 
out and openly say, this is what the King has said and it is incorrect. In the Rwandan traditional 
culture, the King was responsible for all the population. This means that whether right or wrong, 
for the population the King was always infallible. The population usually found out that the King 
was wrong only in the event of a catastrophe. Some sayings identify the peasant as „nyamujya 
iyo bijya‟ – a „go-where-things-go person‟.” (Int.4) The interviewees established that the upper 
echelons emanated from the supreme power, either of the King or the colonial authorities. At 
different levels, interviewees said that the common citizenry trusted the capacities of the elite to 
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organize and stratify the society and, as a result, to do what the latter required them to do. A 
political official said: 
 
The common citizenry trusted the elite as knowledgeable people. That is what we have 
learnt in schools of the colonial authorities. You were sent to school to open the door for 
job opportunities. The fact that you are perceived as knowledgeable ordinary people feel 
they are inferior to you. What someone said remained true if the person was in close 
contact with the colonial authorities. As a result of strong trust in the knowledgeable 
colonial authorities, obedience ensued. Understood from the context of governance in the 
kingdom era, chiefs were not perceived as common people either. They had the mandate of 
the King who had full support of the population. Not only the King was perceived as 
knowledgeable, he also owned land and the cattle. Combined, knowledge and material 
properties made it possible that the common citizenry supported everything he said. Chiefs 
could say, the royal court wants us to do this and this.  It is therefore common that we who 
took over from the colonial elite and the traditional chiefs are having the trust of the lower 
echelons. That is why ordinary people come and ask, „how to go about this and this?‟ You, 
who came from Kigali, who talks to the central administration, you the eldest of our 
community, who talks to the sector or the cell leaders, how can we make this and this? 
(Int.20)  
 
The same interviewee claimed that an extreme dependence on the elite turned into a habit, 
whereby the common citizenry tended merely to do what it was required to do out of personal 
initiative. In a complementary way, a former parliamentarian concluded, “Obedience is 
something taught in our culture. The moment you could not obey your parents, for example, they 
could chasse you from home. That used to be the tradition. And the upbringing process is about 
obedience. Your child might want not to conform to what you tell him; but s/he can still do it 
against his or her will simply to get rid of sanctions.” (Int.4) The interviewees found that not 
many escaped from obedient behavior since disobedience implied forcing someone to do 
something and, to a large extent, implied serious punishment. Many supported that disobedience 
was one of the most serious sins, which could barely be tolerated. 
 
A community mediator in Gakoni cell referred to disobedience as follows: “It was considered as 
the source of all evils because with disobedience, people would not even respect or understand 
what their superiors would say and not listening to one‟s superiors could lead to other evils. A 
20-year-old person for example, for those who drank beer, young people like that could not be 
allowed to drink beer even though they wanted to. Their fathers had to give them the permission 
to.” (Int.12) The social control was identified at higher levels with a rigid hierarchy, which has 
roots in the nuclear family. As a senator said, “ there was strict respect towards the leaders in 
particular, and elders in general. Children obey their parents, and importantly, they obey their 
senior brothers. It is culturally prescribed that each senior person who can guide people in one or 
another field of specialization deserves respect.” (Int.22) And the strict respect in family 
gradually extended to the institutions of learning. With those institutions, the interviewes realized 
that the obedient values, habits and role models reproduced from one generation to another. A 
primary teacher in Murambi reported: “The example of seminary schools where younger pupils 
owed respect to their elder pupils who always were in charge of their younger fellow pupils.” 
(Int.11) As the interviewees established, people enjoyed the right to such respect in a descending 
order. A former leader in Giti claimed:  
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In a family, a husband is the head of the family. When he is not at home, his wife faces up 
to responsibilities and when she is absent, her first–born child replaces her. That is what 
happens in our culture and we know that anybody at any level of leadership should not 
disappoint their people but rather respond to their expectations. Rwandan people respect 
their leaders. Therefore, they all believed in what their burgomaster told them, for 
example. When the burgomaster was absent, there was a sector leader to replace him. The 
sector leader is in his turn replaced by a cell leader. That is how citizens understood it and 
that kind of respect was transmitted from generation to generation, and that was part of 
our culture. (Int.32) 
 
With this unchallengeable structure, there was an assumption that the elite was efficient enough 
and could not derail the common citizenry. As many claimed, a focus group discussion in the 
Agakomeye cell reported that ordinary people said that they never expected the leaders to 
mislead them. They expressed their arguments out of the terminology of „leadership‟. “The word 
„leadership‟ derives from the word „to lead‟. I can compare a leader to a driver. You take the car 
where you want it to go. An ordinary person then follows all the orders from someone who leads. 
Whether good or bad, you are led into their policies.” (Foc.1) In a similar way, the interviewees 
identified higher levels of passivity on the side of the common citizenry. A Church leader 
illustrated: “Under the presence of the elite, ordinary people behaved like sheep. They are sheep 
to be led, while the elite are shepherds. The shepherd is entitled with the right to make order[s] 
and the sheep follows.” (Int.8) Under these circumstances, the interviewees found passivity a 
required condition for the common citizenry to support destructive behavior. 
 
As an illustration, a primary teacher in Murambi said, “Ordinary people put into practice what 
the elite tell them so that in the long run they will accept to perpetrate massacres because they 
believe that the elite cannot be in the wrong…That is how it used to be in Rwanda.” (Int.11) This 
made it possible for the leaders to gain an advantage over the common citizenry because there 
were higher levels of obedience, the interviewees established. A former parliamentarian in 
Murambi described the danger of such an amount of obedience: “Whatever you would want 
ordinary people to get involved in would be possible since they are very much obedient. 
Consider, for instance, someone you require to kill and he or she kills. It means that they are 
relevant resources one could channel to the development or destruction of this country.” (Int.4) 
Given this, many interviewees, as a political official argued, confirmed: “The common citizenry 
was held hostage by those – the elite – who took over from the colonial and traditional elite. That 
is why they are not challenged. That is why they tell you to kill and kill. The common citizenry 
is not the master of its fate. Ordinary people have not been given opportunity to think for 
themselves.” (Int.20) Of course, some interviewees disclosed that the advent of Christianity has 
only made use of the already existing obedience.  
 
To the same interviewee, Christianity has seemed to exaggerate obedience, not only to the 
supernatural power of God but also to the missionaries and religious seen as incarnating those 
powers. The interviewees challenged the methodology of preaching to highlight the extent to 
which obedience was the most striking feature. An official at the Commission for Unity and 
Reconciliation raised the challenge as follows: “I always ask people why pastors and priests 
teach people or read them books including the Bible, and there is no discussion. People take 
priests and pastors as messengers of God. They do not ask them questions about theological 
theories that they do not understand…When you teach me without giving me an opportunity so 
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that I can tell you what I think or ask you questions, even if you tell me lies, I will accept it.” 
(Int.18) By this was meant that blind obedience emerged the most to predispose many of the 
common citizenry to violence. 
Legitimate violence 
 
In earlier paragraphs, some interviewees overemphasized Rwanda, as a peaceful environment 
until the arrival of the colonial masters. At the same time, they have underestimated conflict and 
violence over the kingdom era. At both national and regional levels, different struggles for power 
occurred in Rwanda in the past, which opposed Rwanda to neighboring countries.
81
  
 
Conflicts, as a senator drew from his experience, were elite-driven processes. He reported: “the 
elite have always privileged armed conflicts first. There would be pacific treaties that, when you 
consider Rwandans‟ ideology, used to be full of slyness, with the intention of one side to 
eliminate another side. In the past, there is no doubt that the elite would always put violence 
first.” (Int.9) He also suggested that the settlement of the Great Lakes Region has involved many 
violent conflicts to secure the country and people‟s survival. As he put it, the region is 
geographically strategic and there are resources and opportunities available. The latter served as 
a strong basis for fights to explode “in order to construct kingdoms as strong as Rwanda, in the 
past. We must have inherited the ways of managing conflicts. Even in ancient Rwanda, people 
had to use force for their survival and the defense of their kingdoms.” (Int.9). The war for 
conquest by King Rwabugiri was pointed out to be one of the most striking illustrations. By this, 
the interviewee highlighted that the local elite played a key role in the escalation of conflict, 
which brought violence with it. 
 
Unlike the above claims, many more interviewees stuck to the view that violence was imported 
by the colonial authorities. However, controversial arguments reported circumstances under 
which violence was regarded as a legitimate phenomenon that marked some sequences of life. A 
political party official reported: “In the ancient times, Rwandans could invade and kill an enemy. 
The enemy was the „other‟, but not a Rwandan. Rwandan warriors found the enemy on the 
battlefield outside Rwanda. Enemies could be killed. Only evil-doing people could be killed 
inside Rwanda.” (Int.20) To the same interviewee, lyrical genres and pastoral poetries “refer to 
the enemy as an alien; it is not a Rwandan. When people say, „I have killed so and so‟ it is a 
foreign enemy killed on the battlefield and not a Rwandan national. You cannot find any 
indicator of violence in the Rwandan culture. You only can find quarrels, and they form a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in most societies.” (Int.20) 
 
Equally, a researcher at the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) also described 
legitimate violence in cases of self-defense. He said: “You could engage in violence for self-
defense purpose. In some instances, the Rwandan culture accepted violence, especially in case of 
extending national borders. In this case, violence is oriented against the enemy when there is 
                                               
81 It is establsished that Rwandans have been relatively peaceful to one another. However, the same did not entirely apply to its 
relationship with surrounding countires. The literature on Rwanda emphasizes that the army was important for “defending the 
kingdom against external enemies, extending the kingdom by conquest, and stealing cattle from neighboring non-Rwandese 
tribes…All men were part of the intore (fighting regiments).” (Prunier 1995:14). 
5
  
 
165 
need to gain foreign territories.” (Int.29) He assumes that the elite dragged ordinary people into 
violence, which found justification in the past in the interest of security and of survival. 
Security and survival 
 
It was established that there are many factors that led to violence during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda. In the interviews, the security dilemma – self-protection – as well as survival – in the 
context of scarce resources – took the lead in explaining violence. The interviewees said that the 
elite created a situation of panic and of fear of Inyenzi or cockroaches (a dehumanizing generic 
name given to Tutsi) alleged to be killing people on their way. Within the context of land 
shortages, a former lawmaker in Murambi reported: 
 
It is true that under Habyarimana‟s regime, the Bakiga (people from the northern part of 
Rwanda), as this was in their policy of controlling the whole country, managed to bring their 
own people (Hutu people) to rule over the area in order to keep away the „cockroaches‟ 
[dehumanizing generic name given to Tutsi]. They did it. Not far from here, there is the 
national park of Akagera where people were resettled…[They were]… apparently…their 
relatives only, selected people seemingly. It was a bad omen because it is in the same place 
where genocide occurred more quickly than anywhere else around here. (Int.4) 
 
In connection with these claims, a political party official suggested, “Popular support for 
genocide was made a success when people were convinced that it was worth it to protect their 
lives and their country.” (Int.20) In connection with the survival-related perspective, the 
interviewees widely supported self-defense as leading the explanation of violence in some 
directions. A researcher of dialogue for peace put it this way: “With survival, inheritance of 
goods and of getting rid of the threat against survival are different interests that the elite 
promised ordinary people who accepted violence…When you are threatened, you have to protect 
yourself against the invader [, he emphasized]. Secondly, there must be the possibility of illicitly 
enriching yourselves, [that means] getting out of your misery.” (Int.29) The interviewees 
contended that the ownership of material possessions and the way out of physical threat were 
going to be possible only if the potential perpetrators made sure no one would come back to 
claim back the possessions and bring them to justice. 
 
This is also the way an official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation referred to this 
matter: “Some people participated in killing their fellow citizens because they were told that they 
were going to get hold of their properties like land, cows, houses, etc, and some others were 
promised to be given money. So, one might say: „I am going to kill our mayor in order to have 
his cows. But most of the time people wanted land‟.” (Int.18) Referring to Kiziguro, a religious 
man at Kiziguro parish confirmed this matter. He argued: “Most ordinary people have gone for 
violence just to satisfy very short-term or basic interests. Very ordinary people wanted to own 
cattle and farming plots. Also, committing violence was regarded as a means to seek and to 
sustain power positions.” (Int.8) 
 
Also many could escape from violence in Gikomero, a former leader of Giti observed, because 
the “Interahamwe militia began by eating cows before killing the owners of the cows. We could 
see what was happening there and we were told that people coming from Kigali could escape the 
killings thanks to their cows. They could run away while killers were slaughtering their cows and 
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sharing meat. In Kigali city, for example, hooligans living under bridges were more active in 
massacres than other people and were most of the time leading them. They could then say: „If I 
manage to kill that one I will own his/her fridge and pieces of furniture.‟ Poverty contributed in 
those malicious actions. Of course I cannot attribute genocide to poverty but the latter played a 
major role in the massacres.” (Int.32) The interviewees could pinpoint individual cases where 
bribery acts intensified popular support for violence. 
 
To illustrate, a former village leader in Murambi said: “Ordinary people thought that, by killing 
people, the goods would be theirs. They combined their hatred with people‟s poverty. They did 
not have any love in their heads. That is where the genocide originated.” (Int.16) A group 
discussion held in Cyeru cell also concluded that those who involved in killings in Murambi and 
Kinyami – in the former prefecture of Byumba – were rewarded and not punished for it. An elder 
participating in this session said: “Violence served an opportunity to the killers to free some land 
which, in turn, was distributed to them afterwards. Many thought the after 1994 violence would 
resemble the past in many ways. They probably thought that no sanction would apply or that 
there would be rewards. Had there not been any reward in the past, there would have been no 
reason to commit genocide.” (Foc.2) 
 
Drawing from actual experience, a cell leader at Cyeru made the following conclusion: “When 
ordinary people are told to kill and in turn own properties of those dead, we expect them to 
comply when they have been prior sensitized. Ordinary people are obedient to their leader, 
especially when they can satisfy basic needs, as a result.” (Int.25) This made it a justification, 
according to a businessman, of why ordinary people compromised themselves by accepting a 
little amount of money to commit violence. He observed: “One could promise FRW 5,000 
against one Tutsi dead in some areas of Kibuye, Gikongoro, Butare and Gitarama where 
resistance to violence formerly rated high.” (Int.1) In the same line of thought, the interviewees 
also recalled the case of former Rutare commune. An elder in Giti reported: “People told me that 
the leader of the commune used to say that people would gain according to how many heads they 
would have cut off. He had asked them to make lists for everyone to say whom they would have 
killed.” (Int.3)  
 
While the common citizenry strove to satisfy short-term needs, the interviewees showed that the 
elite targeted political promotion. With a strong emphasis on the problem of poverty, a retired 
public servant highlighted, “What happened in Rwanda is that at the beginning mistakes were 
made on purpose and those who made the mistakes wanted to force others into them so that they 
stayed in power for a long time.” (Int.3) With this background, the interviewees strongly 
supported the context of subsistence and the greed for power as intensifying factors for violence. 
On these bases, and many others, the interviewees concluded that the support for genocide was 
purposeful and goal-oriented.
82
 The interviewees accepted that the common citizenry hardly 
challenge the orders that the leaders imposed on them.  
                                               
82 It is true that the goals differ from context to context, and from one individual to another. That is why people generally “prefer 
more wealth, power, prestige, and esteem to less wealth, power, prestige, and esteem. If we believe one particular course of 
action will produce more positive outcomes, we will choose that course. In this way, our choice may be considered rational in 
that we have chosen to behave in a way that we believe will produce desired outcomes.” (Waller 2002:253). The idea behind 
rationality relates to the pre-determined subjective calculation, where the expected benefits extremely exceed the expected 
costs. This refers, according to Waller, to the rational self-interest understood as the struggle for material or psychological well-
being.  
7
  
 
167 
 
A community mediator in Murambi put it thus: “Normally, common people are very obedient. 
And in their obedience, they are not good at analyses. When you are a leader and you say this or 
that must be done, ordinary people will always be quick to act. Ordinary people can even do 
things without thinking about the importance of what they are doing. In the end, they can realize 
something done is important…Whenever leaders were determined to do something, that 
something was always done.” (Int.12) Not only did ordinary people commit themselves to avoid 
sanction by the elite, but material expectations also raised the interest in genocide. 
 
To sum up, the interviewees supported another view of violence. In this section, they challenged 
the idea of a non-violent Rwanda. A number of indications showed the presence of violence, as a 
social phenomenon, earlier thought to have been imported by the colonial masters. For instance, 
a former leader of Giti, based on the lyrical genres and pastoral poetries, concluded that violence 
was a common phenomenon to inspire the propensity for genocide. He summarized thus: “From 
their history and ways of thinking Rwandans were warriors. Through their war poetry or eulogies 
they say, for instance, „I killed people here and there‟ nobody says that they saved somebody's 
life. They only talk about murderous achievements. I think that this behavior was well set up in 
their thoughts. Yet, they feared death if you take into account their names like Ntirugirimbabazi 
(death does not pity anybody), Ndaruhekeye (I am carrying this body for death), etc. All those 
names are to show that Rwandans also feared death a lot. I think that this motivated them to look 
for means of protection. In seeking protection, however, they commit violent actions in their 
wars. Maybe that is one aspect but I think that they had that spirit of violence.” (Int.32) In other 
words, the poetry hailed heroism, as a warrior killed many people, and made people comfortable 
with violence. This made violence easily exploded afterwards, along with other conditions. 
 
To this interviewee, there was a sprout of violence in Rwandans‟ minds. Although shedding 
blood normally causes fear, Rwandans were very pleased to do it, as referring to their poetries.  
It identified a mood of violence in war and pastoral poetries about the conquest wars by King 
Rwabugiri. On these bases, this interviewee is inclined to a culture of violence that misses the 
balance between violent and non-violent behavior in the past Rwandan society that is allegedly 
stable. A former leader of Giti summarized it: 
 
There is too much violence in the way we slaughter animals. Butchers killed more 
people than others because they were somehow used to shedding blood without any 
problem. Slaughtering animals! Violence can be seen not only in the way we slaughter 
animals, but also the way we carry our livestock in vehicles. Those animals are 
suffering but a Rwandan finds it a normal behavior. We live with that sadistic mind. I 
do not know where we got it…You kill somebody and cut his sex when he is already 
dead as if you think he is going to resurrect. We also saw it during the war where people 
were killing their fellow citizens after torturing them. They could also disgrace the dead 
bodies in many ways. I do not know whether we got it from our education. Cutting 
somebody‟s sex after he is killed showed heroism but it is a kind of animosity! 
However, both the criminal and the one watching the event find pleasure from those 
atrocious deeds and the criminal is rewarded or given promotion. (Int.32) 
 
The definition of enmity on the battlefield, security and survival and the demystification of 
shedding blood are different variables through which violence was empirically supported as 
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legitimate. The perception of individuals in a holistic context was also supported as bearing 
explanatory elements of legitimating violence. 
Collective social units 
 
It was supported that life is about kinship in Rwanda. To a large extent, it is about community. 
From this point of view, a former university lecturer put it: “The traditional Rwandan society 
globally looked at people as members of the community not as single individuals. An individual 
was a part of the entire community. The individualistic approach of living was seen as strange 
and subjected to fierce criticism.” (Int.9) These claims found the support of many, including an 
anthropologist professor. “The communitarian style of life is exclusively seen as the most 
legitimate. It is a style of life whereby representatives of different communities have the 
monopoly of decision for all. The representative of the whole community only matters and has 
stronger voice than separate individuals have. The decision made by the representative translates 
the word order from the King and is implemented without any question or resistance.” (Int.13) 
By virtue of the powers invested in these representatives, they engage their people to take part in 
various initiatives. 
 
A senator found the decision of the representative had two main implications in Rwanda of the 
past. First, their feeling of belonging to the same collective unit of social life stands for the 
driving force for these people to respect the word of order. And second, the same feeling creates 
a strong basis for experience sharing. He summarized it thus:  “In the past, Rwandans used to 
take people living in the same area as a family and they would share difficult times. 
Unfortunately, they would even share wrongdoings. As far as the genocide is concerned, you 
find it that one single killing, for instance, involves different people. Even one who personally 
showed interest in violence would implicate as many people as he or she could.” (Int.9) In line 
with this interview, many more reported that culture bears in itself an impulse to make people 
take part blindly in collective initiatives. The idea strongly supported is that large amounts of 
people participating in a collective initiative made it a legitimate endeavor. A businessman and 
former minister gave support to this legitimacy, while finding application to the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda. “When ordinary people were told that they would not be held responsible for 
collectively committed crimes, mass participation became the easiest thing to perform.” (Int.1) A 
senator raised some individual practices that could enlighten this observation. He cited the 
vendetta and vengeance, which, to him, identified with a „mud-slinging‟ culture in Rwanda of 
the past: 
 
When someone hurts another, there is tendency to implicate the whole family, friends so 
that they may get revenge or come to one‟s help when it is deemed necessary…When 
someone is guilty, then his or her relatives are considered as guilty as well. For example, 
in the ancient times, when someone rebelled against the power, his or her family would 
be taken as rebellion itself. When someone happened to be excommunicated, the family 
would be excommunicated with him or her…I noticed many examples when I was young, 
where everyone in a given community would participate in the killing of someone caught 
in robbery whatsoever or caught poisoning someone for example. That was the way 
people used to lessen the wrongdoing or responsibility. (Int.9) 
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In line with this interview, many more referred to different experiences with which the criteria to 
unite people over an initiative varied. As politics changed over the past, the holistic context from 
which individuals identified became the ethnic identity and the geographical area one came 
from. Against identity, the fascinating experience was that of a senator. She reported: “In my 
childhood, some leaders could come and say: remember, I am yours! We all fight the common 
enemy, which is Tutsi…The Tutsi became scapegoats every time power was about to 
change…So to speak, every threat could bring with it an ethnic aspect of mobilization for 
collectively implemented violence.” (Int.22) As the same perspective goes, a former prefect of 
rural Kigali explained that the identification to a certain geographical area was also made an 
important factor in adopting violent behavior. He summarized it thus: “The Hutu from Bugesera 
identified with Rwambuka. They considered him as belonging to them. He did not need to force 
them to get understood. Equally, he did not need to coerce them to take part in genocide. 
Collective manipulation by the elite was extreme enough to convince the people that taking part 
in genocide was in their supreme interests. „Tutsi will kill you,‟ he told them; „I am honest with 
you, and I belong to you, you know!‟ The people were easily convinced that they were defending 
their interests.” (Int.5) The interviewees showed that similar experiences applied to many areas, 
mostly identified with large-scale levels of violence. 
 
The case of Murambi is particularly cited in this study, given the wide gap between the leaders 
and ordinary people. An elder in Murambi discussed why the magnitude of violence was 
remarkable: “The gap found between the leader and common people was because some of the 
leaders did not treat people equally. That created a large gap that led to hatred among the 
population…The gap was based on ethnic groups to which people belonged so that the Hutu 
leaders were in conflicts with Tutsi…So the population fought in the same way as the elite did.” 
(Int.12) With this, community cohesion deteriorated in many areas of the commune, 
notwithstanding that it used to be effective. They widely cited the huge efforts made by many to 
bring ordinary people into violence in 1959 and 1960. However, it was supported that violence 
was not inherent within the common citizenry, as the 1959 onward cases of violence showed. 
The interviewees reported real cases, which showed active resistance to conflicts organized from 
an ethnic background. This is the way an interviewee traced back a scene of his childhood, 
where people invaded his family‟s home in 1959, and the behavior of the common citizenry: 
 
First of all they came to our house with whistles, and stood outside. But neighbors were 
complaining and saying: „what is going on here? We have been living in harmony for 
long!‟ A policeman suddenly came and said, „you have to destroy their house, and it is a 
must!‟ A man named Kajyibwami immediately said, „you will destroy their house after 
you have killed me!‟ They talked to each other and concluded that we had first to get out 
our property before the house was destroyed. Neighbors came to help, and we took our 
stuff outside. It was a house with glasses, I remember. When we had finished, they 
destroyed the house. It was the evening and neighbors are the ones who took us to their 
homes. The following day, the newly appointed mayor came and took us to church. Still, 
ordinary people were the ones who were feeding us. You could somehow observe strong 
community cohesion…There was a total divorce between what the government of the day 
was saying and what the people were doing. (Int.17) 
 
The interviewee supported the behavior of the common citizenry as an indication of strong 
community cohesion. Against the same behavior, the interviewees spoke about wider gaps 
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between the elite and ordinary people and the presence of two distant sub-cultures – of the elite 
and the common citizenry – working in a contradictory manner. A former parliamentarian 
referred to the events of 1960-2 to apply this community cohesion to the village of Bisesero in 
Kibuye prefecture. As he put it, there was first resistance to violence in Bisesero when some 
„elites‟ covertly went to the Hutu peasants and advised them on how to set Tutsi houses on fire. 
“Some adult Hutu came to our adult Tutsi people and then asked: „strictly speaking, what brings 
us against you?‟ Then they went ahead: „let‟s set Tutsi houses on fire. Accept this to be done, 
and then bring your cattle we will look after them as well as your wives and children; men 
should go and find somewhere to hide, and finally when this „wind‟ – as it was then called – is 
over we will build your houses again.‟ This is what they exactly did.” (Int.4) 
 
With this, the interviewee also highlighted a large gap between common people and the elite. As 
it was stressed, ordinary people could not agree upon the implementation of violent behavior the 
way the elite suggested. A political party official said it would have been made difficult to set 
houses on fire, if it hadn‟t been for the use of cunning in most areas.  “The elite knew very well 
that ordinary people had trust in and full support to the King. They perceived him as the only 
person who could decide on life and death for anybody. The elite misleadingly convinced 
ordinary people that violence against Tutsi was an instruction released by the King. „Any treason 
against the King merited death‟, and „violence had to befall those persons who commit treason‟.” 
(Int.20) This served the point to get the peasantry involved in that imaginary cause. The 
interviewees said that comparable strategies were used to break down the community resistance 
to violence that was claimed to be „historic‟. 
 
The same interviewee summarized the point as follows: “It has taken enough time to convince 
Hutu peasants to participate in genocide, especially those from central and southern Rwanda. It 
happened to threaten and tell them, „if you do not kill Tutsi, they will kill all of you‟. They could 
even tell the Hutu peasants, „if you do not kill them we will kill you‟. These have been strong 
methods to bring the people to cooperate to the Hutu-power
83
 in order to kill Tutsi. Otherwise, 
they did not want to cooperate.” (Int.20) A former leader of Giti agreed, and considered the 
threat to life as a key explanatory variable of such an extreme level of violence. He suggested, 
“The threat to life served a strong justification to the extent that the situation it created sparked 
off a crisis. In that mass, they could say: „Those ones are going to kill us, let us kill them before 
they dare to‟. Like other factors, it caused bad things to happen quickly. This took the logic 
formerly accepted in Rwanda according to which a warrior could kill his adversary and even cut 
his sex afterwards.” (Int.32) On these bases and many more the hypothesis that all people who 
participated in the genocide were notorious killers was strongly refuted. 
 
A parliamentarian put it as follows: “You can‟t have such a big number of notorious killers. No 
way! Some were reluctant to participate in the killings. Whoever a militiaman could identify as 
not totally active during the killings, he could pretend to kill him by using the blunt side of a 
                                               
83 Hutu Power is an ideology, which came into the open in Rwanda probably in 1992, and was professed by groups close to 
Juvénal Habyarimana‟s inner circle (called the Akazu). This process also involved certain circles of the then ruling party (MRND) 
and its political ally, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR). Through the Ten Commandments of the Bahutu, Hutu 
power was opposed to any negotiation with the Rwandan Patriotic Front and vowed the total exclusion of the Tutsi. Between 
1992 and the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, the Hutu Power group managed to split the two main opposition parties – 
the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) and the Liberal Party (PL) – with their extreme factions joining its ranks. Hutu 
Power was the underlying ideology behind the April-July 1994 genocide (Twagirimana 2007:81). 
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machete. The latter could then wake up and kill Tutsis to avoid his own death.” (Int.4) A 
researcher of dialogue for peace said that the methods to get ordinary people involved in 
violence reflected an advanced phase of the creation of a climate of psychosis. To him, it 
consisted of “telling the population that if they do not do this they will be threatened. The elite 
convinced the population that if the RPF came to power, they would be enslaved and oppressed. 
With this, they made sure the population is aware of its self-defense against the RPF for its 
survival.” (Int.29) The methods used to drag ordinary people into violence made the interviewees 
understand the importance of the elite in the processes of change. 
 
The place of the elite in society 
 
It was unanimously said that the elite are important agents of social change. There were 
perceived as people who realize their will over ordinary people. A local government leader in 
Giti refers to the leaders as “powerful people. Be it by elections or official decree, the leader has 
power to make things happen. Of course, the legitimacy of power will depend on ways in which 
the subordinates perceive the leader as role model.” (Int.2) This mainly related to the perception 
many associated with the leaders. A primary school teacher in Murambi elaborated on this 
perception: “Ordinary people respect you since you represent them and are their watchful eye. 
They take everything you tell them as right and do it.” (Int.11)  
 
However, authority and representation were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for ordinary 
people to respect the leader. An official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation said that 
the elite take advantage of ordinary people under specific conditions: “You feel you are superior 
and your being superior makes you think and plan in their place. You also neglect their opinions 
saying that they are not educated and therefore not intelligent. With the assumption that you are 
experienced, you take the liberty of thinking for them. Then we feel we are superior, impose our 
ideas, get detached from the community, embrace policies sometimes ignorantly considering 
only what we can gain from it.” (Int.18) She reported a strong tendency of people to not be 
critical of what the superior required them to do.  
 
At this level, the blame is not only put on ordinary people, but also on the elite at various levels 
of leadership. With reference to her own experience, she spoke as follows: “I remember that in 
1996 when I was working for the Ministry of Gender, we started to design gender policy for that 
Ministry. We agreed on going to consult citizens in order to get their opinions. We went to 
Mutara but I do not exactly remember the district. In the first meeting we met leaders from lower 
echelons, upper echelons: mayors and province leaders. We told them that we wanted them to 
give us ideas about gender policy. I remember that in that meeting they did not give us any 
opinion. They rather asked us to give them the policy in order for them to ask citizens to 
implement it. We vainly told them that the policy had to rise from their views. Even though we 
were the ones to design it, we had to base on their views.” (Int.18) 
 
According to a political party official, this perpetuated a tradition of a large gap between lower 
and upper echelons: “It created a psychological impression among citizens that they are an 
inferior group, which lacks intelligence and resources. The same impression convinced them that 
the elite in different echelons plan and think for ordinary people. The latter wait for orders to 
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implement.” (Int.20) This was strongly supported to have made it easier to trigger consistent 
solidarity for violence. 
 
To sum up, this section has described collective units of social life and their relevance in social 
bond creation. With collective units, it has demonstrated that traditional Rwandans have shared 
experiences and implicated each other in individual endeavors, just to make it a collective 
concern. In so doing, it highlighted the precedence of the holistic view of the kinship and 
community over individual members of the same whole. It is a philosophy that reflected the 
communitarian spirit linked to mass participation in genocide. Such a link led to the conclusion 
that the elite in our time has a lot in common with the traditional elite, concerning the amount of 
power they exercise over ordinary people. Since the sources of power are various today, and are 
distributed in different amounts, unlike in traditional times, it is posited that the same powers are 
also unevenly distributed. This was the subject matter of the earlier discussion on the concept of 
elite and the supporting bases. 
A unique Giti 
 
This study has devoted a deal of time to Giti. This focus denotes a number of aspects that define 
Giti as a unique case that deserves such attention. Earlier paragraphs brought up many of them. 
In addition, the interviewees stressed the „political network‟, as another crucial variable to 
explain this unique aspect of Giti. They distinguished the political network at both local 
government – horizontal structures of power – and the central government level – vertical 
structures of power. To begin with, they argued for a clear demarcation line between the 
horizontal and vertical structures of power, which independently complement and challenge each 
other. In case no clear-cut distinction is established, the central government is likely to realize its 
will over the horizontal structures, no matter how efficient it is. 
 
To an officer at the Office of the Ombudsman, “There has been no clear-cut distinction between 
the vertical and the horizontal structures in Rwanda. In principle, when the vertical structure is 
inefficient and the horizontal one efficient, the latter can resist. However, when both structures 
are inefficient, there is no resistance to the evil. This is exactly what happened to Rwanda 
because both structures before genocide were working in conspiracy.” (Int.26) As per the 
experience in Murambi – after the war exploded – a businessman and former minister observed 
the way in which the local structures served as strong and efficient channels of information. “I 
observed the evolution of war on the ground. I was in Murambi and could go to the refugee 
camps to see the refugees who came from Muvumba. What I found out is that, even in the 
demilitarized zone, you could see that the ex-FAR or the then government had enough 
information about the presence and deeds of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). You could see 
ordinary people providing village administrative structures and sector leaders with information 
who in turn informed upper hierarchies up to the central authority. This means that the 
relationship between the central authority and ordinary people is an organized system, which was 
very efficient in Rwanda. It is inherited from the Kingdom hierarchy.” (Int.1) There was 
feedback at both the central and the local government levels on regular basis. 
 
A former leader of Murambi backed up this interviewee. Pointing out the role of the burgomaster 
in the wartime, he reported: “Murambi has had a leader who accords to implement everything 
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the central government required him to do. As a result, he even happened to be appointed the 
representative of the then district Mayors. This gave him opportunities to build up strong 
relationships with late Juvenal Habyarimana, the President of the Republic.” (Int.33) As far as 
the case of Murambi is concerned, there was no mismatch reported between the vertical and 
horizontal structures.  
 
The interviewees understood what happened in Murambi from this perspective suggested by an 
official in the Office of the Ombudsman, who also is native of this area: “The network among 
political structures (between leaders and the people) could ascend and reach the people at the 
settlement (umudugudu) level. There was a possibility to yield both positive and negative results. 
All depend on the quality of the leaders and on the aim they want to attain. From the upper 
leading structure (i.e. ministers) to the lower leading level (i.e. the grass-root level leaders) – that 
is vertical relation structure – and from the local leadership (i.e. civil society organizations) to 
the common citizenry – in the horizontal structures – our relation structures quickly ascend the 
information either horizontally or vertically. This makes it possible to mobilize people for good 
or bad.” (Int.26) 
 
This interviewee supported the fact of political structures to ascend until the settlement it to have 
created a channel of communication that applied, at least, to the major part of Rwanda from the 
early 1990s onwards. The same interviewee underlined the crucial role that the horizontal 
structure plays to bring about changes – either violent or peaceful. “Very few places resisted the 
collaboration between the vertical and horizontal processes after the conflict exploded in 1990. 
The horizontal structure should help people learn that genocide and discrimination are negative 
values. Little by little, new generations forget about old people‟s negative values and grow up 
with only positive ones.” (Int.26) The interviewee added that the concept of value is relative. It is 
always subjected to strong debates. The experience of lower levels of participation in violence 
was understood from the perspective of disagreement between the vertical and horizontal 
structures in decision-making processes. Referring to various interviewees, Giti falls into this 
category. Many have shown that the burgomaster of Giti had a weaker political network than that 
of Murambi. 
 
For instance, a politician observed that the burgomaster of Giti was not as popular as Gatete of 
Murambi (Int.20). A former deputy governor during the time of these mayors put it thus: “When 
Sebushumba became the leader of Giti commune, he had been teaching, and he was from a 
family that was not influential.” (Int.3) To the contrary, the burgomaster of Murambi was in 
close connection with the central authority for various reasons. A professor with strong ties to 
Murambi reported: “The geographical position of Murambi was of particular interest to the 
central authority. It was perceived as a militarily strategic area in case the Diaspora of Rwanda 
invaded from Uganda. By this, the connection of the burgomaster to the central authority was 
primarily interest-driven. It is a region perceived as inhabited by Tutsi. The former government 
under Habyarimana did not digest it very well because Tutsi were assumed as supporters of 
invaders then known as Inyenzi. In order to prevent this problem, the government surrounded the 
Tutsi with immigrants who would be faithful in case it was deemed necessary.” (Int.29) The 
interviewees perceived immigration as a hidden policy that aimed to have full control of the 
whole country. 
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A resident of Murambi commented as follows: “They managed bringing their own people, the 
Bakiga (people from the northern part of Rwanda), to rule over the area in order to keep away 
the Tutsi. Success in this has given to Gatete a lot of popularity towards the central government.” 
(Int.4). Giti did not attract such an amount of attention, not only because it was land-locked but 
also as it has not had immigrants that would serve the same purpose as in Murambi. The former 
deputy governor summarized it as follows: “The commune did not have many inhabitants from 
other places. It kept its own people…There was no external influence. People did not change and 
that was like a consequence of not having anyone in the leadership. That turned out to be a good 
thing for us. They might have got us killed.” (Int.3) The non-representation of Giti residents in 
central institutions and in political parties – then in the fashion of the day from the 1980s 
onwards – was supported as a strong factor for non-violence in Giti. 
 
A native church leader in Murambi reported it as follows: “Giti has never had representation, 
neither in the government nor in the parliament chamber. Unlike Gisenyi and Ruhengeri from 
where most incumbents originated, Giti did not have any members of the elite to mobilize the 
ordinary people.” (Int.8) To back up this leader, the former deputy governor made the same 
claims, which applied to almost the entire post-colonial period. “Giti did not have any 
representatives at the level of ministries or political parties such as Parmehutu. They could have 
given the divisive orders to prepare for violence. We had only one minister in Twagiramungu‟s 
government – Rucogoza. He happened to come telling Sebushumba not to turn their commune 
into a violent area. We did not have such powerful people who turn into corrupt people once they 
enter the politics or the leaderships…Except for Rucogoza…no one could say there was 
someone else in authority at Kigali. There were some directors who were not influential either, 
who worked in office, who could not come back to sensitize people.” (Int.3) The same 
interviewee supported that if Giti had been given three ministers from the first Republic, for 
instance, then things would have turned out very badly. They would have brought the ideology 
of genocide. Fortunately, there was no external influence, he insisted. People in Giti did not 
change and that was a consequence of not having anyone in the leadership. That turned out to be 
a good thing for Giti of not engaging in violence, the interviewee disclosed. 
 
The experience of Giti served as a strong support to the argument that the elite did not push 
people into violence because of the absence of human catalytic factors for violence. For 
example, a former university lecturer reported: “When there is a community opposed to the 
regime, say a political party in opposition: people are targeted; they are directly assimilated to 
the enemy. When the majority is Tutsi for example, some Hutu in opposition are menaced as 
well. They tried to resist. There could be a negative factor in case the leadership was strong 
because it would have influence on some of them.” (Int.9) It was supported to be fortunate that 
the multiparty politics did not find supporters in Giti. A focus group discussion held in Tanda 
cell reported: “At the advent of multiparty politics, the neighboring communes such as Murambi 
and Gikoro welcomed and warmly embraced the shift from the mono to the multipolitics. But 
together with our leader Edouard Sebushumba we stuck on the MRND – National Revolutionary 
Movement for Development. Very fewer who engaged in the MDR – Democratic Republican 
Movement – in the PL (Liberal Party) and the PSD – Social Democratic Party – found no 
supporters.” (Foc.9) In combination, these claims argued very limited possibility for political 
campaigns in Giti and, therefore, for genocidal violence.  
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In this way, the interviewees supported the absence of human factors to sensitize for violence 
and of representation to the central government as having destroyed the influence that the 
vertical structure could have exercised in Giti. An official at the Office of the Ombudsman 
reported: “The vertical structure collapsed at district level. When the instructions to implement 
the genocide plan reached the burgomaster, he resisted and there was no genocide in his district. 
There was a gap in the vertical structure because the burgomaster did not intend to commit 
genocide even though the horizontal structure could want be committed to killing.” (Int.26) In 
sharp contradiction to Giti, the same interviewee supported that genocide was successfully 
implemented in Murambi because both the vertical and horizontal structures cooperated, as a 
result of effective channels of communication and timely feedback. 
Summary 
 
This chapter has given a forum to the interviewees to look into the structure of social relations in 
the case studies, with the possibility of extension to many more areas in Rwanda. It concludes 
that „culture‟ is not relevant in explaining why violence occurs, or not; but that the middle-range 
leaders and the grassroots thinking is. Importantly, it argues that a „context of cruelty‟ creates its 
own dynamic no matter what historical cultural baggage it bears with it. The historical cultural 
baggage was only demonstrated as strong framework under which the levels of proscriptions 
against violence invariably develop. Against this background, the chapter detailed a number of 
factors for the same levels. Through accepted social taboos, for instance, it has shown different 
prohibitions against violence and the circumstances under which violence was understood as 
legitimate – mainly the dilemma of security and survival. From this point of view, colonialism, 
and both traditional and modern religions, were highlighted as having taken the lead in the 
process of shaping the social taboos. As a result, they were understood as having transformed 
social life in Rwanda tremendously. 
 
The chapter discussed different forms of social pact and the different roles social pacts played in 
the process of conflict escalation. Interestingly, the clientele system and extensive intermarriages 
in the pre-colonial era proved to be the keys to explaining non-violence in Giti. Under the 
clientele system, inequalities were reduced to the minimum. As a result, the possibility to resent 
one another was also limited to the minimum. Equally, the possibility for dichotomization into 
identities was made difficult by extensive intermarriages, through which many were biological 
relatives. Unlike many areas in Rwanda, the clientele system and extensive intermarriages made 
it possible that non-violence in Giti was a historical event. In the colonial era, „forced labor‟ – 
known as the uburetwa – was another social pact introduced by the colonial authorities, as a 
means for tax collection. The chapter showed that resentment had grown most in the areas where 
the dichotomization of identities was strong. Such resentment was a variable on which violence 
could capitalize, along with other conditions. In the context of cultural and identity diversity, 
Murambi fell into this category. In the post-colonial period, the social pact mainly translated into 
political mandates. Until the explosion of genocide, the chapter established that these mandates 
involved two parties – the leadership and the common citizenry –, which were extremely 
unequal. Not only did this lease to the leadership taking advantage of the underpowered common 
citizenry, but it also established the lack of a clear-cut distinction between the leadership – the 
vertical structures – and the civil society organizations – the horizontal structures – which 
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originally served as an interlink between the parties. The obedient common citizenry was caught 
up in-between, before falling prey to the leaders‟ ideologies. 
 
The chapter also established that violence or the absence of violence was a result of the 
communitarian style of life in rural areas. Life was organized into social units to the extent that 
violence or the absence of violence involved a combined effort from within the social unit 
immediately concerned. Should any member of the unit be involved in violence, a tendency to 
implicate many more of the unit was observed, either to lessen the crime or to make it legitimate.  
If the fight against violence required all of the citizens to stand up in Giti, this means that the 
social unit took precedence over single individuals. If, on the other hand, the death of a single 
individual involved almost all of the social unit in Murambi and elsewhere in Rwanda, the same 
reasoning applies. With these arguments, the chapter showed that the communitarian style of life 
is highly valued to understand the collective aspect of violence in Murambi and of non-violence 
in Giti. 
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6. What makes the elite adopt or reject violence? 
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In the specific context of this study, of the structure of how social relations are organized, it is 
legitimate to seek answers to the question „what makes the elite opt for violence in Murambi and 
not in Giti?‟ In a broader historical perspective, earlier chapters outlined the differences and 
similarities between both cases – Giti and Murambi – but the study has not yet specifically 
addressed this question. This chapter presents different claims that indicate the possible factors 
that both lead to and lead away from violence. In its process, the chapter looks into five themes, 
formulated as follows: (1) Strengths and limitations of the elite; (2) Divine right to the resource 
bases; (3) Church-dependent power; (4) Vulnerability management; and (5) Popular hardships 
and politics. It is suggested that the empirical claims to be presented under these themes pave the 
way for conclusions on the subject of this chapter. 
Strengths and limitations of the elite 
 
The empirical evidence argued for little room for ordinary people to bargain in mobilization 
processes. At various levels of the hierarchy, the elite were the driving force of the processes, 
while ordinary people were meant to implement the ideas and orders. Also, ordinary people 
considered the elite as equipped with the required instruments to influence opinions, decisions 
and initiatives. An official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation reported: “...in the 
short run the elite are leading. They lead and influence opinions. In most cases, they initiate good 
or bad things that happen in society. We are talking of that elite‟s power in the Rwandan society. 
I do not know whether it is the same case in other societies. Levels can be different but…it‟s 
almost the same. They can be different in interests.” (Int.18) Given this perception, the gap 
between ordinary people and the elite increasingly grew, and led to extreme passivity on behalf 
of the general population. The interviewees said that lower social status informs such attitudes. 
The same official reported: “In the Rwandan language, it is said that „uwambaye inshabari 
ntagira ijambo [,‟ which literally means: „a man dressed in rags does not have a say‟.] It means 
that people who are deprived and living in poor life conditions will not feel free to express their 
ideas even if the floor is open. Because of their status, they underestimate themselves.” (Int.18) 
Self-underestimation, the interviewees highlight, depended not only on poor living conditions, 
but also on the fact that ordinary people are widely described as illiterate. The same official 
emphasized, “[I am sure] that psychologically citizens knew it from their mind that the elite 
belonged to a high level and are leaders and intellectuals. At the same time, they ended up being 
convinced that they were illiterate and deprived people. And most of them were poor of course. 
So, we put into practice instructions that they give us [, they could argue]. They are intellectuals 
and leaders. We are inferior and since they are our superior, they lead us.” (Int.18) The 
interviewees supported that strong hierarchies have played a large role in perpetuating a situation 
of social distance between the elite and ordinary people. 
Social distance 
 
The distance between the elite and ordinary people was supported to be a phenomenon that dates 
from long in the past. As the interviewees established, it increasingly widened following very 
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rigid structures. In the monarchy system, they established a threefold local structure,
84
 which 
comprised three chiefs – the local chief of the land, the local chief of the pastures, and the chief 
of the army – appointed by the King. In earlier paragraphs, the interviewees have shown that the 
influence of these structures descended to reach the level of the family so that power found root 
in traditions. After reaching the families, an officer in the Office of the Ombudsman disclosed, 
“it was a mixture of powers. This is one thing which makes the difference between the ancient 
leadership and others because there were the king, the high ranking chiefs, the chief of military 
staff, other chiefs in charge of land and animal breeding, heads of clans and heads of families.” 
(Int.26) To this interviewee, the heads of clans and of families served the purpose of extension of 
the elite in the structure of power, which implemented the King‟s orders at various levels. 
 
Under these circumstances, a politician reported that the fact that the elite at the lower level do 
not take initiative without approval by the upper echelons – despite decentralization efforts – is 
taken to be a strong legacy of this past (Int.20). Like many interviewees, an independent 
researcher understood it as a problem of the effective delegation of powers. As he put it, “The 
local authorities at the basic levels of the hierarchy have not understood the essence of 
decentralization. People do not react without referring to their superior hierarchies. The 
intermediate hierarchy always expects a word of command from the superior hierarchy, which 
delays decisions. All solutions come from superior authorities.” (Int.29) Many interviewees have 
argued for the competition between the top-down and bottom-up approaches whereby the latter 
always lost out.  
 
As a result, ordinary people mostly trusted the highest level of authority in the hierarchy. An 
officer at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation illustrated: “I usually receive people on 
Thursdays. Ones may tell you that they came from somewhere in Gikongoro and that they have 
undergone unfairness in this or that problem. I then ask them why they do not first go to their 
leaders at the village, cell and sector levels. They told me that they thought I was the one who 
could give them solutions to their problems. In their mentality, citizens still think they can get 
good solutions from upper echelons. They do not trust their mayors, cell or sector leaders.” 
(Int.18) In the other words, the top-level of leadership overshadowed and incapacitated the 
middle-range level of leadership, which turned into obedient structures under certain 
circumstances.  
 
As the interviewees stated, this situation has led to violence, together with other conditions. An 
officer at the Office of the Ombudsman reported: “When the vertical structure of power is 
violent and the horizontal one tolerant, it is likely to resist the possibility of pressure by the 
former. However, when both structures are violent, there is no resistance to killings. This is 
exactly what happened to Rwanda because both structures before genocide were working in 
conspiracy. The solution to this problem is that there should be different structures, independent 
one to another, so that each can counteract the other side‟s poor decision-making.” (Int.26) To 
                                               
84 Before the Belgian colonial administration introduced the new administrative structure in 1929, the existing structure included 
three main positions. First was the umunyabutaka or umutware w‟ubutaka, who was the local chief of the land. He was in charge  
of agriculture, and he collected land taxes for the Mwami in the form of crops. The second was the umunyamukenke or the local 
chief of the pastures and was also called umutware w‟inka (chief in charge of cattle), or umutware w‟ibikingi (chief in charge of a 
large land concession). He was responsible for organizing grazing pastures and the collection of fees for the Mwami. Finally there 
was the umutware w‟ingabo, or the chief of the army. He was in charge of recruiting young men for the royal armies and was in 
charge of security (watching out for possible enemy incursions into the kingdom) (Twagilimana 2007:164-5). 
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this interviewee, the horizontal structure of power particularly included the Church and civil 
society organizations, in general. The interviewees earlier supported that violence was made 
possible by the fact that there was no clear-cut distinction between the Church and government 
institutions. 
 
In short, the interviewees empirically supported that strong social distance laid the ground for 
obedient behavior among the common citizenry. A politician reported: “That is why putting 
instructions to ordinary people like „let us fight Inyenzi‟ as sector leaders, ordinary people have 
had to concur with it because the orders came from the elite.” (Int20) To this interviewee, the 
instructions go smoothly in centralized systems with strong hierarchies from the top downwards. 
Outcomes of top-down interaction 
 
In earlier paragraphs, the interviewees showed that the top-down style of command did not 
necessarily translate the will of the elite. With the case of Giti, they showed ways in which the 
informal elite exercised power in shadow over both the burgomaster and the common citizenry. 
They also referred to cases where the military officers turned out to be led, beaten and disobeyed 
by their subordinates, and where ordinary people could dismiss their burgomasters and re-
appoint new ones. In so doing, the interviewees showed that the common citizenry successfully 
challenged the orders of the elite under very specific circumstances. In short, the interviewees 
showed that the common citizenry gained the power to upset the elite at a certain point of time. 
They established that ordinary people could rather drag the elite into violence. A senator put it 
this way:  
 
There were a number of leaders who resisted violence and could warn their subordinates 
against it. But the same subordinates ended up to influencing them…The relations between the 
mass and leaders are not so simple as people think. It is not one-way. People can manipulate 
leaders and that could be noticed in the times of the genocide. Some people who were not 
necessarily killers during the genocide would go back home from town. The ordinary people 
were the first to say that those people considered themselves as important to take part in 
killings. Bit-by-bit, to avoid risks, they would start standing timidly at the barriers until they 
became actively involved. Some people are known to have resisted in Butare. The former 
burgomaster of the commune of Mbazi, Antoine, an area known by the name of Shyanda 
whose burgomaster was a political supporter of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). They had 
been targeted, but he ended up influenced. Many people could fight themselves. (Int.9) 
 
With these claims, the interviewees clearly showed an indication of reciprocal influence. 
Depending on how close the elite were to the common citizenry, the interviewees also showed 
strong variations in the patterns of collaboration. Being close to one another, the interviewees 
established, depended on various parameters – such as family ties, political affiliation, blood 
brotherhood and interests of various natures. The same interviewee warned about ordinary 
people‟s passivity: “We are sometimes mistaken about people‟s passivity. We sometimes think 
people were used or manipulated. But who manipulated whom? There was a reciprocal 
influence. Rwandans…easily go where their interests are. The interest might even be very small 
or personal.” (Int.9) The interviewees said that ordinary people, in many cases, made 
calculations before they engaged in violence.  
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A senator gave an illustration taken from the context that served as a transition to genocide. As 
he narrated, a burgomaster could tell people to get rid of someone perceived as source of danger. 
Wherever this was taken as true, the message went so quickly because those who are close to the 
leader of the commune spread it. Many subscribed to the order by the burgomaster when they 
perceived that the danger would befall the whole community. On the contrary, he reported, when 
he asked the same people to do violence to someone they identified with, two opposite factions 
were created. And the factions drastically increased the possibility of fighting themselves. To 
illustrate, he took a tangible case from southern Rwanda: “Some genocide perpetrators had 
differences amongst themselves. A documentary shows a leader of former commune Mbazi who 
was a leader of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) party and was killed by 
Interahamwe militia because of local conflicts.” (Int.9) Under this context, the same interviewee 
disclosed, the forces formerly united against Tutsi fought amongst themselves.  
 
Ordinary people not only disobeyed the elite, they also killed them and fought amongst 
themselves. Also, it was suggested that a number of incumbents at various levels resigned or 
were removed from their positions by the appointing authority following the pressure of mass 
opinion. As the same interviewee regarded the pressure of mass opinion as power, he suggested 
looking into the influence of the elite on ordinary people in a very cautious manner. In this 
context, it emphasized the two-way direction of the interaction between the elite and ordinary 
people. 
Divine right to the resource base 
 
The perceptions about the divine right to the resource base were strongly highlighted to be an 
aspect that predisposes the elite to violence. The interviewees found the nature of the religious 
society as a supporting pillar of such perceptions and beliefs. They related it to power following 
the fact that many of the elite tended to consider themselves as the „chosen‟, understood from the 
perspectives of the biblical scriptures.
85
 As a result, a politician said, those who led were made 
different from ordinary people and could decide on various fields of life in the society. “The 
divine right to power extended to the supreme elite known as Mwami
86
 (monarch) and, to a large 
extent, the traditional chiefs he appointed in lower echelons of the hierarchy. People referred to 
him as an individual entrusted with supernatural powers and had the monopoly on land, herd, 
and peoples‟ fertility.” (Int.20) To the interviewees, material possessions were highly considered 
as supporting bases of legitimacy as well as power delegation to the traditional chiefs. It was 
supported that the monarch could give possession of land and herd to whomever he wanted, and 
take it back anytime. 
                                               
85 As the interviewee described, he referred to Mathew 22, 14. The reference reads, “For many are called, but few are chosen.” 
The interviewees develop the argument that the capacities to lead are necessary conditions, but they are insufficient. To be 
sufficient, the supernatural power should come out in sympathy with one in order to qualify. 
86 The standard form of mwami in the Kinyarwanda language is umwami (king); the plural is abami (kings). According to 
Rwandan oral traditions, the mwami was always Tutsi, and was God‟s incarnation. The Rwandans also referred to him as 
Nyagasani, the same name that Rwandan Christians used for the biblical God. The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa believed that the mwami 
was divine and that land, herd, and people fertility depended on him. Everything in the kingdom belonged to him, and as a result 
he could give anything to anybody or take anything from anybody. Whichever action he took was a sign of his generosity. He also 
had absolute power over his subjects, and he rendered justice as he pleased. There could be no Rwanda without the mwami – in 
fact, the kingdom was called “U Rwanda rw‟ Umwami” (The Rwanda of the Mwami), so any act of rebellion was judged 
sacreligious. Imana (God) would crush any such rebellion and the conspirators would lose everything (Twagilimana 2007:121). 
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At the same time, the monarch could delegate power to chiefs and he had the power to destitute 
them in case anything happened. The monarch was reported to have an absolute power which 
could apply to whoever entered into rebellion against his leadership. A researcher and university 
lecturer said: “During the pre-colonial period, Rwanda had a hierarchical power structure with a 
monarch endowed with absolute power. He could appoint and lay-off chiefs. He could offer 
cows to people and take them back whenever he wanted. Insubordination occasioned the chief 
destitution accompanied with taking all his family fortunes. His death was not excluded if he 
committed a serious offense. He was condemned to death penalty with all his 
family...Insubordination caused one to lose power, fortune. In other cases, it caused a person‟s 
forced exile to neighboring countries. The monarch could negotiate with a chief who had allies 
in order to gain his sympathy.” (Int.29) 
 
This interviewee said that this applied to the Hutu kinglets – known by the name of Abahinza87 – 
given the supernatural powers they were also attributed, with which they were believed to be 
able to make thunder roll. The monarch could also exile people to neighboring countries as a 
way of managing insubordination. The same interviewee reported that this strategy for 
insubordination management was efficient, to the extent that the colonial authorities and the 
post-colonial elite made use of it to make sure every single individual was under their control. 
During the colonial era, it reported, “The Belgian administration via its police could easily 
repress any rebellion against the colonial power using prisons and security measures. All 
indigenous people supposed to create rebellions were put in security guard in the capital Kigali 
or under the territory administrator‟s control [watchful eye].” (Int29) This interviewee referred to 
traditional chiefs being sacked and jailed, with others being forced into exile. He said that the 
system functioned in a way so as to neutralize the possibility of insubordination, using physical 
coercion and repression. 
 
In relation to the supernatural powers the King had on peoples‟ fertility, the interviewees said 
that people could be desperately frustrated in case the monarch died. In other words, there was a 
strong belief that the death of the King threatened peoples‟ fertility. A former burgomaster of 
Giti formulated it thus: “There are even those who used to say that since their King died, women 
would never give birth, cows would not be milked, soil would not be fertile and there would be 
no rain any more. They were somehow saying that God had left them and had gone away. This 
way they associated their King with God. According to them, a leader is God, God commands 
leadership. Therefore, when you disobey a politician or a leader, you disobey God.” (Int.32) The 
interviewees associated the King with God himself, as he was perceived as able to perform deeds 
that required supernatural powers. He was capable of different achievements because, according 
to an elder in Giti, “The King was called Imana [– the word for Imana in English is God -] of 
Rwanda. But there was also the Almighty.” (Int.3) This interviewee disclosed that many had 
taken the monarch as a mediating figure between the living people he led and the Almighty God.  
 
                                               
87 Umuhinza (or abahinza in plural form) meant „one who makes the thunder roll‟, or somebody who rebels against authority. It 
designated any of the Hutu kinglets in the northern part of the Kingdom of Rwanda, a region that remained relatively 
independent of the Mwami‟s court until the end of the nineteenth century, and some until 1912. The German colonial 
administration helped the central power put an end to the insubordination of some abahinza in the north (Twagilimana 
2007:164). 
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On this basis, a politician said, “The power of the Mwami over his people was regarded as God‟s 
gift…he could make a personal monopoly until his son took over from him.” (Int.20) This claim 
found strong support from many other interviewees. One researcher argued: “In the ancient 
Rwanda, power was considered as a divine gift. The monarch had the right of life and death to 
his subordinates. His representatives had all rights except that of death. Only the king could 
decide on the death of someone. In Rwanda, the monarch was recognized as born with a grain, 
which symbolized a divine power. This perception of power as a divine gift dated back to the 
ancient times. The religious ideology only came to reinforce that all power came from God 
(Int.29). And, as the interviewee said, this religious ideology found many supporters since it built 
on the existing belief about the monarch to whom the population was faithful. 
 
Over the post-colonial period, the interviewees supported that the belief in the divine gift of 
power seemed to prevail until it led to the belief that the leadership was efficient and trustworthy. 
A former burgomaster of Giti reported: 
 
They know that this or that leader at this or that level of leadership is qualified in managing 
people. When one is a mayor of a district, a priest, or has any other responsibility, people find 
in them qualities of a good leader. Rwandans had ways of thinking even in the past. When 
citizens trust their leaders, there is a kind of conviction that makes them see their leaders as 
people who are leading to the development in several domains. The only problem is that they 
eventually regard them as gods. Therefore, they consider their leader as a person who 
incarnates God, who cannot make any mistake, and this way of understanding makes them 
follow him blindly. This resulted in the fact that politicians told them to kill their fellow 
citizens and they did it…Furthermore, Rwandans believe in God too much so that they say, for 
example, „God gave us that leader‟. (Int32) 
 
The interviewees established this belief as a strong justification many made to sustain in power. 
As a politician described it, “The elite have successfully striven…until they stayed longer in 
power as much as they could. While in power, they claimed their power to be more-or-less a 
divine right, at least in practice.” (Int.20) In most cases, elite-mandated violence to protect the 
same power was the most striking consequence. Because of the tradition of exaggerated respect, 
ordinary people have fallen easy prey to mobilization of violence. This has always been linked to 
a number of beliefs or perceptions, as this study earlier detailed. 
 
In the context of a strong belief in religion, the interviewees assumed that many who surrounded 
the incumbents exploited the idea according to which power was a divine right. Those who 
perpetuated the idea included the guardians of the esoteric code – in the monarchy system – and 
the most influential persons in most regimes. However, the interviewees stressed the incumbent 
did not believe in what they were being told because each new the ways in which he got into 
power. An officer at the Ombudsman‟s Office reported, “Only people surrounding the incumbent 
could claim his power to be an emanation from supernatural powers. For instance, Habyarimana 
did a coup d‟état after killing Kayibanda. He could not have any reason to say that the exercise 
of power was the divine right. On the contrary, other people such as priests that were 
collaborating with him could justify how that was a divine right, and from that he could believe. 
They could consider him as one of the few chosen among many who were eligible…How could 
that be a divine right when a minister took over from the president after he killed him? Could 
Kagame convince people that his power is divine right while he knows how he took guns and 
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fought until he got to leadership?” (Int.26) As this interviewee went on, religions were preaching 
about divine right, which was making the leader think that without him nothing could be done, 
that without him no one else could lead. That was seen as paternalistic thinking which makes the 
whole system work following the leader‟s thoughts. 
 
As the interviewees strongly stressed, the belief around the divine right served the purpose of 
increasing and sustaining leaders in power, which was a means of satisfying the needs of various 
nature. Those who surrounded the incumbents argued for this belief as a means of survival; a 
source of wealth and social privileges that descended and reached the lower levels of the society. 
This was highlighted as having perpetuated strong dependence, which brought variations with it 
at all levels of society, and prepared the beneficiaries for obedient behavior in case it was 
deemed necessary. For instance, a politician said that individuals could only register 
achievements and social promotions within strong networks that the systems put in place. Driven 
by a historical perspective, this is the way he challenged people‟s thinking development: “During 
the past clientele system, you could hear a vassal saying, „Mpatswe n‟umugabo‟[– literally 
meaning that the master was not scrooge]. Similar statements applied over the post-monarchy 
regimes. At different occasions, you could also hear people saying, „I got this job after the Mayor 
told me to contact X‟, „Father or Pastor Y gave all this to me‟, „I was lucky to turn the favorite of 
a Catholic Church Father‟. You never say, „I was hard-working‟ to achieve this and that. Rather, 
many say if I own this and that „it is because of somebody‟s support‟.” (Int.20) The essence of 
these statements consists of the inability to control one‟s destiny. This was taken as an indication 
of deep incapacitation that translated into strong vulnerability that many failed to cope with. The 
possibility of a bright future was increasingly rendered uncertain. 
 
Against the increasing cost of living, for instance, “People could not be sure that they would be 
able to pay school fees in the next two to three years. It is not possible especially in the context 
of Rwandan families whereby one is responsible for all the relatives.” (Int.20) This related to 
strong family ties development within the framework of kinship that involves a communitarian 
style of life. To illustrate, a researcher said: “Each person who gets the chance to earn a certain 
amount of income shares with his or her family and allocates an amount of resources to the 
support of vulnerable families in their neighbourhoods. This helps to avoid conflict between rich 
and poor people.” (Int.29) To the same interviewee, the structure of social relations within a 
kinship style of life has laid strong foundation for extreme dependency. The interviewees 
considered deep dependency as an incapacitation that made many fail to be visionary in order to 
cope with perceived or real vulnerability.  
 
An interviewee said that vulnerability was so much deeper to allow for “creativity, an invention 
of new ways of life. Under certain circumstances, uncertainty paves way for solution creation. 
There are a lot of resources you can fairly make use of. Humans should create new conditions as 
a way to dominate uncertainties. In the contrary case, frustration develops and the possibility for 
conflict follows. Every time you are not sure about the future, you have to look for available 
opportunities and adequately deal with it.” (Int.20) To the interviewees, those who failed to do so 
are the ones who most raised questions on “how they will live today and tomorrow. Such 
questions predispose them doing wrongs to survive…Of course people who are uncertain are 
also in trouble. They are not sure whether they will be alive tomorrow. It means that they can go 
in any business as long as the ends justify the means.” (Int.18) In most cases, it was established 
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that those under such a social incapacitation depended on whoever would cater for them. The 
interviewees emphasized that the incumbents are likely to exploit this dependence to realize their 
will at the expense of others. In many cases, they argued, many systems made sure such a 
dependency steadily prevailed to make political benefits from it. 
 
In short, the interviewees highlighted the character of divine right to power. In case one was born 
into power, as in the case of Rwandan monarchs, power became something sacred that no one 
could be allowed to challenge. Whether one is born with power, or bases the legitimacy of power 
on the belief in power as divine gift, anything including violence can take place if somebody 
managed to challenge the power. As a result of extreme dependency, the interviewees 
established that people are likely to back up whatever decision the leadership might make to 
secure their survival. This meant that both the divine right-driven power and extreme 
dependence have proved to be strong factors to shape the relations between the elite and ordinary 
people. 
Church-dependent power 
 
It was openly accepted that strong collaboration between the State and the Church laid favorable 
grounds for leaders to choose violence. The Church, originally understood as a major civil 
society organization, lost its power to counterbalance the State. Through the following 
paragraphs, the interviewees report ways in which the historical process contributed to both 
powerful institutions merging into one and supporting genocidal violence. 
 
As earlier mentioned, the interviewees supported that the leadership remained basically related to 
the belief in supernatural powers. On this basis, the monarch, then called God, juxtaposed with 
the clergy. At the very outset, strong disagreements and competition developed around the 
naming of God. The interviewees reported that this naming would predispose many to confusion 
if the missionaries preached God and people understood the King. Also, they reported that such 
confusion would mark no clear-cut distinction between the traditional and the modern religions 
because they both used that terminology.  
 
As a way out of confusion, an elder in Giti reported, “They introduced a Swahili new name, 
Mungu, to designate the „modern‟ God. As time went, they translated God into „Imana Data‟ 
[literally meaning Father in Heaven]. So the King‟s power reduced and people started avoiding 
calling him Lord, but rather King. At the beginning, the Roman Catholic Church struggled to 
bring clarification about the concept of God.” (Int.3) With this, the monarch‟s power was 
annulled to the benefit of the missionaries. In this way, the interviewee reported, the Church 
became the leader and the appointing authority.  For instance, according to an elder in Giti,  
“Some time a priests could disgrace and deprive high ranking chiefs of their cattle as well as of 
power on ordinary people. They could connive with colonial authorities to dismiss him.” (Int.3) 
At this level, the interviewees talked about the fusion of politics and religion. 
 
The interviewees established that the traditional religion ended up stepping down. According to a 
politician, “Rwandans joined the Church of the winner. It means the Church led through the 
missionaries. The monarch could not resist either. Those, like King Musinga, who failed to 
subscribe to the Church doctrines, were removed from power.” (Int.20) As the interviewees 
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reported, this Rwandan King failed to comply as a result of his ignorance about the amount of 
power that the missionaries were entrusted with. For instance, according to an elder in Giti, “He 
could not understand how somebody else could be stronger than earlier monarchs such as 
Rwabugili and Ruganzu who died and were never resurrected…So conflicts arose between him 
and the missionaries. Then what happened to him?” (Int.3) He was dismissed from power, the 
interviewee emphasized. The same interviewee reported that the missionaries appointed Mutara 
III Rudahigwa to take over from Musinga after he appeared to be a good follower. The 
interviewees said that the interference of the Church in politics kept affecting the appointments 
of different incumbents. 
 
In so doing, they argued that the faith in Catholic Church doctrine had benefited alliance and 
power security. As a result, this stood for a sign that the Church has been powerful in Rwanda‟s 
past, and could make drastic changes in the political arena happen. As this politician disclosed, 
“Had it not been for the Catholic Church, Kayibanda would not have got in power.” (Int.20) As 
he reported, the latter was perceived as an efficient follower and was sure of the support of the 
missionaries. No one would fight him when time came to abolishing the King from power. The 
same applied to Habyarimana, when he organized a coup d‟état against Kayibanda. An aged man 
in Giti found the interference of the Church as legitimate when he referred to the letter by Bishop 
Class to the white residents under the monarchy rule. “The Bishop told them that they had better 
to rule the country in consultation with Tutsi if they wanted to stay longer. It was an official 
vicariate letter. So the white residents followed his advice and worked with the Tutsi.” (Int.3) 
Since the colonial authorities in the administration closely collaborated with the missionaries, the 
same interviewee mentioned, the local authorities found it wise to oppose neither the colonial 
authorities nor the priests with whom they collaborated. So for the sake of a good life and 
sustainable power, they had to live peacefully with them. 
 
The major explanation for this avoidance, according to an officer of the Ombudsman‟s Office, is 
that the Church was financially and materially strong and structurally well organized. Despite 
that multidimensional power of the Church, the interviewees said that it always developed the 
mentality of dependency on the State. This is the way an interviewee put it: “The dependency 
probably derives from the White Father‟s philosophy from Bishop Lavigerie and Class who used 
to urge his priests to go and collaborate with the governments they were joining. The explanation 
is that the Church grew up in this mentality. This became a tradition, which the President 
Kayibanda and Bishop Perraudin, President Habyarimana and Archibishop Nsengiyumva 
adopted.” (Int.26) 
 
To the interviewee, each leader was under the support of the Church authority. The presence of 
religion in the access to power has always been a strong argument to infer the connection 
between the divine right and power. The interviewees accord to understand this presence as a full 
support of the Church to politics, in line with the fact that close collaboration made it difficult to 
cut a demarcation line between politicians and religious leaders. After late Bishop Nsengiyumva 
was nominated as an executive committee member of the then ruling party, this interviewee saw 
it as the Church and politics merged. Thus, it was an indirect invitation to Catholic Church 
followers to comply with the ruling party. With the engagement of Bishop Nsengiyumva in 
politics, the interviewees found it a continuation of what had begun with the colonial era. A 
senator put it thus: 
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At the beginning, when missionaries came, we already had a structured society and they 
accepted the leadership in place. And those who brought the missionaries were already part of 
the leadership. In the first years, colonial administrators were not even visible. Only 
missionaries were. The missionaries were like leaders. They could distribute lands, and they 
were the judges. For instance, Father Lupias died during his visit to the scene of dispute. Many 
of the catechumens were given plots by the missionaries. The latter were part of the 
leadership. They were clever enough to cooperate with the Rwandan leadership of then and to 
take the leaders‟ children to their schools. All the schools belonged to the Roman Catholic 
Church until 1960-1966…They functioned under the government sponsorship even if the 
Church owned them. They shaped the Rwandan society. (Int.9) 
 
Comparable claims brought the interviewees to say that the administration implemented what the 
Church required it to do until one could not distinguish one from the other. The interviewees 
expressed concern that the supernatural powers are still present in the exercise of power in the 
current democratic context. They said that leaders are bound to the electorate, which delegates 
power. Thus, leaders are mandatory, exercising power on behalf of the constituency to which 
they are accountable. As a researcher and university lecturer observed, “Public speech for elected 
people was that they got power from the population under the framework of democracy. Even 
now, we hear that leaders swear that their power comes from the people but insert the clause 
saying „May god help me in those tasks‟. This shows that God is not excluded from this exercise 
of power.” (Int.29) To this interviewee, the invocation of God when leaders are sworn in is an 
indication of the presence of an invisible power, which intervenes at a certain level for one to 
access power. 
 
In societies perceived as religious, like Rwanda, the interviewees considered the invocation of 
God to have established strong ties between the State and the Church. An official at the 
Ombudsman‟s Office extended the thinking to the Christian movements of liberation in South 
America, and those in Nicaragua, which had priests as members. He also extended to the case of 
Rwanda to observe a pro-government Catholic Church. He cited strong ties between the State 
and the Church to be “the legitimate reason why the liberation movement of Rwanda did not 
seek support from the clergy even if it had taught a lot. It was not in the habit of priests to rise up 
against injustice, especially the Catholic Church because of its involvement in politics.” (Int.26) 
Instead, someone who lived near the seminary school of Rwesero suggested that the clergy was 
doing injustice in schools. Under Archbishop Nsengiyumva, not everybody who applied was 
admitted into seminary schools.  
 
As he argued, the Church representatives knew that the government supported such an injustice. 
Hence, they contributed to merging two powerful institutions – the State and the Church – into 
one. That was very dangerous, especially to foment the ground for violence. He suggested that 
both the State and the Church followed the same political line in education, although in a 
different manner. Provided the strong ascendancy of the Church over its Christian followers, he 
reported that the government could not have dared to plan for genocide. It was only possible 
because it knew beforehand that the Roman Catholic Church was not going to oppose the plans. 
He said: 
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The Church is normally a powerful institution that can at any time oppose anything but the 
trouble was that the Bishop was also convinced and participated, as nobody could accuse him 
nor claim. Habyarimana and the Church were very strong. Rome also knew that he was 
powerful…Nsengiyumva was highly involved and played a significant role and it was unusual 
to see a follower of the Church being a member of MRND. Let me tell you a story, 
Nsengiyumva once passed here by the time he was Archbishop. I will never forget this image. It 
was on Sunday, and he used to pass here on several occasions heading to Rwesero Seminary 
school. We used to know each other when he was still priest. He passed here dressed in MRND 
shirt. On Sunday, you know! He was dressed in MRND trouser and shirt, on Sunday. And two 
nuns dressed in cassocks accompanied him. Can you imagine a Bishop in political party clothes 
holding its slogans! It is said that he used to say he would go together with Habyarimana when 
he died. (Int.3) 
 
Many interviewees said that they observed similar patterns during the independence and the 
Republic regimes. Unlike the past, the interviewees stated the demarcation line is being made 
clearer. The same elder as above reported, “The Church and the government are two independent 
institutions that respect each other. There is no more any kind of domination. The Church now 
knows which line it should follow and which line meets Rwandans‟ expectations.” (Int.3) Some 
interviewees argued for a secular government which, according to a primary school teacher, 
“functions independently from any religion. The government in power today is a government of 
Rwandans and not a government of a religion.” (Int.11) 
 
The interviewees stated that the legacy of the collaboration between the State and the Church is 
still a constraint of major importance. As an official at the Office of the Ombudsman highlighted, 
the sort of mutual support that developed for long in the past “has totally entered their mentality 
in a way that when the Church is advised to be independent or required to decide on their own, 
they always want to be on the government‟s side. For instance these days the Church condemns 
the State that it does not ask them for advice about its plans of actions because it was a tradition 
in the past.” (Int.26) To the same interviewee, it is an innovation that has not been in the habit of 
the Church. 
 
To sum up, the interviewees strongly supported, through the above paragraphs, that no 
demarcation line existed between the State and the Church since the arrival of the colonial 
authorities. This made it difficult for the Church, originally viewed as an important civil 
organization, to resist government abuses. It was supported that this opened the ground for the 
elite to opt for violence in extreme cases of challenge to their power. 
Vulnerability management 
 
Reliable empirical evidence showed that coup d‟état and war or military invasions have been 
common in the process of power rotation in Rwanda.
88
 The interviewees found it to be a critical 
                                               
88 The current literature finds overthrow incumbents in coup d‟état and war as a phenomenon which tends to generalize 
particularly to Africa. Southall et al. (2006:1) observed ways in which former presidents in African politics have left office in sub-
Saharan Africa within the timeframe of 1960 until 2004. Within the 44-year-long post-colonial era, the observation “reveals that 
a majority (54.3 per cent) has been forced from office unconstitutionally, the military coup being the most frequently employed 
means. When looked at by decade, the trend has at least been downward and sharply so in the post-cold war period. Even so, in 
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trend that extends to many African countries where state-mandated violence has most occurred 
and has arisen popular support. A former burgomaster in Giti illustrated this from a Rwandan 
proverb: “„Amaboko yahobeye ingoma ayirekura ari uko bayakase‟ [– which literally means 
„arms that have held leadership release it only when they are cut‟]. This proverb translates a 
political situation where leaders, once in the office, look for ways to keep longer in power.” 
(Int.32) This interviewee reported that even if they stepped down, many retained the presidency 
of their political parties to keep on influencing major decisions, especially when they came from 
the ruling party. A researcher at the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace confirmed that 
heads of state followed the same pattern to perpetrate violence (with notable exceptions, the 
cases of Nyerere in Tanzania, Kimasi in Botwana, and Atete in Mali, who stepped down at the 
end of their political terms) (Int.29). Conversely, the interviewees established in previous 
paragraphs that the incumbents were power hungry and wanted to maintain power. Through the 
following paragraphs, the interviewees present possible reasons for which the incumbents have 
been power hungry and have wanted to retain power for so long. 
 
Resource mobilization 
 
The interviewees established material possessions as a major reason for which the elite opted for 
violence or sought to hold onto power. For instance, an official at the Commission for Unity and 
Reconciliation reported, “You find that most African elites think that the easiest way to reach 
success or make money and power is through politics. So, politics has become a good way to 
enrich oneself illegally. People take politics as a means for good life rather than a means to serve 
society and help in managing it in order to reach lasting development.” (Int.18) To her, politics 
has been seen as a source of material possessions and response to vulnerability. This claim found 
the support of a researcher who linked various insurgent organizations against governments to 
the search for wealth. 
 
He reported, “It is common knowledge that the opportunity of accessing…to power is a way of 
illegally enriching oneself in Africa. With this, conflicts of interest ensued.” (Int.29) The official 
at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation argued for some preconditions for this, as 
follows: “There should be a group to exploit. That group is made up with ordinary people. 
Without ordinary people, the elite would have no power and there would be no room for them to 
exercise power.” (Int.18) In other words, ordinary people have served as a ladder for the elite to 
access material possessions through power.  In a broader perspective, the interviewees 
emphasized that power was a relevant source of various interests. They claimed that politics 
equipped leaders with resource bases of a different nature so that many African heads of state 
declined to relinquish office when it was their time to do so. A researcher made a short summary 
of factors behind the delay in relinquishing power: 
 
The first reason is that power gives them richness and they become afraid of losing that richness 
once they leave their powerful posts. Secondly, Heads of states that stay long in power are 
assimilated to heads of families. They assimilate citizens to children to take care of. In the 
traditional context, they believe to be smart and endowed with the required wisdom to think on 
behalf of the nation. They stay in power considering themselves as ideal and wise persons, etc. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the 1990s, more heads of state were forcibly ejected or assassinated (24 and 38.3 per cent) than retired either voluntarily or 
because they had been voted out of office (21 or 32.9 per cent).” 
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Such presidents consider themselves as the most eligible in the „family‟ to lead and 
consequently irreplaceable. The third reason is that they are afraid of pursuits that might be done 
against them due to illegal accumulation of national richness. Finally, another reason is that the 
population under their administrative order is unable to rebel against the power firmly 
established. This population cannot show its discontent due to its inefficiency. (Int.29) 
 
In many ways, the interviewees established that the substance of these claims was based in the 
decentralized structures. Many shaped the ideas about leadership to different expectations in 
material terms. In Gatobotobo cell, a resident reported that people informally said that if they 
were leaders, they would have beautiful houses, many cows, and much beer. This is the way she 
looked at it at a local level: 
 
The cows that Kagame is giving out to people might not go to those they are supposed to. They 
might go to the leaders‟ friends while they are supposed to go to the poor. That is what they say.  
But they take the cows somewhere else. They talk to their friends: „I am giving you this cow, 
but you will give it back to me when it delivers‟. Instead of saying: „you will give it to the next 
person on the list‟. Still about possessions, for example, poor people had to be given pigs to 
keep and 20,000 francs. It means people who are terribly poor. They got pigs but they were not 
given the money. When they go complaining to the mayor, and when the mayor raises the case, 
those people are threatened. Personal interests are put forward to the detriment of the ordinary 
people. I think that is where the problem lies. (Int.16) 
 
The more vulnerability increased, the more the elite did not see clearly how to cope with the 
future once their source of material possessions dried up, and so the more the elite struggled for 
and delayed relinquishing power. An inhabitant of Gatobotobo cell established that the future 
was even more confusing to dictators, untouchable, and unsociable people who create a large gap 
between them and the common citizenry. Thinking about living a humble life became a major 
concern to many. As she put it, “They think people would lower them once out of power. It is 
just about prestige, respect and nothing else. But when you leave power, those who respected 
you keep respecting you. You keep respecting yourself as well and no one defies your respect.” 
(Int.16) This interviewee highlighted perceptions that affect the behavior of both the leaders and 
the electorate, formally entrusted with the appointing authority. 
 
Failing democratic rules 
 
In the democratic system, it was supported that the leaders exercise power on the behalf of the 
electorate for which they must account. The interviewees established that leaders drastically 
failed to bear in mind that leadership belonged to citizens and that they hold it for them. A 
former burgomaster of Giti advised: 
 
We should also know that leadership is for citizens so that when we fail to make use of it, they 
can retake it and give it to others. However, this is not the way we understand it and that is why 
some of our leaders neglect their people. They felt that they are very powerful so that when they 
are dethroned, people say many things. That relation between leaders and their people has not 
yet been strong. It lies only in theory and not in practice. The conviction of social contract 
should be our mechanism to build peace because it is a pact between a citizen and the politician 
they gave leadership to. (Int.32) 
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To back up these claims, the interviewees identified a failure in the manner in which the leaders 
interacted with the common citizenry. Ordinary people were said to have very rudimentary 
capacities to elect appropriate leaders. Also, as a result, they were not empowered enough to 
hold the leaders accountable for what they did. Importantly, they did not know the terms of 
reference for which they elected leaders. A resident of Gatobotobo cell said that ordinary people 
went electing leaders to fulfill an obligation. She reported, “They think the latter are the one who 
will come to bother them with tax collection. They could even go electing people they did not 
know bearing in mind that whoever could collect taxes from them. They hardly went beyond 
taxes to focus of the common interests in the leaders…With such a perception, it used to be not 
common to the common citizenry to go and ask to be granted the rights…For those uneducated, 
they would choose the uneducated leaders for them to share drinks, those who cannot do 
anything to them.” (Int.16) These conditions for leaders‟ appointment made it difficult to set up 
appropriate mechanisms for accountability. 
 
In many cases, the interviewees reported that such difficulties laid the ground for different office 
abuses, which, in turn, overshadowed the bright future of leaders once out of office. Hence, the 
search for accountability remained strongly connected to the vulnerability of leaders. 
 
Accountable leaders 
 
One of the major areas of concern to leaders, the interviewees argued, has been wealth 
accumulation. In illicit ways, it was stressed that leaders, as a result of corruption, accumulate 
material possessions for which they might not account for once out of office. This fact made 
worry a real issue that drove leaders to specific behavior. It was said that many made use of 
propaganda to acquire the support of the common citizenry to keep office. In this area, the 
interviewees said that leaders politicized the shortage of land to make people protest or resist the 
repatriation of the Tutsi Diaspora. An official to the national Commission for Unity and 
Reconciliation reported: “It was said that Inkotanyi were coming to share land with people who 
were in the country…Rwandans have a sound attachment on land so that during the conflict 
people were searching for resources and political power. People in power could speculate over 
the number of ministries and of seats in the parliament they would secure in case of power 
sharing. That is why they created a rift in order to maintain their political power.” (Int.18) 
Instead of land issues, this interview said that the number of ministries and of seats in the 
parliament were rather under dispute.  
 
As a result of Article 14 of the Arusha Peace Agreement, some of the government officials did 
not agree some of those ministries and seats could be assigned to the RPF-Inkotanyi. Most of the 
interviewees reported that some politicians were tormented by the accountability for the time 
they were in the office. A burgomaster in Giti reported that such politicians could say: “We 
signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. As a result, we are going to share leadership and Inkotanyi 
are going to head very important ministries. But if they happen to ask us how we led this 
country…what are we going to answer? „Let us continue hiding them‟ [, they could say]. 
Uncertainty may be one of the reasons that caused the Arusha Peace Agreement to be contested.” 
(Int.32) Since most of the leaders of that time were not sure whether they would have a viable 
future, their vulnerability continued to increase, according to the interviewee. 
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To show the extent to which the phenomenon generalized, the same interviewee pinpointed 
different cases of vote rigging and change of constitutional provisions by some heads of state 
when they found they were no longer eligible for the next elections. He reported that leaders 
build a bright future while in office through transparency and accountability, and make it easy to 
leave power in peaceful ways. It changes when transparency and accountability are lacking while 
in office. The same former burgomaster said: “Leaders fear that things they have held secret can 
be revealed and be questioned about them. When people always live in confusion, their leaders 
are somehow covered because confused people are easily taken in. But this makes leaders suffer 
in their mind because when, for example, one became president after electoral fraud, the person 
feels guilty especially when other presidents are being prosecuted…And there may be one who 
can cause war thoughtlessly in order to protect oneself without caring about enormous 
consequences that can take away people‟s lives at a large number.” (Int.32) With similar claims, 
the interviewees established that security of the leaders and of their wealth were the major 
preoccupations that tended to perpetuate the traditional understanding of leadership, where 
traditional chiefs could reign in Rwanda until they died. 
 
To the interviewees, holding onto power was said to be an extension of that philosophy of 
leadership by traditional chiefs. They reported that heads of state considered themselves as an 
incarnation of the nation, and therefore as leaders for life. They linked this fact to the 
proliferation of insurgencies that fought governments; fights that resulted in coup d‟état in many 
cases. As was earlier supported, the interviewees found that the support of the common citizenry 
played a central role. A researcher and university lecturer reported: “The access to power 
requires having allied (popular support). The latter can be found among the elite as well as non-
elite. The allied were selected on the basis of the area they came from, religion and ethnic 
affiliation, the clan, among others.” (Int.29) With this claim, the circle of power rotation 
perpetuated violence. The proliferation of political parties in newly introduced multiparty 
politics and liberation movements of the 1980s was established to be the result of holding onto 
power. 
 
Multiparty politics 
 
It was empirically supported that the proliferation of political parties exercised strong pressure 
on the government, which they wanted to topple and take over. The pressure was high in such a 
way that it drastically put human lives in danger. The interviewees stressed that multipolitics has 
always laid the ground for violence. As a matter of fact, they argued, there was little difference 
between the eruption of political parties of 1959-1960, and that of the 1980s, concerning the 
patterns of violence to which they led. Under the conspiracy of the colonial master, for instance, 
the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (MDR-Parmehutu) was founded to access power, 
which was seen as the monopoly of Tutsi.  
 
A resident of Gatobotobo followed the development of political parties in both periods, and 
reported: “The colonial masters had told Hutu that there would be many people to help them kick 
Tutsi away from the power if they founded a political party. Many people who were Tutsi then 
had their identity cards changed into Hutu for them to survive. The common citizenry…gained 
nothing…They just felt they were Hutu and that Hutu were leading…That is how ordinary 
people did not gain anything from political parties. Only those who were important people in 
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parties benefited…They told people to hate one another, to have some kicked out of…power for 
them to have power in their turn. And it happened so.” (Int.16) Despite the sacrifice of human 
lives, it was supported that political parties served as means by which the elite accessed or 
sustained power.  
 
From a broader, historical perspective, the interviewees highlighted the monopoly of power by 
the inner circle of power to have been an issue in dispute, following the amount and the nature of 
resources it involved. The interviewees showed that the inner circle of power varied in size and 
criteria for which it was established. They observed that the power clique involved the ethnic 
identity under Kayibanda under which the patronage of Hutu was exercised. Under 
Habyarimana, the clique was based on the region. Thus, eligibility for resources depended on 
whether people lived in the north or the south. 
 
As an official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation put it, the criteria served to make 
the clique narrower so as to make it fit to the ecological resources available. She drew the 
following conclusion: “It is clear that it was a way to seek how to maintain the cake. [Former 
president] Habyarimana happened to realize that the north and the south were getting bigger and 
bigger. Therefore, he decided to patronize his chiefdom, the Bushiru. It is clear that a time would 
come when he could even favor only his family: himself, his wife and children if he happened to 
stay some more time in office,” (Int.18) In other words, the interviewee supported, the more the 
cake was shared among many, the more shares that became insufficient. The proliferation of 
political parties erupted in the 1980s from this background. At the expense of many others, it 
was supported that the government patronized a handful of people who came from the former 
chiefdom of Bushiru in northern Rwanda. 
 
The interviewees reported that the monopoly of power created strong hardships, which could 
serve as a strong ideological base for the creation of political parties. However, a researcher 
involved in dialogue for peace in Rwanda reported that political parties paid less attention to 
popular social welfare. He disclosed, “The concern was rather about the collapse of the then 
regime. The founders perceived the launch of the liberation war in 1990 as an opportunity for the 
political opposition to attain their objective. They quickly joined the RPF side as a way of getting 
rid of Habyarimana. It was for them a way of access to power and the material possessions it 
brings with it.” (Int.29) 
 
The interviewees held that the basis of the proliferation of political parties had been more about 
power than ideological interest. Some concluded this to be one of the explanatory factors for 
which tentative efforts vainly tried to put an end to the problem of refugees. A researcher of 
dialogue for peace pointed out different conferences, which brought the government and the 
Rwandan Diaspora together for a negotiated solution. After a conference held in Washington
89
, 
                                               
89  In August 1988, the Rwandan regugees organized an International Conference in Washington to negociate the solutions for the 
Rwandan refugees. The refugees hosted by different countries sent delegates. The organizers invited the Government of Rwanda 
and different countries, which directly or indirectly related to the history of Rwanda or exercised a certain amout of influence on 
Rwanda. Thy included Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, the Western Germany (the then Federal Republic of 
Germany), France, the United States of America, and the UK. Except the Government of Rwanda, all the countries invited 
attended the conference. They interpreted the failure of the Government of Rwanda to attend as an indication for the lack of 
political will to settle the issue of the Rwandan refugees. This failure led to different speculations: some people could say that the 
failure was a reaction against the RPF movement, which intended to launch the war campaign. 
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he cited the [6
th
 Congress of MRND held in June 1987 in Kigali], which concluded that Rwanda 
was overpopulated and that there were no places left for more people. He mentioned that the 
proliferation of political parties failed to focus on the increment of the population‟s wellbeing. 
He reported this to link to a coalition of the newly created political parties with the government 
intended to make the Arusha Peace Accords a failure. He reported: “A former political leader in 
Habyarimana regime explained me that there was sensitization that RPF members would replace 
high-ranked officials if the s were put into practice. Ministers could be told that the success of 
the Arusha Peace Accords would result in losing their positions. If you are army chief of staff, 
for instance, you will lose that position. If you are the national bank governor or hospital 
director, you will hold a deputy position. Briefly, they were against the sharing of power.” 
(Int.29) 
 
Along these lines of thoughts, the interviewees linked the greed for power with the future
90
 that 
was then not perceived as bright. In other words, power sharing as the Arusha Peace Accords 
suggested, increased the vulnerability of many leaders. At this level, the interviewees held that 
higher levels of vulnerability also increased the risk of opting for violence. In many cases, power 
security also linked to material possessions was seen as the way out from vulnerability. In other 
words, deprivation pushed towards power struggle and violence. However, the interviewees said 
that material possessions were not the only target that (potential) leaders strove for in politics. 
The fact that leaders are in good positions to „make conclusive decisions‟ was a perspective of 
power that the interviewees strongly underlined. An official at the Ombudsman‟s Office said that 
power is not exclusively about wealth and various advantages it brings. He reported: 
 
It is not the matter of money. Decision-making is the reason why people fight to be elected at 
the grassroots levels of leadership (Cells and settlements) or in the Church where leaders are not 
paid. Power, leading others, making decisions, having the most competing ideas is something 
people enjoy. The power is the interest that most people are happy of, not because they 
necessarily earn money but because they are leaders. They are people who make decisions, give 
instructions and orders. They are persons others respect because they guide them in whatever 
they do. If it were a matter of money, people would go to business, which gets more interests 
quickly instead of becoming Minister or President. Power corrupts leaders. (Int.26) 
 
Many interviewees disclosed that the „political ideology‟ was a key factor for which the elite 
strove for power at any cost. It was empirically supported that, above all, the elite engaged in 
power struggle to lay a ground for ideology implementation. Interviewees widely cited Nyerere 
as a politician who dreamed of transforming Tanzania into a socialist state in an African fashion. 
He was said to have made use of power to bring about fundamental changes. To him, according 
to an Official at the Ombudsman‟s office, “power was an instrument or means to achieve the 
mission. When he found that his rhythm towards the objective was slowing down he gave up and 
allowed others to take over.” (Int.26) 
 
Unlike Nyerere, this interviewee found that Habyarimana laid favorable grounds for the inner 
circle of power to develop and for the frustration of many who formed the political opposition in 
                                               
90 This perfectly reflects the perceived vulnerability or uncertainty Davies (1974) earlier theorized. In other words, there were 
strong mechanisms set to inculcate higher levels of orientation toward the future (Lewis 1961, 1965, as paraphrased by Bernard 
2000:33). To refer to Bickel et al. (1997), the elite, at least, had stopped becoming fatalistic and reckless, as a result of strong 
sensitization. 
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the 1980s. Given the fact that the inner circle of power did not benefit many people, the 
proliferation of political parties was seen as a result of frustration. An independent researcher 
reported, “The inner circle of power comprises very few persons, trustworthy and family 
members, while the remaining people are excluded. It is a group that manages the resource bases 
and, sometimes, those who do not have access to the management of those resource bases hate 
this group.” (Int.29) This interviewee reported that the proliferation of political parties was a 
reaction to social inequalities. Also, it was established that the management of the inner circle of 
power created appropriate conditions for such a reaction to lead the elite to foment violence.  
 
An official at the Ombudsman‟s Office perceived those political parties as teams that always 
rebel against the leader after attaining power. They exercise strong pressure on the leader but, 
according to the same official, “When he wants to give up, the clique refuses and advises him to 
keep on…because of their own interests. He works under the pressure from the sweetness of 
power and that from his challengers. As a dictator, he wants to get rid of the latter and promote 
those who support his acts and ideas. He gets pressure from his supporters who please him in 
words by telling him that he is everything for the country. It makes him behave as a father of the 
country without whom, the country would not survive.” (Int.26) In short, power was established 
as a crucial factor for which the elite fomented violence in the past in Rwanda. 
 
Poverty as an instrument 
 
There have been controversial arguments about whether poverty was linked to genocidal 
violence in Rwanda. Earlier paragraphs referred to this when they discussed the search for 
survival at a certain level of the society. It is established that frustration closely connected to the 
development of multipolitics. Many of the interviewees show poor link between frustration and 
poverty although it has been a real concern of all the past. A historian said that poverty was an 
instrument used to mobilize the support of ordinary people to the elite‟s initiatives. As an 
example, he identifies “Germany as one of the richest countries in the world when it committed 
genocide. In addition, Yugoslavia was not poor when similar deadly violence took place. Rather, 
it was intellectually and technically a powerful country. That is, poverty is used as a means to 
attain hidden interests that justify conflict.” (Int.26) It was supported to be easy to mobilize the 
poor and use them in conflicts. Poor people were said to be ready to engage in violence because 
they perceived that they could gain more than they would lose. The study referred to the French 
revolution under Louis XIV. 
 
An official at the Commission for Unity and Reconciliation said: “Peasants were mob…they 
were the people who had nothing to lose and everything to gain. They had no houses, no land, 
and no capital whatever it could be, and no assets. Therefore, when they were told to set a town 
on fire, they did not care. They could say: „I have no house in this town and none of my children 
goes to school‟.” (Int.18) She continued: “If you want to set Kigali on fire, [the businessman] 
Rujugiro will try his best to keep stability because of his investments. But peasants who hardly 
find something to eat can easily get involved.” (Int.18) She pointed out the unemployed youth 
and desperate people had fallen prey of mobilization for genocidal violence in Rwanda just 
because they thought they would gain more than what they would lose. She established the youth 
that participated in genocide as the ones who did not have chance to go to school, who had no 
properties and who were very poor, without alternatives in life. The point to which many 
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subscribed is that poverty served as an intensifying factor for conflict to develop. The argument 
is that poorer African countries did not necessarily engage in violence on a large scale, as it was 
in the case of Rwanda. To this interviewee, it would be taken as an underestimation if one argued 
that genocide took place because Rwanda was mostly poor and illiterate. But it is clear that 
poverty and illiteracy intensified genocide and made manipulation easily yield results.  
 
To sum up, the interviewees showed that vulnerability management has always involved the elite 
in a struggle for power, which brought violence with it. At a local level, the pressure of 
immigration and the threat to survival were established as indicators of vulnerability in 
Murambi, understood as responsible for violent competition. At the national, and probably 
regional, levels, different struggles for power in the Great Lakes Region were empirically 
supported as a means for which vulnerability was managed, through the construction and defense 
of strong kingdoms. Earlier paragraphs showed that violence was put first in most cases. 
Popular hardships and politics 
 
After earlier paragraphs presented the main reasons that predisposed the elite to violence, the 
focus in this section is on the role hardships played in the process of conflict escalation. It was 
empirically supported that conflict always involved the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy of identity. 
The interviewees reported that the dichotomy shifted the focus from the social injustices the 
conflicts were meant to address.  
 
If the elite were dedicated to addressing such injustices, a politician said, they “could have 
coalesced to form a threat to injustice and inequalities in resource distribution among leaders. 
The failure we ever had is that the elite did not come together to reflect on the real issues. 
Instead, they thought that problems individuals were facing were the result of one being Tutsi, 
while the other is Hutu.” (Int.20) This interviewee raised this suggestion to show indignation 
against the way of doing things the elite made use of. “Bad luck that existed befell everyone 
regardless of the ethnic background. Those included poverty, illiteracy, an extreme lack of 
university education, and maternity death during the delivery process, among others. The 
colonial authorities misled Hutu when they succeeded to convince them that the Tutsi elite were 
the main source of their bad luck.” (Int.20) This interviewee agreed that the situation was 
conflict-prone, but the responses missed the focus.  
 
The same interviewee suggested that in 1959, for instance, the coalition could have targeted the 
traditional chiefs who owned the lion‟s share of the country‟s material possessions and, 
therefore, perpetuated injustice and social inequalities of different natures. The same logic could 
have applied to the 1994 conflict, the interviewee stressed. If the elite had been fair, he argued, 
“Conflicts could have opposed ordinary people against the wealthier people at that time. In other 
words, ordinary people should have fought Habyarimana, Shamukiga and Kajeguhakwa, 
[respectively president of the State and businessmen] and the administrative and commercial 
elite at national level. At local level, the same could have organized sackings against the 
properties of their burgomaster and of the businessmen in Bisesero.” (Int.20) This interviewee 
suggested that the amount of material possessions and the individual share in popular hardships 
would have been carefully assessed and would have been the most important criteria to identify 
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whom to fight. The interviewee said that the elite seemed to blame Tutsi as a justification for the 
hardships or bad luck the society underwent. 
 
In line with these claims, some interviewees tended to downplay the possibility of a relationship 
between popular hardships and violence in Rwanda. For instance, a politician reported as 
follows: “Truly, if poverty can make people revolt it did not totally apply to Rwanda because 
people could have fought the administration, those who were better off…But it has not been the 
case. The work of indoctrination transformed the pattern of conflict into ethnic identity, which 
served the purpose to define the enemy to fight.” (Int.20) This interviewee stated that the Hutu 
extremists indistinctly identified Tutsi with the monarchy power who, as a result, were allegedly 
viewed as the Inkotanyi supporters. At the same time, it found this an appropriate context under 
which the same extremists duped better-off Hutu into discriminating against Tutsi, allegedly 
saying that they would take ownership of their wealth in case they won the battle. The 
interviewees suggested that this background drastically affected the proliferation of political 
parties in all periods.  
 
During the democratization process of the 1980s, for instance, the interviewee reported that the 
active political parties degenerated into Hutu power to open the ground for many other forms of 
discrimination. Had it not been for the „Hutu power‟ philosophy, the interviewees strongly 
supported that violence could not have been possible on a large scale. For example, a politician 
argued, that “[In Gitarama] it was not easy to run violence because people from that area thought 
that their participation would translate the support to Habyarimana power, with whom enmity 
was for long established after he organized a coup d‟état against their fellow Kayibanda.” 
(Int.20) This interviewee suggested those people could have wanted the Democratic Republic 
Movement (MDR) – which had been popular to them since its inception – to kick him out of 
power. It meant the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy of (south and north) regional affiliation. 
 
In this area, at least, the same interviewee reported, “Leaders have engaged ordinary people in 
genocide. Ordinary Rwandan people were not aware of genocide. A Rwandan could tell you if 
he or she dislikes you. The same could insult and curse you if needed. But it could take time for 
people to go for violence…And for the elite to plan for violence, it requires them to turn 
dishonest and, as a result, take violence as the unique way to settle conflict.” (Int.20) To this 
interviewee, the elite became dishonest to see violence as a unique way to address the social 
injustices of past times. The political ideologies of the 1980s formed parties are said to have 
done little to address the real hardships to which the population was subjected. 
 
There was a misleading assumption that (the president) Habyarimana was the key problem the 
newly formed parties tirelessly dealt with, a politician mentioned. “The elite and the opposition 
should have wanted him to step down and leave them the ground to bring about change in the 
system. However, their political ideologies did not clearly show what the change would look like 
and what hardships they would tackle. They only wanted to take over from him.” (Int.20) This 
interviewee said that the political opposition did not shake the then government because they had 
a clear plan for ordinary people in southern Rwanda, who were hungry or discriminated against, 
for instance. Rather they challenged the government because they also wanted power. If this is 
the case, the same interviewee argued, ordinary people have participated in violence not just to 
meet their experienced needs. Rather, they played an instrumental role to the benefit of the elite.  
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Hardships in political agendas 
 
As the interviewees showed, political agendas accorded little attention to the idea of addressing 
popular hardships. They reported that the democratization processes of the 1960s ranged from 
nationalist to democratic parties, located between which was the revolutionist or socialist party. 
The Rwandese National Unity party (UNAR) was a nationalist party, which strove for immediate 
independence. At the other extreme, the Rwandese Democratic Rally (RADR) was a democratic 
party and focused on economic growth under the auspices of the colonial administration, before 
the country became independent. To the interviewees, these parties focused on macro-issues in 
their ideologies, except the MDR Parmehutu, a socialist party, which committed to addressing 
popular hardships. It aimed to work for the masses in order to change the poor living conditions 
of the majority. 
 
Unfortunately, lamented an official at the Ombudsman‟s Office, the pioneers of the revolutionist 
party in Rwanda did not adopt this logic. “The party could have built their ideologies on the 
people‟s problems. But it departed from wrong bases. Not only had Hutu undergone hardships, 
but there were also Tutsi who had suffered extreme deprivation. For instance, it could have 
considered the problem of poverty between Hutu and Tutsi instead of building their ideology on 
Hutu only. Their policy would have been better if they avoided discriminating Tutsi who were 
also starving in the hunger and poverty.” (Int.26) This interviewee assumed that the proliferation 
of political parties of the 1980s took inspiration from this background, which also had failed to 
address popular hardships. He attributed the failure to the fact that most political parties were 
plagiarized from the Western context. 
 
The political parties were meant to improve socio-economic conditions that long ago consisted 
of the satisfaction of primary needs. The interviewees stressed the „relative‟ aspect of need 
satisfaction.  A former burgomaster of Giti described the situation this way: “Somebody who 
could eat, wear clothes, store from the beginning up to the end of the year, qualified as rich. 
Cases of robbery were not many. People did not claim to be poor because they afforded these 
rudimentary needs.” (Int.32) This interviewee added that people felt relative poverty as they 
compared to one another. Against comparisons, a senator reported a link to violence: “There 
might be wide gaps in the ways of living in terms of the inequality in revenues…The wider the 
gap gets, the more it gives birth to conflicts that might even be out of control. There might be 
wars and chaos from that, not necessarily because of the word order from leaders. It is like 
adding fuel to the fire…The less there is a gap, the more there is cohesion in the society.” (Int.9) 
To this interviewee, the gap increases frustration, which ends in attacks against each other. It 
said that this would start with people developing jealousy, envy and hatred among people, which 
would eventually sow the seeds of conflict. In some cases, the interviewees understood poverty 
as a result of the competition between demographic growth and available ecological resources, 
on the one hand, and of the awareness raised from the budgeting of services and of material 
resources.  
 
A former burgomaster said that the common citizenry did not budget for transport, the time 
different journeys would take to them, accommodation and catering, given that generous people 
could cover everything through popular hospitality. “In the past people used to go on foot. 
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Nobody needed a vehicle. One could use three weeks walking from here up to Nyanza to 
respond to the court of appeal. People were not at all busy and had no notion of time. They could 
also stay and be received at any citizen‟s home when it was night. Nowadays, when you are 
travelling without money, you neither sleep nor eat because you can stay nowhere other than in 
hotels where you have to pay for a stay. That is something not affordable for everybody.” 
(Int.32) This interviewee said that exposure to modernity highly aroused awareness about 
poverty and vulnerability as income-generating sources increasingly dried up. No matter how the 
socio-economic conditions of the common citizenry were understood, the interviewees showed 
that these conditions bore some aspects that were tolerable in specific periods. 
 
For instance, a senator argued, “It was not surprising to see people with „jiggers‟ [it means 
parasites which attack body parts – i.e., feet and fingers – as a result of poverty-driven 
carelessness] in 1940. Nevertheless, unlike today, it is scandalous to meet a Rwandan with 
„jiggers‟. Therefore, the poverty is prevailing than ever before and it is gradually becoming 
tolerable. People should therefore take into consideration this aspect as well.” (Int.9) Until the 
eve of genocide, the standards of the benchmarks to weight poverty had improved before they 
led many to view poverty from other perspectives – like increased level of education, access to 
medical care, among many others parameters – that had not been considered in the past. If, 
according to the researcher at the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, the latest “studies 
on poverty concluded that 60% of Rwandans are under the poverty line despite of improvements 
registered in the past years,” (Int.29) much attention was paid to modern indicators. These claims 
brought the interviewees to argue that the concept of poverty of socioeconomic conditions, in a 
broader sense, changed in meaning over time. They also suggested that the democratization 
processes of the 1960s and the 1980s could have brought the political parties to formulate 
different ideologies to address the concerns of socioeconomic conditions among the common 
citizenry. 
 
Difference making 
 
The interviewees said that the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was different to some extent than 
the internal political opposition. At its inception, one of the founders said that it began as the 
Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1979, which aimed to address human rights-
related issues within a socialist Republic. According to this founder, however, the focus shifted 
to the progressist ideology after deep analyses in 1987 to harmonize with problems most 
pressing for citizens. As the situation appeared to the different founders, one of them said, 
“There were some bases of a progressist line, that is, democracy, national unity, fight against 
corruption, and the rise of the national economy, among other things. When these parameters are 
combined, they made a progressist line.” (Int.26) The same interviewee said that this line served 
as a basis for the liberation campaign, which later raised awareness about the rights among the 
population.  
 
To back up this founder, a politician formulated as follows: “Liberation campaigners could 
denounce, for instance, that people of the sub-region of Nduga were being treated differently 
because of their ethnic affiliation. As a result, people began waking up and realized that the 
government had disregarded their rights. They understood that it was a right to children coming 
from humble families to access education mostly made a privilege to children of leaders.” 
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(Int.20) To this interviewee, the liberation movement became popular because they could speak 
up about those concerns that had long been taboo, and they increased awareness about injustice. 
They empowered people with the conscience that it was the responsibility of the government to 
meet the basic needs – such as accommodation, catering and education, among other things. In 
this framework, the interviewees said that democracy was expected to define the strict respect of 
people‟s rights. An official at the Ombudsman‟s Office reported: 
 
If the children who pass examinations go to school, parents are satisfied. And it does not bother 
those whose children failed. Another example goes with the people‟s rights of property. They 
sell their products without any problem. People are given equal rights for instance when the 
government is distributing fertilizers or cows within the framework of „One Cow One Family 
policy‟ on the basis of clear and pre-established principles. They are sure whether poor families 
are given priority without any discrimination whatsoever or selfishness. People see such a 
policy quickly. There may even be some mistakes probably done by the leaders at the lower 
level. If there is no complicity with the leaders at the higher level, the people understand. 
(Int.26) 
 
On the basis of these claims, the interviewee concluded that ordinary people have strong 
intuition to find out where the injustice comes from. This conclusion found strong support 
among many interviewees, who argued that citizens are not ignorant as it is in the habit of many 
to think. It was supported that they are aware of numerous rights the government disregards or 
suppresses, but do not complain when it steadily becomes part of the habit. A former 
burgomaster of Giti reported: “Ordinary people are aware when they are subjected to injustice 
but they keep silent about it. They are easy for mobilization since someone might come and tell 
them: „Don‟t you see that you have suffered a lot?‟ They might agree with that person that they 
would consider as their redeemer worth being followed. This one would seem to have activated a 
volcano that was about to explode.” (Int.32) As he argued, the Rwanda Patriotic Front might 
have played that role during the liberation campaigns that are openly accepted to have raised 
popular awareness. 
 
However, the interviewees established that the common citizenry still had limited horizons to 
capture the scope of rights socially entitled to them. In other words, they used to not have a clear 
idea of the „right‟ as distinguished from the „favor‟. The interviewees attributed the lack of this 
idea to the fact that the struggle for subsistence has been the main preoccupation of the common 
citizenry over the past. To a politician, it is hard for societies predominantly characterized by 
subsistence to know the obligations of the government towards its citizens. Whether the 
government exists or not, the peasants subsist on farming, he said. In short, he argued, “they 
have not yet understood that the State is required to assist them in accessing manure for 
production increase, for instance. As a result, ordinary people could not complain about 
insufficient production. That situation exonerated leaders from being held responsible for 
different failure to assist the population. Under poverty and famine, peasants relate their situation 
to severe drought or to supernatural evil powers in some cases.” (Int.20) 
 
From the same perspectives, a senator also reported that poverty, not only in Rwanda, but also in 
many African contexts, is the legacy of past leadership. The responsibility of the leaders was 
established through the formulation of failing policies (Int.9). A former burgomaster of Giti also 
identified the root cause of poverty in the leadership. To him, poverty of a household is 
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attributable to the head of the family who fails to work hard in order to earn a living. 
Alternatively, he argued, families can be poor because the head mismanages the earnings or is 
selfish. He extrapolated to the country level: “When citizens are poor, poverty is attributed to 
their leaders. The leaders are the first to be blamed when they fail to respond to peoples‟ needs in 
order to overcome poverty. Either, it could be that leaders are not able to exploit the existing 
resources. Or, there could be scarcity of resources, which turn to be accumulated in the hands of 
selfish leaders…Then, people can say: „our leaders are making self-aggrandizement from 
resources we might live on‟.”(Int.32) The interviewees strongly highlighted that similar 
criticisms did not openly come up since the empowering interaction between the elite and the 
common citizenry was still at the initial stages. 
 
In summary, the interviewees reported the weaknesses of the political parties in the area of 
ideology formulation. Until the eve of genocide, they showed that the proliferation of political 
parties struggled for power in isolation from the real or perceived hardships that the population 
was subjected to. At this level, the interviewees said that the most concern of interest was about 
the elite grabbing power from one another. This observation was particularly formulated against 
the political parties, which developed from within to make a clear distinction from the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF). In sharp contrast, the interviewees claimed the latter to be different, in the 
sense that its ideology was clearly spelt out and adjusted to the experienced problems in different 
areas of social life – such as democracy, national unity, fight against corruption, national 
economy, and repatriation of refugees. Even if the interviewees highlighted this difference, it 
was in common that political parties were exclusively elite-driven initiatives on both sides. It 
was supported that the elite sought popular support using different methods. Depending on the 
interest each side was looking for, it aligned supporters behind specific causes. The interviewees 
understood genocide in Murambi and the absence of genocide in Giti from this background. 
Summary 
 
Among many other justifications, the scarcity of ecological resources was supported to be a 
major reason why leaders and their respective surroundings constructed a „divine right‟ to the 
resource base. The latter made it legitimate to fight and repress whoever would challenge the 
leadership in place. It was supported that leaders suffered vulnerability that, in most cases, was 
not dealt with in empowering ways. Violence, and human rights abuses of different kinds, 
followed under strong conspiracy of civil society organizations. The media and human rights 
organizations were implicated in this conspiracy, but the Church was at the forefront of 
institutions implicated. The most explanatory arguments singled out the absence of a clear-cut 
distinction between the State and the Church. The interviewees supported it to be a strong legacy 
of colonialism. 
 
On a large scale, politics was also supported to have played a role in what makes the elite opt for 
violence. It was supported that politicians were mostly motivated by power. The proliferation of 
political parties during the 1960s and 1980s was mainly seen as a means to access power. As a 
result, politicians overlooked popular hardships, which could have served as strong bases of 
different political ideologies, if the political parties were meant to address identified popular 
hardships. Other than the Rwanda Patriotic Front, the interviewees emphasized, there were few 
people-oriented political ideologies. 
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At the outset, this study indicated an interest to respond to the main research question: „Why 
could genocide take place in Murambi but not in Giti despite that they are allegedly 
homogeneous on cultural and socio-economic grounds?‟ To seek the empirical explanation of 
popular support for genocidal violence in Rwanda, it formulated the following sub-questions: (1) 
What level of leadership mattered the most during the course of genocide? Under what 
circumstances did leadership matter? (2) How did individual political networks among the 
middle-range leaders affect the genocide? (3) How did formal and informal structures interact 
during the genocide? (4) In what ways did mixed ethnic relations affect the genocide? (5) What 
role did migration and displacement of people from the war zone have in the variations in the 
magnitude of the genocide? (6) What role did civil society organizations play during the 
genocide? (7) How did grassroots thinking help in explaining the variations in the magnitude of 
the genocide in the case studies? and (8) Under what circumstances did vulnerability and poor 
living conditions contribute to genocidal violence?  
 
These research questions were theoretically discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, through various 
theories, introducing a multi-theoretical model. The model served the purpose of addressing the 
explanatory gaps each theory in isolation would bring with it. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 dealt with the 
empirical material in an exploratory style. They served as an opportunity for the interviewees to 
express detailed perceptions against the research question. In the following paragraphs, this 
chapter globally endeavours to highlight the key responses to these research questions. 
Highlights of the findings 
 
On the empirical grounds, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 investigated the important factors contributing to 
explaining popular support for genocidal violence in Rwanda. The study collected the bulk of 
raw material that are systematically presented in the aforementioned chapters. The following 
paragraphs highlight the main findings. The highlights are summarized in five clusters, 
formulated as follows: (1) The levels of leaderships and collaboration; (2) Mixed ethnic relations 
and human factors; (3) Politics and civil society organizations; (3) Collectively accepted 
character; (4) Issues in dispute and escalation; and (5) Vulnerability and poor living conditions. 
In so doing, this summary does not necessarily follow the same order of presentation as in the 
chapters on the basis of which they are formulated. Across the empirical chapters, the findings 
pointed out the main ideas, as summarized in the following paragraphs. 
 
The levels of leaderships and collaboration 
 
The middle-range level of leadership has remained the most important catalyst for social change 
in Giti and Murambi. It created a framework where the government leaders and the religious at 
local level interchangeably drove the process of change. The political elite were depicted to be 
the most active human factors in causing and dealing with crises by means of physical and legal 
coercion. At the same time, the local religious elite were perceived as entrusted with the 
capacities to reach the innermost side of the individual to bring about change on a long-term 
basis. In sharp contrast, it was being said that both the political elite and the religious 
concomitantly exercised power over the common citizenry in Giti, while they alternated in a 
sequential fashion in Murambi.  
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The broader historical perspective was an explication of each case. In each case, the middle-
range level of leadership was important in arousing the response of the common citizenry. Many 
causal relationships applied to explain why the middle-range leaders matter, but the following 
has seemed the most convincing. It was stated that the shorter the distance between the common 
citizenry and leaders in the hierarchical line, the looser the feeling of detachment among the 
common citizenry became. As a result of reduced distance, the middle-range leaders always 
competed with the top-level of leadership in terms of their capacities to influence the common 
citizenry. By the means of the same capacities, the middle-range leaders yielded different 
outcomes in the case studies. 
 
For instance, it was found that genocide, and the absence of genocide, respectively, related to the 
inefficient leadership in Murambi and to the efficient leadership in Giti, both identified as being 
historically-grounded. The findings particularly circumscribed the non-violent Giti in the 
sequences of violence of 1959, 1963, and 1973, to conclude that resistance to violence in 1994 
was a continuation of resistance established over the past. As a result, Giti residents successfully 
faced the pressure from the neighboring communes – Gikomero, Gikoro, Rutongo and Murambi, 
depicted as the most virulent at the time of genocide. Not only did Giti residents save their own 
people, they also saved many lives of those who sought refuge in Giti.  
 
Over the same periods of time, different leaders were reported to have repeatedly perpetrated 
violence on their own people in Murambi. The most cited consisted of the repeated selection of 
male Tutsi, who were taken at night to the Nyamarebe marsh to be killed. Such massacres were 
linked to the fact that the middle-range leaders disputed power between Hutu and Tutsi, resulting 
in a discriminatory attitude among the common citizenry. Against this background, the response 
to the 1994 genocide in Murambi, like Giti, was depicted to be an extension of the same manner 
in which they responded to violence in 1959-60. The collaboration of the levels of leadership 
offered strong explanation. 
 
It was found that the central government institutions patronized some of the middle-range leaders 
following particular interests. As a trustworthy supporter of the then leading political party, the 
burgomaster of Murambi fell into this category. The most important implication is that the 
middle-range leadership in Murambi was in a strong political network with the top-level of 
leadership. As a result, there was a strong political network with the central government 
institutions that ensured a healthy two-way feedback between the common citizenry and the top-
level of leadership, under the intermediation of the middle-range leaders. Unlike in Murambi, 
there was a large gap between the central government institutions and the local institutions of 
Giti. The same feedback continued collapsing at the middle-range level of leadership in Giti, as a 
result of a weaker political network, until it made it difficult to own the process of genocide then 
understood as top-down driven.  
 
In short, both the middle-range and the top-levels of leadership were strongly disconnected. In 
this context, the community-grown wisdom of the traditional elite usurped the top leaders‟ 
prerogative to urge the middle-range leadership to non-violence. The latter exercised the 
prerogative that was traditionally made an exclusive monopoly of the formal elite. With this, it 
was brought to the attention of this study that the concept of „elite‟ goes beyond formal 
education, and that it is a „context-specific‟ concept that finds definition in particular cultural 
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settings. The concept of „informal elite‟ ensued and appeared to juxtapose with that of „formal 
elite‟, and both typologies of elite seemed to overlap at the lowest levels of the community. 
 
If the informal elite, regarded as trustful advisors to the burgomaster, exercised power in shadow 
to give guidance on efficient ways in which to behave during the course of genocide, it showed 
that family relations turned into a key element to leadership legitimacy, since they were all 
family elders. In other words, the influence of the formal structures descended to reach the level 
of the family, so that there was a mixture of powers where the formal elite consistently interacted 
with the extended families. The community elders served an instrumental role to build strong 
trust between the burgomaster and the common citizenry to which they belonged. With this, it 
was supported that the informal elite played an intermediary role between the common citizenry 
and the middle-range leaders to preserve a non-violent environment in Giti, while richer people 
played the same role to arouse popular support for genocidal violence in Murambi.  
 
With the case of Giti, this showed that the top-down style of command does not necessarily 
translate the will of the elite. As the paramilitary organizations became most important, cases 
emerged where the military officers turned out to be led, beaten and disobeyed by their 
subordinates. Similar situations in which ordinary people could dismiss their burgomasters and 
re-appoint new ones showed that the common citizenry is, under some circumstances, entrusted 
with the power to challenge and upset the orders of leaders. This made it possible to conclude 
that the influence between the elite and non-elite was not a one-way process. Various parameters 
are taken into account to find out that the influence can be reciprocal for both partners to be able 
to manipulate each other for specific purposes. 
 
Unlike in Giti and some few other comparable areas, the two-way process of influence was made 
unthinkable in most areas, typified by Murambi. The community elders – thought to resist the 
inefficiencies of the formal elite – were given limited opportunities to grow and influence the 
decision-making in Murambi. There were strong incapacitations, which many viewed to be the 
result of a total absence of human factors sensitizing for non-violence. Instead, the community 
elders turned into obedient or, at least, bystander subjects vis-à-vis the genocidal violence.  
 
Mixed ethnic relations and human factors 
 
The most striking characteristic of the case studies was depicted to be strong mixed ethnic 
relations or extensive intermarriages. Unlike many other Rwandan areas, it was not easy to find a 
Tutsi without biological ties to Hutu, and vice-versa, in the sub-region of Buganza. In other 
words, it was difficult to establish a clear-cut distinction between ethnic identifications. In 
addition to extensive intermarriages, different events highly contributed to mixing up different 
ethnic identities until identity bore an elusive meaning. Primarily, those events include inter alia 
the registration of Hutu as Tutsi at a certain level of wealth in what was known as Hutu 
cleansing, the identity documentation changing to facilitate Tutsi access schools and travelling 
documents in the post-monarchy regimes, and to survive violence that followed the proliferation 
of political parties of 1959-1960.  
 
Many linked these parameters with the strong sense of community and of social ties that the sub-
region of Buganza identified with in the past, and which political struggles for power controlled 
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for. Also, many practices – including the blood-confirmed promise of friendship, assistance to 
each other in case of danger and of the gift exchange of cattle, land and brides – and institutions 
were highlighted as important to this process. For instance, the clientele system was said to have 
yielded satisfactory outcomes to both Hutu and Tutsi, particularly in Giti. It resulted in cow 
giving which caused Hutu and Tutsi to be in close relationship. As a result, Hutu perceived the 
cattle clientship (Ubuhake) not as enslaving, but rather, it helped many to set non-polarized 
interactions, in the sense that Tutsi were not disdainful of Hutu and vice versa. On relational 
grounds, the gap between the lords and servants was perceived as minimal. Following the logic 
of Tutsi perceived as good masters and of Hutus‟ faithful behavior to the same masters, some 
viewed the clientele system as an educational institution from which people could get rid of 
polarizing ethnicity. The clientele system was a common practice until the King resolved to 
redistribute cattle in 1954 as a way to fight social inequalities. 
 
However, the lifespan of mixed ethnic relations varied between Giti and Murambi, as a result of 
internal migrations. In the 1960s, the State organized intense migrations to move people from 
densely populated areas to less populated ones from where they acquired free land. As a result, 
the immigrants owned larger spaces for farming activities before they became the most 
prosperous in Murambi. With immigration, it was made possible for the State to have full control 
of all the citizens and the territory that was suspected to be where the Tutsi Diaspora in Uganda 
would invade Rwanda from. Security threat was a major concern that most post-colonial regimes 
predicted in that area.  
 
As a result, the government devoted particular attention and resources, including the military, to 
Murambi, then widely perceived as a Tutsi land.
91
 The immigrants always became faithful to the 
government that gave them land. Hence, they followed the political elite. In other words, the 
immigrants perceived the leadership as a legitimate government to which they owed respect and 
obedience in order to give gratitude for their new land. From the security and migration 
perspectives, Murambi was dissimilar to Giti. In Giti, people were homogeneously poor with the 
possibility for most residents to trace back more than seven ancestors for the last three centuries. 
 
This laid the ground for the government to make political calculations for manipulation. 
Different voices related a higher magnitude of violence to the presence of immigrants in 
Murambi. It was strongly highlighted that, unlike Giti, the sense of community and of social ties 
in Murambi eroded after the arrival of immigrants established the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy of 
ethnic identities. Many held the immigrants responsible for the resurrection of ethnic differences 
that mixed ethnic relations had successfully managed to lessen before. The start of war in the 
neighborhoods of Murambi and the war-displaced people in the same area – from former 
communes Kiyombe and Muvumba – were reported to have only come to exaggerate the 
demarcation line between „us‟ and „them‟ identities that already existed. With this, the context of 
cruelty – people heard gunshots from the war zone and felt an imminent danger – that existed in 
                                               
91 The sub-region of Buganza is one of the regions where intermarriages have attained the maximum rate in Rwanda. The label 
„Tutsi land‟ defines that area where identification of Hutu and Tutsi through the stereotypes set by the colonial authorities have 
most occurred. As people referred to economic activities, major food, and style of living, they found everything different from 
regions where intermarriages have barely existed. „Tutsi land‟ is a concept that was used to signify the absence of Hutu in the 
region. 
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the neighborhoods of Murambi (such as the war zone) was taken as an important factor in 
predicting genocidal violence.  
 
To the contrary, people of Giti had no war-displaced people on their land before the catalyst for 
violence emerged. Of course the human factors sensitizing for violence and non-violence played 
a crucial role in engineering the plot against Tutsi. In Murambi, the local leadership is 
highlighted to not only have connived with the immigrants to set a clear-cut distinction between 
Hutu and Tutsi, but by means of destructive mobilization, it is also said to have inflamed ethnic 
and discriminatory feelings among the war-displaced people – then aware of the danger of war 
perpetrated by the majority Tutsi Diaspora. Unlike Murambi, there was total absence of human 
factors sensitizing for violence in Giti. The few elites who managed to access education were 
said to be mixtures of Tutsi and Hutu, who settled in their working place – i.e., the capital city of 
Kigali. It was found that it was not in their habit to come back and sensitize people to 
discrimination. Whenever they came back, they were considered as sons and daughters of the 
community and behaved humbly. 
 
There are a number of arguments to justify the absence of human factors for genocidal violence 
in Giti. Contrary to Murambi, the multiparty politics of the 1980s found fewer supporters in Giti, 
as the proliferation of political parties was extremely weak. Also, Giti was poorly represented in 
the central government institutions – i.e., the cabinet and the parliament. Even the commune 
leaders came from very humble backgrounds. Also, difficult access to Giti, as a result of poor 
communication infrastructures – such as road and telephone connection – and being a land-
locked commune, came to make it difficult for the national elite to effect mobilization 
campaigns. At the same time, the proximity of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) was said to 
have successfully played a dissuasive role against violence. 
 
Politics and civil society organizations 
 
A mono-party political environment has always determined the quality of civil society 
organizations in Rwanda. Until the advent of the multiparty politics, the Church was top of the 
list of civil society organizations. Many accorded that the Church was powerful enough to resist 
the inefficiency of the State. Starting from the colonial period onwards, Churches closely 
collaborated with the government so that it was difficult to identify a demarcation line between 
politicians and religious leaders. As a result, the Church failed to intermediate between the State 
and the common citizenry, according to the proper functioning of civil societies. The ascendancy 
of the Church over Christian followers – the majority of the Rwandan population – led many to 
conclude that the government would not have dared to plan large-scale genocidal violence if the 
Church had sided with the common citizenry.  
 
Rather, the Church and State merged into one, stronger, institution to make it difficult for the 
Church to oppose the plans of which it was part. This does not ignore the independence – based 
on the appointment of Bishops from Rome – of the Church, which ideally exercises political 
influence on many institutions, including the State. As a result of close collaboration between the 
Church and the State, both the Church and the State merged, not by legal means, but by interest. 
The data circumscribed this style of collaboration in a broader historical perspective. In the 
colonial era, the data underlined the primacy of the Church over the monarch, where priests were 
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entitled the right to disgrace, dismiss and deprive high-ranking chiefs of their cattle, and to settle 
disputes. Under these circumstances, it was highlighted that the local authorities neither opposed 
the colonial authorities in the administration nor the missionaries who closely collaborated with 
them. 
 
In order to sustain power, the local authorities lived peacefully with the colonial authorities and 
missionaries. The same pattern reproduced in the post-colonial regimes, where the Church not 
only affected the appointments of different incumbents, but also circumscribed their power in the 
supernatural powers, so that each leader was subject to the support of the Church authority. With 
this background, modern religion came to exaggerate the existing perceptions of the divine right, 
understood since the monarchy regime as a strong pillar to support power. The guardians of the 
esoteric code (in the monarchy systems), the inner circles of power and priests exploited the 
existing beliefs to emphasize that those who led were the „chosen‟ of the supernatural powers.  
This made it legitimate to fight whoever might challenge the power of the „chosen‟ of 
supernatural powers. In most cases, violence ensued. Unlike Murambi, Giti depicted the 
cooperation of the local government leaders and the religious as efficient, resulting in community 
harmony during the course of genocide. 
 
In short, the data identified the Church as having interfered with politics, and as having 
emphasized the sacred aspect of leadership. In usurping the authority of parents over the youth, it 
also substituted the culture – the carrier of religious ceremony and the oaths that the traditional 
religion brought with it to regulate the relation between the initiates and godparents – that was 
fundamentally regarded as the regulatory element of human behavior in ancient times. It not only 
preached the removal of social taboos – the carriers of social norms, moral barriers and 
prohibitions – but the demystification of sacred places during the 1994 genocidal violence was 
also understood as an indication of the total collapse of Christian values and of the prohibitions it 
brought with it. 
 
Collectively accepted character 
 
The communitarian style of life was openly accepted as the most legitimate in Rwanda. As a 
result, collective efforts to preserve a peaceful environment in Giti and to perpetrate mass 
violence in Murambi made use of this style of life. It was found that one single killing would 
involve different people. Each person caught up in violence would implicate as many people as 
possible so that the people took the wrongdoing as a collective matter that never held responsible 
particular individuals out of the indivisible group. At the same time, non-violence in Giti is 
widely understood as being the result of collective efforts of all residents. These results have 
corresponded with different characters that strongly shaped grassroots thinking in Rwandan 
society. 
 
To begin with, the data established that different institutions – i.e., the nuclear and extended 
families, schools and the Church – inculcate strict upbringing that extends obedient behavior 
from childhood to the entire lifespan. Many cases in which ordinary people followed the orders 
that leaders made automatically were understood from this perspective. However, people from 
Giti also perceived as obedient, concomitantly analyzed what and why leaders told them, and 
what the consequences might be. It was found that they had rarely come up with decisive 
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responses to the invitation of leaders in the past. In other words, these people were identified 
with a cautious and reserved attitude.  
 
To a large extent, this attitude extended to the majority of people from the sub-region of 
Buganza, including Murambi when the phenomenon of migration is controlled for. The 
mobilization campaigns at the national level might have underestimated this attitude. They took 
for granted the obedient behavior earlier defined as historically embedded in everyday life, and 
thought that people would automatically follow instructions, especially in Giti, locked between 
other communes. This denotes that obedience is not so straightforward as it was earlier 
supported. The data related it to the Rwandese saying, „Abanyenduga batsa umuriro bajunditse 
amazi‟,92 which literally means „people from Nduga light fire with the mouth full of water‟. The 
cautious and reluctant attitude embedded in this wisdom encouraged ordinary people not to 
decide ignorantly to opt for genocidal violence in the sub-regions of both Buganza and Nduga. 
 
The attitude found in Giti was thought to have shaped the grassroots thinking that drastically 
affected not only the pattern of social relations but also politics at the local government level. 
Particular to Giti, it was found that the same grassroots thinking grounded in a cautious and 
reserved attitude guided people in many incidents that could have required the locals to behave 
in a violent manner over the past. The sequences of violence and the campaign of abolition of the 
monarchy are examples of such tendencies. On collective grounds, the cautious and reserved 
attitude was an indication of strong community cohesion that drove a divorce between the 
invitation to genocide by leaders and the response of the common citizenry. The data pointed out 
a heavy concentration of this attitude in the sub-regions of Buganza and Nduga, and variations of 
the same concentration in most areas of Rwanda.  
 
As a result, it was contended that genocidal violence was not embedded in the common citizenry. 
At the other extreme, the data highlighted that such cautious and reserved attitude was largely 
absent, historically, in the northern parts of Rwanda. Unlike the sub-regions of Buganza and 
Nduga, people are said to be straightforward in the northern parts, also known by the name of 
Rukiga. It was supported that the straightforward character of those from Rukiga competed with 
the cautious and reserved attitude of the people of Buganza. As a result, the same attitude 
increasingly diluted in Murambi, following immigrants outnumbering the locals over whom they 
ruled. Unlike in Giti, this shift in collective character was depicted to have driven a receptive 
response to genocide in Murambi. 
 
Issues in dispute and escalation 
 
In line with earlier paragraphs, the elite were identified as human factors that made violence 
either occur or not. The data emphasized that heads of state were assimilated to heads of 
families. At the same time, the citizens were assimilated to children of whom the heads of state 
were required to take care. Under these capacities, the heads of state pretended to be human 
factors that made violence either occur or not in the ultimate interest of the citizens. The data 
established that genocide found strong signification in the patriarchal philosophy of power, 
whereby the head of state was perceived as the most eligible in the „family‟ to lead, and was 
                                               
92 In the Rwandan way of life, fire is lit by using pressure from the mouth. So lighting fire with water in the mouth is impossible. 
The saying denotes a reluctant attitude, which makes obedience not a clear and straightforward concept in practice. 
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consequently irreplaceable. It is contended that the response to genocide by the middle-range 
leaders was an indication of support of this thinking. This was taken as part of the habits of the 
past. As emphasized, the elite always privileged armed conflicts to ensure survival, to construct 
and defend kingdoms as strong as Rwanda, and to sort out power-related issues, with the 
intention of one side eliminating another. This fact brought people become familiar with 
engaging in violence. This found support in the repression of rebellion that dared challenge the 
leadership over the past, or in forced exile in case negotiations failed to yield results. However, 
the relationship between violence and different social injustices was not so clear. 
 
The proliferation of political parties in the 1960 and 1980s developed as a means to seize power, 
at the cost of human lives. Genocide in Rwanda was supported as being a result of the political 
ideologies of the political parties of the 1980s that overlooked the real popular hardships that 
needed addressing. This was understood as a continuation of what happened during the 
democratization process of the 1960s, where political parties focused on macro-issues – such as 
the immediate independence and the rise of the national economy – instead of building 
ideologies responsive to the people‟s hardships. In contrast with most political parties, the 
Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) paid attention to popular hardships, but failed to view 
both ordinary Hutu and Tutsi as starving, in hunger and poverty. The proliferation of political 
parties during the 1980s patronized ordinary Hutu at the expenses of Tutsi and, as a result, 
strongly established the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy of ethnic identity. In other terms, the 
democratization processes deviated from the social injustices they were meant to address. If Giti 
and Murambi responded differently to genocide, the material reveals that there are two major 
reasons: on the eve of genocide, both cases were not actively involved in the democratization 
process in the same way, and the concentration of the „us‟ and „them‟ dichotomy of ethnic 
identity was unequally distributed. Each case owned a particular historical background, which 
drove to different levels of indoctrination, so that the pattern of conflict transformed into a matter 
of ethnic identity. 
 
Vulnerability and poor living conditions 
 
It was strongly supported that from time to time, the common citizenry tried in vain to satisfy 
their primary needs. And the measurement of the level of satisfaction has only made use of 
benchmarks of rudimentary standards and poor budgeting of resource bases (such as time and 
weeks of walk) and of services – i.e., free catering and accommodation. With all these 
parameters, combined with strong competition between the demographic and available 
ecological resources, it was found out that the common citizenry starved in poverty so that they 
purposively participated in genocide to satisfy short-term needs – i.e., obtaining the land, cattle 
and houses in order to transcend their misery. Importantly, mass participation aimed to get rid of 
the threat against survival, and to obtain rewards of different kinds out of individual 
responsibility. This was taken to be an indication of strong dependency and of deep 
incapacitation by which the common citizenry failed to control their own destinies. By this was 
meant that ordinary people lived in a situation of strong vulnerability, which leaders exploited to 
realize their genocidal agenda. 
 
At a higher level, the same situation of vulnerability faced leaders of different echelons of 
leadership. To begin with, the elite comparatively enjoy better living conditions. In a context 
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where the government is the main employer, the data established the elite to be those that 
material possessions drive to politics, which was openly accepted to be a source of better living 
conditions. At the middle-range level, as at the top-level of leadership, there was identified a 
recurrent risk of illegal accumulation of wealth, about which leaders were afraid of possible 
repercussions. As the context of resolutions in the Arusha Peace Accords showed about power 
sharing, leaders cause war thoughtlessly in order to protect their wealth and themselves without 
caring about the cost of people‟s lives.  
 
Unlike ordinary people, this proved to be related to relative poverty, where the creation of the 
inner circle of power is inclined to satisfy insatiable needs. This was identified to be the case the 
moment leaders are reminded of their accountability for their time in office, especially when 
their future appears to be under a cloud. At the local government level, the future was more 
confusing for dictators – untouchable and unsociable leaders – who, after they have created a 
large space between themselves and the common citizenry, are tormented by the prospect of 
living a humble life out of the office. At one or another level of leadership, as a result, there was 
a tendency to perpetuate the traditional understanding of leadership, where traditional chiefs 
could reign in Rwanda until they died. 
 
However, no matter how absolute or relative poverty is, the study established a weak causal 
relationship between poverty and genocidal violence in Rwanda. Instead, poverty was taken as 
an instrument that leaders used to mobilize the support of ordinary people for genocidal violence. 
The argument remained that the poor – such as unemployed youth and other desperate people – 
easily fell prey to mobilization for genocidal violence in Rwanda, as they thought rather to gain 
more than they would lose. In other terms, the study described poor living conditions as an 
intensifying factor encouraging people to subscribe to violence. The study showed that 
vulnerability management has always involved the elite struggling for power, which brought 
violence with it. 
Theoretical implications of findings 
 
At the outset of this study, it was made clear that the genocide in Murambi and the absence of 
genocide in Giti were not mono-causal. The design of a multi-theoretical model was intended to 
solve some explanatory gaps that individual theories have brought with them. As a result of the 
chosen model, the study looked into leadership (top, middle-range and grassroots levels), social 
power, popular support, and grassroots thinking, as parameters between which there was strong 
interplay. Against the empirical material, it was made clear that none of these parameters were 
more than the others. In a descriptive way, parts of the data gave support in one direction, and 
others in other directions, so that there was no clear-cut conclusion that could be definitively 
drawn. In this way, the data supported some theoretical claims while they challenged some 
others. At some points, the study brought in some more empirical inputs, so that the multi-
theoretical model could be improved and capture the maximum scope of the research question 
that was investigated. Therefore, the following paragraphs look back to the departing parameters 
to weigh the amount of support that the findings have. 
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The middle-range level of leadership 
 
It is theoretically documented that the small interlocking group in command is heterogeneous, in 
terms of decision-making, and is always in tension. According to certain theories, they only 
come together in case of strong crisis to protect specific interests. In the American ruling elite, 
that group includes corporate executives, government officials, and military leaders jointly said 
to hold the effective control of major social and political decision making in the United States 
(Wright Mills 1956). In the terms of Etzioni-Halevy (1993), this interlocking group reflected a 
concerted conglomeration of power whose style of collaboration varies depending on the 
context. With Lederach (1997), this conglomeration of power corresponded with the macro-level 
view of leadership – that is, the top-level of leadership.  
 
With the support of other theorists, he suggested that there is strong interplay between the top, 
the middle-range and the grassroots levels of leadership, to start a change or initiate conflict 
transformations. As he puts it, it is not the top leaders who have much credit in bringing about 
change or conflict transformation. He emphasized that the change starts from the middle-range 
level of leadership, widely thought to have the required capacities to engage the common 
citizenry. Hence, to link to Bauman (2000), modernity and bureaucracy are relevant in the case 
of Rwanda to explain violence and the absence of violence in the case studies. The findings 
strongly support the important role of the modern state in the dichotomization process and 
planning, without which it would have been difficult to mobilize so many ordinary people to 
genocide. 
 
In a non-mono-causal way, the local leaders in Giti, as well as in Murambi (the middle-range 
leaders), were highly relevant factors influencing why genocide could take place in Murambi but 
not in Giti. However, these areas are allegedly homogenous on cultural and socio-economic 
grounds. The empirical material strongly supported, in line with Lederach, that the middle-range 
level of leadership plays a crucial role. It also emphasized that different categories of the elite 
could exercise power in shadow, in specific circumstances. In line with Mills (1956) and Etzioni-
Halevy (1993), crisis and stability are specific circumstances that governed the rotation of this 
power. They contended that the military and, to an extreme level of absence of social norms, the 
paramilitary organizations, decisively influenced important decisions during the crisis time. 
Thereby, the findings supported the rotation of social power in the small interlocking group in 
the control in the United States.  
 
The same as the military influenced important decision in the case studies, Mills (1959) found 
the US military to enhance its power, and the corporate sector to be firmly entrenched in the 
public decision-making processes. To the detriment of the corporate rich and the high-level 
warlords in the US, the professional politicians nearly lost the power to influence public matters 
after World War II. Following the same pattern, the findings were consistent with the existing 
literature on Rwanda, according to which the military strongly influenced the middle-range 
leaders to make decisions during the crisis time. In the transitional period from conflict to 
stability, the same pattern seemed to recur, as the military was actively involved in reconciliation 
processes. The survey ordered by the Rwandan Senate between May 16 and 28, 2005, showed 
that the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) is the institution most actively involved in the post-
6
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conflict processes.
93
 As during the conflict, the innermost-oriented elite – theoretically 
recognized to inculcate moral values and to successfully operate inner changes at the individual 
level – have hesitantly become involved in actively participating in the restoration of socio-
political stability. 
 
In short, the middle-range leaders remained human factors starting change or initiating conflict 
transformation. Even if the power in shadow could interpose between the middle-range leader 
and the common citizenry, the former was highly visible in events that required the formal 
representation of the leadership. Unlike the idea of rotation of the exercise of power among the 
small interlocking group in control in the United States, the material supported the rotation of the 
exercise of power in shadow in the Rwandan case. For instance, the military (security apparatus 
and paramilitary organizations) and legal instruments (instruments for coercion) influenced the 
decision-making process at the middle-range level of leadership. And in many cases, the material 
argued, the innermost-oriented elite were not so visible.  
 
In a particular way, the same pattern applied to Giti, but there was a shift away from the military. 
The „traditional‟, „informal‟ elite or „community‟ elders remained important factors, and played 
a crucial role in politics. In so doing, they influenced the decision-making process at the middle-
range level of leadership to preserve a non-violent environment. Of course, the outcomes of this 
shift in the exercise of power in shadow depended on various preconditions to yield genocide in 
one case and not in the other. The efficiency in leadership, among others, mattered most in this 
distinction. The level of efficient leadership, the extent of the political network with the central 
government, among other things, involved the local leaders of the common citizenry in 
transforming into perpetrators of genocide in Murambi, and into genocide-resisters in Giti.  
 
Regarding the political network, the findings supported the argument by Clapham (1985) that the 
central leaders were inclined to encourage strong political support through the recruitment of 
local leaders, who demonstrate strong ascendancy over their areas. They emphasized visible neo-
patrimonial system which nearly translate the absence of what the literature meant as „rational-
legal authority‟ in Weber‟s terms. In this perspective, the empirical material supported the idea 
of micromanagement of genocide (Des Forges 1995) by local state representatives. By this is 
meant that the State instigates, organizes and legitimizes genocide (Uvin 2001), which can only 
yield results if the middle-range leaders are fully involved. In other words, the concerted 
conglomeration of power by the elite (Ezioni-Halvy 1993) alone is useless when the above 
requirement is absent.  
 
Contrary to many studies – such as Prunier (1995), Millwood (1996); Howard et al. (1996), 
Millwood and Sellström (1996); Mamdani (2001), and Melvern (2004) – who, as a result of 
focusing on the macro-level political, economic, and historical factors, indistinctly give primacy 
to the elite in arousing popular support for genocide and mass killing, the data strongly 
highlighted the nuance of Lederach‟s model. It is in this context that the massacres preceded 
political meetings requiring the attendance of the local authorities, with which the peasants were 
                                               
93The same survey has identified that various national institutions played a crucial role in the reconstruction of unity among 
Rwandans. In the priority order, it mentioned “the national army (RDF) (81.9%), NURC (81.1%), the National Commission for 
the Repatriation of Refugees (66.5%), Office of the Ombudsman (65%), National Commission of Human Rights (60.6%) 
(Republic of Rwanda 2006:179). 
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familiar, in parallel with very important persons who would come from Kigali to add 
respectability and official sanctions to the events (Prunier 1995). Consistent with Lederach, the 
local leaders in both Giti and Murambi competed with the central government leaders in the area 
of capacities to mobilize for popular support. The data highlighted one major reason: the feeling 
of detachment. As clearly understood, a social distance interposes between the common citizenry 
and leaders. The wider the distance is, the deeper the feeling of detachment becomes. As a result 
of the proximity of the middle-range leaders, the distance is reduced and attributes the middle-
range leaders with more influence than the central government leaders. 
 
The informal elite 
 
The classic literature of elite has exaggerated the power of the elite – mostly defined from the 
formal perspective – over the common citizenry. In this theoretical perspective, the latter was 
taken as powerless people, without any alternative in life, who, as a result acquiesce in the 
arrangements made by the elite (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). The data supported this theoretical claim. 
This primarily applied to the common citizenry under the conditions of abject poverty, so that 
the elite could drag it into violence, purposively to satisfy short-term needs, or simply to rise out 
of misery, in the same way as Simon (2006) argued in the theoretical chapters. The material 
strongly supported the idea that genocide and mass killing in Rwanda led the common citizenry 
to nonconformist behaviour following the idea that the formal elite could reward and punish 
those who complied or misbehaved, respectively (Rule 1988, Rowan 1976, Bogucki 1999). Not 
only the common citizenry fall prey to violence, the same data emphasized, in line with Waller 
(2002), who extended the likelihood to commit genocide and mass killing to most people, 
regardless of their backgrounds.  
 
Following the levels of dependency and of social incapacitation numerous of the elite, like the 
common citizenry, failed to control their destinies. This increased the risk for vulnerable elites 
and the common citizenry to be trapped into being mobilized for violence. Given this 
background, it was theoretically and empirically supported that a demarcation line could be 
established between the elite and the common citizenry. To emphasize this dichotomy, theories 
showed that, in advanced capitalist societies, the small bourgeoisie mainly fell back to the 
proletariat so that fewer, if any, managed to stay in the „grey zone‟ between two mutually 
opposing camps (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). Applied to developing societies, and particularly to 
Rwanda, the data supported a strong dichotomy between the elite and the common citizenry. 
 
In another direction, however, they questioned the bases for which the concept of elite is defined. 
They showed ways in which it goes beyond formal education. To influence people‟s opinions, 
they emphasized, they considered the tradition as an institution for socialization from which 
some people rated higher against the accepted values so that they became people of integrity, 
role models and innovative in their respective communities. Those who met these requirements 
in kinship institutions qualified as the „informal elite‟, who interpose between the common 
citizenry – from which they emerge – and the formal elite traditionally identified with formal 
education. In other terms, the informal elite form the „grey zone‟, which is much closer to the 
common citizenry. Unlike the empirical material – the classical theories of elite – they failed to 
accommodate the informal elite, who are empirically supported as important social actors in 
rural contexts.  
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To substantiate, the same material showed ways in which the informal elite exercised power in 
shadow and usurped the top leaders‟ prerogatives, as a result of the weak political network of the 
middle-range leaders with the same top leaders. With the power in shadow by the community 
elders in Giti, the data supported that kinship institutions – where they remained active – 
exercised the last remnant of social power of former traditional leaders in Africa. The 
community elders asserted their authority informally over the residents and the local leaders, that 
they expected to humbly comply, much as they regarded them as their own children. The fact 
that ordinary people abstained from committing genocide and mass killings is empirically 
supported to be the result of the influence of the community leaders or the informal elite who 
have gone missing in the literature on the „elite‟. Hence, the findings show that the „traditional‟ 
or „informal‟ elite played a crucial role in politics. 
 
This perspective challenges the theoretical claims according to which the formal elite realize 
their will over ordinary people no matter how resistant they might be (Weber 1920, Dahl 1957, 
Thibault and Kelley 1959, Parsons 1960, Mowday 1978, Mann 1986, McLean and McMillan 
2003), impede others, and maintain control over their actions, outputs and movements (Sariola 
1972), and influence their behaviors and goals (Cohen 1959, Stotland 1959, Parsons 1968, 
Kanter 1977, Mowday 1978, Kipnis and Schmidt 1988, Yukl and Falbe 1990). Unlike studies 
(Stotaland 1959, Cart 1995, Uvin 1998, Waller 2002, Reyntjens 1996) that theoretically claimed 
that ordinary people only consent to the formal elite‟s agenda, the informal elite in Giti, mostly 
understood as an extension of the common citizenry, showed the capacity to divert the middle-
range leaders‟ actions, behaviors and goals from the violent tendency of the day. In this way, the 
data did not entirely support the theoretical claims according to which the formal elite 
manipulate the non-elite to accept their rule (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). In other words, the exercise 
of power was not exclusively a one-way process, as theories suggested. If the empirical material 
established some cases of disobedience in the military, of local leaders‟ dismissal and re-
appointment of new ones, this served as strong indications of a two-way process in the exercise 
of power. It also emphasized that commands by the formal elite do not necessarily yield 
expected results, as the theoretical claims suggested. It has appeared that the informal structures 
destroyed the formal structures traditionally driven by the law and cultural norms. 
 
In short, unlike the classical theories, the findings located the „traditional‟ or „informal‟ elite in 
the „grey zone‟ that interposes between the formal elite and the common citizenry.  
 
The community asset of beliefs 
 
For a variety of reasons discussed above, it was found that the middle-range leaders have the 
capacity to bring about change, to initiate conflict transformation and, importantly, to arouse the 
support of the common citizenry. However, there is a state of mind – shared beliefs and 
perceptions by the community – that ease the process. In the theoretical chapters, different 
scholars (Staub 1989, Prunier 1995, and Waller 2002, among others) theorized the individual 
attachment to the group to which individual characters abandon themselves to develop strong 
commitment to the same group. This commitment brings individuals to sacrifice even their lives 
for the group to which they belong. From this perspective, the findings supported the view of 
group behavior in the way Gustav Le Bon (1895) prescribed.  
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In this way, it was supported that an organized crowd radically transforms the individual‟s 
behavior, as individual psychology becomes subordinated to a collective mentality. Since 
individuals participated in violence under strong pressure of the group, the findings supported 
the theological perspective by Reinhold Niebuhr (1932), according to which the pursuit of the 
ends of the group absorbed the goodness and morality that individuals are capable of. Similarly, 
they support the opposite result, in the case of Giti. Equally, Prunier (1995) corroborated (in 
order of importance) the family, lineage and the clan to be the social units in which individuals 
are singularly circumscribed in order to be meaningful. And the findings supported this argument 
through what it identified as the communitarian style of life. Also, Waller (2002) theorized the 
beliefs in the „we-group‟ and the „others-group‟ – that is, „each of us is like no other human 
being‟; „each of us is like some other human beings‟ and „each of us is like all other human 
beings‟. In the application to Rwanda, different effects were observed – i.e., assumed similarity, 
out-group homogeneity and accentuation effects – depending on the school of identity – the 
essentialism, the social constructivism and the national common civic identity – from which 
Rwandan ethnicity was understood. 
 
The findings supported the above beliefs about the „we-group‟ and the „others-group‟ identities 
in Rwanda. Consistent with Waller (2002), they emphasized that the accentuation effect strongly 
enhanced the differences at the expenses of the similarities between Tutsi and Hutu. In some 
cases, as a result, the gap was so wide as to expect mixed ethnic relations, openly accepted to be 
a strong factor for non-polarized interactions. With this, the findings supported the argument that 
different stereotypes were designed around ethnicity (Prunier 1995) so that the anti-Tutsi 
ideology dominated the beliefs and perceptions of many people. After extensive intermarriages 
made it difficult to establish a demarcation line between Hutu and Tutsi in the sub-region of 
Buganza, those native to the area turned to be the privileged targets of the same ant-Tutsi 
ideology.  
 
As a result of the absence of external factors, Giti particularly identified with a strong national 
common civic identity and, therefore, was relatively free from the anti-Tutsi ideology. With this 
case, the material supported various arguments according to which ethnicity was not an 
important factor to define people‟s sense of self or to determine their group membership 
(Wiegandt 1993, Umar and Surya 2003, Mukimbiri 2005). Since the anti-Tutsi ideology and the 
national common civic identity differed between each case, both Giti and Murambi adopted 
different beliefs and perceptions about ethnic identity, which turned to be beneficial to the 
middle-range leaders to yield the expected outcomes of their endeavors. Hence, political 
grassroots culture was a relevant factor in explaining violence or non-violence, as the findings 
supported the current literature. 
 
In short, the material strongly supported the theorizing around crowd psychologies (Gustav Le 
Bon 1895, 1921, Sigmund Freud 1921, Sorokin 1925) through the collective aspect that popular 
participation in the genocide and the absence of genocide showed. In Murambi, as in Giti, it was 
established that individuals lost their capacities to feel, think and act – while in a state of 
isolation – in the collective mentality led by the local leaders. At a certain point of time, it means 
that the common citizenry stopped controlling their superego so that they followed the 
conscience of the middle-range leaders. Therefore, the same conscience determined what the 
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subordinates became, and the outcomes their behavior would yield. The empirical material 
supported that the leaders accommodated the existing community beliefs and perceptions about 
ethnic identity, so that the common citizenry identified with the leaders. By this is meant that 
shared beliefs and perceptions about Tutsi bear the explanation of the variations in polarization 
of interactions, which informed the conscience of the middle-range leaders in both Murambi and 
Giti. Hence, the empirical material supported that, as the ideology of eliminationist anti-
Semitism shaped, the anti-Tutsi ideology shaped an extraordinary culture, which transformed 
ordinary people into killers. In this way, the findings supported the defects of the neo-patrimonial 
system – understood as an extension of the patron-client relationship or clientelism – according 
to which it mobilizes for ethnicity awareness. 
 
Nation-building process 
 
In the discussion of theories, strong state building was discussed as a strategy by which societies 
are fully controlled. The findings related immigration to the magnitude of genocidal violence in 
Murambi. In so doing, they were consistent with Clapham (1985) who argues for the possibility 
of the neo-patrimonial state to provide a fertile breeding ground in order to firmly establish the 
patron-client relationship. In addition to land distribution to immigrants, the finding, in the same 
line as Clapham, the findings established that the allocation of different benefits was also likely 
to arouse interest, not only in violence, but also in the strong state-building process. To go about 
it, the findings supported, the incumbents of different regimes either put in place a strongly 
centralized, hierarchical and extensive structure of the state (Strauss 2006), or concentrated the 
power resource base in the hands of a few high-ranking persons (Roberto Michels 1962). This 
had been the case of the circle of courtiers around the Rwandan King, with the hierarchy that 
reached the households (Prunier 1995), during the pre-colonial era. The inner circle of power – 
known as Akazu during the post-colonial period (Melvern 2000) – is also widely cited as 
identified with the concentration of power resource base. This power was discussed to have a 
hand in the local councils and prefectures, the Rwandan embassies, in politics, the army, finance, 
agriculture, science and religion, to the extent that the State was everywhere, and each single 
individual was administered (Reyntjens 1996).  
 
Melvern (2000) corroborated that the central government made sure those leading the 
neighborhoods were faithful to the orders made from above. Theorists also understood the close 
collaboration of the Church and the State, of the colonial authorities and the missionaries 
strongly involved in the indirect style of rule (Newbury 1988, Millwood 1996) as another way to 
strengthen the state-building process. In both the kingdom and colonial regime, some theorists 
argue, the Christian religious orientation of authority played a crucial role in setting control over 
the population. As a religious society, to refer to Bass (1991), they contend that Rwandans had a 
high propensity for accepting the commands of an authority, contrary to less religious societies. 
Similarly as in the Middle Ages, Reinhard (1996) suggested that the authority of the leader was 
perceived as sacred to the extent that it yielded obedient behavior to the network of formal and 
informal structures of power. 
 
In the discussion of theories, strong state building was discussed as a strategy by which societies 
are fully controlled. The findings related immigration to the magnitude of genocidal violence in 
Murambi. In so doing, they were consistent with Clapham (1985) who argues for the possibility 
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of the neo-patrimonial state to provide a fertile breeding ground in order to firmly establish the 
patron-client relationship. In addition to land distribution to immigrants, the finding, in the same 
line as Clapham, the findings established that the allocation of different benefits was also likely 
to arouse interest, not only in violence, but also in the strong state-building process. To go about 
it, the findings supported, the incumbents of different regimes either put in place a strongly 
centralized, hierarchical and extensive structure of the state (Strauss 2006), or concentrated the 
power resource base in the hands of a few high-ranking persons (Roberto Michels 1962). This 
had been the case of the circle of courtiers around the Rwandan King, with the hierarchy that 
reached the households (Prunier 1995), during the pre-colonial era. The inner circle of power – 
known as Akazu during the post-colonial period (Melvern 2000) – is also widely cited as 
identified with the concentration of power resource base.  
 
This power was discussed to have a hand in the local councils and prefectures, the Rwandan 
embassies, in politics, the army, finance, agriculture, science and religion, to the extent that the 
State was everywhere, and each single individual was administered (Reyntjens 1996). Melvern 
(2000) corroborated that the central government made sure those leading the neighborhoods were 
faithful to the orders made from above. Theorists also understood the close collaboration of the 
Church and the State, of the colonial authorities and the missionaries strongly involved in the 
indirect style of rule (Newbury 1988, Millwood 1996) as another way to strengthen the state-
building process. In both the kingdom and colonial regime, some theorists argue, the Christian 
religious orientation of authority played a crucial role in setting control over the population. As a 
religious society, to refer to Bass (1991), they contend that Rwandans had a high propensity for 
accepting the commands of an authority, contrary to less religious societies. Similarly as in the 
Middle Ages, Reinhard (1996) suggested that the authority of the leader was perceived as sacred 
to the extent that it yielded obedient behavior to the network of formal and informal structures of 
power. 
 
The war-displaced people, according to the material, only came to exaggerate the already 
polarized interactions in Murambi after the context of cruelty in their home war-zone 
degenerated into real danger, as violence attained the climax of violence. The fact that 
destructive mobilization brought about inflamed ethnic and discriminatory feelings among the 
war-displaced people led the findings to support Waller (2002). In so doing, the findings contend 
that the war-displaced people committed violence in Murambi not because they were 
fundamentally evil, but because the threat of the 1990 war had generated into deadly violence 
and bloodshed, highly traumatic for those displaced. Hence a series of social forces – such as 
traumatic wartime conditions – conditioned the war-displaced people to perpetrating high levels 
of violence in Murambi. Following the perspective of strong state building, it could be said that 
both the immigrants and war-displaced people served as potential human factors that would carry 
out genocidal violence. 
 
Needs satisfaction and the propensity for violence 
 
This thesis discussed some bodies of literature which argued for the connection between poverty 
and conflict under some circumstances (Davis 1959, Rawls 1971, Davies 1969, 1974, Nagel 
1974, Galtung, 1997, Panning 1983, Burton 1990, Hettne 1990, 2002, Draman 2003, Miall 
2005). Decision-makers of various fields of specialization, politicians, academicians, civil 
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society, and human rights organizations were understood to have shown strong ownership to this 
causal relationship. Among other bodies of literature, the thesis discussed Marx‟s historical 
materialism (Chalmers 1999), the „hard‟ and „soft‟ Malthusianism (Uvin 2001), the politicization 
of identity from below – i.e., bottom-up process – and the instrumentalization of politics from 
above – i.e., top-down process – (Abrahamsson 2003), relative deprivation theory (Runciman 
1966, Crosby 1979, Gurr, 1968 a, b, 1997), resource mobilization theory (Tilly 1978), and the 
ABC-theory (Galtung 1962). 
 
The empirical material contended that these bodies of literature all have some explanatory gaps 
vis-à-vis the causal relationship between needs satisfaction and violence. They only found 
substance in the multi-theoretical model earlier detailed in the theoretical discussion. Therefore, 
the findings supported parts of the theoretical literature, and very seldom entirely supported the 
theories. In some circumstances, for instance, the material strongly supported Marx‟s historical 
materialism, the „hard‟ Malthusian argument and resource mobilization theory fundamentally 
driven by the economic base against the population growth – i.e., the ecological equilibrium. The 
findings argued for strong social inequalities under which the satisfaction of short-term needs – 
by unemployed youth and desperate common citizenry in precarious conditions – juxtaposed 
with the illicit accumulation of wealth by the incumbents of different levels of the society. On 
the one hand, the common citizenry committed violence as a way out of their misery. While on 
the other, the incumbents privilege violence as a means to protect illicitly accumulated wealth 
and to evade accountability. 
 
In the other direction, the data contended that the aforementioned bodies of literature only 
explain the causal relationship between needs satisfaction and violence under specific 
circumstances. In this way, other bodies of literature added value. For instance, the „soft‟ 
Malthusian argument – which the findings strongly supported – argued for the correlation 
between needs satisfaction and violence only if ideological factors interpose to intensify conflict. 
In this way, the politicization of identity was given credit to explain the genocide, and the 
absence of genocide, respectively, in Murambi and Giti. However, the data gave weak support to 
the politicization of identity from below – i.e., the bottom-up process. Popular participation in 
genocidal violence did not follow the meeting point of formulation of political claims – by the 
marginalized elite – in terms coinciding with the claims of a specific group identity in a 
politicized context. In the manner earlier prescribed by the theory of crowd of psychologies, 
popular participation is rather understood as a result of the instrumentalisation of politics from 
above. Hence, the findings gave strong support to the top-down process.  
 
However, they did so in a very cautious manner. Unlike the approach prescribed, the top-down 
process did not principally originate among marginalized elite who felt they had less room for 
affirmation on economic, political, social or cultural grounds. It does not mean that they did not 
want to improve their capacities for competition against others. Through the multiparty politics 
of the 1960s and 1980s, the data showed that the marginalized elite showed interest in 
competition. However, the theorizing around the dichotomization between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat showed ways in which both classes absorbed the same elite – small bourgeoisie – 
to serve political purposes. Hence, the common citizenry did not serve as a social base or 
constituency for the marginalized elite. That it is why, as earlier emphasized, the middle-range 
level of leadership took the lead vis-à-vis the common citizenry. 
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Another body of literature – that is, relative deprivation theory – came in to explain the 
variations in the magnitude of violence in the case studies. But again, the findings supported only 
certain parts of it. In this way, the frustration-aggression theory in different perspectives of Gurr 
(1968, 1997), Crosby (1979) and Runciman (1966) laid favorable ground for violence – 
according to the empirical material – but did not bring essential arguments to understand such a 
variation in the case studies. This statement applies to the Rawlsian perspective later supported 
by scholars such as Nagel (1974) and Panning (1983), among many, who argued for violence at a 
certain point where the difference in wealth is moderate. Within the theoretical framework of 
relative deprivation, the findings gave full support to Davies‟ (1969) „J-Curve‟ hypothesis. The 
central argument was that abrupt change of improved conditions increases the risk of social 
discontent in a chronological sequence. The findings translated this hypothesis into high levels of 
visible vulnerability, principally among the elite. As the Tutsi Diaspora successfully negotiated 
power sharing, the material argued for an increased uncertainty about a secure and prosperous 
future as a result of illicitly acquired wealth that many would not be able to account for. The data 
found power as a cover of such preoccupations. 
 
In summary, the empirical material brought up different findings to confirm, on the one hand, 
and to reject, on the other, the parameters that supported the theoretical discussion of the 
research question. In the same perspective, they supported the application of the ABC-theory to 
the escalation of conflict in Murambi. With the idea that violence was an end result of the 
competition over ecological resources held responsible for contradictions and incompatibilities, 
of the dichotomy of identity that degenerated into violent behavior, the findings entirely 
supported grievances, land, power struggle and identity to be the root causes of genocide in 
Murambi. With Clapham (1985), they related the whole process to the fact that the legacy of 
clientelism has made it difficult to distinguish the individual‟s public role from their private role. 
Among other results, corruption ensued as public office became accepted as a route to personal 
wealth and power in neo-patrimonial systems. In similar cases, the embezzlement found weak 
support of the findings. Hence, in line with Clapham (19859) the office becomes a source of 
benefits and comforts that are tirelessly protected against domestic discontent and opponents 
from any source. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The departing idea of the thesis was that the genocide, and the absence of genocide, in the case 
studies could not be understood through one single theory. The theoretical perspectives were 
consistent with the empirical material in emphasizing that individual theories taken in isolation 
could only partly offer significant explanation. In this way, this thesis also confirmed the 
explanatory gaps of different theories in the area of peace research. Hence, a multi-theoretical 
perspective showed that various possible theories could fit to understand the genocide in one 
case, and the absence of it, in the other case. In other words, the mono-causal perspective of this 
research question was increasingly enabled to capture the whole scope of it. The empirical 
material showed the same pattern. It unearthed a number of explanatory factors between which 
strong interplay was established. In both cases, the interviewees successfully managed to relate 
those factors to the leadership. And they regarded the latter as a factor that not only explained 
genocide in Murambi, and its absence in Giti, but also intensified the remaining explanatory 
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factors with which it interacted. As Figure 7.1 shows, the empirical conclusions supported the 
interplay between the levels of leadership, as in Lederach (1997). At the highest level is the top 
level of leadership. 
 
On the eve of genocide, the material established, this top level of leadership faced the context of 
cruelty and the democratization process as the main sources of pressure to deal with. Under a 
total absence of the role of civil society, vulnerability or uncertainty triggered – or at least 
intensified – anti-Tutsi ideology, which was meant to spread over the second level of leadership 
– that is, the middle-range level of leadership. In line with the existing literature, the latter was 
important to successfully initiate the campaign for, and against, genocidal violence in Murambi 
and Giti, respectively. As Figure 7.1 shows, the side to campaign for depended on the political 
network and the historical background of violence each case had in the past.  
 
On each side, the third level of leadership – that is, the grassroots level of leadership – was 
supported as playing a crucial role in the campaign for or against genocidal violence. It is 
important to see the intermediary roles that the informal elite and wealthier people – mainly with 
immigrant backgrounds – played between the common citizenry and the middle-range leaders in 
Giti and Giti and Murambi, respectively. It is also important to pay attention to the combined 
effort between the informal and religious elite in Giti, and between wealthier people and the 
village leaders. 
 
At the fourth level – the bottom of Figure 7.1 – there is not only the common citizenry but also 
the grassroots thinking it brings with it about ethnic identity. This level undergoes the influence 
of the efficient middle-range leadership, on the one hand, and of the inefficient middle-range 
leadership on the other. The empirical material contended that the latter were frequently in some 
tension, so that they became an effective human factor sensitizing for non-violence, or for 
violence, respectively. It is interesting to see that the common citizenry divided into two distinct 
and opposing factions to stick to their respective historical backgrounds of violence (see the 
second level of Figure 7.1). The material showed that the middle-range leadership had 
ascendancy over the common citizenry with whom it identified with the historical background. If 
this is the case, there is a meeting point between the middle-range leaders and the common 
citizenry, whereby a minimum level of shared grassroots thinking drives the interactions in a 
mutually accepted direction. It is the same level of shared grassroots thinking that steadily 
supported the campaign against, in one case, and for, in the other, genocidal violence. Popular 
obedience is not just about automatically following the elite‟s ideology and propaganda, as many 
argue. Obedience to the campaign for or against violence was only possible at that meeting point. 
It is very important, as Lederach (1997) concluded, that the middle-range level of leadership is 
more important than any other factor in starting a change and initiating conflict transformation. 
In a complementary way, this thesis suggests that the grassroots thinking is conducive to higher 
rates of success by the middle-range level of leadership. 
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New research questions 
 
This study investigated a complex research question to which various possible theories could fit. 
Hence, a multi-theoretical model was developed to address some explanatory gaps each theory 
brought with it. Equally, further studies are expected to bring in various possible aspects of the 
phenomenon under investigation. The following paragraphs suggest a non-definitive indication 
of areas of research that need more attention. 
 
The first relates to the characteristics of the empirical material and the timeframe of data 
collection. Fourteen years after genocide occurred, some social narratives were collected during 
the move to the national common civic identity. This study recommends a critical analysis of 
these narratives to check ways in which they are affected by this post-conflict move. 
 
With the existing literature, this study discovered more isolated cases (i.e., former communes of 
Taba and Musambira in Gitarama, Kayove in Gisenyi, and the rural village of Bisesero in 
Kibuye) that shared some similarities with Giti when the anti-Tutsi ideology reached a climax. It 
is therefore recommended that this research be extended to such additional cases to increase the 
possibility for generalization of the findings. 
 
Thirdly, if the traditional elite remained and played a crucial role in politics in Giti, a study of 
„the grassroots political culture‟ would be an aspect to look into to increase knowledge about 
factors explaining why genocide occurred elsewhere in Rwanda, but not in Giti. It would be an 
opportunity to deepen the understanding of the cautious and reserved attitudes and investigate 
ways in which they shaped the middle-range level of leadership. 
 
Fourthly, further research projects could – in an exploratory style – concentrate on the meeting 
point between the middle-range leadership and the common citizenry. In a descriptive way, they 
could develop the measurements of grassroots thinking sharing and describe the circumstances 
under which grassroots thinking is conducive to mutually accepted endeavour. 
 
Fifthly, migrations to the sub-region of Buganza were not equally distributed, following the 
ecological resources available. Of the case studies subjected to investigation, Murambi registered 
a larger number of immigrants. The material considered is a bad omen, since genocide occurred 
quickly in the areas where immigration rates were highest. Since genocide is regarded as state-
mandated violence, further studies could relate migrations to the strategy for strong nation-
building. 
 
Sixthly, both the theoretical and empirical claims showed that ethnic identity was a source of 
violence under specific circumstances. Such identity was only identified with a loose definition 
in the sub-region of Buganza, the phenomenon of migration controlled for. It could be revealing 
for further studies to offer an opportunity to people in the sub-region of Buganza to comment on 
questions like: „What do I believe I am?‟ and „What do others perceive me to be?‟ in order to 
build knowledge about the process of valuation and devaluation of the other. 
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Seventhly, the mixed ethnic relations (intermarriages) constituted a common phenomenon in the 
past in Rwanda. While the empirical material found the latter to be a factor, among many others, 
explaining why genocide did not occur in Giti, they have still played a neutral function in other 
areas of Rwanda. During the course of genocide and later, ethnically motivated murders were 
reportedly registered in various families in places other than Giti. A further study is appropriate 
to provide answers to the question „Why?‟ 
 
Eighthly, the findings earlier showed that the context of cruelty creates its own dynamic, 
regardless of the historical cultural baggage it bears with it. This meant that culture is not 
relevant in explaining why some societies end up in violence, or conversely why violence is 
absent. However, some parts of the culture (in the „context of good society‟) have an impact on 
the dynamics in the „context of cruelty‟, especially in linear vertical authoritarian structures. In 
contrast, in other areas, exhibiting extensive inter-ethnic marriages, the impact is trivial. Given 
this finding, new research questions need to be addressed for further research in order to find out 
how „culture‟ before violence can have an impact on the dynamics in the „context of cruelty‟. 
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Speeches 
 
Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Rwanda: Speech by H.E Paul Kagame, President of 
the Republic of Rwanda, at the Baker Institute (Houston, 6th March 2003).  
 
The Great Lakes Conflicts: Factors, Actors, and Challenges. An Inaugural Lecture delivered by 
His Excellence Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda at the Nigeria War College, 
Abuja (16th September 2002). 
 
The Rwandan Genocide and The Failure of the International Community: Speech by His 
Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, Boston (11th April 2005). 
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In-depth interviews 
 
Interviewee no.1:  Native of Murambi, former cabinet member, and private sector officer, held at 
Kigali, June 19, 2007. 
Interviewee no.2: Village leader, held at Nyagahinga, Giti, July 30, 2007. 
Interviewee no.3: Former officer in colonial administration, retired public servant, held at 
Nyagahinga, Giti, July 16, 2007. 
Interviewee no.4: Native of Bisero and resident of Murambi, former parliamentarian, held at 
Akabuga, Murambi, June 30, 2007. 
Interviewee no.5: Former prefect of rural Kigali, Senator, held at Kigali, July 13, 2007. 
Interviewee no.6: Village leader, held at Karenge, Giti, July 18, 2007. 
Interviewee no.7: Former traditional deputy chief, held at Gakoni, Murambi, June 02, 2007. 
Interviewee no.8: Church leader, held at Gakoni, Murambi, August 07, 2007. 
Interviewee no.9: Former university lecturer and cabinet member, Senator, held at Kigali, August 
01, 2007. 
Interviewee no.10: Village leader, held at Gakoni, Murambi, July 27, 2007. 
Interviewee no.11: Primary school teacher, held at Akabuga, Murambi, August 05, 2007. 
Interviewee no.12: Community mediator, held at Gakoni, Murambi, August .11, 2007 
Interviewee no.13: University lecturer, held at Kigali, August 31, 2007. 
Interviewee no.14: Village leader, held at Kigabiro-Bukure, Giti, July 24, 2007. 
Interviewee no.15: Former journalist and NURC comissioner, Senator, held at Kigali, August 14, 
2007. 
Interviewee no.16: Former village leader, native of Murambi, held at Gatobotobo, Giti, August 
17, 2007. 
Interviewee no.17: Former governor, cabinet member, held at Kigali, August 20, 2007. 
Interviewee no.18: Officer at the NURC headquarters, held at Kigali, August 25, 2007. 
Interviewee no.19: Village leader, held at Akabuga, Murambi, July 19, 2007. 
Interviewee no.20: Former cabinet member, officer at RPF headquarters, held at Kigali, August 
09, 2007. 
Interviewee no.21: Cabinet member, held at Kigali, August 22, 2007. 
Interviewee no.22: Former cabinet member, Senator, held at Kigali, August 23, 2007. 
Interviewee no.23: Former village leader, held at Nyagahinga, Giti, July 04, 2007. 
Interviewee no.24: Retired public servant, held at Rwesero, Giti, June 24, 2007. 
Interviewee no.25: Village leader, held at Cyeru, Giti, June 09, 2007. 
Interviewee no.26: Officer at the Ombudsman office, native of Murambi, held at Kigali, August 
27, 2007. 
Interviewee no.27: Clergyman, held at Kiziguro Parish, Murambi, August 29, 2007. 
Interviewee no.28: Retired Church leader, held at Gakoni, Murambi, July 21, 2007. 
Interviewee no.29: Native of Murambi, university lecturer and officer at the IRDP, held at 
Kigali, July 11, 2007. 
Interviewee no.30: Former burgomaster of Giti, held at Rutare, July 6, 2007. 
Interviewee no.31: Officer at the RPF headquarters, held at Kigali, June 21, 2007. 
Interviewee no. 32: Former burgomaster of Giti and parliamentarian, held at Rwesero, Gitit, June 
16, 2007. 
Interviewee no.33: Former mayor of Murambi, held at Kiziguro, Murambi, August 3, 2007. 
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Focus group discussions 
 
Focus no.1: Agakomeye cell, held at Muringa, Murambi, June 26, 2007. 
Focus no.2: Cyeru cell, held at Bijunde center, Giti, Jun 7, 2007. 
Focus no.3: Gakoni cell, held at the headquarter office, Murambi, June 12, 2007. 
Focus no.4: Karagari cell, held at the headquarter office, Giti, June 24, 2007. 
Focus no.5: Karenge cell, held at the experimental terracing garden, Giti, July 17, 2007. 
Focus no.6: Murehe cell, held at a nearby center to the headquarter office, Giti, June 14, 2007. 
Focus no.7: Ndatemwa cell, held at Ndatemwe primary school, Murambi, July 2, 2007. 
Focus no.8. Nyabisindu cell, held at the headquarter office, Murambi, July 9, 2007. 
Focus no.9.Tanda cell, held at the headquarter office, Giti, June 27, 2007. 
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